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PRECIS
This Thesis is concerned with the present relationship between 
trade unions and the state in Australia* It is argued that the 
relationship can be understood adequately only in terms of the 
relations existing in each of three areas - legal, administrative 
and party-political* The first involves the law affecting trade 
unions; the second, the unions’ role in government administration; 
and the third, their role within a political party with which they 
are closely linked* An analysis of the relations established in 
each of these areas is the main purpose of the Thesis.
XPREFACE
The question of the relationship between trade unions and the state 
was discussed at sane length by W. Milne-Bailey in his Trade Unions and 
the State« published in 1934* At the time Milne-Bailey's book appeared, 
the state-trade union relationship in Australia probably represented among 
political democracies one extreme of the spectrum on which the situation in 
the United Kingdom, with which he was primarily concerned, was the other. 
Simply stated, the most obvious point of contrast was between an 
Australian trade union movement subject to a high degree of legal 
regulation and a British trade union movement comparatively free from 
such regulation. This is no less true today, and gives the Australian 
situation a significance in its own right* Apart from this consideration, 
however, there are two more general grounds justifying further study of the 
state-trade union relationship. In the first place, Milne-Bailey omitted 
to consider a crucial element in the relationship as it exists in both 
Australia and the United Kingdom - the effect of close ties between the 
trade unions and a single political party. In the second place, since he 
wrote there have been many developments which have fundamentally affected 
trade unionism’s standing in relation to the state.
This Thesis attempts to analyse the nature of the relationship 
between trade unions and the state as it exists in Australia today. More 
broadly, it aims at making a contribution to the empirical data necessary 
for an understanding of the pluralistic character of the modern state 
as a group of groups.
The Thesis is divided into five parts. Part I is concerned with 
problems of definition and with establishing the background to the 
Australian situation, including the nature and development of trade union
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o rg a n iz a tio n  and th e  cou rses of a c tio n  open to  A u s tra lia n  tra d e  unions fo r  
th e  achievem ent o f th e i r  aim s. In  th e  succeeding th re e  P a r t s ,  which form 
th e  body of th e  T h esis , th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  s t a t e  and tra d e  
unions i s  d iscu ssed  in  term s of each of i t s  th re e  major a s p e c ts .  P a r t  I I  
th u s  d e a ls  w ith the  le g a l framework, P a r t  I I I  w ith  th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  
framework, and p a r t  IV w ith th e  p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  framework, th e se  term s 
being  defin ed  in  Chapter 1 . The t o t a l  r e la t io n s h ip ,  i t  is  contended, can 
be understood only ip  term s of th e  n a tu re  of th e  r e l a t io n s  e s ta b lis h e d  
w ith in  each of th e se  th re e  a re a s .  P a r t  V c o n ta in s  a b r i e f  co n c lu s io n . A 
number of ta b le s  co n ta in in g  d a ta  re fe r re d  to  in  th e  t e x t  a re  appended, 
to g e th e r  w ith e ig h t appendices summarizing le g a l  p ro v is io n s  which are 
a ls o  re f e r r e d  to  in  th e  t e x t .  With a few in d ic a te d  e x c e p tio n s , no m a te ria l 
i s  included  th a t  has appeared s in ce  the  end of 195V.
The T hesis does not a ttem p t to  d ea l more than  in c id e n ta l ly  w ith  the  
fu tu re  tre n d  of the  s ta t e - t r a d e  union r e la t io n s h ip .  Nor does i t  co n sid er 
the  question  of tra d e  union (or s t a t e )  1 r e s p o n s ib i l i t j^  , th e  sp e c ia l 
problem s fa c in g  tra d e  unions in  state-ow ned in d u s t r ie s ,  or a number of 
qu estio n s  r e l a t in g  to  the  e f f e c t  of th e  r e la t io n s h ip  on th e  a c t i v i t i e s  
and in te rn a l  o rg an iza tio n  of the  u n io n s . F in a l ly ,  no a ttem p t i s  made to  
s e t  out a view of th e  r e la t io n s h ip  th a t  should e x i s t ;  b u t i t  i s  hoped th a t  
the  T hesis may p ro v id e  an e n p ir ic a l  b a s is  fo r  d is c u s s io n  o f th i s  problem .
---------- oOo --------- ---
A g re a t d ea l of the  m a te r ia l con tained  in  th e  T hesis was obtained  
through in te rv ie w s . Among those  in terv iew ed  were le a d in g  o f f i c i a l s  of the  
F ed e ra l and a l l  S ta te  c e n tra l  tra d e  union o rg a n iz a tio n s , th e  F ed e ra l
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E xecu tiv e  and a l l  S ta te  branches of th e  A u stra lian  Labor P a r ty , and the 
F e d e ra l and a l l  S ta te  government departm ents p r im a r i ly  concerned v i th  
la b o u r m a tte rs . In a d d it io n , many o f f i c i a l s  of in d iv id u a l unions were 
in te rv iew ed , a la rg e  p ro p o rtio n  of them in the  course of th e  Congress held 
by th e  A u s tra lia n  Council of Trade Unions in  September 1957. In a l l  cases 
th e  in te rv iew s  were conducted on th e  understand ing  th a t  inform ation  given 
or views expressed  would n o t be p u b lic ly  a t t r ib u te d  to  the  person 
concerned . Thus i t  i s  n o t p o s s ib le  to  r e f e r  to  the source of some f a c tu a l  
m a te r ia l ,  b u t wherever p o s s ib le  t h i s  was checked -  in  th e  absence of 
a v a ila b le  documentary support -  over a number o f in te rv iew s w ith d i f f e r e n t  
p e rso p s . For th e  same reaso n , views expressed  in  th e  course of in te rv iew s 
and quoted in  the  t e x t  of th e  T hesis cannot be a t t r ib u te d  to  sp e c if ic  
p e rso n s . In some c a se s , item s of in fo rm ation  were given on the 
u n d ers tan d in g  th a t  th ey  would n o t be d is c lo se d , and th ese  have in fluenced  
opin ions advanced in  th e  T h es is .
The m a te r ia l ob tained  through in te rv iew s and through th e  access
given to  the  minute books of c e n tr a l  union o rg a n iz a tio n s , and o ther tra d e
union and Labor P a r ty  documents, was in v a lu ab le  fo r  th e  p re se n t work. The
ready  co o p era tio n  extended w ithou t excep tion  by tra d e  un ion , Labor P a rty
and government o f f i c i a l s ,  t o  one who i s  n e i th e r  a u n io n is t ,  a P a rty
member nor a p u b lic  s e rv a n t, i s  deeply  a p p re c ia te d . I t  i s  no t p o s s ib le  to
name a l l  those  to  whom g ra t i tu d e  i s  owing in  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  I  can only
th an k , as t h e i r  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s ,  Mr A.E. Monk and Mr H .J . S o u te r, P re s id e n t
and S e c re ta ry , r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  of th e  A u s tra lian  Council of Trade Unions;
1 The s p e l l in g  of ’Labor* i s  t h a t  adopted by th e  P a r ty ; i t  i s  a ls o  p re fe r re d  
by Trades and Labor C o u n c ils . I t  i s  used here in  a l l  t i t l e s  where i t  i s  
custom ary; o th e rw ise , as in  th e  case of ‘ labour movement* or ‘M in ister 
fo r  Labour*, th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  E n g lish  form i s  used .
1
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Mr F.E. Chamberlain and Mr J. Schmella, Federal President and Secretary, 
respectively, of the Australian Labor Party; and Mr H.A. Bland, Secretary 
to the Commonwealth Department of Labour and National Service.
I am indebted to Professor L.C. Webb for advice throughout the 
course of the work, to Dr D.W. Rawson for his comments on the final 
draft, and to Professor G. Sawer for help in relation to a number of 
the legal problems involved in Part II.
The work was made possible by a Research Scholarship provided by 
the Australian National University.
PART I  
INTRODUCTORY
oCHAPTER 1 
DEFINITION
The relationship between British tEade unions and the state, it is
claimed, has passed through three phases, ’hostility, toleration and
1
finally, partnership’• The Australian trade union movement has been viewed
as now being ’on the brink of the transition from the second to the third
2 >
phase’ of ’co-operation or partnership’. The phase approach may be 
convenient and useful in broad terms, but it must also assume a simplicity 
that does not in fact characterize the phenomena dealt with. For instance, 
in the absence of a precise definition of ’co-operation or partnership*, it 
is arguable that because of their activities within the various systems of 
industrial arbitration, Australian trade unions have cooperated with the 
state since the early years of this century.-' Similarly, Labor governments 
have been commonplace in Australia since before the first world war, and 
the unions have usually been eager to cooperate with them. Moreover, if 
cooperation is equated with trade union participation in bodies such as the 
Australian Ministry of Labour Advisory Council, set up by a non-Labor 
government, does the recent withdrawal of the union representatives 
from that body necessarily signify a regression to the second phase?
A more fruitful approach to the question of the total relationship 
between trade unions and the state is to examine the separate elements 
composing that relationship, rather than attempting to fit it into any 
particular category. The initial problem in a study of these elements is
1 Allan Flanders, Trade Unions, 149.
2 E.L.Wheelwright, ’Trade Unions and the State' (June 1953)> 25 Australian 
Quarterly 26.
3 See Chapter 5 below.
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one of definition; not, as in the 'phase1 approach, of the various types 
of relationship which may exist, but of the parties to the relationship 
and the areas in which there is inter-action between them.
0O0
It is difficult to give a completely satisfactory definition of the
term 'trade union'. The Webbs suggested that it meant 'a continuous
association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving
the conditions of their working lives'/ To the student of modern trade
unionism, however, this is open to the initial objection that it excludes
the large body of organized salaried employees, and for this reason wider
definitions have been formulated - though there are difficulties even in
their application.^ Trade unionism in the more inclusive sense than that
implied by the Webbs can be said to be legally defined in Australia because
registration under appropriate statutes is .almost universal in the case of
Australian employees' organizations/" though this is not so in the United
. 7
Kingdom« But definition on these lines is inadequate where the trade union 
is something more than an industrial bargaining unit - that is, where its 
purposes extend beyond those specified in the Webbs' definition. It is from
4 S. & B. Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (1920 ed.), 1.
5 See J.D.M, Bell, 'Trade Unions', in The System of Industrial Relations in 
.Great Britain (Flanders & Clegg, eds.), 128—130, for a discussion on 
this question.
6 The Acts concerned are chiefly industrial arbitration measures, under which 
the trade union, as it is usually known and statutorily defined by English 
and. Australian trade union Acts, is variously entitled 'industrial union' 
(N.S.W., Qd. and W.A.), 'organization' (Cwealth) and 'association' (S.A.). 
There is in Australia, as in the U.K., no statutory compulsion for trade 
onions to register. It may be noted that a union can be unregistered within 
the State in which it operates, and thus constitute an unregistered union 
where the State's jurisdiction is concerned, but be registered in the
Cwealth jurisdiction as a branch of a Federal union.
oee B.C.Roberts, Trade Union Government and Administration in Great
Britain. 18.
t h i s  s ta n d p o in t t h a t  tra d e  unionism  i s  commonly reg ard ed ; and i t  i s  in  th i s
sense th a t  tra d e  unionism , viewed in  i t s e l f  as a ‘movement’ or as p a r t  of a
wider ’ lab o u r movement’ , i s  o f g r e a te s t  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  s ig n if ic a n c e «
Here th e  term  ’ tra d e  un ion ’ i s  given a more r e s t r i c t e d  a p p l ic a t io n  w hile th e
purposes of th e  o rg a n iz a tio n s  i t  deno tes a re  broadened.
To most of us [ ’ tra d e  u n io n ’ ] denotes an e s s e n t i a l ly  w o rk in g -c la ss , 
or even manual w ork ing -class  o rg a n iz a tio n , re p re s e n tin g  th e  c laim s 
o f th e  employed a g a in s t the  employers in  m a tte rs  of wages and working 
c o n d itio n s , b u t somehow n o t r e s t i i c t e d  in  i t s  ou tlook and a c t i v i t i e s  
to  th e se  th in g s ,  be in g , indeed , g e n e ra lly  a s so c ia te d  w ith  s o c i a l i s t  
id eas  and movements in  bo th  in d u s try  and p o l i t i c s . ^
This ’ common-sense u n d e rs tan d in g ’ o f th e  n a tu re  of th e  tr a d e  union
fa s te n s  on th e  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  th a t  give tra d e  unionism , in  the  U nited
Kingdom and A u s tra l ia  a t  l e a s t ,  an im portance beyond th e  com parative ly
narrow f i e ld  of in d u s t r ia l  r e l a t i o n s .  I t  re c o g n ize s , in  s h o r t ,  t h a t  to  a
la rg e  e x te n t tra d e  unions to d ay , as in  th e i r  o r ig in s ,  a re  no t only  in d u s t r ia l
b a rg a in in g  u n i ts  b u t a re  a ls o  ’ o rg a n iz a tio n s  of the  u n d e rp riv ile g e d  in
9
so c ie ty  . . .  v e h ic le s  o f so c ia l  p r o te s t ,  a b ro th e rh o o d ’ . They a re  th u s  
ty p if ie d  as o rg a n iz a tio n s  whose members have a community of i n t e r e s t ,  
in c lu d in g  b u t n o t confined  to  economic in t e r e s t s ,  which i s  based on th e  
re c o g n itio n  by them selves and o th e rs  th a t  they  a re  members o f a s in g le  s o c ia l  
c la s s ,  the  w o rk in g -c la ss ."^  In so f a r  as common membership of a s in g le  s o c ia l  
c la s s  i s  th e  c r i t e r io n  of t ra d e  union o rg a n iz a tio n , a number of em ployees’ 
a s s o c ia t io n s  r e g is te r e d  under A u s tra lia n  in d u s t r ia l  l e g i s l a t i o n  a re  excluded . 
These a re  p r im a r i ly  a s s o c ia t io n s  of s a la r ie d  or su p e rv iso ry  em ployees. They
8 B e l l ,  op. c i t . ,  128.
9 I b id . ,  130.
10 See D.W.Rawson, ’The F r o n t ie r s  of Trade Unionism’ (1956), 1 A u s tra lia n  
Jo u rn a l of Pol i t i c s  and H is to ry , 199-201, fo r  a f u l l e r  d is c u s s io n  of 
t h i s  p o in t .
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cannot correspond in  membership to  a s in g le  s o c ia l  c la s s  because t h e i r  
members tend  to  reg ard  them selves as p a r t  of a c la s s ,  the  m id d le -c la ss , th a t  
in c lu d es  n o t only employees b u t a ls o  employers and self-em ployed . The 
members of a s s o c ia tio n s  of t h i s  n a tu re  a re  u n lik e ly  to  see in  t h e i r  a sso c ­
ia t io n s  an a p p ro p ria te  means of ach iev ing  o b je c tiv e s  beyond th e i r  in t e r e s t s  
as em ployees. Although the  ro le  of ‘ in d u s try ’ s o p p o s itio n ’"^ i s  fundam ental 
to  a l l  em ployees’ o rg a n iz a tio n , such o rg a n iz a tio n  i s  n o t in v a r ia b ly  
c h a ra c te r iz e d  by th e  assum ption of broader s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  aims 
ex tend ing  beyond th e  r e la t io n s  of employees w ith th e i r  p a r t i c u la r  employers# 
This d is t in c t io n  i s  v i t a l .  But i t  i s  e a s ie r  to  drawrf in  concep tion  
than  in  p r a c t ic e .  There i s  a p o s s ib le  l in e  of d iv is io n  acco rd ing  to  
a f f i l i a t i o n  w ith c e n tr a l  union o rg a n iz a tio n s , w ith th e  Labor P a r ty , or in  
th e  e x is ten c e  of some perm anent and form al t i e s  w ith o th er u n io n s , on th e  
view th a t  such t i e s  s ig n ify  re c o g n itie n  of common in te r e s t s  o u ts id e  
p a r t ic u la r  in d u s tr ie s  and in  th i s  way sep a ra te  tra d e  unions as d i s t in c t iv e  
w orking-class o rg a n iz a tio n s  from ’em ployees’ a s s o c ia t io n s ’ . I t  has been 
estim ated  on th i s  b a s is  t h a t  about tw o -th ird s  of th e  r e g is te r e d  em ployees’ 
o rg an iza tio n s  in  A u s tra l ia ,  c o n ta in in g  n in e - te n th s  of organized em ployees, 
could be regarded  as tra d e  u n io n s . T his approach has become l e s s  u se fu l 
w ith the form ation of an A u s tra lia n  Council of S a la r ie d  and p ro fe s s io n a l  
A sso c ia tio n s , which prom ises to  be an a c tiv e  body b u t w ith the  l im ite d  aims 
c h a r a c te r i s t ic  of ’em ployees’ a s s o c ia t io n s ’ . ' Nor i s  a p re c is e  d i s t in c t io n  
p o s s ib le  in  term s of w h ite -c o lla r  and o ther o rg a n iz a tio n s , because , a p a r t  
from the mixed membership of some, th e re  a re  a number of w h ite -c o lla r
11 H.A. C legg, I n d u s t r ia l  Democracy and N a tio n a liz a t i o n . 22.
12 Rawson, op. c i t . ,  197 -8 .
13 Even b efo re  th i s  th e re  e x is te d  a S a la r ie d  Employees C o n su lta tiv e  C ouncil 
in N.S.W. and a C ouncil of White C o lla r  Workers in  V ic .,  b u t thejr do 
n o t appear to  have been very  a c t iv e .
o rg a n iz a tio n s  w ith a long reco rd  of a f f i l i a t i o n  w ith  c e n tr a l  union bod ies
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and the  Labor Party#
However, d e sp ite  th ese  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  i t  can be s ta te d  s a fe ly  th a t
manual workers make up the  g re a t bulk  of the  t o t a l  membership o f a s s o c ia t io n s
l e g a l ly  de fin ed  as tra d e  unions by s ta tu to r y  r e g i s t r a t i o n .  Moreover, t h e i r
un ions n o t only most commonly use unionism *s c h a r a c te r i s t i c  weapon, th e
s t r i k e ,  b u t p o l i t i c a l l y  as w ell as in d u s t r ia l ly  c o n s t i tu te  the  hard  co re  of
la b o u r o rg a n iz a tio n , and e x h ib it  a c la s s  sen tim en t t h a t  c o n d itio n s  th e i r
approach to  general s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  q u e s tio n s . I t  i s  beyond t h i s  core
th a t  the  o u tlin e s  become b lu rred  and c a te g o r iz a t io n  d i f f i c u l t . ^ *
For p re se n t purposes i t  i s  enough to  note t h a t ,  even i f  the  d iv is io n
cannot be determ ined p re c is e ly ,  th e re  a re  two k inds of em ployees'
o rg a n iz a tio n s  -  one in c lu d in g  o rg a n iz a tio n s  fu n c tio n in g  as l i t t l e  more than
economic i n t e r e s t  groups, the  o ther in c lu d in g  th o se  w ith b roader i n t e r e s t s
and aims which may be reg a rd ed , and reg ard  them selves, as p a r t  of a g re a te r
tra d e  union movement. At tim es th e  d i s t in c t io n  must be ignored because of
i t s  d i f f i c u l t y  in  a p p l ic a t io n ,  as in  the  d isc u ss io n  on the  developm ent of
union membership and o rg a n iz a tio n , th e  a v a ila b le  f ig u re s  co v erin g  a l l
15re g is te r e d  o rg a n iz a tio n s . At tim es th e  d i s t in c t io n  is  no t im p o rtan t, as 
i s  the  case in  most of th e  d isc u ss io n  below on in d u s t r ia l  law -  though 
here  i t  i s  s ig n i f ic a n t  in  r e la t io n  to  th e  e f f e c t  of the  law concern ing
14 In th e  l a s t  tw enty y e a rs  i t  i s  ap p aren t th a t  w h ite -c o lla r  employees have 
in c reased  th e i r  sh are  of the  t o t a l  tra d e  union membership in  A u s t r a l ia ,  
though by no means enough to  shake th e  dominance of manual w orkers in  
th i s  r e s p e c t:  see  B rian  F i t z p a t r ic k ,  The A u s tra lia n  Commonwealth. 69-70, 
fo r  an a n a ly s is  of a v a ila b le  f ig u re s  on th i s  p o in t .
15 The f ig u re s  used by F i t z p a t r ic k  (see note 14 above), w hile s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  
h is  p u rp o ses, a re  n o t d e ta i le d  enough to  allow  an acc u ra te  d i s t in c t io n
to  be made betvjeen manual and w h ite -c o lla r  employees in  th e  t o t a l  member­
ship  of A u s tra lia n  em ployees’ o rg a n iz a tio n s .
s t r i k e s .  R ecognition  of th e  d i s t in c t io n  i s  v i t a l  in  th e  exam ination of th e  
a d m in is tra tiv e  and, e s p e c ia l ly , th e  p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  fram eworks.
---------------- 0 O 0 --------- ---------
A d e f in i t io n  of the  s ta t e  s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  th e  purposes of the  p re se n t 
work does n o t need to  be p h ilo s o p h ic a lly  ex haustive  b u t m erely re le v a n t to  
th e  c o n te x t . The fo llo w in g  s ta tem en t i s ,  th e re fo re ,  p r im a r i ly  aimed a t  
s e t t in g  out th e  assum ptions which a re  to  be taken  as u n d e rly in g  the  n o tio n  
of th e  s ta t e  fo r  th e  l im ite d  purposes of th i s  s tu d y , r a th e r  than p re se n tin g  
an argument fo r  th e i r  general v a l i d i t y .  This invo lves answ ering two 
q u e s tio n s .
In the f i r s t  p la c e , th e re  i s  the  question  of what th e  term  ’ s t a t e ’ 
s tan d s  fo r  h e re . The s ta t e  i s  a group of p eo p le . I t  i s ,  f u r th e r ,  an 
o rgan ized  group in  th e  sense th a t  some one or body of i t s  members a re  
regarded  in  some way as speaking and a c tin g  fo r  -  th a t  i s ,  making d e c is io n s  
b ind ing  on -  th e  group as a whole. In th e  modern s t a t e  th i s  body of 
decision-m aking  members i s  found in  c e r ta in  reco g n izab le  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  of government, as they  may be c a l le d ,  a re  th e  v i s ib le  mani­
f e s t a t i o n  of th e  organized group, and in  one form or an o th er a re  e s s e n t ia l  
to  th e  g ro u p 's  continued e x is te n c e . The men in  th e se  i n s t i t u t i o n s  tak e  th e  
f i n a l  d e c is io n s  on p a r t i c u la r  m a tte rs  a f fe c t in g  the  group a t  a given tim e .
I t  is  n a tu ra l  th a t  the  term  ’ s t a t e ’ should commonly be held  to  cover no t 
only th e  group rep re se n te d  by the  i n s t i tu t io n s  of governm ent, bu t a lso  the  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  them selves. Moreover, i t  i s  only by u sin g  the  term in  th i s  way 
th a t  an em p irica l study  l i k e  th e  p re s e n t can u s e f u l ly  be c a r r ie d  o u t.
In th e  second p la c e , th e re  i s  th e  question  of th e  d is t in c t io n  between 
the  s ta t e  and o th er organized groups found in  modern s o c ie ty , s in ce  we a re
concerned w ith the  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  s t a t e  (as a group) and one o th e r 
type  of organized group, th e  tra d e  u n io n . The fe a tu re  of th e  s t a t e  as an 
organized group is  e q u a lly  a c h a r a c te r i s t i c  of th e se  o th er groups. The 
s t a t e ’ s b a s ic  s t r u c tu r e ,  th en , does n o t s e t  i t  a p a r t .  Nor, as Max Weber has 
p o in ted  o u t, i s  i t  s o c io lo g ic a l ly  d is t in g u is h a b le  in  term s of ends, because 
th e re  i s  no ta sk  which the  s ta t e  cannot f in d  competence to  undertake  and no 
ta s k  which a t  a l l  tim es and in  a l l  p la c e s  can be held  ex c lu s iv e  to  th e  s t a t e  
The d i s t in c t iv e  mark of the  modern s t a t e  i s  found in  th e  means a v a ila b le  to  
i t  -  the  s t a t e ’ s c laim  to  ’th e  monopoly of th e  le g it im a te  u se  of p h y s ic a l 
fo rce  w ith in  a given t e r r i t o r y ’ The focus h e re  i s  monopoly o f p h y s ic a l 
fo rc e , bu t th e  re fe re n c e  to  t e r r i t o r y  im plies a fu r th e r  s ig n i f ic a n t  i f  l e s s  
d i s t in c t iv e  f e a tu r e .  The q u a l i f ic a t io n  fo r  membership of th e  s t a t e  i s  
t e r r i t o r i a l .  As a r e s u l t ,  membership i s  n o t a m a tte r of in d iv id u a l c h o ic e . 
This compulsory elem ent accompanying membership of a s ta te -g ro u p  i s  no t 
s t r i c t l y  speaking a d is t in g u is h in g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  b u t i t  i s  im portan t 
because i t  means th a t  th e  members of a l l  o th e r organized groups o p e ra tin g  
w ith in  a s t a t e ’s t e r r i t o r y  a re  a t  the same tim e members of th e  s ta te -g ro u p , 
and are  su b je c t to  d e c is io n s  em anating from i t s  in s t i t u t i o n s  o f governm ent,
-  -  -  -  0 O 0  -  -  -  -
The view of th e  s ta t e  s e t  down here  has two consequences of im portance
In the  f i r s t  p la c e , th e  A u stin ian  concep tion  of le g a l  so v e re ig n ty  i s
16 From Max Weber :  Essays in  S ocio logy (Gerth & M ills , e d s , ) ,  78, I t  i s  to  
Be noted th a t  th i s  d i s t in c t io n  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  th e  modern s t a t e .  As 
Weber in d ic a ted  e lsew here, p h y s ic a l fo rc e  has n o t always been a 
su ccess fu lly -c la im ed  monopoly of th e  s t a t e :  see  Max Weber on Lav; in  
Economy and S o c ie ty (R h e in ste in , e d . ) ,  17.
17 The compulsory elem ent i s  n o t in v a r ia b ly  p e c u l ia r  to  membership of th e  
modern s t a t e ;  a lthough  i t  i s  more r a r e ly  and l e s s  un ifo rm ly  a s s o c ia te d  
w ith o th er organized groups, p a r t i c u l a r ly  in  r e l a t io n  to  the  san c tio n s  
a v a ila b le  fo r  i t s  enforcem ent.
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i r r e l e v a n t ,  and q u estio n s  concern ing  the  n a tu re  or s e a t  of so v ere ig n ty  a re  
th u s  avo ided . I t  fo llo w s th a t  in  th e  case of a fe d e ra l  s t a t e ,  l i k e  
A u s tra l ia ,  th e  vexed q u estion  of the  u n ity  or d i v i s i b i l i t y  of so v ere ig n ty  
does n o t a r i s e .  A ll t h a t  needs to  be recogn ized  i s  th a t  th e  s ta te  power 
i s  ex e rc ised  by and through th e  i n s t i tu t io n s  of government (merely more 
numerous than  in  th e  case of a u n ita ry  s ta t e )  found a t  both  F ed e ra l and 
S ta te  l e v e l s ,  each s e t  of in s t i t u t i o n s  having e x c lu s iv e  use of the s ta te  
power in  th e i r  r e s p e c tiv e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly -d e f in e d  t e r r i t o r i e s  and a re as  of 
a c t i v i t y ,  and none (in  th e  f i r s t  in s ta n ce  a t  l e a s t )  being dependent on any 
of th e  o th e rs  fo r  th e  d e le g a tio n  of t h a t  power.
In th e  second p la c e , th e  K elsenian  concep tion  of the  s ta te  as law is  
a ls o  i r r e le v a n t .  Law here  i s  no more than  th e  announced body of norms of 
conduct to  which a l l  members of the  s ta te -g ro u p  a re  expected to  Conform.
The law of a given s t a t e  s p e l l s  out th e  form al term s of th e  r e la t io n s h ip s  of 
members among them selves, and between each member or group of members and 
th e  in s t i tu t io n s  of governm ent. Not a l l  norms a re  law , however, even though 
they  may be g e n e ra lly  accep ted  by members as s o c ia l ly  v a l id  ru le s  of conduct. 
They tak e  on th e  s ta tu s  of law only a f t e r  they  have been approved by compe­
te n t  persons in  the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of government, and a f t e r  the  p rocess of 
approval has follow ed recogn ized  p ro ced u res . F u r th e r ,  the  power to  make law 
includes the  power to  a l t e r  e x is t in g  law . Law in  th ese  term s i s  n e i th e r  
autonomous nor im m utable.
Up to  th i s  p o in t  the  d e s c r ip t io n  of s ta te - la w  is  eq u a lly  a p p lic a b le  to  
th e  law of o ther organized  groups. In both c a se s , to o , norms embodied as law 
a re  backed by c e r ta in  d e fin ed  or im p l ic i t  s a n c tio n s , the  e x e rc ise  of which 
i s  v ested  in  each group’ s in s t i t u t i o n s  of government. However, s ta te - la w  i s  
d is tin g u ish e d  by the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  can be enforced  by the  san c tio n  p e c u lia r  to
th e  s t a t e ,  p h y s ic a l fo rc e . But obedience to  th e  la v  i s  no t in v a r ia b le . Men 
fo rm a lly  bound to  obey may f in d  i t  p r e f e ra b le ,  and consider i t  p o s s ib le ,  to  
ignore le g a l  o b lig a tio n s  a t  tim es . On th e  o th e r hand, those  in  the  i n s t i t u ­
t io n s  of government v i th  the  pover and form al du ty  to  enforce th e  la v  may 
a ls o  f in d  i t  ex p ed ien t a t  tim es to  d e c lin e  f u l l  e x e rc ise  of th e i r  pover.
Lav i s  n o t s e lf - e n fo rc in g .
While the  la v  s e ts  out the  term s on vhich  th e  s ta te  pover v i l l  be used 
a t  a given tim e, both the la v  i t s e l f  and i t s  a d m in is tra tio n  may be a l te r e d ,  
as ve have seen , by a p p ro p ria te  d e c is io n  v i th in  th e  in s t i tu t io n s  of govern­
m ent. For th i s  re a so n , th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  s ta te  and an in d iv id u a l 
member or group of members i s  n o t e x c lu s iv e ly  a fu n c tio n  of the  term s of 
e x is t in g  l a v .  E qually  Im portant i s  the a b i l i t y  of the  in d iv id u a l or group to  
in flu en ce  th e  making, a l t e r a t io n  and a d m in is tra tio n  of the  la v  -  in  o ther 
words, t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  in flu en ce  th e  d e c is io n s  and a c tio n s  of th e  men 
o p e ra tin g  th e  i n s t i tu t io n s  of government. A r e la t io n s h ip  of th i s  kind is  
th e re fo re  determ ined n o t only by th e  le g a l  framework s e t t in g  out i t s  form al 
te rm s, b u t a ls o  by th e  ways in  vhich and the  e x te n t to  vhich th e  in d iv id u a l 
or group can a t  a given time in f lu e n c e , or hope to  in f lu e n c e , d e c is io n s  on 
law-making and a d m in is tra tio n  a t  a p o in t  where th o se  d e c is io n s  a re  form ulated  
and made v i th in  th e  in s t i t u t i o n s  of government. S ince th e  c a te g o r ie s  of bo th  
law-making and la w -a d m in is tra tio n  a re  re d u c ib le , in  term s of our d e f in i t io n  
of th e  s t a t e ,  to  th e  s in g le  ca teg o ry  of th e  e x e rc is e  or a d m in is tra tio n  of the  
s ta te  p o v er, th i s  a sp ec t of the  r e la t io n s h ip  may be d esig n a ted  the 
a d m in is tr a t iv e  fram ework.
The le g a l  and a d m in is tra tiv e  frameworks re p re s e n t  th e  minimal f i e ld  fo r  
study of th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between the  s ta t e  and an o th er organized group. In 
r e la t io n  to  c e r ta in  s ta t e s  and c e r ta in  groups, however, th e  f i e ld  c le a r ly
r e q u i r e s  e x te n s io n . This is  so in  th e  case of th e  A u s tra lia n  s t a t e  and the 
A u s tra lia n  tra d e  union movement. The men who d i r e c t ly  c o n tro l  th e  i n s t i t u ­
t io n s  of government a t  th e  h ig h e s t le v e l  in  A u s tra lia  a r r iv e  a t  th is  p o s i t io n  
by means of a p ro cess  th a t  i s  a com bination of popu lar s e le c t io n  from the  
s ta te -g ro u p  as a whole and r e s t r i c t e d  s e le c tio n  w ith in  those  organized 
groups we know as p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  The l a t t e r  s ta g e , as th e  s e le c tio n  
p ro c e ss  o p e ra te s  a t  p re s e n t ,  i s  a lm ost as in v a r ia b le  as th e  fo rm er.
S e le c t io n  w ith in  a p a r ty  i s  u s u a lly  c o n d itio n a l on th e  accep tance  by 
th e  member concerned of the  p a r ty ’ s p o lic y  -  th a t  i s ,  th e  way in  which the  
p a r ty  p rep o ses  th a t  the s t a t e  power should be used . As a r e s u l t ,  where th e  
men s e le c te d  w ith in  a p a r ty  a re  a ls o  s e le c te d  w ith in  th e  s ta te -g ro u p  as a 
whole, th e  way in  which th ey  e x e rc ise  th e  s ta t e  power can be expected , 
b ro ad ly  speak ing , to  r e f l e c t  the  p o lic y  of th e  p a r ty .  Thus in flu en ce  b rought 
to  bear through th e  p a r ty  may have i t s  p ro d u c t in  th e  p o l ic ie s  follow ed by 
men who have g raduated  th rough th e  p a r ty  to  key p o s i t io n s  in  th e  i n s t i tu t io n s  
o f government. In flu en ce  in  th i s  c o n tex t i s ,  of co u rse , aimed a t  ach iev in g  
th e  same s o r t  of r e s u l t s  as in flu en ce  ex e rted  w ith in  the  a d m in is tra tiv e  
framework. But i t  i s  d is t in g u ish e d  by the  f a c t  th a t  i t  has a t  onee g re a te r  
l im i ta t io n s  ( i t  can hope to  be e f f e c t iv e  only when the  p a r ty ’ s nominees 
c o n tro l the i n s t i t u t i o n s  of government) and g re a te r  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  ( i t  may 
be backed by th e  th r e a t  of san c tio n s  a v a ila b le  to  th e  p a r ty  as an organized 
group a g a in s t  i t s  member-nominees)• Thus a th ir d  dim ension, th e  
p a r ty-pol i t i c a l  framework, i s  added to  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  s ta t e  
and o th er organized groups, a dim ension th a t  i s  of p a r t i c u la r  s ig n if ic a n c e  
in  th e  case  of A u s tra lia n  tra d e  unions because of t h e i r  long and c lo se  
a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  one of th e  g re a t A u s tra lia n  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .
CHAPTER 2
THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT
Union r e c o g n i t io n  t h a t  th e  s t a t e  i s  u l t im a te ly  u n c h a lle n g e a b le  came 
in  A u s t r a l i a  w ith  th e  d e f e a t  of th e  g r e a t  s t r i k e s  o f th e  1890*s ,  T h is  
p ro v id e d  th e  le s s o n ,  l a t e r  g iven  B r i t i s h  t r a d e  u n io n s  by th e  f a i l u r e  o f th e  
1926 G enera l S t r i k e ,  t h a t  a t  th e  p o in t  where th e  f u l l  w eigh t o f  th e  s t a t e  i s  
th row n a g a in s t  s t r i k i n g  u n io n s , th e y  must in e v i ta b ly  s u f f e r  d e f e a t  -  u n le s s  
th e y  a re  p re p a re d  t o  embark on o u t r ig h t  r e v o lu t io n .
Not t h a t  a l l  A u s t r a l ia n  t r a d e  un ion  le a d e r s  s in c e  th e  I8 9 0 , s have 
abandoned th e  n o tio n  t h a t  s t r i k e s  can succeed even a g a in s t  th e  
o p p o s itio n  of a d e te rm in ed  governm ent. The l a t e r  s p e c ta c u la r  f a i l u r e s  o f 
d i r e c t  a c t io n  in  th e s e  c irc u m s ta n c e s , as  in  th e  t r a n s p o r t  s t r i k e  o f 1917 and 
th e  1949 c o a l m in e rs1 s t r i k e ,  were a t t r i b u t e d  by th e s e  le a d e r s  l e s s  t o  th e  
w eigh t o f th e  s t a t e  power th a n  t o  th e  u n io n s 1 la c k  o f o rg a n iz a t io n  and u n i ty .  
Thus th e  S e c re ta ry  o f th e  T rades and Labor C ouncil of Q ueensland , r e p o r t in g  
on th e  d e c is io n  of th e  A u s t r a l ia n  C ouncil o f Trade U nions (A .C ,T .U .) to  end 
th e  n a t io n a l  w a te r f ro n t  s t r i k e  o f 1956, cou ld  a s s e r t  t h a t  th e  A .C .T .U . 
I n t e r s t a t e  E x ecu tiv e  was ’ in  a  commanding p o s i t io n  and shou ld  have been 
p re p a re d  to  c h a lle n g e  th e  Government and th e  sh ip o w n ers , in  o rd e r  t o  b reak  
th ro u g h  on th e  m argins issue*
However, a  t r u e r  r e f l e c t i o n  o f g e n e ra l un ion  o p in io n  was g iv en  a t  th e  
A .C ,T .U . C ongress o f 1957 in  re sp o n se  to  a p ro p o sa l from  th e  Amalgamated 
P o s ta l  W orkers Union t h a t  th e  * f u l l  w e ig h t1 o f th e  A ,C ,T ,U , shou ld  be throw n 
beh ind  th e  u n ion  in  i t s  lo n g - s ta n d in g  wages d is p u te  w ith  th e  F e d e ra l
G overnm ent, The A ,C ,T ,U , P re s id e n t  spoke a g a in s t  th e  p ro p o s a l ,  p o in t in g  out 
1 M in u te s . T rades & L abor C o u n c il o f Q d., 2 2 /2 /1 9 5 6 ,
t h a t  i f  th e  tra d e  union movement, through th e  A .G .T.U ., was drawn in to  a
s t r ik e  c a lle d  by th e  un ion , then  i t  would be involved  in  a h e a d -o n 'c o l l is io n
w ith  th e  Government from which th e  movement would p robab ly  tak e  tw enty  years
to  re c o v e r . The p r e s id e n t ’ s p o in t was accep ted  by C ongress. T his a t t i t u d e
has a ls o  been Im p lic i t  in  th e  A .C .T .U .’ s approach to  w a te rfro n t s t r ik e s  in
p a r t i c u la r  d u ring  re c e n t y e a r s .  But th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  s t a t e  and
th e  tra d e  unions has more p o s i t iv e  fe a tu re s  th an  th o se  stemming from th e
r e a l i z a t io n  th a t  th e  unions cannot f ig h t  the  s t a t e .
The c ircum stances of A u s t r a l ia ’s fou n d a tio n  as a B r i t i s h  colony from th e
beg inn ing  le d  to  a dependence on s ta te  a c tio n  in  many f i e ld s  which, in  th e
2U nited Kingdom, were regarded  as p ro p e rly  th e  p ro v in ce  of p r iv a te  e f f o r t .
In  A u s tra l ia ,  th e re fo re ,  th e re  has long been a c lim a te  of opinion in  which 
s t a t e  in te rv e n tio n  i s  r e a d i ly  accepted  and i s  o f te n  ex p ec ted . From th e  e a r ly  
s tag e s  th e  s ta t e  \jas involved d i r e c t ly  in  in d u s try  as an employer on a la rg e  
s c a le , and th e  scope and v a r ie ty  of p u b lic  e n te r p r is e  has g ra d u a lly  in c re a se d . 
Moreover, in c re a s in g  emphasis has been p laced  on th e  s t a t e ’ s s o c ia l  w elfa re  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  and on i t s  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  economic p lan n in g . These develop ­
ments a re  n o t m erely a reaso n  fo r  th e  tendency of A u s tra lia n  unions to  look  
to  th e  s ta t e  fo r  help  in  ach iev in g  th e i r  aim s; th ey  a re  to  a la rg e  e x te n t  a 
r e s u l t  of th a t  tendency , which e a r ly  found ex p re ss io n  in  th e  u n io n s ’ e n try  
in to  p a r ty - p o l i t i c s  th rough  th e  medium of th e  Labor P a r ty .
The s t a t e ’ s growing a c t i v i t y  along th e se  l in e s  alone j u s t i f i e s  a 
n a tio n a l tra d e  union le a d e r ’ s remark th a t  th e  ’th re e  g re a t bod ies concerned 
w ith in d u s try  in  A u s tra l ia  a re  Governments, em ployers’ o rg a n iz a tio n s  and
2 W.K. Hancock, A u s t r a l ia . 68-73.
3 At June 1957 n e a r ly  27 p e r c e n t ,  of th e  t o t a l  c iv i l i a n  work fo rc e  were 
employed by government a u th o r i t i e s :  quart e r l y  Summary of A u s tra lia n  
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rt r a d e  u n io n s1. But th e re  i s  more t o  i t  than  t h a t .  The s t a t e  in  A u s tra lia
has p layed  a major p a r t  in  th e  re g u la tio n  of in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s  g e n e ra lly
fo r  more than  f i f t y  y e a r s . I t s  concern with p r iv a te  in d u s try , and w ith
th o se  s e c to rs  c o n tro lle d  by p u b lic  c o rp o ra tio n s , i s  th e re fo re  bo th  c lo se r
and more d i r e c t  than  in  th e  United Kingdom where, i t  is  claim ed, a ’t r a d i t io n
of minimum in te rv e n tio n  by th e  s t a t e '  has r e s u l te d  in  'th e  most autonomous
system  of in d u s t r ia l  r e l a t i o n s '  found among th e  w o rld 's  in d u s tr ia l iz e d  
a
n a t io n s .  In  the  U nited Kingdom th e  s ta t e  p ro v ides m ediatory and a r b i t r a l  
m achinery which th e  p a r t i e s  can u t i l i z e  i f  th ey  w ish, b u t i t  norm ally 
in te rv e n e s  on i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e  in  th e  in d u s t r ia l  b a rg a in in g  p rocess only 
as a l a s t  r e s o r t .  In A u s tra l ia ,  on th e  o th er hand, s ta tu to r y  p ro v is io n  fo r  
compulsory a r b i t r a t io n  m achinery w ith an alm ost u n iv e rs a l coverage means th a t  
th e  s t a t e  in te rv e n es  in  th e  b a rg a in in g  p rocess as a m atte r of course -  no t 
m erely  in  order to  help  th e  p a r t i e s  reach  agreem ent, b u t v e ry  o ften  in  order 
to  decide  and to  en fo rce  th e  d e ta i le d  term s of the  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  
p a r t i e s . .  In te rv e n tio n  by th e  s ta t e  in  t h i s  way and a t  t h i s  le v e l  has 
im portan t consequences fo r  the  s ta t e - t r a d e  union r e la t io n s h ip .
Trade un ions, l ik e  many o ther organized groups, concern them selves 
w ith  a wide v a r ie ty  of p u b lic  q u estio n s  b u t a re  p r im a r i ly  in te re s te d  in  a 
s p e c if ic  s e t  of q u e s tio n s . Unions and th e i r  le a d e rs  a re  th u s  to  be found 
ex p ress in g  views on to p ic s  as d iv e rse  as hydrogen bombs and opera houses.
But i t  i s  w ith q u estio n s  of economic p o lic y  t h a t  th ey  a re  c h ie f ly  concerned; 
and w ith in  th e  economic se c to r  i t s e l f  th e re  i s  a narrow er range of m atte rs  
t h a t  i s  th e  focus of t h e i r  a t t e n t io n .  These a re  rough ly  d e lim ita b le  under 
th e  heading of in d u s t r ia l  m a tte rs , m a tte rs  which d i r e c t l y  and im m ediately
4 A.E. Monk, add ress  to  Summer School, A u s tra lia n  I n s t i t u t e  of P o l i t i c a l  
S c ien ce , J a n . 1957; p r in te d  in  (1957) 3 A.C .T.U . B u l le t in , a t  33.
5 B .C .R oberts , 'T rade Unions in  th e  W elfare S ta te ' (1956), 27 P o l i t ic a l  
Q u a rte r ly 7 .
r
a f f e c t  th e  co n d itio n s  under which u n io n is ts  work and th e i r  o rg a n iz a tio n s  
o p e ra te . While union le a d e rs  a re  in te n s e ly  in te r e s te d ,  fo r  example, in  
budgetary , im m igration and g en era l in d u s t r ia l  development p o l i c i e s ,  t h e i r  
c lo s e s t  a t te n t io n  i s  most c o n s is te n t ly  given to  th e  c o n d itio n s  of employment 
of t h e i r  members and th e  n a tu re  o f th e  m achinery (in c lu d in g  th e  un ions 
them selves) by which th o se  co n d itio n s  a re  determ ined . These a re ,  in  b r i e f ,  
th e  sh o rt- te rm  q u estio n s  of how much can be gained or p reserv ed  fo r  t h e i r  
members on th e  job  and th e  ways in  which t h i s  can b e s t be ach iev ed , whether 
th e  ’much' r e l a t e s  to  wages or l e i s u r e  or to  union freedom of a c t io n .
Through the  A u s tra lia n  compulsory a r b i t r a t io n  system s, th e  s ta t e  i s
th e re fo re  alm ost in v a r ia b ly  involved in  d isp u te s  over p r e c is e ly  th o se
questio n s  in  which u n io n is ts  a re  most in te re s te d  and on which th e y  have th e
s tro n g e s t f e e l in g s .  Moreover, s in ce  th e  a r b i t r a l  a u th o r i t ie s  d e c id in g  such
questions a re  s ta tu to r y  b o d ies, th e  n a tu re  and e x te n t of t h e i r  powers can be
a l te re d  by l e g i s l a tu r e s ,  which can, indeed , d i r e c t ly  determ ine th e  q u e s tio n s
them selves. Given t h i s  connection  beti^een th e  s ta t e  and th e  u n io n s ' c e n t r a l
problem s, A u s tra lian  tra d e  unions a re  n e c e s s a r i ly  concerned w ith  s t a t e  a c t io n
a t  a lower le v e l  than  i s  u s u a lly  th e  case in  th e  U nited Kingdom or th e  U nited
S ta te s ,  where th e  unions have looked to  th e  s ta t e  c h ie f ly  fo r  th e  p ro te c t io n
of th e i r  o rg an iza tio n  and have in s is te d  th a t  th e  term s of in d u s t r ia l  b a rg a in s
are  p r im a r i ly  fo r  t h e i r  own d e te rm in a tio n .^  By c o n tra s t ,  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty
of th e  s ta t e  in  A u s tra lia  i s  regarded  as ex tend ing  beyond th e  r e g u la t io n  of
th e  general economic and le g a l  environm ent in  which th e  unions o p era te  to  th e
d e te rm in a tio n  o f the  s p e c if ic  r ig h t s  and rew ards of t ra d e  union members. Thus
th e  'fo u r-p ro n g ed  programme* of tra d e  union alms given in  1945 i s  a t  a l l
6 See F la n d e rs , Trade U nions. 150-1, and E.L.Wigham, Trade U nions« 164-5 , 
re g a rd in g  th e  U.K.; T .P . Jen k in , R eac tio ns of  Major Groups to  P o s i t ive 
Government in  th e  U nited S t a t e s . 361-2, 3 72 -3 ,’ reg a rd in g  th e  U .S.
p o in ts  re la ted  t o  s ta te  action
Those g iv in g  th e ir  labour to  industry . . .  are e n t it le d  to  share in 
the proceeds of production, and i t  i s  the job of the nation to  see  
th a t i t  i s  made p o s s ib le . We th erefore seek f u l l  employment . . .  pro­
g ress iv e  reduction of hours as ind iv idu al production in creases . . .  a 
su ccessiv e  r a is in g  of the standard of l iv in g  as fa s t  as th e n ation al 
income r i s e s ,  and a general u t i l i s a t io n  by the government of 
ta xa tion  revenue to  enable the b iggest measure of so c ia l serv ices  
to  be provided for  the people . . .  '
In ad d itio n , the working of in d u str ia l a rb itra tio n  in A ustralia
estab lish ed  the p r in c ip le  of the ‘key-bargain1 rather e a r lie r  than was the
case in the United Kingdom and the United S ta te s , as w ell as ensuring th at
the precedents esta b lish ed  by the bargain are extended to  other in d u str ies
8with greater speed. More important, as a r e s u lt  of the emphasis on t e s t  
cases, i t  has g rea tly  widened the bargaining u n it by d irectin g  a tten tio n  
beyond p a rticu la r  in d u str ies  to  the economy as a whole. This i s  most 
evident in standard hours and basic wage cases before the main Federal
tr ib u n a l, where union advocates must argue from a n ational rather than an
10
industry standpoint. In these circum stances, the condition of the n a tion a l 
economy is  not merely a factor  of general concern which a f fe c ts  in  d if fe r e n t  
ways various in d u str ies  and the concessions th e ir  workers can ob ta in . I t  i s  
a consideration  th at i s  of d ir e c t and uniform concern to  most unions and
th e ir  members,^ and i t  i s  o ften  one th at carr ies  more weight in the
7 P .J . Ölarey, A.G.T.U. P resid en t, 'In d u str ia l R elation s After the War', in  
Au s tr a l ia 's  Post-War Economy (M elv ille  & o th er s), 260.
8 Kenneth F . Walker, In d u stria l R elations in A u stra lia . 368.
9 I b id ., 365.
10 Thus, w ithin the terms of reference s e t  down by the A rbitration  Commission, 
the unions' advocate in the 1956-57 basic wage case argued th at the 'capa­
c i t y  o f the economy' was such as to  allow  the payment of an increased basic  
wage in the l ig h t  of the fo llow in g  fa c to rs: the le v e l  of employment, of 
investm ent, of production and p ro d u ctiv ity , of overseas balances, of com­
pany p r o f i t s ,  the con d ition  o f overseas trad e, the com petitive p o s it io n  of 
industry, the volume of r e t a i l  trade, and the trend in the le v e l  of p r ic e s .  
Transcript of Proceedings, Basic Wage Case 1956- 57, 4 - 5 .
11 An e f fe c t  and symptom of th is  i s  seen in the emphasis placed by many union 
lead ers on approaching union problems on a n ation al b a sis  rather than a t  
bne. p lan t o industrjr le v e l :  see , e . g . ,  L.C.Webb, in Unions, Management 
and the Public (K.F.Walker, e d . ) ,  88.
d e te rm in a tio n  of in d iv id u a l u n io n s’ c laim s th an  th e  economic p o s i t io n  of
12t h e i r  own in d u s t r ie s .
The e f f e c t  of compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  a p a r t ,  th e  n a tio n a l economy, and 
hence s t a t e  a c tio n , looms la rg e r  in  tra d e  unien  th in k in g  to  th e  e x te n t th a t  
th e  unions a re  involved in  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  A u s tra lian  tra d e  unions 
have been c lo se ly  lin k e d  w ith the  Labor P a r ty  fo r  n e a r ly  seventy  y e a rs . This 
has been a t  l e a s t  as im portan t as compulsory a r b i t r a t io n  in  persuad ing  them 
to  look beyond t h e i r  own in d u s tr ie s  in  in d u s t r ia l  m a tte rs  and to  have s tro n g  
opin ions on a wide v a r ie ty  of economic and s o c ia l problem s, as w ell as 
en su rin g  th a t  th ey  r e ly  h e a v ily  on s t a t e  a c tio n  as a means of so lv in g  those  
problem s.
The s ta t e - t r a d e  union r e la t io n s h ip  i s  no t ex p la in ab le  s o le ly  in  term s 
of union re lia n c e  on th e  s t a t e .  There i s  a ls o  a l in e  of dependence running  
from th e  modern dem ocratic  s ta t e  to  th e  tra d e  union movement, la rg e ly  as a 
r e s u l t  of th e  wide r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  th e  s t a t e  has assumed fo r  th e  t o t a l  
economic w elfare of th e  n a t io n . The ex p erien ces  of two world wars and the  
problem of m ain ta in in g  s o c ia l  w elfa re  and f u l l  employment p o l ic ie s  a t  a tim e 
when the  ’s ieg e  economy’ i s  an endemic fe a tu re  of n a tio n a l l i f e  has le d  to  
a s i tu a t io n  where th e  s ta t e  in  A u s tra l ia  cannot a ffo rd  to  ignore th e  tra d e  
unions -  e s p e c ia l ly  s in ce  th e  fu lf i lm e n t  o f th e se  p o l ic ie s  ensures th e  
u n io n s’ s tre n g th .
There is  much to  be sa id  fo r  th e  view th a t  th e  e s tab lish m en t of th e
12 The r e la t iv e  unim portance o f s p e c if ic  in d u s tr ie s  in  t h i s  co n tex t i s  exemp­
l i f i e d  by the approach of a r b i t r a t o r s  t o  th e  q u estion  of m argins which, 
added to  th e  b asic  wage, c o n s t i tu te  th e  award wage r a te  fo r  p a r t ic u la r  
in d u s tr ie s  or c r a f t s .  Here th e  a r b i t r a t o r  looks to  th e  com parative s k i l l  
or d isag reeab len ess  involved in  jo b s  in  one in d u s try  as a g a in s t o th e rs , a 
procedure th a t  d iv e r t s  a t te n t io n  from th e  question  of th e  p a r t ic u la r  
in d u s try ’ s p r o s p e r i ty .
A u s tra lia n  M in is try  of Labour Advisory Council in  1954 in d ic a te d  a ‘growing
re c o g n itio n  of th e  in terdependence of Governments, employers and unions and of
th e  need to  seek s o lu tio n s  of our problems through jo in t  e f f o r t s  and mutual 
13co n fid en ce1. I t  does a t  l e a s t  seem c le a r  t h a t  t h i s  was an elem ent in  th e
a t t i tu d e  of th e  non-Labor government th a t  suggested  th e  C o u n cil’ s 
14fo rm atio n .
The s ta t e  may be u lt im a te ly  u nchallengeab le  by th e  u n io n s . N everthe­
l e s s ,  in  a p o l i t i c a l  democracy i t  cannot crush every  q u e s tio n in g  of i t s  
a u th o r i ty .  This i s  p a r t i c u la r ly  so when th e  q u es tio n e r happens to  be an 
o rgan ised  group w ith th e  p re se n t in d u s t r ia l  and s o c ia l  power of th e  
A u s tra lia n  tra d e  union movement. In  such c ircu m stan ces , th o se  e x e rc is in g  
the  s ta t e  power f in d  i t  exped ien t no t m erely to  to le r a t e  th e  movement bu t 
to  seek a measure of coopera tion  from i t  -  a t  l e a s t  up t o  th e  p o in t where 
q u estio n in g  i s  converted  in to  c h a lle n g e .
13 H.A. B land, The Work of th e A ustral i a n  Mini s t r y  of Labour Adviso ry
Council (roneoed), background paper a t  th e  Summer School of th e  A u s tra lia n  
I n s t i t u t e  of P o l i t i c a l  S c ien ce , January  1957, 2 .
14 See C hapter 10 below.
CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZATION
The story of the organization of the Australian trade union movement
is a story of a growing strength in numbers and a developing centralization
of authority. It begins with the formation in the 1830*3 of a few small
unions.of skilled workers. These were in most cases less trade unions, as
the term is understood today, than mutual benefit societies. But some did
carry out the function of bargaining with employers on the question of wage
rates; and there were also a number of temporary combinations formed from
1
time to time for the same purpose. Most of the early attempts at union
organization failed to survive the effects of an economic downswing in the
early 1840*s and, in New South Wales, the enactment of a repressive Masters 
2and Servants Act. It was not until the gold discoveries of the following 
decade brought with them prosperity and a flood of new immigrants that union-
3ism was able to take strong root in Australia.
1. The Structure of Unionism by 1900
The development of unionism that began among skilled town workers in 
the 1850*s, and accelerated during the ‘sixties and ‘seventies, was early re­
flected among unskilled town workers and those in the mining and, somewhat
4later, in the pastoral industries. Organization was confined in most cases 
to single colonies, but by 1900 a few unions of an inter-colonial character 
had been formed, usually by amalgamation or federation of unions established
* 5separately in different colonies. The process of centralization begun in 
this way was also evident in looser forms of federation, where groups of
1 J.T. Sutcliffe, A History of Trade Unionism in Australia. 13; also Lloyd 
Ross, ‘The Role of Labour* in Australia (ed., Grattan),~237
2 Sutcliffe, op. cit., 15; Kenneth F. Walker, ‘Australia1 2345 in Comparative 
Labor Movements (ed., Galenson), 174
3 Sutcliffe, op. cit., 17; Walker, op. cit., 175-6
4 Sutcliffe, op. cit., 30-1; Walker, op. cit., 175
5 Sutcliffe, op. cit., 63
u n io n s covering  employees in  th e  same in d u s try  formed a s s o c ia tio n s  to  fac ­
i l i t a t e  common a c t io n . In  A delaide , fo r  example, th e re  were in  o p e ra tio n
by 1891 a Maritime Labor C ouncil, a B uild ing  Trades Council and an Iro n  Trades
6
C ouncil. S im ila r  un ion  groups were to  be found in  the  main c e n tre s  o f the
o th e r  co lo n ie s  -  an a s s o c ia t io n  of b u ild in g  unions being formed as e a r ly  as
7
1875 in  M elbourne.
At the same tim e, the  fo rm ation  o f permanent c e n tr a l  un ion  o rg a n iz a tio n s  
covering  un ions re g a rd le ss  of in d u s try  was encouraged by the f in a n c ia l  weak­
ness o f most u n io n s , which l im ite d  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  conduct s t r ik e s  w ithou t
o u ts id e  h e lp , and by the  need f e l t  f o r  some means o f im pressing  the g en e ra l
8
i n t e r e s t s  o f u n io n is ts  on governm ents. The Melbourne Trades H a ll C ouncil,
s e t  up in  1856 w ith  very  l im ite d  fu n c tio n s , was in  1874 given extended powers
in  keeping w ith  th ese  needs. S im ila r  b od ies, u s u a lly  known as tra d e s  and
lab o u r c o u n c ils , were founded in  the  o th e r  main c e n tre s :  1871 in  Sydney,
9
1883 in  B risbane and H obart, 1884 in  Adelaide and 1892 in  P e r th .
A d e s ire  fo r  some form of co o rd in a tio n  on an even w ider b a s is  was 
e v id e n t in  the m eeting of an In te r -C o lo n ia l  Trade Union Congress in  1879»
The second Congress was n o t h e ld  u n t i l  f iv e  y ears  l a t e r ,  in  1884; b u t th e re ­
a f t e r  f iv e  more fo llow ed  in  ra p id , i f  i r r e g u la r ,  succession  up to  the  seventh
10
Congress o f 1891, each of them being p ro g re s s iv e ly  more r e p r e s e n ta t iv e . .  The
Congresses gave g re a te r  im petus to  moves to  f e d e ra te  in d iv id u a l unions on an
in te r - c o lo n ia l  b a s is ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  in  the case o f New South Wales and V ic t-  
11o r ia n  u n io n s . They a lso  le d  to  d isc u ss io n  of schemes f o r  c re a t in g  a n a tio n ­
a l  fe d e ra t io n  o f a l l  un ions -  though the  one scheme th a t  went f u r th e r  than
6 S .0 * F lah e rty , The Labor P a r ty  in  South A u s t r a l ia , 10
7 W alker, op. c i t . ,  176
8 S u tc l i f f e ,  op. c ih ,  64
9 W alker, op. c i t . ,  176 
lO S u tc l if fe ,  op. c i t . ,  47-8
11 S ouven ir, Amalgamated E ng ineering  Union, 25th  A nniversary , 1945, 360
9  -
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th e  p ro p o sa l s ta g e , the  Q u e e n s la n d -in itia te d  A u s tra lia n  Labor F ed e ra tio n ,
12
f a i l e d  to  take  r o o t .  The seven th  Congress, however, was fo llow ed by a 
r e - d i r e c t io n  of energy from in d u s t r i a l  to  p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n iz a tio n , which tu rn ­
ed union  le a d e r s ’ a t t e n t io n  to  the  c o lo n ia l  r a th e r  than  the n a tio n a l sp h ere . 
The f a c t  t h a t  th e  n ex t Congress was n o t h e ld  u n t i l  189S was symptomatic of 
t h i s  s h i f t  o f a t t e n t io n .  The poor a ttendance  a t  the  Congress was la rg e ly  
a r e s u l t  o f economic co n d itio n s  which had weakened the  u n io n s ’ f in a n c ia l
p o s i t io n ,  bu t i t  i s  n o t u n l ik e ly  th a t  i t  was a ls o  symptomatic of the  concen-
13t r a t i o n  on p o l i t i c a l  r a th e r  th a n  in d u s t r ia l  a c t io n .  The foundation  of the 
A u s tra lia n  Commonwealth in  1901 was th e  main, b u t no t the  on ly , reason  why 
union  le a d e rs  began s e r io u s ly  to  c o n sid e r once more the q u e s tio n  o f organ-
14
iz a t io n  on a n a t io n a l  s c a le .
2 . Union Membership and Union S tru c tu re
The membership o f the  A u s tra lia n  tra d e  union  movement, as shown in  
Table 1, in c re a se d  w ith  rem arkable r a p id i ty  from the  tu rn  o f th e  century*
In  term s o f  th e  p ro p o rtio n  o f u n io n is ts  to  the  tofe.1 number of employees th e  
g re a te s t  advance took p lace  in  the  y ears  up to  1916, t h i s  being the  p e rio d  
when in d u s t r i a l  a r b i t r a t i o n  was e s ta b lis h e d  a t  both  th e  F ed era l and S ta te  
l e v e l s .  The r e s u l t  o f th i s  growth i s  th a t  unions today  re p re se n t the g re a t 
bulk  of em ployees, and t h e i r  membership c o n s t i tu te s  a s ig n i f ic a n t  s e c tio n  of 
the t o t a l  p o p u la tio n .
The o rg a n iz a tio n s  in to  which u n io n is ts  a re  grouped vary  g re a t ly .  Unions 
formed on a c r a f t  o r i n d u s t r i a l  b a s is  rub shou ld ers  w ith  those  combining 
fe a tu re s  of b o th . The A u s tra lia n  tra d e  union  movement has emerged l i t t l e  
changed from the  c o n tro v e rsy , a  s tag e  Goommon to  most union movements, on the
12 S u tc l i f f e ,  op. c i t . ,  97
13 I b id . ,  125-9
14 For o th e r  re a so n s , see C hapter 4
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relative merits of craft and industrial organization. The size of unions 
varies xrom organizations with a handful of members to the Australian Work­
ers Union with a claimed membership of 200,000.
Apart 1rom its membership, the most important change in union, organiz­
ation since 1900 has been the trend towards Federal organization. This 
trend was given impetus by the development from 1907 of the Commonwealth 
arbitration system, with its requirement that a dispute had to be of an
interstate character before it could fall within the jurisdiction of the Fed- 
15eral tribunal. Organization on an interstate basis was not new; it had 
earlier been carried out with notable success by the Australian Workers Un­
ion. But, as Table 2 shows, it has been most extensively applied since 1907. 
In some cases Federal organization has been little more than a formal proced­
ure enabling a number of similar State unions to invoke Commonwealth indus­
trial powers, the unions acting independently in most other matters. In 
others, the Federal body exercises a determining influence over its State 
branches in relation to the whole range of union activity. The Australian 
Workers Union and the Amalgamated Engineering Union, both established as in­
terstate unions before the Federal arbitration system was set up, are examples 
of strong Federal organizations, which include a number formed directly under 
the spur of the Federal arbitration system. Their power structure contrasts 
with federations like the Australian Railways Union and the Australian Meat 
Industry Employees Union, in which the State branches have in practice con­
siderable autonomy.
The role of State branches of Federal unions is frequently enhanced by 
the fact that sections of the union’s membership come under the awards of 
State industrial tribunals; sometimes the whole of a State branch's membership
15 Sutcliffe, op. cit., 166
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is affected in this way, a situation that is most common in Queensland and 
Western Australia. Apart from their activities within the respective 
State arbitration systems, where they are on the same footing as the sub­
stantial number of unions still confined to single States, Federal union 
branches are constantly involved in matters of an intra-State character*
Thus even in the case of strongly centralized Federal unions, the branch 
officials have a wide field of activity which is often untouched by the 
Federal body.
3* Coordinating Bodies
Inter-union organizations functioning on an industry basis are common. 
Usually they operate at the State level, but there are notable examples link­
ing Federal unions - the Metal Trades Federation being perhaps the most ad­
vanced. Industry groups formed on a more or less permanent basis are usu­
ally symptomatic of a militant outlook among the unions concerned: thus they 
operate in strike-prone industries where coordination is important because 
of the reliance on direct action rather than industrial arbitration. The 
metal, building, transport, maritime and coal-raining industries have the 
longest record of this type of inter-union combination. The permanence of 
these groups is usually a function of their success, and a heavy strike de­
feat often leads to at least their temporary abandonment. The Combined 
Mining Unions Council, for example, died after the 1949 coal miners’ strike 
was smashed, as also did the Metal Trades Federation in Western Australia 
following the failure of the 1952 metal trades strike in that State.
The most important coordinating bodies at the State level, however, are 
the trades and labour councils whichuLval all other groups in permanency 
and extent of membership. A number of councils operate in each State, with
th e  ex cep tio n  of W estern A u s tra l ia  w here, as shown below, the s t ru c tu re  of 
the  c e n tr a l  o rg a n iz a tio n s  a re  somewhat d i f f e r e n t .  The main co u n c ils  a re  
those  in  the c a p i ta l  c i t i e s .  The m e tro p o litan  c o u n c ils  n o t on ly  re p re se n t 
the  l a r g e s t  memberships through t h e i r  a f f i l i a t e d  un ions b u t, excep t in  Tas­
m ania, a re  fo rm ally  the  p a re n t bodies of the  r e le v a n t  d i s t r i c t  o r p ro v in c ia l  
c o u n c ils y which opera te  under a c h a r te r  g ran ted  by the m e tro p o litan  body and 
in  most cases a re  e n t i t l e d  to  re p re s e n ta tio n  a t  i t s  m eetings. In  Tasmania, 
th e  Hobart Trades H all C ouncil has no form al c o n tro l over the  fo u r  p ro v in c ia l  
co u n c ils  in  th e  S ta te .  A Tasmanian Trades Union C ouncil, s e t  up in  1940 on 
the  model o f the  A u s tra lia n  Council of Trade U nions, fu n c tio n ed  s p o ra d ic a lly  
and in e f f e c t iv e ly  u n t i l  d isbanded twelve y ears  l a t e r .  In  1957 a more modest 
body, th e  Tasmanian Trades H all C ou n cils’ S ta te  E x ecu tiv e , was formed to  
co o rd in a te  the  c o u n c ils ' a c t i v i t i e s ,  one of the  p ro v in c ia l  c o u n c ils  re fu s in g  
to  take p a r t  in  i t .
The m e tro p o litan  co u n c ils  meet f r e q u e n tly , u s u a lly  a t  f o r tn ig h t ly  or 
weekly in te r v a l s .  D elegates from each a f f i l i a t e d  un ion  are  e n t i t l e d  to  
a t te n d . In  Queensland the  m e tro p o litan  co u n cil has f o r  more th an  t h i r t y  
y e a rs  convened an annual Trade Union Congress a tte n d ed  by d e le g a te s  from 
a f f i l i a t e d  unions th roughout the  S ta te  and from th e  tw elve p ro v in c ia l  coun­
c i l s .  This p ra c t ic e  i s  n o t fo llow ed  in  o th e r  S ta te s ,  even though d e le g a te s  
from p ro v in c ia l  co u n cils  r a r e ly  a tte n d  re g u la r  m eetings of the  m e tro p o litan  
b o d ie s .
In  W estern A u s tra lia  th e re  have been no s e p a ra te  o rg a n iz a tio n s  s in ce  
1906, when t h i s  ro le  was assumed by the nine d i s t r i c t  co u n c ils  o f th e  S ta te  
Branch o f the  A u s tra lia n  Labor P a rty  and the  S ta te  E xecutive o f th e  P a r ty . 
S ince 1947 a Trade Unions I n d u s t r ia l  Council has o p e ra ted  w ith in  the  P a rty  
s t ru c tu re  as the  c o u n te rp a r t o f the  m e tro p o litan  t ra d e s  and la b o u r co u n c il
1in other States, Affiliation with the Party automatically entitles unions 
to representation on the Industrial Council.
The leaders of trades and labour councils do not usually favour industry 
groups of unions operating outside the councils’ structure, but they may en­
courage their formation within that structure. The most complete example of 
this is found in the constitution of the Labor Council öf New South Wales, 
which provides for the formation of a number of industry groups (one of w^Lch, 
the Australian Workers Union, is a ’group’ in name only) with elected officer^
and each with the power to elect one member of the Council’s Central Execut- 
2ive. In recent years, the Trades and Labor Council of Queensland played a
leading part in establishing a State Maritime Group, after ensuring that it
3would be linked with the Council."
The formal power of the various metropolitan counnils to control affili­
ated unions is limited to the extent that their only sanction is expulsion.
But major disputes are usually handled by a council’s disputes committee on 
the understanding that it carries sufficient weight to ensure that financial 
and other help may be cut off from unions flouting its authority. The ex­
tent of the councils' influence has in the past varied considerably* but it 
is apparent that the growing power of the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
within the union movement, which is discussed below, is reflected at the 
State level in relation to the role of the metropolitan councils.
- - - oOo - - -
5Ehe question of a central union organization that could coordinate the 
activities of the unions in all the colonies was raised at every Inter-Colon­
ial Trade Union Congress after the first^" In the early stages the proposals
1 See Chapter 4*
2 Rules, Labor Council of N.S.W., rr.5,6.
3 Minutes. Trades and Labor Council of Qd., 27/7/1955; 2/11/1955
4 See Sutcliffe, A History of Trade Unionism in Australia, 195-202
made were sk e tch y . I t  was n o t u n t i l  the seventh  Congress o f 1891 th a t  a 
d e ta i le d  scheme was adopted , an alm ost id e n t ic a l  p lan  being endorsed by the 
e ig h th  Congress of 1898. Although th i s  p lan  f o r  an A u s tra lia n  Labor Feder­
a t io n  was a t  d i f f e r e n t  tim es p u t in to  e f f e c t  in  Queensland, New South Wales 
and W estern A u s tra l ia ,  i t  never reached the  s tag e  of in te r - c o lo n ia l  o p e ra tio n . 
A p ro p o sa l f o r  a body w ith  a le s s  e la b o ra te  s tru c tu re  and claim ing  le s s  ex­
te n s iv e  powers was approved by the  f i r s t  i n t e r s t a t e  Congress h e ld  in  1902,
b u t f a i l e d  to  ga in  g e n e ra l acceptance d e sp ite  i t s  re-endorsem ent by the  succ-
5
eeding  Congress of 1907. A f u r th e r  Congress in  1913> which as in  1907 con­
s is te d  on ly  o f t ra d e s  and la b o u r co u n cil d e le g a te s , produced y e t an o th er and 
even more u n p re te n tio u s  scheme f o r  a body w ith  th e  p re te n tio u s  t i t l e  o f the
F ed era l Grand Council o f Labor, on which re p re se n ta tio n  was fo r  the  f i r s t
6
tim e confined  to  th e  tra d e s  and lab o u r c o u n c ils . The Grand Council showed
some s ig n s  o f l i f e  compared w ith  i t s  s t i l l - b o r n  p re d e ce sso rs , b u t th ese  were
soon ex tin g u ish ed  beneath  the  co n tro v ersy  aroused  by the  movement fo r  n a tio n -
7
a l  tra d e  un ion  u n i ty  th rough amalgamation r a th e r  than  f e d e ra t io n .
The p ro p o sa ls  f o r  One Big Union d eriv ed  t h e i r  su p p o rt from a growing 
b e l ie f  in  the  v i t a l  need f o r  u n ite d  in d u s t r i a l  a c t io n . But d e sp ite  the 
enthusiasm  the  O.B.U. campaign aroused among in d u s t r ia l  u n io n s , i t  fa ced  th e  
t a c i t ,  i f  n o t always outspoken, o p p o s itio n  o f th e  c r a f t  un ions and th o se ,
p a r t i c u la r ly  the A u s tra lia n  Workers Union, th a t  were wddded to  p o l i t i c a l
8
a c t io n . This o p p o s itio n  proved too g re a t ,  and the p ro p o sa ls  f o r  One Big 
Union were e v e n tu a lly  abandoned, d e sp ite  t h e i r  endorsem ent by the A ll Aust­
r a l i a n  Trade Union Congress o f 1921.
5 I b id . ,  ' 152-3
6 I b id . ,  204-6
7 I b id . ,  174-6,208-9
8 V .G .C hilde, How Labour G overns. 193-4
M . I  f l « r
Before the f i n a l  c o lla p se  o f the One Big Union campaign, many union  
le a d e rs  had tu rn ed  again  to  th e  id ea  o f f e d e ra t io n .  The f i r s t  e f f e c t iv e  
in te r -u n io n  o rg a n iz a tio n  a t  the  F ed e ra l le v e l  was formed in  th e  e a r ly  1920’ s .  
This body, the  Commonwealth Council o f F ed e ra ted  U nions, c o n s is te d  o f d e le ­
g a te s  from a f f i l i a t e d  F ed era l u n io n s . I t  was to  a c t  ’in  an a d v iso ry  capa­
c i t y ’ on q u estio n s  r e la t in g  to  F ed e ra l i n d u s t r i a l  le g is la t io n ,a n d  to  coord-
9
m a te  union  subm issions in  m ajor cases befo re  th e  F ed e ra l A rb i t r a t io n  C ourt.
By 1926 f o r ty - e ig h t  un ions were a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  th e  C ouncil. But hopes fo r  
a body w ith  more ex ten s iv e  powers were no t d is c a rd e d . In  June 1925 a con­
fe ren ce  o f tra d e s  and lab o u r co u n c il r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  from a l l  S ta te s  adopted 
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  of a Commonwealth I n d u s t r ia l  D ispu tes Committee, which was 
to  c o n s is t  o f two d e le g a te s  from each S ta te  c o u n c il , and to  have th e  power 
’to  d ea l w ith  a l l  d isp u te s  ex ten d in g , o r l i k e l y  to  ex ten d , beyond th e  l im i t s
o f any one S ta te ’ . However, a re s o lu t io n  c a r r ie d  a t  a s im ila r  conference
q u e s tio n  of n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n  was n o t, co n sid e red  a t  an ’A ll A u s tra lia ^ ' 
Trade Union Congress h e ld  in  Sydney l a t e r  th e  s&me y ea r and composed alm ost 
w holly o f  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  from New South Wales u n io n s . But a more re p re ­
s e n ta t iv e  and momentous A ll A u s tra lia n  Trade Union Congress was convened the 
nex t y e a r  on the  i n i t i a t i v e  of the  Melbourne Trades H a ll C ouncil, which v is ­
u a liz e d  the  Congress as a means of f u l f i l l i n g  ’ th e  o f t-e x p re s se d  d e s ire  th a t
some more complete form of o rg a n is a tio n  from an A u s tra lia n  v iew poin t should  
13
be a d o p te d '.  From t h i s  C ongress, h e ld  in  May 1927, is su ed  th e  A u s tra la s ia n
9 D ra ft Bye Laws o f the  Commonwealth C ouncil o f F edera ted  U nions, (undated) 
a r t i c l e s  2 ,3 .
10 From l i s t  on le t te rh e a d  in  M inutes, U nited  Trades and Labor C ouncil of 
S .A ., 4 /6 /1926
11 Rules of th e  Commonwealth I n d u s t r ia l  D ispu tes Committee, (u n d a ted ).
12 M inutes. I n te r s t a t e  Conference o f Trades and Labor C ouncils , June 1926
13 C irc u la r  is su e d  by Melbourne Trades H a ll C ouncil, 27/1/1927
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in  1926 in d ic a te d  th a t  the D isputes Committee had n o t been s e t  up .
12
The
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1A ^C ouncil o f Trade Unions?
The A.C.T.U. was f i r s t  formed as a ’ tem porary body’ , the  1927 Congress
d e c id in g  th a t  a f u r th e r  Congress should be h e ld  in  1929 in  o rd e r th a t  a
’d e f in i t e  C o n s ti tu tio n ' could  be adopted 's e t t i n g  up the  A.C.T.U. as a peima-
15
n e n t i n s t i t u t i o n  in  the  i n d u s t r i a l  raovanent'. In  November 1927 the  f i r s t  
m eeting was held  o f th e  new body 's  F u ll Executive (now known as th e  In te r ­
s t a t e  E x e c u tiv e ) . D eterm ination  to  make the  A.C.T.U. succeed where i t s p r e -  
d ecesso rs  had t a i l e d  was a lso  e v id en t in  the  convening of a w idely  re p re se n t­
a t iv e  A ll A u s tra lia n  Tre.de Union Congress in  1928 which approved ’m achinery
16
c la u se s  f o r  hand ling  in d u s t r i a l  d i s p u te s . ’ The 1929 Congress duly  approved 
a perm anent c o n s t i tu t io n  f o r  the  A.C.T.U.
The fo rm ation  and u u rv iv a l o f the  A.C.T.U. in  the  d i f f i c u l t  e a r ly  years  
o f i t s  e x is ten c e  c o n tra s t  m arkedly w ith  the a b o rtiv e  beginnings o r ra p id  
decay o f each o f i t s  p re d e c e sso rs . The d if fe re n c e  was due to  a number o f 
f a c to r s ,  th e  most im portan t o f which were p robab ly  the n a tu re  o f th e  A .C .T .U ^ 
s t ru c tu re  and o f the economic and p o l i t i c a l  environm ent in to  which i t  e n te re d .
The s t ru c tu re  o f the A.C.T.U. was both le s s  e la b o ra te  than  many o f th e  
p rev ious schemes and on a more re p re se n ta tiv e  b a s is  than  o th e rs . There was 
no a ttem p t to  c re a te  new in te rm e d ia te  in te r -u n io n  bodies a t  the S ta te  l s v e l .  
Each m e tro p o litan  tra d e s  and lab o u r co u n c il fu n c tio n ed  a s  a S ta te  Branch, 
was a u to m a tic a lly  re p re se n te d  on the A.C.T.U. E x ecu tiv e , and had th e  power to  
approve o r r e j e c t  a l l  E xecu tive d e c is io n s . While ga in ing  the pow erful supp­
o r t  of th e  m e tro p o litan  c o u n c ils  in  t h i s  way, the A.C.T.U. d id  n o t r e l y  s o le ly  
on the  c o u n c ils . P ro v is io n  was made f o r  th e  a f f i l i a t i o n  o f in d iv id u a l Fed­
e r a l  unions and t h e i r  d i r e c t  re p re s e n ta t io n  a t  the b ie n n ia l  Congress, the
14 The term  ’A u s tra la s ia n ' was a l te r e d  to  ’A u s tra l ia n ’ in  1947.
15 S e c re ta ry ’s R eport, A .C .T .U ., March 1930
16 O f f ic ia l  R eport, A ll A u s tra l ia n  Trade Union Congress, Ju ly  1928
supreme policy-making body.
The A.C.T.U.'s claim to national representation was from the start
somewhat marred by the omission of the biggest of the Federal unions, the
Australian Workers Union (A.W.U.), and the central union organization of
Western Australia, the State Executive of the Australian Labor Party. The
omission of the A.W.U. was the more serious. The A.C.T.U. made a number of
attempts in 1927 and 1928 to secure the A.W.U.'s affiliation, until the union
17refused even to discuss the matter - though in 1930, for the first and last
time, the A.W.U. sent delegates to a conference of Federal unions convened 
18by the A.C.T.U. Since then, however, the A.W.U. has consistently refused
wasto affiliate. On the other hand, in 1957 the unionAaffiliated with every 
metropolitan trades and labour council except the Hobart Trades Hall Council, 
having affiliated with the Queensland Trades and Labor Council the previous 
year after a break of sixteen years. It is thus represented on five of the 
six State branches of the A.C.T.U. The Western Australian State Executive’s 
rejection in 1927 of an invitation to affiliate with the A.C.T.U. was regard­
ed as less serious than the A.W.U.'s stand on the matter. No further attempt 
was made to secure Western Australian affiliation until after the second 
world war; the State Executive of the A.L.P. became the State Branch of the 
A.C.T.U. in 1950. Despite these omissions, however, nearly all of the ind- 
ustrially-strong Federal unions wereaffiliated from the beginning, including 
the watersiders’, seamen’s, timber workers’, coal miners', ipeat workers’,
engine drivers', and the most important of the metal workers' unions. By
*
September 1957 ninety-five unions were affiliated with a total membership of
17 Minutes. A.C.T.U., Executive Council, April 1928, 7
18 Minutes. A..G.T.U., Conference of Key Unions, September 1930.
w ell over one m ill io n . The only  om issions of sjny s ig n if ic a n c e  were the
A.W.U. and the  Amalgamated S o c ie ty  o f C arpen ters and J o in e r s ,  a m in o rity
b u ild in g  union  covering  th re e  S ta te s .
The s t ru c tu re  o f the A.C.T.U. was im portan t to  i t s  s u rv iv a l .  But o f
equal im portance was the  Commonwealth’s in c re a s in g  ro le  in  economic a f f a i r s
by comparison w ith  th e  S ta te s ’ . T h is, to g e th e r  w ith  th e  growth o f F ed e ra l
union  o rg a n iz a tio n , made i t  more obvious th an  ev e r t h a t  the  ’d is jo in te d  S ta te
Labor Council system ’ was inadequate when i t  came to  making the  un ion  vo ice
20
heard  a t  the  F ed era l l e v e l .  These c o n s id e ra tio n s  were to  become of mounting 
im portance w ith  the  r e a l iz a t io n  th a t  the union movement had to  be p rep ared
to  n e g o tia te  on a wide sca le  w ith  non-Labor F ed e ra l governm ents, a.s w e ll as
21
m erely ex p ress in g  views on t h e i r  p o l ic ie s .  In  a d d it io n , the d i f f i c u l t y  o f
e x e r tin g  p re ssu re  on F ed era l Labor p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  th rough  th e  P a r ty  machine
was to  g a th e r su p p o rt fo r  the A.C.T.U. as a means o f b rin g in g  the  w eigh t o f
22
the  unions d i r e c t ly  to  b ear on F edera l Labor governm ents. Above a l l ,  the  
immediate e f f e c t  of the economic d ep ress io n  of th e  ’t h i r t i e s  was to  weaken 
the  in d u s t r ia l  s tre n g th  o f in d iv id u a l unions and, thereb}^ to  in c re a se  t h e i r  
need fo r  m utual su p p o rt.
But w hile th e se  f a c to r s  ensured  th e  su rv iv a l o f th e  A .C .T .U ., th e y  d id
no t guarantee i t  e f f e c t iv e  power over i t s  c o n s t i tu e n t  o rg a n iz a tio n s . ’ I t s
powers were few, i t s  funds sm all; i t  had no fu l l - t im e  o f f i c e r s ,  no perm anent
o f f ic e  even. The r e a l  power rem ained w ith the  S ta te  Labor C o u n cils , which
23
met re g u la r ly  and had a perm anent s t a f f ’ . At the  beginning  of th e  second
^9 Ifcg&cutive R ep o rt. A .C .T .U ., S ep t. 1957, 59-60. Not a l l  th ese  un ions were 
F edera l o rg a n iz a tio n s ; the  A.C.T.U. allow s a S ta te  un ion  to  a f f i l i a t e  i f  i t  
covers an in d u s try  or occupation  no t a lre ad y  covered by a F e d e ra l un ion  op­
e ra t in g  in  th e  S ta te  concerned.
20 Souven ir. Amalgamated E ng ineering  Union, 25th  A nn iversary , 1945, 365.
21 See C hapter 10.
22 See C hapter 14*
23 S ouven ir, op. c i t . ,  364*
w orld  war i t  could s t i l l  be s a id ,  as i t  had been s a id  in  1930, t h a t ,  des­
p i t e  i t s  d i r e c t io n  o f a su c c e ss fu l campaign a g a in s t  the  pre-w ar i n s t i t u t i o n
24
o f a 'n a t io n a l  r e g i s t e r ’ , the A.C.T.U. ' s t i l l  has to  prove i t s e l f  as an
25
e f f e c t iv e  power’ . In  tim e , th e  p roof was fo rthcom ing . I t  appeared , in  
s ta g e s , w ith  g r e a te s t  p re c is io n  and c l a r i t y  in  changes in  the  A .C .T .U .’s 
o rg a n iz a tio n .
The F u ll  Executive met in f re q u e n tly  and i r r e g u la r ly  during  the  ’t h i r t i e s .  
Most o f th e  work between Congresses was c a r r ie d  ou t by the  Emergency Committee 
composed of the  ex ecu tiv e  o f f i c i a l s  and the two Executive members from the  
m e tro p o litan  tra d e s  and la b o u r co u n cil o f th e  S ta te  in  which th e  Committee 
was m eeting . A fte r  the  1943 Congress, th e  I n te r s t a t e  E x ecu tiv e , as i t  was 
now b e t t e r  known, began m eeting re g u la r ly  a t  q u a r te r ly  in te r v a ls ;  and since  
about 1952 s p e c ia l  m eetings a d d it io n a l  to  th e  q u a r te r ly  ones have become 
in c re a s in g ly  f r e q u e n t .  During the ' t h i r t i e s ,  expense was k ep t to  an abso­
lu te  minimum by making no p ro v is io n  f o r  fu l l - t im e  o f f i c i a l s .  The S e c re ta ry  
th roughou t th i s  p e r io d , C. C ro f ts , re ta in e d  h is  f u l l - t im e  p o s i t io n  as S e c re t­
a ry  of the  F ed era ted  Gas Employees Union. The 1943 Congress c re a te d  the 
p o s i t io n  o f f u l l - t im e  S e c re ta ry ; and in  1949 added the  P residency  as a p a id  
.o f f ic e .  In  1954 a R esearch O ff ic e r  was added, and e f f e c t  was given to  a 
1951 Congress re s o lu t io n  d i r e c t in g  the  p u b lic a tio n  o f a q u a r te r ly  jo u rn a l 
f o r  d i s t r ib u t io n  to  a f f i l i a t e d  b o d ie s . In  the  same y e a r , a f t e r  o p e ra tin g  
s in ce  1943 from o f f ic e s  f i r s t  in  the  Sydney and th en  in  th e  Melbourne Trades 
H a ll, the  A.C.T.U. s e t  up i t s  permanent h ead q u a rte rs  in  i t s  own b u ild in g  in  
M elbourne. These a re  ta n g ib le  s ig h s  of a development in  the  A .C .T .U .’s
s ta tu re  w ith in  the  tra d e  un ion  movement; they  a lso  in d ic a te  the  com paratively
24 See B rian  F i t z p a t r ic k ,  The A u s tra lia n  Commonwealth, 148-9, 266-7.
25 W.K. Hancock, A u s t r a l ia .- 216 .
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recent occurrence of that development.
As its first Secretary recalled in 1945, the main functions the A.C.T.U.
was formed to carry out were ’to organise the presentation of the trade union
case in relation to major issues such as the basic wage, standard hours, etc.,
26
and to provide a Federal machinery for unified action in industrial disputes’.
From the beginning, its ability to carry out these functions was hampered by
27
’great difficulties arising from want of finance and lack of authority’. 
Nevertheless, A.C.T.U. officials did play a leading, if not dominant part, in 
the formulation and presentation of major cases before the Federal Arbitrati<nn 
Court during the ’thirties. From time to time its authority in this res­
pect was challenged. The 1932 Congress was obliged to call on unions to
refrain from making applications on major matters to the Court without the
28
consent of the A.C.T.U.} and as late as 1949, the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union forced the Interstate Executive to increase its original basic wage 
claim to one preferred by the union. Since then, however, the A.C.T.U. has 
played the leading part in formulating major union claims and has had com­
plete control of the submissions made in support of them. But the unions’ 
acceptance of the A.C.T.U. as the body best-fitted to handle their claims in 
the most important arbitration cases was natural enough, given the character 
of the arbitration system, once the A.C.T.U. had established itself as a reas­
onably representative organization, Such acceptance entails no significant 
curtailment of the independence of individual unions. On the other hand, 
for the A.C.T.U. to take over the direction of industrial disputes and (a 
function to which its first Secretary did not refer in the statement cited 
above) to assume the role of the unions’ representative in negotiations with
26 Cited in A.C.T.U. Bulletin. April 1954, 1.
27 Secretary’s Report. A.C.T.U., March 1930.
28 Minutes. A.C.T.U. Special Congress, September 1932, 26.
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federal governments clearly does involve some encroachment on union independ­
ence .
lhe inability of the A.C.T.U. to obtain recognition as the authoritative
union spokesman from either Labor or non-Labor Federal governments during the
29second world war is described in a later chapter. Its inability to control
its stronger affiliated unions was as evident in this context as in the case
of industrial disputes. In 1942 a trade union delegate pointed out: ‘It
was farcical to suggest that the A.C.T.U. had control over the organisations
3°
that were affiliated* • So far as militant unions like the Waterside Workers
Federation and the Miners Federation were concerned, he continued, ‘No matter
what the policy of the A.C.T.U. was, in connection with disputes affecting
these organisations they did what they liked and decided upon their own terms
31oi settlement in all disputes in which they were involved*• The change 
which has occurred since the war in the attitude of these unions is the cru­
cial determinant of the A.C.T.U.‘s present position as the authoritative or-
32gan of the trade union movement, in fact as well as in name.
The defeat of the coal miners* strike of 1949, following drastic measures 
taken by the Federal Labor Government, was the turning-point. The A.C.T.U. 
opposed the strike on the ground that it was Communist-engineered for polit­
ical rather than industrial Ends; and, without expressly approving them, it 
did not protest against the Government’s strike-breaking measures. For 
those union leaders who still believed direct action could succeed when it 
came to a head-on collision with government, the lessonAthe 1949 strike was
clear. In a major struggle the strongest union could no longer afford to
29 See Chapter 10.
30 Report, Conference of Federal Unions convened by the Federal Minister for 
labour and National Service, February 1942, 20.
31 Ibid.
32 See R.M. Martin, ‘The Rise of the Australian Council of Trade Unions’ (March 1,95S1, 30 Australian Quarterly,30,for a full discussion of the events and 
developmerrts-siTtiined below.'
ig n o re  the  views o f th e  g re a t  bulk of th e  tra d e  union movement, which were 
r e f l e c te d  by and la rg e  in  th e  a t t i tu d e s  of th e  A.C.T.U. le a d e rs h ip . Even a 
Labor government was ab le  to  tak e  th e  s e v e re s t  a c tio n  a g a in s t  a s t r i k e  which 
d id  n o t have th e  general backing of th e  union movement s in c e , a t  a tim e when 
th e  u n io n s ' i n d u s t r ia l  s tre n g th  was g re a te r  than  ever b e fo re  in  peacetim e, i t  
was assu red  th a t  such a c t io n  would evoke no w ider in d u s t r ia l  re p e rc u s s io n s .
That th e  le a d e rs  of th e  Miners F e d e ra tio n  had absorbed th e  le sso n  was 
dem onstrated two y e a rs  l a t e r  in  th e  course  of a d isp u te  in v o lv in g  th e  F ed e ra ­
t io n .  Faced w ith  an ultim atum  from th e  A.C.T.U. P re s id e n t th a t  i t s  members 
should resume normal work under term s n e g o tia ted  by th e  A.C.T.U. or lo se  th e  
A .C .T .U .'s  su p p o rt, th e  F e d e ra tio n  accepted  the  d i r e c t io n .  The m in ers ' 
P re s id e n t ,  opening w ith  a s ig n i f ic a n t  re fe re n c e  to  th e  1949 s t r i k e ,  exp lained  
th e  F e d e ra t io n 's  d e c is io n  in  th e se  term s:
. . .  d u ring  th a t  tim e [1949] they  had been is o la te d  from th e  r e s t  
o f the  tra d e  u n io n s , w ith the  consequence th a t  th e y  were d e fea ted  
. . .  But d u rin g  th i s  p re s e n t d is p u te , th e  Miners d e l ib e r a te ly  p r e ­
pared  so t h a t  th ey  would no t be is o la te d  from th e  r e s t  o f the tra d e  
unions . . .  T h e re fo re , th e  Miners C en tra l Council had t o  look a t  th e  
p o s i t io n  sq u a re ly : co n tin u e  th e  d is p u te , be is o la te d  by th e  ACTU
from o th er tra d e  unions -  or -  c a l l  o ff  th e  one-day p e r week 
s to p p a g e s . . .  33
With some v a r ia t io n s ,  th e  same p a t te r n  has been re p e a te d  in  th e  case  of 
in d u s t r ia l  d isp u te s  in v o lv in g  th e  W aterside Workers F e d e ra tio n . The comple­
m entary le sso n  to  th a t  of th e  1949 m iners ' s t r ik e  was p rov ided  by th e  su ccess 
a tte n d in g  the  A .C .T .U .'s  le a d in g  p a r t  in  th e  w a te rfro n t s t r ik e  of 1954 and in  
the  subsequent n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  th e  Menzies Government on th e  Government's 
p ro p o sa ls  to  change th e  method of r e c r u i t in g  w atersid e  w orkers. Moreover, 
the  A .C .T .U .'s  a u th o r i ty  in  t h i s  f i e ld  surv ived  even th e  I n te r s t a t e  Executive's 
d i r e c t io n  o f F ebruary  1956 th a t  th e  w a te rs id e rs  should end t h e i r  s t r i k e  begun
33  Minutes, Trades and Labor Council of Qd., 14/3/1951
the previous month with the A.C.T.U.'s approval. This wasone of the Exec­
utive^ most controversial decisions in recent years - but it was obeyed, 
despite widespread union support for the strike*s continuation.
As these examples indicate, the A.G.T.U. since 1949 has in fact carried 
out, for the first time, its original function of providing *a Federal mach­
inery for unified action in industrial disputes’. This function has been 
reflected in the increasing role of its officials in the negotiation of com­
posite agreements, covering the members of a number of unions, with Federal 
government departments and instrumentalities. More recently, the A.C.T.U.’s 
coordinating procedures have been extended to negotiations for agreements 
with private firms in certain industries.
There are signs that the trend to greater centralization of trade union 
activity, which is implicit in the A.C.T.U.’s developing authority, is also 
beginning to have its effect on the organizational structure of the trade 
union movement. The industry groups of Federal unions originally represent­
ed a serious threat to such authority as the A.C.T.U. had. However, with 
the development and acceptance of the A.C.T.U.’s coordinating activities, 
the need for such bodies has tended to diminish. During 1957, for example, 
the A.C.T.U. convened meetings of the unions concerned in well over a dozen 
industries to consider industry problems - in addition to meetings of various 
unions affected by a single issue. The industry groups themselves have not 
only shown a greater readiness to keep in line with A.C.T.U. policy, but in 
some cases have moved to link themselves with the A.C.T.U.’s structure.
This process has reached its most advanced stage in the case of the building 
industry unions: a permanent Building Industry Unions Sub-Committee was set
up in 1957 under the auspices of the A.C.T.U. with the intention of working 
through the combined building unions’ groups at the State level. Moves in
a similar direction have come from the metal trades and transport groups. 
There is little doubt that the trend will develop further as a result of 
the 1957 Congress decision providing for six members of the Interstate Ex­
ecutive to be elected on an industry group basis, instead of by the metro­
politan trades and labour councils whose Executive representation is now 
reduced to one member each.
The enhanced authority of the A.C.T.U. as, in a union official’s terms,
the ’mouth-piece and spearhead’ of the Australian trade union movement has
also had its effect on the A.C.T.U.’s standing in negotiations with Federal
governments. The Menzies Government has shown an increasing inclination
34to donduct its dealings with the trade unions solely through the A.C.T.U.
But it may be noted here that it is a policy which was very much less in 
evidence before the defeat of the Federal Labor Government in 1949. To a 
large extent the difference is a product of three factors.
In the first place, Communist influence within the A.C.T.U.’s policy­
making body, Congress, w^s strong during much of the Curtin and Chifley Labor 
governments’ terms of office, and Labor ministers were therefore inclined 
to regard the A.C.T.U. with some reserve. On the other hand, during most 
of the Menzies Government’s period of office Communist influence was reduced 
to comparatively minor proportions; and even since September 1957, with 
four Communist members of the Interstate Executive, Communist officials do 
not play as decisive a role in A.C.T.U. affairs as they were able to during 
the war years.
In the second place, there is a smaller political obligation on non- 
Labor than on Labor ministers deliberately to restrict, in favour of the 
A.QT.U., the ability of individual unions to consult with them.
34 See Chapter 10.
Finally, Labor recognition of the A.C.T.U. was hampered by the host­
ility of the unaffiliated Australian Workers Union. The Menzies Govern­
ment has less need to placate the A.W.U. in this respect because the streng­
th of the A.W.U. lies in its great influence within the Labor Party machine; 
industrially, it is much less important than many smaller A.C.T.U.-member 
unions.
The Menzies Governments greater ability to put into effect the nat­
ural preference of any administration for dealing with a single represent­
ative organization in place of a multitude of sectional groups has undoubt­
edly enhanced the standing of the A.C.T.U. But such a policy can be ade­
quate only if the central organization with which a government wishes to 
deal is iistially able to secure its members1 compliance with its decisions. 
Thus the determining factor in the A.C.T.U.’s present commanding position 
in the trade union movement, and it is a position that a future Labor gov­
ernment will have to reckon with, is the change in the attitude of the 
leadership of the most powerful and militant unions.
Perhaps the most striking illustration of what this change has meant 
is given by the contrast between the defensive report of the A.C.T.U.’s 
first Secretary in 1930 and the confident tone of the report presented by 
its third Secretary twenty-five years later, in 1955. In 1930:
Delegates might be reminded that many attempts have been made over 
a period of years to establish a body capable of speaking for the 
industrial movement of the Commonwealth as a whole and it may be 
claimed that the A.C.T.U. is the nearest approach to such a body 
yet set up. From its inception, despite its many drawbacks, it has 
been acknowledged by Governments, Wage Fixing Tribunals and Employers 
as the mouth-piece of the industrial movement when matters of an 
interstate character were involved. This has been accomplished with­
out in any way lessening the influence or interfering with the work 
of the State Trades and Labor Councils. 35
35 Secretary’s Report, A.C.T.U., March 1930.
In  1955:
No lo n g e r i s  th e  A.C.T.U. regarded  m erely as a  fo rc e  to  
c o -o rd in a te  working c la s s  th o u g h t. I t  i s  re q u ire d  to  speak 
and a c t  a u th o r i ta t iv e ly  upon m a tte rs  a t  n a t io n a l  and i n t e r ­
n a tio n a l  l e v e l s .  I t  i s  reco g n ised  by the  p o l i t i c a l ,  
commercial and c u l tu r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of th e  Commonwealth, 
and i s  accep ted  as an in te g r a l  p a r t  of community l i f e .  As 
such, the  work and r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of th e  A .G .T .U .. . .m ust 
co n tinue  to  e x p a n d .. .36
36 Executive R e p o rt. A .C .T .U ., September 1955, 44 .
CHAPTER 4
INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL ACTION
1. Unions-in-Politics
The skilled workers* unions founded in Australian cities between 
1820 and 1850 devoted much of their resources to acting as benefit societ­
ies. By the end of the period, however, they were making increasing use 
of the strike in order to obtain wage concessions from employers. &t the 
same time, mainly through the independent action of individual unionists,
union views were pressed at political meetings and in political associations 
1of various kinds. Organized attempts to influence governments were occas-
2ionally made by way of demonstrations and petitions. From the late 18/0*s, 
when unionism began to cover a substantial and increasing number of semi­
skilled and unskilled workers, there were signs of a change in this pattern. 
Direct action was primarily relied on for the achievement of the chief 
union aim, the maintenance of wage rates. Political activity was usually 
regarded as outside the area of union methods. But, as Gollan points out, 
the drive towards closer union organization and the inevitable extension of 
union aims to include employment conditions and economic policy generally, 
gradually forced the unions into the political arena. *Up to 1885 the 
trade unions were moving slowly towards political action in spite of their
3protestations that they were unpolitical’.
Mainly during the ’eighties, but as early as the ’fifties in Victoria, 
’working class representatives’ were occasionally elected to parliament in 
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia, frequently with
1 See R.M. Hartwell, 'The Pastoral Ascendancy, 1820-50', in Australia: A 
Social and Political History (ed., Greenwood), 56-7
2 Hancock, Australia, 199-200; and see K.F. Walker, 'Australia*, in Compar­
ative Labor Movements (ed., Galenson), 174
3 K.A. Gollan, ’The Labour Movement and the Commonwealth, 1880-1900', in
Australia: A Social and Political History (ed. Greenwood), 155 _______
union endorsement and financial support. But direct parl­
iamentary representation was initially incidental to the central union
bodies1 efforts to obtain favourable legislation by direct pressure on the
4existing parties and government leaders. Nevertheless the matter soon 
came to the forefront. It was discussed and approved at the Inter-Colonial 
Trade Union Congresses of 1884 und 1886, and the parliamentary committees
formed in Sydney, Melbourne and, later, Adelaide showed increasing interest
. . . 5in it as a means of supplementing their pressure group functions. The
Secretary of the 4*outh Australian Trades and Labor Council indicated the 
increasing emphasis placed on activity in this field when he commented, af­
ter seven of nine endorsed candidates had been returned in the elections of
1887, 'the Council bids fair to become a powerful factor in determining the
£
choice of Parliamentary candidates’. The process was to be hastened by 
the experiences of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers’ unions organized 
on a large-scale during the ’eighties.
Up to 1890 these unions, particularly the miners* and the shearers’, 
had successfully used industrial action to obtain collective bargaining 
agreements with employers. But by 1890 the deteriorating economic situ­
ation had stiffened the employers' resistance. The first fruit of their 
resistance was the maritime strike that began in August 1890 and involved 
the pastoral, mining and transport industries. The unions were defeated 
on this occasion,, as they were in the later struggles of the shearers in 
1891, the Broken Hill miners in 1892 and the shearers again in 1894« A
vital factor in their defeat, as the unions recognized, was the action taken
by the governments concerned. Moreover, ’whilst we have no cause for
4 These tactics were especially successful in Victoria where good relations 
existed between the unions and governments: see Dveracker, The Australian 
Party System. 44-$
$ See June Phillip,’1890 - The Turning Point in Labour History?', (1950) 4 
Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand, 151; also Lloyd Ross,'The 
Role of Labour*, in Australia (ea., Lrrattah) 7 240 ,--------------- 6 S.O'Flaherty, The Labor Party In South Australia, 9
g r a t i tu d e  to  the  government1, the  Labor Defence Committee w rote a f t e r  th e
1890 d i l u t e ,  ’we have no reason  f o r  b e lie v in g  th a t  the  o p p o s itio n , had i t
7
been in  o f f i c e ,  would have a c te d  more f a i r l y * .  T h is , added to  th e  s h o r t­
comings re v e a le d  in  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t io n , was th e  c a ta ly s t  th a t  p r e c ip i ta te d  
th e  f u l l - s c a l e  in te rv e n tio n  o f the  unions in  p a rlia m e n ta ry  p o l i t i c s .
The r u le  th a t  tra d e  unionism  must s te e r  c le a r  o f p o l i t i c s ,  was a 
golden ru le  when th e re  was so much work to  be done w ith in  our p re ­
s e n t  i n d u s t r i a l  environm ents. But th a t  t i m e . . . i s  ra p id ly  draw ing to  
an end and e re  we can r a d ic a l ly  improve th e  l o t  o f the w orker we 
must secure  a s u b s ta n t ia l  r e p re s e n ta t io n  i n  P a rliam en t. ^
The ’golden ru le*  had p re v io u s ly  h e ld  only  to  th e  e x te n t t h a t  th e  un ions
had made no more than  h a lf -h e a r te d  a ttem p ts  to  form t h e i r  own p o l i t i c a l
Q
p a r ty .  The p r o je c t  was now, however, to  be embarked upon w ith  determ in­
a t io n .  The form i t  took  was to  ex tend  the  p o l i t i c a l  s t ru c tu re  c e n tre d  on
the  un ions in to  the  e le c to r a te s .
The seven th  In te r -C o lo n ia l  Trade Union Congress o f 1891 recommended
th a t  the  new p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n iz a tio n  should be e s ta b lis h e d  on a n a t io n a l  
10s c a le ,  b u t in  the  ev en t i t s  fo rm ation  was c a r r ie d  th rough in d ep en d en tly
11
in  each o f th e  c o lo n ie s . In  New South Wales and Q ueensland, th e  c e n t r a l  
un ion  bod ies had a lre a d y  begun to  o rgan ize p o l i t i c a l  branches e a r ly  in  1891. 
The combined unions in  V ic to r ia  and South A u s tra l ia  con tinued  to  nom inate 
t h e i r  own p a rlia m e n ta ry  can d id a te s  f o r  a tim e , no perm anent p o l i t i c a l  
branch o rg a n iz a tio n  being  s e t  up u n t i l  l a t e r  in  th e  decade. The co rresp o n d -
7 Quoted by G ollan , op. c i t . ,  165
8 QQoted by S u tc l i f f e ,  A H is to ry  of Trade Unionism in  A u s t r a l ia , 82n.
9 See G o llan , ’The Trade Unions and Labour P a r t i e s ,  1890-4* (1955), 7 Hisj>-= 
o r ic a l  S tu d ie s : A u s tra lia  and New Z ealand . 2 1 -2 .
10 QiiLla^, ’The Labour Movement and th e  Commonwealth, 1880-1900’op. c i t . ,  169
11 See O veracker, op. c i t . ,  63-75 . The t i t l e ,  ’A u s tra lia n  Labor P a r ty ’, was 
n o t o f f i c i a l l y  adopted  u n t i l  1918, when the  P a r ty ’ s F ed e ra l Conference 
a p p lie d  i t  n a t io n a l ly .  Before th e n , a v a r ie ty  o f names were u sed . The term  
’Labor*, as l a t e r  adopted , i s  used  in  the  p re s e n t  d is c u s s io n .
r -
ing  s t ru c tu re  was formed in  W estern A u s tra lia  and Tasmania fo llo w in g  f e d ­
e r a t io n .
From th e  time of th e  f i r s t  and resounding  success o f th e  new o rg an iz ­
a t io n  in  New South W ales, when t h i r t y - s i x  o f i t s  can d id a tes  were e le c te d  
a t  th e  1891 d ie c t io n s ,  i t  was c le a r  th a t  even as a m in o rity  group Labor 
p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  could  hope to  in flu en ce  governm ents. Up to  1900, w ith  
one m inor ex cep tio n , Labor d id  n o t form a government o f i t s  own, and i t  was 
r a r e ly  ab le  to  do so during  th e  f i r s t  y ears  o f the  new century* But Labor 
p a rlia m e n ta ry  groups were o f te n  ab le  to  ho ld  th e  balance between government 
and o p p o s itio n  p a r t i e s .  The t a c t i c  o f * sup p o rt in  r e tu rn  f o r  c o n ce ss io n s '
was most f r e q u e n tly  p ra c t ic a b le  and most e f f e c t iv e ly  employed in  New South
12
Wales and l a t e r  in  the  F ed e ra l P a rliam en t. I t s  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  in  th e  lo c a l
p a rliam en ts  d ec lin ed  a f t e r  th e  Commonwealths fo u n d a tio n  in  1901 and th e
t r a n s f e r  to  the F ed e ra l sphere o f the  t a r i f f  q u es tio n  which had been the
h h ie f  is su e  d iv id in g  th e  non-Labor groups.
In  New South W ales, non-Labor governments re ta in e d  o f f ic e  only  w ith
the  su p p o rt o f the  Labor group f o r  s ix  o f th e  te n  y ears  between 1891 and
13
1901, b u t never ag a in  under th ese  co n d itio n s  a f t e r  Ju ly  1901. V ic to r ia n  
Labor f i l l e d  the  same ro le  f o r  a t o t a l  o f n e a r ly  f iv e  y ears  between 1891 
and June 1902. The balance o f power t a c t i c  was le s s  in  evidence in  Queens­
la n d , where the Labor group c o n s t i tu te d  th e  o f f i c i a l  O pposition  as  e a r ly  as 
1896; b u t in  1893 and ag a in  between 1903 and 1906, Labor members took p a r t  
in  a c o a l i t io n  governm ent, w hile in  1908 th ey  k ep t a non-Labor government 
in  o f f ic e  f o r  e ig h t  m onths. In  South A u s tra lia  Labor members m ain ta ined  
th e  K ingston L ib e ra l Government in  o f f ic e  from 1893 to  1896, jo in e d  an
12 See M aurice B lackburn, 'The Labour P a r ty ' ,  in  Trends i n A u s tra lia n  
P o l i t i c s  (e d .,  Duncan), 3 -4
13 These d a te s ,  and those  fo llo w in g  in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  o th e r  S ta te s ,  a re  
e x tra c te d  from ta b le s  in  E v e re tt  M. C laspy , An A tla s  o f P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s  
in  A u s tra lia  and the  U nited  S ta te s .
e ig h te e n  m onth-old c o a l i t io n  government in  1899, and between 1905 and 1909
le d  a c o a l i t io n  government. In  W estern A u s tra l ia ,  a f t e r  a l a t e  e n try  in to
p a r lia m e n t a t  the  end of th e  1890’s ,  Labor formed a m in o rity  government in
1904 w ithou t ever having been ab le  to  fo llow  a balance of power p o lic y .
The adop tion  of p a rlia m e n ta ry  aims was a ls o  ta rd y  in  Tasmania, where Labor
members supported  a non-Labor government fo r  over a year between 1903 and
1904 b e fo re  farm ing a m in o rity  government of t h e i r  own in  1909.
The t a r i f f  q u estio n  remained to  d iv id e  th e  non-Labor groups in  th e
F e d e ra l P arliam en t fo r  some y ea rs  a f t e r  fe d e ra t io n . Labor formed only one
m in o rity  government du rin g  the  seven y ears  between May 1901, when th e  f i r s t
P a rliam en t m et, and November 1908, when th e  fo rm ation  of th e  f i r s t  F ish e r
Labor Government was fo llow ed by the  fu s io n  o f the  non-Labor g roups. But fo r
a l l  excep t seven months of th i s  p e r io d , Labor was ab le  to  enfo rce  a 'su p p o r t
in  re tu rn  fo r  c o n cess io n s ' p o lic y . 'Throughout th e se  years  i t  was Labour
14
th a t  was re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  tempo and d i r e c t io n  of s o c ia l  l e g i s l a t i o n '.
This p o lic y  had advan tages, b u t i t  was recognized  as a p re lim in a ry  to  
f u l l  c o n tro l o f the  government machine. The F e d e ra l Labor Conference d ec­
is io n  in  1908 th a t  th e  Commonwealth p a rlia m e n ta ry  group should no longer
15e n te r  in to  'a l l i a n c e s '  was an exp ression  of t h i s .  But in  any event moves 
by th e  non-Labor groups to  u n ite  in  th e  face  of L ab o r's  r i s i n g  e le c to r a l  
s tre n g th  made abandonment of th e  balance  of power t a c t i c  in e v i ta b le .  Thus 
Labor became th e  o f f i c i a l  O pposition  in  th e  F e d e ra l P arliam en t in  1909. In 
Queensland i t  had f i l l e d  th e  same p o s i t io n  s in c e  1896; in  W estern A u s tra lia  
s in ce  1901; in  New South Wales s in ce  1904; in  V ic to r ia  s in ce  1906; and in  
South A u s tra lia  and Tasmania Labor was the  o f f i c i a l  O pposition  by 1909.
14 C risp , The Pa r l i a m entary Government of th e  Commonwea l th  of  A u s t r a l ia , 98
15 E v a tt, A u s tra lia n  Labour L eader, 222
The five years from 1910 were the years of Labor's triumph. By the end 
of 1915 there were majority Labor governments in the Commonwealth and five 
of the six States. The first in the Commonwealth, New South Wales and 
South Australia were elected in 1910; Western Australia followed suit in 
1911, Tasmania in 1914 and Queensland in 1915. Only Victoria was omitted, 
and here Labor had to wait until after the second world war.
But the years of triumph were also years of disillusion for many. The 
battle for power through the ballot box had been won. In the process, how­
ever, the demands of the electoral system had forced the moderation of union 
policies at the political level, and Labor governments soon made it plain 
that they were prepared to go neither as far nor as fast to satisfy union
aspirations as had been hoped.
- - - 0O0 - - -
It has been claimed that from the start the unions regarded party-pol­
itical action as merely a temporary expedient enabling the 'protection of
16their past gains' until such time as they recovered their industrial wind. 
But between 1890 and 1900 at least, there seems little reason to doubt that 
unionists in the eastern mainland colonies were inclined to regard party- 
political action as something more than this. It was natural that the dis­
astrous failure of the strike weapon should be followed by a search for a 
substitute. It was equally natural, especially in a period of economic 
depression, that once the substitute was found, the hopes shattered by the 
failure of industrial action should be transferred wholeheartedly to it. 
Thus: 'Political action was welcomed by the Labour Movement in 1890-91 as
17a panacea, as a simple and single recipe for the regeneration of society'.
The consequent 'tendency unduly to decry industrial weapons and exalt
16 Fitzpatrick, A Short History of the Australian Labor Moveirent, 99.
17 June Phillipp, op. cit., 153.
p o l i t i c a l ’ may n o t have la s t e d  in  so extreme a form once experience had
’sob ered  those lab o u r o p tim is ts  who saw in  o rg an ised  b a t ta l io n s  of work-
18
ingmen v o te rs  an in s tru m en t f o r  su b ju g a tin g  c a p i t a l ’. Yet even to  the  
sobered  o p tim is t ,  the  fav o u rab le  l e g i s l a t i o n  o b ta ined  over th i s  p e r io d , and 
l a t e r ,  by Labor p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  who were n o t in  o f f ic e ,  no t only  gave a 
prom ise o f what could  be gained  from p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n  b u t c le a r ly  achieved  
more th an  m erely the  p ro te c t io n  of p a s t  union g a in s . In  th ese  te n  years  
’p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n  secured  f o r  tra d e  unionism  n o t only  the  re c o g n itio n  bu t
even th e  fav o u r o f the S t a t e . . .  (jandj secured  f o r  working men advantages
19
which th ey  could  n o t have won by the  most trium phant d i r e c t  a c tio n * . Sp 
i t  seemed to  the  h i s to r ia n ,  and so i t  may w e ll have seemed to  many tra d e  
u n io n is t s .  M oreover, by the  tim e the  r e l a t i v e ly  slow advance o f S ta te  
Labor to  government o f f ic e  became te d io u s , th e  e a r ly  success of F ed e ra l 
Labor in  1904 ’ seemed l i t t l e  le s s  than  a p o r te n t  -  an in d ic a t io n  o f alm ost
m agical a b i l i t y  and success on the p a r t  o f Labor w ith in  the  F ed era l a ren a* •
Added to  t h i s  was th e  le s s  c re d ita b le  b u t d o u b tless  s ig n i f ic a n t  in flu en ce  of
p o l i t i c a l l y  am bitious un ion  le a d e rs  whose in t e r e s t s  la y  in  fo s te r in g  the
view th a t  ’ the  p a rlia m e n ta ry  a rena  was th e  b a ttle g ro u n d  whereon q u e s tio n s
21v i t a l l y  a f f e c t in g  the  in te r e s t s  o f Labour should  be s e t t l e d ’ •
On th e  o th e r  hand, w hile  th e re  was p robab ly  w idespread acceptance o f '*■ 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n  a s  being a t  l e a s t  th e  p r in c ip a l  means of ach iev in g  th e i r  
aim s, th e  un ions had le s s  reaso n  to  be c o n te n t w ith  th e  in s tru m en ts  a t  t h e i r  
d is p o s a l .  They had la rg e ly  p rovided  th e  i n i t i a l  im petus necessa ry  to  
launch Labor’s p o l i t i c a l  m achine, bu t i t  was soon apparen t th a t  the  machine 
was to  be som ething more th an  t h e i r  c re a tu re . In  New South Wales and
18 V ic to r  S . C la rk , The Labour Movement in  A u s t r a la s ia , 63 ^  l i b r a r y  'V-
19 Hancock, op. c i t . ,  203
20 W.A. Holman, quoted  by E v a t t ,  op. c i t . ,  220 V ^ a/versy^ ^ '
21 S c o t t ,  A u s tra l ia  During the War, O f f ic ia l  War H is to ry , v o l. X I, 658
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Queensland in particular, where the unions had launched into political
action earliest and with greatest vigour, they had soon lost ground in the
22organization to the parliamentarians and the political branches. In 1906 
an observer was able to state in general terms that the political organiz­
ation ’has not superseded trade unions, though it has made them subsidiary
23 24
to party organisation’• The ’lessening power and prestige1 of the unions
after 1890 occurred not only in relation to their position in the industrial
community but also in relation to the political machine to which they had
primarily given birth.
At the same time, Labor’s parliamentarians had emerged as individuals 
’with interests and ideas of their own that did not always coincide with those 
of their supporters outside parliament, and often varied among themselves. 
The young party devoted a great deal of energy to struggles with its parl­
iamentarians over their acceptance of the party pledge and the disciplined
25action that it implied. Equally important in the long-run was the question,
also involved in these struggles, of the parliamentarians’ responsiveness
to the policies advocated by the party organizations and by their steady
supporters in the unions. Here again, the parliamentarians were often
prepared to put political advantage or their own convictions before union 
26wishes. By 1915 it was abundantly clear that the adoption of a party plat­
form and its application by majority Labor governments were two quite diff­
erent things. Union reactions to the comparatively cautious legislative 
programmes of Labor governments were all the more extreme because of the
great hopes that had been placed in Labor’s achieving control of government.
22 See Childe, How Labour Governs. $5-7; Overacker, op. cit., 69-70; Gollan, 
<*The Trade Unions and Labour Parties, 1890-4*, op.cit., 34
23 Clark, op. cit., 63
24 Evatt, op. cit., 134
2$ See Overacker, op. cit., 54-62, 68-9, 73
26 See, e.g., Childe, op. cit., 57; Overacker, op. cit., 70-1
•P erhaps* , C hilde commented, * t h e i r  su p p o rte rs  d id  n o t a p p re c ia te  the
d i f f i c u l t i e s  th a t  con fron ted  t h e i r  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s ,  b u t th ey  c e r ta in ly
27
had cause to  be d isap p o in ted * •
These c o n s id e ra tio n s  added f u e l  to  the  growing d i s t r u s t  o f p o l i t i c i a n s ,  
ihe su ccessiv e  d e s e r t io n s  o f the  Queensland Labor le a d e rs  K idston and K err 
in s p ire d  a p r e s id e n t ia l  d e n ig ra tio n  of the  breed  in  g en e ra l a t  th e  1907 
S ta te  Conference:
Once you allow  the  p o l i t i c i a n  to  boss th e  show, he w i l l  give away 
ev ery th in g  to  save h im se lf , because he b e lie v e s  h im se lf in d isp e n s ­
ab le  to  the  show, and in  f a c t  ends by becoming the show h im se lf , 
and making a ho ly  show of the r e s t  o f u s .  28
Union d i s t r u s t  was e v id en t in  the  re c e p tio n  g iven  the  e a r ly  wartime propos­
a l ,  em anating from Labor p o l i t i c a l  q u a r te r s ,  f o r  th e  e s tab lish m en t o f an 
A u s tra lia n  Trade Union F e d e ra tio n  -  a * cunning ly  dev ised  scheme by a few 
w ily  p o l i t i c i a n s  to  hobb le , bind and shack le  th e  unions^? The u n io n s ’ 
a t t i t u d e ,  and th e i r  p o s i t io n  up to  1915 in  th e  New South Wales p a r ty  machine 
a t  l e a s t ,  i s  f u r th e r  i l l u s t r a t e d  by th e  h is to r y  o f the  p ro p o sa l f o r  a ru le  
d e b a rrin g  p a rlia m e n ta r ian s  from membership o f th e  S ta te  E xecu tive . The 
p ro p o sa l was r e je c te d  by the  19*10 Conference b u t c a r r ie d  by th a t  o f 1916, 
f o r  which the  u n io n s , goaded beyond endurance, had s e t t l e d t h e i r  d if f e re n c e s
and formed a t ig h tly -o rg a n iz e d  ‘i n d u s t r i a l  sec tion*  which enabled  them to
30
dominate p ro ceed in g s .
The in c re a s in g  c o n f l i c t  between the  p o l i t i c i a n s  and the bulk  o f the
unions up to  1915 cannot be ex p la in ed  w holly in  term s o f  a ’r e v o l t  a g a in s t  
31
p o l i t ic a l is m * . Union le a d e r s ’ m otives v a r ie d .  For many, the  c o n f l i c t
a ro se  le s s  from a b e l i e f  in  the f u t i l i t y  o f p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n  than  from a
27 C h ilde , op. c i t . ,  33
28 Quoted by C h ilde , i b i d . ,  24-$
29 I b id . ,  113
30 See O veracker, op. c i t . ,  116-7
31 C hilde , op. c i t . ,  114
belief that control of Labor*s parliamentary representatives was not close 
enough, or that Labor had the wrong political leaders. In these cases the 
aim was to dominate the party machine in order to control or replace the 
politicians. Nevertheless, the failure to achieve the more radical union 
aims by parliamentary methods clearly led many unionists to conclude that 
the methods themselves, and not merely the politicians, were at fault. To 
those union leaders initially unaware of the compromises necessary, and 
temperamentally unsuited to accept the devious procedures involved, it 
seemed that the promise of political action had been false. Labor goveri*- 
ments often appeared to act no differently from other governments, and Lab­
or parliamentarians often appeared more ready to condemn than to support 
union claims.
So long as the economic situation was unfavourable there was little to 
be done. But once the unions were in a sounder industrial position, the 
rising distaste for political action manifested itself not only in resort 
to direct action, but also in more determined moves to unify the trade union 
movement. For many unionists the formation of the first Australian Indus­
trial Workers of the World clubs in 1907, and the *wobblies* doctrine of 
industrial action by a closely-organized trade union movenE nt, provided a
ready-made * ideal of emancipation alternative to the somewhat threadbare
32
Fabianism of the Labor Party*. For others, however, disillusionment with 
political action did not mean its abandonment. But it did mean an increas­
ing awareness of unionism* s need to put its own house in order as a means 
of supplementing, if not supplanting, the activities of the politicians - a 
trend that received its greatest impetus from the politicians* disregard of 
union opinion on the conscription issue in 1916.
32 Ibid., 172
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2. The Reaction to Party Politics
The split in the Australian Labor Party (k.L.P.) over conscription 
produced among the unions two reactions whichwere to some extent 
contradictory.
In the first place, the unions, united on a non-industrial issue to 
an extent rarely evident before or since, exerted their combined weight on 
and within the A.L.P. to discipline Labor's political leaders. In the 
process, they enlarged their influence within the Party machine. Added 
to the re-assertion of their traditional allegiance to the Party, this was 
enough to ensure that they would continue, at least for a time, to rally 
strongly to the standard in the name of solidarity - apart altogetherflrom 
the motives of those union leaders who spied the prospect of a political 
career in the newly-vacated places in Labor's parliamentary representation.
This change of attitude was brought out in the report of a sub-committee 
of the Tasmanian Workers Political League, the name of the State Party at 
that time. The sub-committee had been appointed in July 1916 to discuss 
with unions a 'closer unity' scheme modelled on the Western Australian Lab­
or organization. Its report, presented in January 1917 a few weeks after 
the conscription referendum,referred to the unions' initially cool reception 
of the proposal, and gave some reasons:
It was plain that large and increasing numbers of unionists were 
inclined to regard political activity as comparatively unimportant. 
There was dissatisfaction with the attitude of some members of the 
Parliamentary Labor party towards questions affecting the unions, 
and there seemed to be a good deal of disappointment at the general 
results of the Labor Government's term of office.There is evidence 
that this attitude was fast developing into active hostility to 
the Labor party. ^
But this was before the conscription split. The subsequent change in the
Tasmanian unions' attitude to closer organization, so the sub-committee 
1 Hobart Daily Post. 12/1/1917
c laim ed , was a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f the a n t i - c o n s c r ip t io n  campaign:
The referendum  f i g h t . . . c l e a r ly  showed bo th  the  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  and 
the  p o l i t i c a l  u n io n is ts  t h a t  in  time o f r e a l  Labor danger th e  a c t iv e  
co -o p e ra tio n  of the two s e c tio n s  was n o t o n ly  p o s s ib le ,  bu t n a tu r a l  
and v e ry  n ecessa ry . I t  was a lso  made p la in  by th e  numerous d e fe c tio n s  
o f h i th e r to  t r u s te d  Labor P a rlia m e n ta r ia n s  t h a t  the  danger to  Labor 
was even g re a te r  th an  had been supposed, and l i k e l y  to  be o f such 
continuous n a tu re  as  to  re q u ire  th e  ve ry  c lo s e s t  and most perm anent 
s o l id a r i t y  p o s s ib le  between a l l  s e c tio n s  o f the  w o rk in g -c la ss  
movement. 2 3456
At the  same tim e , i t  was in e v i ta b le  t h a t  th e  perform ance o f Labor 
p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  in  the c o n sc r ip tio n  d isp u te  should  re in fo rc e  e a r l i e r  sus­
p ic io n s , w ith  the  r e s u l t  t h a t  'a n  im p l ic i t  d i s t r u s t  o f p o l i t i c i a n s  was
3
perm anently  in tro d u ced  in to  th e  p a r ty  m achine1.
The second r e a c t io n  was a tendency on th e  p a r t  o f many un ion  le a d e rs  
to  reg a rd  the  c o n sc r ip tio n  d isp u te  as f i n a l  co n firm a tio n  o f the  f u t i l i t y  
o f p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n *  and to  tu rn  t h e i r  a t t e n t io n  more de term inded ly  to  
in d u s t r ia l  a c tio n  and o rg a n iz a tio n . Those who s h i f t e d  in  th i s  d i r e c t io n
4
jo in ed  w ith  o th e rs  wedded to  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t io n  on more d o c tr in a i r e  grounds. 
E rn es t S c o tt saw the  in c re a se d  in d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  o f the  l a t e r  war y ea rs  
as flow ing a t  l e a s t  p a r t ly  from the  1v io le n t  p sy c h o lo g ic a l re a c tio n s*  r e ­
s u l t in g  from the  1in te n se  b i t t e r n e s s  o f f e e l in g  evoked du rin g  th e  two con-
5
s c r ip t io n  campaigns*. M oreover, th e  s p e c ta c u la r  su ccess  o f th e  co a l miners*’
s t r ik e  in  November 1^16, and th e  subsequent su ccess  o f a  number o f sm a lle r
s t r ik e s ,  * in s p ire d  a g e n e ra l b e l i e f  in  th e  e f f ic a c y  o f d i r e c t  a c t io n ’ which
was only  brought in to  q u e s tio n  w ith  the  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  g re a t  t r a n s p o r t  s tr ik e
6
of September  1917.
2 Ib id .^ h e  re fe re n c e  to  ’p o l i t i c a l  u n io n is t s '  as opposed to  ' i n d u s t r i a l i s t s '  
in d ic a te s  a d iv is io n  o f a t t i t u d e  among th e  un io n s  which i s  always p re s e n t, 
I t s  e x is te n c e  i s  im p l ic i t  th ro ughou t th e  p re s e n t  d is c u s s io n , and i s  d is ­
cussed below.
3 Rawson, The O rg an iza tio n  o f th e  A u s tra l ia n  Labor P a r ty , 1916-1941. 190
4 See Greenwood, 'A u s t r a l ia  a t  War 1 9 1 4 -1 8 ', in  A u s t r a l i a ; A S o c ia l and 
P o l i t i c a l  H is to ry  ( e d . ,  Greenwood), 282
5 S c o tt ,  A u s tra l ia  During th e  War, O f f i c ia l  War H is to ry , v o l .  XI, 665 > 683
6 G hilde, How Labour G overns, 178
On the other hand, while many unionists may not have regarded indus­
trial action with any great favour - particularly after the transport strike- 
- or were in no position to use the strike effectively, they did regard 
political activities with increased indifference once the crisis had passed. 
The Tasmanian unions, for example, were industrially much weaker than their 
counterparts in the mainland States. As we have seen, they had accepted 
the scheme for closer organization with the political machine under the 
spur of the conscription crisis. But the joint organization, the Tasman­
ian Labor Federation, set up in January 1917 was formally dissolved barely 
a year later, after the unions withdrew on the ground that the Federation 
had approached industrial questions in terms of political considerations.
The Federations President, a member of the State Parliament, noted at the 
wixling-up conference that * there seemed to be some difficulty between the 
political and industrial arms of the movement1, and plaintively announced
that 'he could not understand why there should be any such antagonism by
7the industrial section towards the politicians*.
Union leaders who saw salvation in industrial action and many of those 
who, while less certain that salvation lay in this direction, were at least 
disillusioned with political action, found common ground in the belief that 
the union movement should be more tightly organized - the industrial action- 
ists blaming lack of organization for the f ailure of the 1917 transport 
strike. During the greater part of the * twenties unionists were primarily 
concerned with the question of closer union organization. Thus the All- 
Australian Trade Union Congress, convened by the A.L.P. Federal Executive 
in 1921 for the purpose of discussing relations between the unions and the 
Party, concerned itself not with this question but with proposals for the
formation of One Big Union. Union leaders were not of one mind on either 
7 Hobart Daily Post, 9/5/1918 8 Rawson, op. cit., 43
die need for unified industrial organization or the form such organization 
9
should take. But, especially in the years when the A.L.P. was licking its
conscription battle wounds, the contrast between the apparent stagnation
of Labor’s political wing and the hopeful struggle to unify the trade union
movement turned many union leaders away from political activities.
Many of the most important union officials in New South Wales had 
walked out of the A.L.P. in 1919 {when the A.W.Ü. secured control) 
and, so far from anxiously trying to get back, were devoting their 
t me either to union activities, or in some cases, to the negotiat­
ions which produced the Communist Party of Australia. In other States, 
the unions remained attached to the A.L.P. but without any particular 
enthusiasm. 0
However, it is equally apparent that the bulk of union leaders did no 
more than flirt with the idea that they should withdraw from political act­
ivities altogether. Labor governments might often be unsatisfactory, but
11they ware not entirely worthless. The leftward trend in A.L.P. policies, 
notably the adoption of the socialization objective, was attributable larger 
to those union leaders who were at the same time trying to re-shape and 
strengthen the trade union movement itself. And control of the A.L.P. 
machine was something the same leaders considered worth fighting for, as 
was shown in the bitter^struggles waged during the »twenties and ’thirties 
for control of the New South Wales Party machine. On the industrial side, 
national unity of a sort was achieved with the formation of the A.C.T.U. in 
1927, and there was hope that the great Federal unions might achieve a coher­
ence of purpose at t he industrial level which had previously been lacking. 
Through the A.C.T.U. the unions could also hope to reduce the dominant pos­
ition enjoyed by the political wing, and particularly by the Federal Parlia­
mentary Labor Party, in the formation of Labor policy at the Federal level,
9 See Chapter 3
10 Rawson, op. cit., 43
11 See Greenwood, op. cit., 289
r o
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s in ce  1901. But th ese  advances were s t i l l  f o r  th e  fu tu r e ;  and a lthough  
le s s  f a i t h  was p laced  in  th e  e f f ic a c y  o f p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n , th e re  was s t i l l  
more th a n  a g ra in  of t r u th  in  the a s s e r t io n s  o f an American o b serv er w r i t ­
ing  in  1928.
There i s  no q u e s tio n  th a t  the p o l i t i c a l  m achinery i s  th e  more im port­
a n t p r iz e  to  c ap tu re ; no q u es tio n  th a t  th e  s te p  so commonly tak en  
from un ion  o f f i c i a l  to  P a rliam e n ta ria n  i s  co n sid ered  a prom otion; no 
q u e s tio n  th a t  the aeb a te s  in  the  P a rty  conven tions a re  reg a rd ed  more 
s e r io u s ly  than  those  in  tra d e s  C ouncils and t r a d e  un ion  co n g resses ;
3-ftd l i t t l e  doubt a lso  t h a t  the o rd in a ry  workman ex pec ts  to  g a in  more 
by th e  trium ph o f h is  P a r ty  than  by the  c lo s e r  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f h is  
u n io n .
Events in  the  succeeding decade, however, were g r e a t ly  to  le s s e n  the  fo rc e  
of th i s  s ta te m e n t.
The rec o rd  o f S ta te  Labor governments d u rin g  the  1920*s had n o t been
a l to g e th e r  u n s a t i s f a c to ry  from the  union p o in t  o f v iew . N e v e rth e le ss , a t
the A ll-A u s tra l ia n  Trade Union Congress o f 1927, a t  which the A .C.T.U . was
form ed, a number o f speakers  echoed the view th a t  »in New South W ales, Queens-
land  and South A u s tra l ia ,  we had the  p o l i t i c a l  s e c tio n s  whose views were as
wide a p a r t  from the I n d u s t r ia l  Movement as the  two p o le s» . * In  New South
Wales and Q ueensland,Labor governments were in  o f f ic e  a t  the  tim e . The
South A u s tra l ia n  Labor Government had been d e fe a te d  ab the  p o l l s  a  month
e a r l i e r  »due e n t i r e ly * ,  J .S .G arden  su g g ested , »to the  f e e l in g  e x is t in g  be-
15
tween the Labour Council and th e  P a rliam en ta ry  P a r ty ’ -  the bad f e e l in g  th a t
d id  e x i s t  being  t e s t i f i e d  to  in  f o r th r ig h t  term s by South A u s tra lia n  d e le -
16
g a te s  to  th e  C ongress. In  V ic to r ia  r e la t io n s  form ed w hile th e  P a r ty  was
17ou t o f power were *a l i t t l e  more happy*. Events d u rin g  the d e p re ss io n
U  see c r i s p ,  Thd A u s tra lia n  F ed era l Labour P a r ty . 1901-1951. 188; C h ild e , 
op. c i t . ,  43
13 C a r te r  G oodrich, »The A u s tra lia n  and American Labour Movements* (1928)
4 Economic Record 196-7
14 O f f ic ia l  R ep o rt. A ll A u s tra lia n  Trade Union C ongress, May 1927, 10.
15 I b i d . ,  8 .
16 I b id . ,  8 , 10.
17 I b id . ,  10.
years were to poison still further the relationship between political and 
industrial wings, and to dash even the mildest union hopes in the useful­
ness of political action.
The union leaders who in 1930 ‘recognized an unfortunate tendency on*
the part of tabor Parliamentary Parties to sink principle for expediency1
saw final confirmation of their view in the reception most Labor governments
gave the Premiers* Plan, the anti-depression policy adopted by the Premiers1
conference of June 1931« Proposing wage-reductions for government employees
and cuts in social services expenditure, the plan was ‘substantially the pol-
19
icy of Labour’s opponents*. It was formally accepted by the four Labor
governments of the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia
that were in power at the time, and conscientiously put into effect by all
except J.T. Lang‘s Government in New South Wales. In the eyes of many
unionists, Lang’s stubborn resistance stamped him as the only one of Labor’s
political leaders who had ’managed to preserve an independent and defiant
20
working-class point of view’. His dismissal from office by the State Gov­
ernor for acting in defiance of the law, and the electorate’s endorsement of 
the Governor’s action, constituted the most disastrous example of the short­
comings of political action for union leaders, the great majority of whom 
opposed the Premiers’ Plan.
The near-adulation unionists showered on Lang because of his stand on 
the plan and his previous record as Premier, ensured him the support of most 
of the New South Wales unions in his five-year fight against the A.L.P. Fed­
eral Conference decision of 1931 to depose him from leadership of the State 
Party machine. Earlier, in 1927, widespread union support had enabled him
18 Minutes, A.C.T.U., Conference of Key Unions, September 1930, 13
19 Partridge, ’Depression and War 1929-50’, in Australia: A Social and Pol­
itical History (ed., Greenwood), 363
20 Ibid., 362
to  g a in  a lm ost ab so lu te  c o n tro l o f a  S ta te  P a rliam en ta ry  Labor P a r ty  th a t  
was an y th ing  bu t u n ite d  behind him. By 1936, however, Lang’ s p e rso n a l 
power w ith in  the  P a rty  machineAm a te r ia l ly  d im in ished  the u n io n s ’ r o l e .
When he began to  encroach on the unions th em selves, t h e i r  su p p o rt tu rn ed  
to  o p p o s itio n , and th ey  opened the  long  and b i t t e r  campaign n e ce ssa ry  to  
break h is  g r ip .  Union d i s t r u s t  o f p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  again  appeared  j u s t i ­
f i e d ,  t h i s  time in  a q u a r te r  where i t  had been l e a s t  e v id e n t . ’A f te r  t h i s
d ish e a rte n in g  experience the union o f f i c i a l s  seem to  have l o s t  hope o f f in d -
21m g  any c u t and d r ie d  way of c o n tro l l in g  the  p o l i t i c i a n s  ’ .
3• P o l i t i c a l  A ction R e - in te rp re te d
During the  d ep ress io n  and the  le a n  y ears  t h a t  fo llow ed , the  ho p e less­
ness o f u s in g  the s t r ik e  weapon on any s ig n i f ic a n t  s c a le  was p la in  to  a l l  
a m in o rity  oi union o f f i c i a l s  wedded to  i n d u s t r i a l  a c tio n  on d o c tr in a ir e  
grounds. The view th a t  p u re ly  in d u s t r i a l  methods were the on ly  way ’to
d ea l w ith  economic q u estio h s  between employer and employee' may have made 
1
sense in  1927. I t  d id  n o t make sense in  the  ’hungry t h i r t i e s ’ . In  1931
and ag a in  in  1934 the A.C.T.U. Congress r e je c te d  p ro p o sa ls  f o r  an immediate
g e n e ra l s t r i k e .  ’The b e s t  th in g  th a t  could  be done’ , as one d e le g a te  p u t
i t ,  was ’to  c a r ry  on as b e s t  we could  and g a in  s tre n g th  r a th e r  th an  d is s ip a te
2
our energy  in  a G eneral S tr ik e  th a t  would f a i l ’ . At th e  same tim e , th e  reco ­
mmendation of the  1934 Congress to  th e  ’whole wage—and—s a la ry  c la s s  to  un­
c o n d it io n a lly  s e le c t ,  and the  e n fra n ch ise d  to  e l e c t ,  on ly  wage—c la s s  can d i- 
d a te s  in  every  c o n stitu en c y  to  the a d m in is tr a t io n  o f Government’ , was c le a r ­
ly  no answer to  the  immediate problems of a tra d e  union movement faced  w ith  
21 Raws on, ’The O rgan ization  o f th e  A .L .P .' (A.N.TI,) Seminar p a p e r ) ,  7
1 M inutes, A ll A u s tra lia n  Trade Union C ongress, May 1927 , 10
M inutes. A.C.T.U. S p e c ia l C ongress, February  1931, 34 
3 M inutes, A ll A u s tra lian  Trade union C ongress, October 1934> 27
non-Labor governments everywhere ex cep t in  Queensland, W estern A u s tra lia  
and Tasmania. Something more was n e ce ssa ry  i f  the  unions were to  hope to  
fu n c tio n  ad eq u a te ly . P o l i t i c a l  Labor, excep t in  Q ueensland, was on ly  spor­
a d ic a l ly  and tem p o ra rily  in  o f f ic e ;  in d u s t r i a l  Labor was c o n tin u a lly  in  
o f f ic e .  And the  unions always faced  governments whose p o l i c i e s ,  w hatever 
t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c o lo u r, p layed  a m ajor p a r t  in  de term in in g  the  r ig h t s  and 
rew ards o f tra d e  union  members.
P o l i t i c a l  a c tio n  by the  u n io n s , in  th e  sen se  o f f r e e  p re ssu re -g ro u p
a c t i v i t y  w hatever the  n a tu re  of th e  government of the  day, i s  as o ld  as trade
4 5
union ism . I t  was an e a r ly  fe a tu re  o f A u s tra lia n  tra d e  unionism . But, as
Maurice B lackburn r u e f u l ly  rem arked, th i s  was befo re  A u s tra lia n  tra d e  unions 
embarked on 1independent p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n 1 and c re a te d  t h e i r  own p a r ty .  
P a r t i c u la r ly  in  the Labor P a r ty ’s fo rm ative  y e a rs , the p re v a le n t un ion  a t t i ­
tude was to  expect no co o p era tio n  from non-Labor governm ents, and to  give 
none. Union a s p ir a t io n s  were to  be r e a l iz e d  when p o l i t i c a l  Labor c o n t r o l l ­
ed the  5 ia te  m achinery. In  the meantime, th e  un ions were o f te n  ab le  to  
e x e r t  in d i r e c t  p re ssu re  on non-Labor governments where Labor p o l i t i c i a n s  
h e ld  th e  p a rliam en ta ry  balance of power. At th e  l e a s t ,  those  same p o l i t ­
ic ia n s  gave them a voice in  p a r lia m e n t. Even when experience  had tem pered 
the  hopes p laced  in  p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ,  th e  doubt rem ained w hether inde­
pendent n e g o tia tio n  w ith  non-Labor governments was com patible w ith  a lleg ian ce  
to  th e  Labor P a r ty , a doubt which i t  was in  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f Labor p o l i t ic ia n s  
to  encourage. M oreover, the  very  f a c t  o f t h a t  a lle g ia n c e  tended  to  harden 
th e  a t t i t u d e  o f non-Labor government le a d e rs  a g a in s t  un ion  approaches.. 
E s p e c ia l ly  a t  the S ta te  l e v e l ,  approaches were made and re c e iv e d , b u t th ey
4 See Webb, The H is to ry  o f Trade Unionism, 4 6 f f .
5 See S ec tio n  1 above.
6 B lackburn, Trade Unionism (V ic to r ia n  Labor C o lle g e ) , 13
were much less common and usually more formal than was to be the case after 
the second world war.
It was during the 1 thirties that union leaders in general showed signs
of reaching towards a new view of political action, a view that seemed to
provide the only way out of the dilemma arising from the unions' inability
to use effectively either direct action or Labor's political machine as a
means of ameliorating their problems. The A.C.T.U. Congress of 1934,
faced with a npn-Labor Federal government and a need to secure a number of
vital amendments to legislation, turned down a general strike proposal and
called for greater support for Labor's parliamentary candidates. But as
far as immediate action was concerned, the Secretary, C.Crofts, suggested
that 'influence could be brought to bear on Members of Parliament, both Lab- 
7
or and anti-Labor'. Another delegate agreed cautiously that 'it was poss-g
ible to force antagonistic Governments to do something*,
Crofts' suggestion was revealing in its emphasis on individual parlia­
mentarians rather than on the government itself: the A.C.T.U. no longer cofa- 
cerns itself with individual parliamentarians rather than cabinet ministers. 
In more general terms, these views indicated that at least some union lead­
ers were facing the fact that political action, if it was to be utilized on 
as wide a scale as possible, meant more than merely biding time until a 
swing of the electoral pendulum sent Labor to the government benches. The 
attempt to influence a non-Labor government could and should be made, even 
if there was only a faint hope of extracting concessions from such a govern­
ment. This change of attitude was inevitable once it became completely 
clear that, Queensland apart, Labor could not hope to monopolize the govern­
ment benches. Moreover, even if non-Labor governments could be expected
7 Minutes, All Australian Trade Union Congress, October 1934, 28. My emphasis
8 Ibid
to concede little in the way of new legislation or new policies, there was 
a field in which some cooperationccmld be expected with more justification.
Favourable legislation and policies established under Labor governments 
were often accepted by succeeding non-Labor governments. But acceptance 
was not always enough. The question ofodministration was of equal import­
ance. The distinction is of importance even in relation to a Labor govern­
ment. The President of the A.C.T.U., A.E.Monk, was to show that the unions1
recognized it when he pointed out to the Curtin Labor Ministry in 1942 that
the unions’ ’quarrel was not with policy; it was a quarrel with the adminis-
9tration of that policy’• Recognition of the importance of this distinction 
led naturally to the conclusion that the unions should seek regular channels 
through which they could make their views heard on the daily questions of 
administration. Only acceptance of this conclusion could have been behind 
the resolution, clearly union-inspired, that was carried by the A.L.P. Fed­
eral Conference in 1936 when a non-Labor Federal government was in office;
’on the appointment of any Board, Commission or Trust by Parliament, it 
shall be the duty of the Labor members to press for adequate representation
of the trade union movament, with due regard to the rights of the union or 
10unions concerned*. In similar vein, the A.C.T.U. had suggested to the 
Scullin Labor Government in 1930 the formation of an Economic Council includ­
ing union representatives, and with the functions of «conducting a survey of
the Commonwealth’s economic resources and allocating credit for their dev- 
11elopment. But more significant was the demand made directly to a non-Lab­
or government by the All Australian Trade Union Congress in 1937, and re­
affirmed in 1939: ’Adequate representation for the organised workers upon
9 Report. Convention of Federal Unions called by the Federal Government, 
June 1942, 20.
10 Quoted by Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 1901-^951 * 286
11 Report. A.C.T.U. Committee on Unemployment, February 1930, 1.
any body th a t  may be e s ta b lis h e d  to  d ea l w ith  wages, h o u rs , o r p r ic e s ,  and
12
S o c ia l Insurance and N atio n al Economy* 1 23.
The im petus to  acceptance o f a p o lic y  o f t h i s  n a tu re  i n i t i a l l y  came 
from the  alm ost complete breakdown during  th e  1 t h i r t i e s  o f th e  u se fu ln e ss  
o f p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n  to  th e  unions and th e  p a r a l l e l  e f f e c t  of economic 
d ep ress io n  on t h e i r  in d u s t r i a l  s t r e n g th .  But the  f a c t  t h a t  a fundam ental 
and more l a s t in g  change in  union  a t t i tu d e s  was invo lved  was to  be re v e a le d  
in  the  even more v igorous a s s e r t io n  o f the  same claim s a f t e r  th e  adven t of 
a  w orld war and, l a t e r ,  economic p ro s p e r i ty  had g r e a t ly  enhanced the  tra d e
union m ovem ents in d u s t r i a l  s t r e n g th .13
( l i brary
4« The C urren t Scope of Union A ction < ^ i v e r s \ V ( ^
The in d u s t r i a l  s tre n g th  o f the  A u s tra lia n  tra d e  un ion  movement has 
probab ly  been g re a te r  in  th e  y ears  s in ce  1939 th an  ev er be fo re  in  i t s  h i s t ­
o ry . Where n ecessa ry , i t  has used th a t  s t r e n g th  to  en fo rce  i t s  c la im s by 
d i r e c t  in d u s t r ia l  a c t io n . At the same tim e , la r g e ly  because o f th e  unions*
in d u s t r ia l  s tre n g th , non-Lqbor governments have shown a new re a d in e ss  -
1
even eagerness -  to  o b ta in  the co o p era tio n  o f the  un ion  movement. For th e i r
p a r t  the unions have been p repared  to  c o n su lt w ith  such governments on a
2
sca le  undream t o f  before  the  ’t h i r t i e s .  This has n o t invo lved  the  unions 
renouncing t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  a lle g ia n c e  to  the  A .L .P . The c h o ice , as viewed 
by most union  le a d e r s ,  i s  n o t a m a tte r  o f ex c lu s iv e  a l te rn a tiv e s . I t  i s  n o t, 
as has been sug g ested , a q u e s tio n  o f the  tra d e  un ion  movement s u b s t i tu t in g  
’the  ro le  of the  u n a ttach ed  p re s  sure-g roup  and uncommitted a d v is e r  o f succ­
e ss iv e  Governments o f a l l  p o l i t i c a l  c o lo u rs ’ f o r  ’ i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  ro le  of
12 M inutes, A ll A u s tra lian  Trade Union C ongress, March 1939> 16
13 See C hapter 10
1 For a f u l l  d is c u ss io n  on government a t t i t u d e s ,  see C hapter 10.
2 For q u a l i f ic a t io n s  to  th i s  broad s ta tem e n t, see C hapter 10.
3 C risp , The A u s tra lia n  F ed e ra l Labour P a r ty , 1901-1951« 296
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backbone and conscience of the labour Party'"- any more than it was, in 
the long-run, a question of the unions substituting party-political for 
industrial action after 1890. To most union leaders it is a matter of 
combining both methods of political action, party—political and independent 
pressure-group.
No central union organization has more actively promoted closer liaison 
with a non-Labor government than the A.C.T.U. with the Menzies Federal Gov­
ernment; but the A.C.T.U. can still call for
the widest possible unity in action between the Trade Union Movement 
throughout Australia and the Federal and State Australian Labour Par­
ties...as a base for organisation in action to drive the Menzies Gov­
ernment and anti-Labour Governments in the relevant States, out of 
office. 4
In September 1955 A.C.T.U. officials accepted an invitation from the Liberal 
Prime Minister to discuss the current economic situation; while in Canberra 
for this purpose, they conferred on the same question with the Leader of the 
Labor Opposition and officials of the A.L.P. Federal Executive.5 Union 
deputations to ministers in the Menzies Government have not uncommonly in­
cluded Labor parliamentarians and A.L.P. officials^ and unions seeking 
concessions from non-Labor governments quite often put their case at the
7same time to corresponding parliamentary Labor parties and A.L.P. executives.
In the same way, there is no question of substituting political action 
for industrial action, or vice versa. On the one hand, most union leaders 
recognize now (if they did not before the 1949 coal strike) that there are 
limits to the effectiveness of direct action - the most significant limit 
being set by the point at which a government decides to throw its full
weight against striking unions. Moreover, to union leaders who rail against
3 Crisp, 'The Australian Federal Labour Party. 1901-1951. 296
4 Minutes„All Australian Trade Union Gongress, September 1955, 27.
5 Sydney Morning Herald, 20/9/1955
6 See, e.g., Sydney Marning Herald. 22/4/1956.7 This policy was carried out on the widest scale in recent years during the 
A.R.U.'s campaign for representation on public transport bodies.
the procedures of industrial arbitration but firmly support its purpose of 
laying down minimum working conditions binding on employers, the suggestion 
that they should give up political for industrial action means abandoning 
the method by which they may at once preserve industrial arbitration and 
shape the arbitral structure closer to their wishes.
On the other hand, concentration exclusively on political action would, 
in the eyes of many union leaders, involve abandoning the means by which 
concessions over and above the minimum standards established by legislation 
and industrial tribunals have been gained from employers. This attitude is 
not confined to unions able to use the strike weapon effectively. These 
unions are commonly recognized as filling the role of ’pace-setters’, their 
strike successes frequently being reflected in concessions granted by em­
ployers, or by industrial tribunals for the sake of uniformity, to unions 
that are less able or willing to resort to direct action on their own account 
It is often asserted, especially by American observers struck with the 
contrast between the free political status of American unions and the close 
institutional ties linking Australian unions with the A.L.P., that the Aus­
tralian trade union movement is concerned almost exclusively with party-pol­
itical action. In this way, it is claimed, union aims are achieved.
The unions can use their power in the Party to alter the social 
services as they deem necessary. The wages and arbitration courts... 
can be indirectly controlled by political action. Therefore, the 
unions by means of their Labor Party can have an effective voice 
in practically all the various means used to divide the nation’s 
output... Cand] through the Labor Party and its influence upon law­
making and law-administration, they can get organizational security 
andean largely insure that their members will receive fair and just 
shares of th© national income. ®
If, in fact, the connection between party-political action and the achieve-
8 Kuhn, ’Why Pressure-Group Action by Australian Trade Unions?’, (September 
1952) 24 Australian Quarterly, 67
os
ment of union aims was as simple as this statement implies, then it would 
indeed be true to say that 1 political action through the Party makes achieve­
ment of union goals so easy...that the union members get what they want too 
9
easily* - and it would not be surprising that the unions should channel all 
their activities through the A.L.P. But the connection is not so simple. 
Parliamentary Labor is frequently out of office, and therefore incapable of 
carrying out union wishes. When it is in office, it has never responded 
automatically to those wishes, and no two Labor governments have shown a 
uniform response. In addition, the unions themselves are often divided 
on the way in which their potential power in the Party machine should be 
used and on the kind of policies Labor governments should adopt. The most 
that can be said, therefore, is that Australian unions place greater reliance 
on party-political action than do American unions, a fact that has not pre­
cluded their taking other courses of action open to them in order togiin 
their ends.
- - - 0O0 - - -
It has been said that ’reliance is usually placed oh the e fforts of
the trade unions [i.e., industrial action] in a period of business upswing,
whereas, in the days of contraction, hopes and expectations are generally
directed to the energies of the labour parliamentarians [i.e., party-political 
n 10actionj This is broadly true, but it is also an over-simplification.
In the first place, it ignores the possibility of unions acting politically 
as independent pressure-groups. Their views can be expected toc arry great­
est weight with non-Labor governments in times of economic buoyancy, but 
even in less auspicious circumstances they are unlikely to be lightly 
brushed aside.
In the second place, the statement overlooks the importance of the
9 Ibid.
10 Foenander, Better Employment Relations. 212
nature of the specific issue involved in determining the unions' choice of
methods. Thus, in the prosperous post-war period^ the unions placed their
reliance in turn on the most appropriate of e ach of the three methods open
to them in order to achieve three different aims. The 'break-through* on
the continuation of the war-time wage-pegging policy was achieved in 1947
11
by determined strike action on the part of the metal trades unions. The
application of the forty hour week in 1947 was largely the result of party-
political action, which secured the enactment of appropriate legislation by
the Labor governments of two major States and in this way, as union leaders
are firmly convinced, forced the Federal Arbitration Court to apply the prin-
12ciple on a national scale. The full and regular participation of trade 
union repräsentatives in both the formulation and administration of the post­
war immigration programme was achieved not through the Federal Labor Govern­
ment but by pressure-group action in relation to the succeeding non-Labor 
13Government.
In the third place, the s tatement fails to make the point that on a 
single issue, where possible and appropriate, the unions may utilize all 
three methods. Thus, on the issue of long-service leave: by party-polit­
ical action, they achieved the enactment of long-service leave legislation 
by four State Labor governments; by pressure-group action, they obtained 
corresponding if less favourable legislation from a non-Labor State govern­
ment; and by threat of direct action, they obtained agreements covering 
important industries in the latter State and providing for long-service
leave on terms similar to those embodied in legislation by the State Labor
11 See Perlman, Judges in Industry. 118ff, for a description of the events 
involved. His interpretation of them, however, fails to give due weight 
to the point emphasized by union leaders - the authorities' acceptance, 
under strike pressure, of the principle that the wage-freezing policy 
should be abandoned.
12 See Chapter 14
13 See Chapter 11
governm ents.
F in a l ly ,  as a g e n e ra l iz a t io n , the s ta tem en t does n o t a llow  f o r  v a r i ­
a tio n s  in  th e  emphasis d i f f e r e n t  unions p lace  on each course of a c t io n  open 
to  them a t  the same tim e , v a r ia t io n s  which a re  u s u a l ly  most marked in  r e l a — 
t io n  to  in d u s t r i a l  and p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n . Thus, w hile  th e  A u s tra lia n
Workers Union i s  t r a d i t i o n a l ly  d isposed  to  fav o u r p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ,H e
1$
Amalgamated E ngineering  Union lean s  towards in d u s t r i a l  a c t io n .
N e v e rth e le s s ,th e  g en era l im p lic a tio n  of th e  s ta tem en t quoted  above i s  
a c c u ra te . The e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f each o f th e  methods a v a ila b le  to  the  unions 
a t  a g iven tim e i s  la rg e ly  a fu n c tio n  of e x is t in g  economic c ircu m stan ces ; 
and the r e la t iv e  emphasis adopted by union le a d e rs  fo llo w s from t h e i r  judge­
ment o f each method’ s e f fe c t iv e n e s s .  This g e n e ra l iz a t io n  has been i l l u s ­
t r a t e d  in  th e  re c e n t h is to r y  o f a s in g le  u n io n , th e  Miners F e d e ra tio n . 
T ra d i t io n a l ly  one o f the  most pow erful and m i l i t a n t  u n io n s , the Feder­
a t io n  has been hard  h i t  in  re c e n t years  by in c re a s in g  m echan ization  in  th e  
co a l in d u s try  and by a sh rinkage  in  the  co al m arke t. The e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  
S i t u a t io n e n  a union th a t  had f o r  long r e l i e d  more s tro n g ly  th a n  any o th e r  
on in d u s t r i a l  actio n ,w as e v id e n t in  the  s ta te m e n t made by one o f i t s  le a d in g  
o f f i c i a l s  when the  A.G.T.U. Congress o f September 1957 was c o n s id e rin g  the  
q u e s tio n  o f autom ation: ’The only  way in  which w orkers can share  in  th e  in ­
c reased  p ro d u c tiv i ty  brought about by autom ation i s  no t by ask ing  th e  b o ss , 
f o r  more, b u t by l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i o n '.
5 . Union A tti tu d e s  to  the A .L.P.
At no tim e s in ce  the  fo u n d a tio n  of the  A u s tra lia n  Labor P a r ty  has th e
u n io n s ' dependence on the P a r ty  been le s s  th an  in  th e  y ears  s in ce  th e  second
14 See C hapter 14
15 See, e . g , ,  K .F. W alker, I n d u s t r ia l  R elatüons in  A u s t r a l ia , 264, 271.
world war. During this period the trade union movement has possessed an 
industrial strength greater than ever before, and has conducted consultat­
ions and negotiations direct with non-Labor governments on a scale and at 
a level previously unheard of. The extent to which the latter course of 
action, in particular, is used vitally affects the relationship between the 
trade union movement and the A. L.P. ' ‘Usually closer and less hostile
relations with a non-Labourgovernment involve an implicit weakening of the
1ties which bind the unions to the Labour Party1. There has in fact occur­
red a general weakening of the ties between the unions and the A.L.P. since 
the war, a feature that is partly a result and partly a cause of the unions’ 
greater readiness to negotiate with non-Labor governments.
One striking sympton is the attitude found in many union quarters to
the question of union officials entering parliament. Generally speaking
there appears to be at least a feeling of indifference on the question. One
leading A.L.P. official commented: ‘Prominent trade union officials don’t
seem to feel it necessary to move into politics’; while a union official
remarked that ’unions don’t try to get their men into parliairent as they
used to’. In some cases there seems to be a distinct current of feeling
against union officials taking up political careers. Another prominent
official, not a union official, went so far as to claim that in his
1 Rawson, ‘The A.L.P. Industrial Groups Assessment’ (December 1954), 26 
Australian Quarterly 45. Rawson qualifies this by pointing out that better 
relations between unions and non-Labor governments can be reconciled with 
‘unusually close ties’ with the A.L.P. because Industrial Group union lea­
ders were ’both closer to the A.L.P. and less violently opposed to the 
non-Labottrparties’ than other union leaders.This does not impair the argu­
ment followed in the text because Industrial Group influence in the union 
movement was smaller than in the A.L.P. The significant support for some 
form of cooperation with non-Labor governments has come from officials 
not connected with the Groups and less closely involved with the A.L.P.
For a discussion of the Industrial Groups see below in this section.
S ta te  i f  a tra d e  union o f f i c i a l  nominated f o r  a s e a t  i t  commonly happened 
th a t  a ‘wave of re v u ls io n  runs through h is  u n io n 1. This a t t i t u d e ,  w hether
of apathy  o r of antagonism , i s  a d i s t i n c t  b reak  w ith  the  p a s t  -  i t  i s  ad­
m itte d  a s  being of f a i r l y  re c e n t o r ig in ,  e s tim a te d  u s u a l ly  w ith in  the l a s t
tw enty  y e a rs . Thus, w hile t h i r t y  y ears  ago th e re  was ‘no q u e s tio n  th a t  the
2
s te p . . . f ro m  union o f f i c i a l  to  P a rlia m e n ta r ia n  i s  co n sid ered  a p rom otion1, 
to d ay , as one o f f i c i a l  p u t i t ,  ‘i t  i s  no lo n g e r  an honour f o r  un ion  o ff ic ia ls  
to  g e t e le c te d 1.
The reaso n  commonly g iven  f o r  th i s  t re n d  i s  t h a t  u n io n is ts  c o n s id e r  an 
o f f i c i a l ’s f i r s t  lo y a l ty  to  be to  h is  u n io n , which should  n o t be made ‘ j u s t  
a s tep p in g -s to n e  to  p o l i t i c s 1. So f a r  as un ion  o f f i c i a l s  them selves a re  
concerned, a t t i tu d e s  vary  n o t only  acco rd ing  to  p e rso n a l ambitions b u t from 
union to  u n io n . At one extreme th e  A u s tra lia n  Workers Union has always 
been the s in g le  most a c tiv e  union in  Labor p o l i t i c s ,  and a p p a re n tly  c o n tin ­
ues to  en joy  i t s  ro le  as the most p r o l i f i c  spawning ground of u n io n is t—p o l­
i t i c i a n s .  On th e  o th e r  hand, la ck  o f i n t e r e s t  in  p o l i t i c a l  c a re e rs  i s  
p robab ly  s tro n g e s t  among the  o f f i c i a l s  o f u n io n s , such as the  Amalgamated 
E ngineering  Union, in  which th e re  e x is t s  a s tro n g  lo y a l ty  to  the  un ion  and 
a co rp o ra te  p rid e  in  i t s  c a p a c ity  as an i n d u s t r i a l  o rg a n iz a tio n .
The f e e l in g  a g a in s t  union  o f f i c i a l s  e n te r in g  p a rlia m e n t does n o t appear 
to  have reached th e  s tag e  in  A u s t r a l ia ,  as i t  has in  the  U nited  Kingdom,
where un ion  ru le s  debar p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  fr©m membership o f t h e i r  ex ecu tiv e
3
b o d ies , nor even o f ru le s  b a rr in g  f u l l - t im e  o f f i c i a l s  from p o l i t i c a l  c a re e rs
4
a fe a tu re  o f most B r i t i s h  u n io n s . A number o f Labor p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n s ,
2 Goodrich, 'The A u s tra lia n  and American Labour Movements1 (1928), 4 Econ- 
omic Record 196
3 The Amalgamated E ngineering  Union i s  an e x c e p tio n , i t s  ru le s  be ing  based 
on those  o f  i t s  B r i t i s h  p a re n t-u n io n .
4 Jacobson & Connor, 'The Trade Unions and P a r lia m e n t1 (1956), 9 P a r l i a ­
m entary A ffa irs  475
fl"
mainly confined to State legislatures, continue to hold full-time or
5
other union positions. However, as a matter of practice officials are 
usually expected to give up full-time union positions on election in 
accordance with the principle of * one-man-one-job‘; in many cases they 
become automatically ineligible for continued membership of their union 
under its qualifications rule.
It is difficult to estimate with any precision the extent to which
this development is reflected in the proportion of union officials in the
ranks of parliamentary Labor parties, and even more difficult to estimate
its effect on the proportion nominating as parliamentary candidates. The
only figures available are limited to the Labor membership of the Federal
6
Parliament from 1901 to 1954» There are no corresponding figures avail­
able for State parliaments, and none at all covering Labor candidates con­
testing elections. The Crisp-Bennett figures are set out in Table 3.
They show that from 1931 there was a distinct, if small, decline in the 
proportion of former union officials of all ranks in the Federal Parlia­
mentary Labor Party, though the proportion of former full-time secretaries 
remained comparatively stable and even exhibited a marked but temporary 
iise during the 1 thirties. On the other hand, it is clear from a survey 
conducted by the present writer that the proportions of former or existing
union oiiicials of all ranks in State parliamentary Labor parties in recent
7years are usually much lower than at the Federal level. Assuming that 
the change in union attitudes, noted above, has had the effect of reducing 
the numbers of union officials embarking on a political career, the contrast
between the recent proportions of unionist-parliamentarians at the State
5 This is exclusive of the N.S.W. Legislative Council in which the propor­
tion of full-time officials is very high owing to the peculiar nature of 
membership of it; see Table 16, note 1.
6 L.F. Crisp & S.P. Bennett, Australian Labor Party: Federal Personnel 
1901-1954 (mimeograph)
7 See Table 15
and F e d e ra l le v e ls  i s  p robab ly  a r e s u l t  o f th e  Commonwealth's in c re a s in g  
s t a t u r e ,  which i s  l ik e ly  to  make a c a re e r  in  F ed era l p o l i t i c s  more a t t r a c t ­
ive  th an  one in  S ta te  p o l i t i c s  to  union o f f i c i a l s  whose am bitions l i e  in  
t h i s  d i r e c t io n .
On th e  o th e r  hand, even in  the F ed era l sph ere , bu t e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e
S ta te s ,  i t  i s  ev id en t th a t  th e  a v a ila b le  d a ta  a re  s u f f ic ie n t  to  p u t in  doubt
th e  p re s e n t re levance  o f the th i r ty - y e a r - o ld  sta tem en t th a t  th e  p o s i t io n  of
tra d e  un ion  o f f i c i a l  i s  th e  ' f i r s t  s tep  on the  m o s t- tra v e lle d  road  to  h igh  
8
p u b lic  o f f i c e ' .  I t  i s  n o t y e t  c le a r  w hether t h i s  h e ra ld s th e  e v o lu tio n , as
observed in  th e  U nited  Kingdom, of a 'new type of tra d e  union le a d e r  who,
towards the  end o f h is  c a re e r  lo o k s , n o t f o r  a s e a t  in  the  House o f  Commons,
bu t fo r  an o p p o rtu n ity  of g iv in g  f u r th e r  s e rv ic e  as an a d m in is tra to r  on a
9
p u b lic  board of some k i n d ' . But the  o p p o rtu n itie s  f o r  s e rv ice  o f t h i s  n a t­
u re  have in c re a se d  co n sid e rab ly  in  A u s tra lia  s in ce  the  second w orld w ar, i f
10
n o t to  th e  same e x te n t and im portance as in  B r i ta in .
-  -  -  oO o---- ---
The independence o f the unions from L ab o r's  p o l i t i c a l  m achine, and the 
weaker t i e s  between them th a t  th i s  im p lie s , has been f u r th e r  dem onstrated  
in  re c e n t y ea rs  in  connection  w ith  the  q u e s tio n  o f c lo s e r  o rg a n iz a tio n  be­
tween the  i n d u s t r i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  w ings. Only in  W estern A u s tra l ia  a re
11
both  wings u n ite d  in  a s in g le  o rg a n iz a tio n . A ttem pts to  t r a n s p la n t  t h i s
s tru c tu re  have been r e s i s te d  by most union le a d e r s .  A p ro p o sa l f o r  n a t io n a l
12
o rg a n iz a tio n  on th e se  l in e s  was sponsored by the  A .L.P . du ring  th e  'tw e n t ie s .
Some union le a d e rs  favoured  the  scheme on th e  ground th a t  i t  would ensure
8 Goodrich, op. c i t . ,  195
9 B.C. R o b erts , Trade Union Government and A dm in istra tion  in  G re4t B r i ta in
468
10 See C hapter 11
11 See C hapter 3
12 See C risp , The A u s tra lia n  F ed e ra l Labour P a r ty . 1901-1951. 186, 190-2
13union control of the political wing. But most agreed with the view of
the Trades and Labor Council of South Australia that «the main object of
uhe re—organisation scheme is to hand over the Trades and Labor Councils to
14
a political bureaucracy*. A similar scheme put into effect earlier in 
Tasmania soon broke down as a result of union dissatisfaction1.5 However, 
further moves in this direction were made in Tasmania more recently. In 
February 1957, the Tasmanian General Executive of the A.L.P. requested all 
union delegates attending the State Conference the following month to meet 
before the Conference opened in order to discuss the question of freconstit-
'I ^
uting the Tasmanian Trades Union Council within the auspices of the A.L.P.’.
The Executive justified its action on the ground of the'vital necessity of
complete co-ordination between the Political and Industrial wings of the 
17
A.L.P.’, but it did not escape a unanimous censure vote at thenext meeting
18oi the Hobart Trades Hall Council. The pre—Conference meeting on the ques­
tion was attended by sixty—four trade union delegates, of whom sixty—two 
voted against the Executive’s proposal. The agenda item recommending the
formation of ’machinery to establish a State-wide industrial body of broad
19representation within the framework of the Australian Labor Party*' was not 
dealt with by Conference.
13 See Rawson, The Organization of the Australian Labor Party. 1916-1941,195
14 Minutes, United Trades and Labor Council of 3.A., 3/6/1927
15 See Section 2 above.
16 Letter reproduced in Hobart Trades Hall Council’s circular to affiliated 
unions, 25/2/1957. The Tasmanian Trades Union Council was a moribund body 
set up in 1940 to coordinate the activities of the various trades and 
labour councils in the State: see Chapter 3.
17 Ibid.
18 Minutes, Hobart T.H.C., 21/2/1957. The A.L.P. Executive’s move followed 
an attempt it had made the previous year to set itself a as the competent 
body to advise the State Labor Government on industrial matters, a claim 
which was hotly disputed by the Hobart T.H.C.
19 Agenda for Annual Conference, A.L.P., Tasmania, March 1957, item number 50
'H
It is, however, in Western Australia itself, where »the whole organiz­
ation of the Labour Movement is calculated to minimize the distinction be-
20tween political and industrial elements’, that the post-war independence 
of the unions from the A.L.P. has been most strikingly thrown into relief. 
From 1906 up to the second world war the combined central organization head­
ed by the A.L.P. State Executive operated without any serious challenge to 
its existence from the trade union side. But since the war there have been 
signs of tension.
During the war, as one »moderate» Western Australian union leader put
it, the unions »found out what industrial organization could do*. At the
same time, many union leaders became increasingly sensitive to the fact that
industrial matters considered by the A.L.P. State Executive in its capacity
as the central union organization were discussed at a ’political rather than
an industrial level'. The situation was brought to a head by the attitude
of the State Labor Government to the locomotive drivers' strike in 1946.
As a result a number of A.L.P.-affiliated unions combined with the Communist-
controlled unions to form a Western Australian Council of Trade Unions (W.A.
♦
C.T.U.) in July 194V, with a claimed membership of ten unions and the promise
21of further affiliations. The new organization promptly applied for recog-
22
nition as the State Branch of the A.C.T.U., V/estern Australia being the 
only State without such a branch. By October, fortified by the A.C.T.U.' 
Congress's favoural^e response to its application, it was claiming an affil-
23
iated membership of fourteen unions representing 12,000 members.
That the W.A.C.T.U. was not merely an organization of Communist-led 
unions - unions which could not affiliate with the State A.L.P. - was dem­
onstrated by the speedy reaction of the A.L.P. State Executive, which set
Commonwealth of Australia, 91. 
10/10/1947.
in train plans for the creation of a Trade Unions Industrial Council (T.U. 
I.C.) within the A.L.P. framework. The T.U.I.C. was formally constituted 
by the A.L.P. State Conference (General Council) in December 1947. The 
powers of the new body, on which only A.L.P.-affiliated unions were entitled 
to representation, were subject in all cases to the A.L.P. State Executive;
24and it could amend its own constitution only with the Executive’s approval.
The T.U.I.C., as a member of the Executive pointed out, was to be Merely
an advisory body, the decisions of which would be subject to the State Exec- 
25utive’.
The great bulk of the A.L.P.-affiliated unions that had joined or were 
contemplating membership of the W.A.C.T.U. transferred to the T.U.I.C., des­
pite its limited powers. The W.A.C.T.U. languished from then on. In Nov­
ember I94S the President and Secretary of the A.C.T.U. refused it recognit-
26
ion as the State Branch of the A.C.T.U., after finding that only eight
27unions were affiliated with it instead of the claimed thirty. The coup de 
grace was delivered by the President of the State Arbitration Court in May 
1949 when,after an exhaustive and damaging analysis of the W.A.C.T.U.*s claim­
ed membership end its representative’s credentials, he refused it leave to
be represented alongside the A.L.P. State Executive in a hearing on the 
28
basic wage.
Nevertheless,the formation of the T.U.I.C. did not solve the problem, 
of friction between the political wing and those officials of affiliated 
unions who wanted greater independence; it merely shifted the focus of the 
struggle to the question of the T.U.I.C.’s powers. At the A.L.P. State
24 See Constitution and Rules of T.U.I.C., as approved, in Official Report. 
A.L.P.> W.A., 14th General Council, December 1947, 52-5
25 Ibid., 42
26 Workers Star. 26/11/1948
27 Statement by P.J. Clarey, President, A.C.T.U.: Official Report, A.L.P. 
W.A., 16th General Council, August 1949» 16
28 (1949) 29 W.A.I.G., 7.
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Conference of 1949, a number of remits from unions proposed that a set
proportion of the Party’s affiliation fees (one-third) should be set aside
for the use of the T.U.I.C., and that the T.U.I.C. should be given exclusive
jurisdiction over industrial matters: both proposals were rejected by Con- 
29ference. However, the major battle took place over the question of affil­
iation with the A aC.T.U. Delegates were apparently agreed that affiliation 
was desirable in order to establish a State Branch of the A.C.T.U. The 
controversial question was whether the Branch should be constituted by the 
State Executive »r the T.U.I.C. To the motion put fnrward on behalf of the 
State Executive, that it should become the Branch, an amendment was moved 
claiming the position for the T.U.I.C. The subsequent debate and the vote 
on the amendment indicated the seriousness of the division.
Speakers supporting the State Executive were unanimous that the exist-
30
ing organization ’had proved very successful’ and they deplored the emphasis
placed by the opposition on ’the distinction between the political, and in-
31dustrial sides of the Movement'. One State Executive supporter thought
that if the amendment were carried, individuals who were both Executive and
T.U.I.C. members ’would find it difficult to determine to which body they
32
owed greater loyalty'; and another promised that even if the motion was 
carried, the T.U.I.C. 'would still have a considerable voice in the indust-
33rial matters involving the A.C.T.U.'. For their part, the T.U.I.C. supp­
orters were equally unanimous in denying that the existing organization was 
’successful'. Fear was e:xpressed that if the State Executive became the
A.C.T.U. Branch, ’industrial principles might be sacrificed to political
29 OffidalReport, A.L.P., W.A., 16th General Council, August 1949, 24, 27.
30 Ibid., 30
31 Ibid., 31
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 30
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expediency'. It was claimed that since 'the industrial movement was now
expanding, therefore it should have some organisation for exclusively reach-
35
ing its own decisions'. And one delegate complained: 'When the Industrial
Council was set up it was understood that some of the industrial work of the
State Executive would be delegated to it. This had not been done to any
36
extent.' When the vote on the amendment moved by the T.U.I.C. supporters
was taken, the result was 50 to 78 against; and on a card vote being called
37for, it was again lost by 232 to 371. The Executive's motion was subse­
quently carried.
Their sound, if not inglorious, defeat did not choke off the advocates
of greater independence for the T.U.I.C. Within a month they were urging
the State Executive to provide the T.U.I.C. with sufficient funds to employ
38its own full-time secretary, it having no funds of its own. The request
tkft
was not granted, the State Executive suggesting thatAState Secretary of the
A.L.P. should also act as Secretary of the T.U.I.C. (a practice that has
since been followed) and that the Council should 'continue to function as 
39an advisory body'. As before, the T.U.I.C. was able to consider only 
matters referred by the State Executive and to submit recommendatiins to 
the Executive. Its trifling powers, and the frustration they implied, are 
illustrated by the resolution carried in response to a letter from an affil­
iated union asking the T.U.I.C. to subscribe to a labour journal: 'That we
40
suggest to the State Executive that it subscribe to the review'.
T.U.I.C. recommendations were usually accepted by the State Executive. 
But it was inevitable that having been given an inch by the formation of
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 30
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 31
38 Minutes, T.U.I.C., 13/9/1949
39 Ibid., 20/1/1950
40 Ibid.
the T .U .I. 
ex isten ce  o f
by the S ta te  Secretary in  December 
those persons who sta ted  th a t there should be
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between the p o l­
i t i c a l  and in d u str ia l sec tio n s  of the Party1.
In 1952 the serious metal trades s tr ik e  o f th a t year was handled by 
the S ta te  Executive*s D isputes Committee, the T .U .I.C , being given no powers 
to  deal w ith i t .  This demonstration of the complete inadequacy o f the 
T .U .I .C .  from an in d u str ia l p o in t of view caused those union o f f i c i a l s  who 
had been most a c tiv e  w ith in  the Council to  turn away from i t  in  d is g u s t . As 
a r e s u lt  the T .U .I.C . did not meet from September 1952 u n t i l  the middle o f  
1953# when A.L.P. leaders considdred i t  vise to  attem pt to rev ive  i t .
But the ri'.U .I.C .*s r e v iv a l was not achieved w ithout concessions on the
part o f the S ta te  E xecutive. The nature o f th ese con cession s, which were
42
form ally adopted by the A.L.P. S tate Conference o f October 1953, r e f le c te d  
the depth o f union d iscon ten t with the T .U .I.C . as o r ig in a lly  co n stitu te d .
The Council’ s general powers, formerly o f ’recommendation’ on ly , became 
powers o f ’determ ination’ , and included the power to  amend i t s  own c o n s t it ­
u tio n . I t  was a lso  given the r igh t to  e le c t  two rep resen ta tives d ir e c t  to  
the S tate  E xecutive, and the r ig h t ‘to  nominate and e l e c t ’ one o f the two 
State rep resen ta tives to  the A.C.T.U. In ter sta te  EÄscutive. In a d d ition , 
an In d u str ia l Committee was s e t  up, composed o f a l l  the o f f ic e r s  o f the 
T .U .I.C . and the S tate  President and Secretary o f the A .L .P ., to  con su lt w ith  
the S tate  Parliam entary Labor Party ’on a l l  in d u s tr ia l matters requiring  
le g is la t iv e  a tte n t io n ’ .
These extensions o f the T .U .I .C .’s power succeeded in  th e ir  immediate 
purpose o f rev iv in g  in te r e s t  in  the Council and preventing an open s p l i t  in
41 O ff ic ia l  Report. A .L.P.,W .A., 17th General C ouncil, December 1950, 12.
42 See Report o f D ec is io n s .A .L .P .. W .A .,Special General Council, O ctober,1953
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th e  P a r ty . They d id  n o t, however, succeed in  d isarm ing union  c r i t i c s  o r 
e lim in a tin g  p o ss ib le  causes o f fu tu re  f r i c t i o n .  The Council was s t i l l  
f irm ly  sub o rd in a te  to  the  S ta te  Executive -  under the in f lu e n c e , acco rd ing  
to  one un ion  o f i i c i a l ,  o f ’p o l i t i c ia n s  and women’ • I t  had no funds o f i t s  
own, and a l l  i t s  d e c is io n s  were su b je c t to  a r i g h t  of appeal to  th e  S ta te  
E xecu tiv e , though t h i s  p ro v is io n  had n o t been used  up to  Ju ly  1957. Appoint 
ments of union  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  to  p u b lic  bodies were made by the  S ta te  Execut 
iv e ,  which re fu sed  a re q u e s t to  d e leg a te  the  power in  a case claim ed by th e
43
T .U .I .C . to  involve an in d u s t r i a l  m a tte r .
The q u e s tio n  of competence in  r e l a t io n  to  A.C.T.U. d e c is io n s  was a con­
s i s t e n t l y  sore  p o in t .  C o n flic t on the  is su e  was ev id en t in  th e  term s o f a  
no te  which accompanied c e r ta in  I n te r s ta te  E xecutive d e c is io n s  when the S ta te  
Executive re f e r r e d  them to  th e  T .U .I.C .
As the  S ta te  Executive o f the A .L .P . i s  the accep ted  a f f i l i a t e d  body 
by the A .C .T.U ., only th a t  body i s  deemed to  have complete powers o f 
adop tion  o r r e je c t i o n .  As S ta te  C ongress, however, has c lo th e d  the 
I n d u s t r ia l  Council w ith  c e r ta in  powers i t  i s  deemed a d v isa b le  t h a t  
the  Council should a lso  re c e iv e  f o r  i t s  c o n s id e ra tio n  the  d e c is io n s  
of th e  I n te r s ta te  E x ecu tiv e . I t  i s  suggested  th a t  the  C ouncil should  
be the  f i r s t  body to  give c o n s id e ra tio n  to  the item s, as i t s  a t t i ­
tude should  p rovide a v a lu ab le  guide to  the  S ta te  B x e c u t iv e .^
The m a tte r  was ra is e d  in  c ru c ia l  form when the  A.C.T.U. I n te r s t a t e  Executive 
r e f e r r e d  to  i t s  S ta te  branches the d e c is io n  o f the 1956 S p e c ia l Congress t h a t  
a na tion-w ide  stoppage should be h e ld  in  p r o te s t  a g a in s t  the F e d e ra l A rb it­
r a t io n  C ourt’s f a i lu r e  to  r e s to re  th e  system of au tom atic  c o s t - o f - l iv in g  ad­
ju stm en ts to  the b a s ic  wage. The W estern A u s tra lia n  S ta te  E xecu tive approv­
ed the  stoppage p ro p o sa l by a la rg e  m a jo r ity . B ut, when i t  was r e f e r r e d  to
the  T .U .I .C ., the p ro p o sa l was r e je c te d  w ith  on ly  one d is s e n tin g  v o te , and
45
the  C ouncil l a t e r  re -a ff irm e d  th i s  d e c is io n . S ince the  un ions t h a t  would
43 M inutes. T .U .I .C ., 14/5/1957; a ls o ,  i b i d . ,  4 /6 /1 9 5 7 .
44 I b id . ,  8 /2 /1 9 5 5 .
45 I b id . ,  9 /10 /1956 , 30/10/1956.
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have had to conduct the stoppage were almost unanimously against it, on 
the ground that it would be ineffective, the State Executive was forced to 
rescind its decision. One result of the episode was that A.C.T.U. decisions 
on indies trial matters were subsequently sent to the T.U.I.C. before being 
dealt with by the State Executive.
But perhaps one of the most critical sources of friction had been the 
State A.L.P. rule debarring unions with full-time Communist officials from
46affiliating with the Party, a rule which automatically disqualifies Commun­
ists led unions from taking part in the T.U.I.C.’s activities. Less than 
half-a-dozen unions are affected in this way, but many union leaders are 
convinced that they should be entitled to representation on the T.U.I.C. as 
a body concerned with industrial rather than political matters. The same 
principle was raised in 1957 when a union official was suspended from the 
A.L.P. for three years. The official, not a Communist, was a delegate to
the T.U.I.C. and one of its officers; but his suspension from the A.L.P.
47involved automatic suspension from his T.U.I.C. positions. The incident 
reinforced earlier criticisms on the nature of T.U.I.C. membership.
The seriousness of the conflict aroused by the issues outlined above 
was shown by the reaction to six items on the agenda of the 1957 A.C.T.U. 
Congress which criticized the character of the A.C.T.U.’S Western Australian 
Branch. Before Congress met, the T.U.I.C. adopted certain recommendations 
emanating from the A.L.P. State Executive. These included an undertaking to 
hold a special conference of A.L.P. -affiliated unions, and excluding polit­
ical branches, to decide whether a separate trades and labour council should 
be formed or whether the T.U.I.C. should become the A.C.T.U.!s State Branch. 
In addition, the State Executive undertook to examine the question of amend­
ing the rule debarring Communist-led unions from affiliation, and also to
46 State~T?onstitution, A.L.P., W.A., 1956, r.8.
47 Minutes, T.U.I.C. Officers’ Meeting, 5/2/1957.
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permit the T.U.I.C. to determine for itself the eligibility of any person
48to act as a delegate to it.
The Western Australian case, as an illustration of the unions1 present 
tendency to assert their independence of the A.L.P., is significant because 
it involves a State where unionism is somewhat isolated from the more tur­
bulent influences operating in the eastern States. It is true that State 
branches of Federal unions have played a major part in the agitation within 
the State, and have been spurred on by their Federal headquarters - as the 
raising of the matter at the A.C.T.Ü. Congress indicates. But they have 
been supported also by a number of State unions. Moreover, most of the 
unions concerned clearly view the problem less in terms of the formation of 
a separate trades and labour council, as is the inclination of union leaders 
in the eastern States, than in terms of an increased role for the T.U.I.C.
An official of a Federal union’s State branch summed up this view: »If the 
Council was given full powers, and open powers to admit all unions who 
wanted to affiliate, then you couldn't want much better'. Only in this 
way, they realize, can a split of major proportions in the State Labor move­
ment be prevented, an attitude that is indicative of their sincerity and 
moderation. The A.L.P. leadership has shown itself equally anxious to 
prevent a split - and not merely because the present organization enables 
uhem to fix union affiliation fees at a rate that is not only more than twice 
the rate levied by the A.L.P. in any other State, but is considerably higher 
than the combined rates of each other State Party and the corresponding 
trades and labour council.
- - - 0O0 - - -
^  Iteg-Q^aendations, Special .Industrial Council Meeting, 20/8/1957. The 
A.C.T.U. Congress subsequently approved the union conference, but urged 
that it should include unions not affiliated with the A.L.P.: Minutes. 
A.C.i.U. ^on&ress> Sept. 1957, 10, But the A.L.P. State Secretary indicated 
that his organization's constitution prevented it calling a Conference 
including unaffiliated unions: ibid., 27.
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The reserve towards the A.L.P. which is evident in the attitudes of
many union leaders today is compounded of many elements - not the least of
these, in some cases, being thwarted personal ambitions. More important,
however, has been the effect of post-war prosperity and full employmeht 
inpolicies^enlarging the unions' opportunities for successful action independ­
ent of Labor's political wing. Especially to the extent that such action 
takes the form of dealing with non-Labor governments, it has inevitably led 
to some conflict between the unions and the A.L.P. Party leaders,Ahave nat­
urally resented the readiness shown by unions to by-pass the A.L.P. in order 
to achieve their aims. Frr their part, many union leaders reason that it 
is better to gain something by dealing direct with non-Labor governments than 
nothing by pressing their views through Labor parliamentarians. The latter 
course has usually proved abortive in the past because governments are under­
standably reluctant to make even minor concessions which may be credited to 
their political opponents. The supporters of this attitude are concerned less
with which political party gets the credit than that the concessions should 
be made.
These attitudes were brought out in two recent episodes in South Aus­
tralia, where the problem is particularly acute because Labor has been out
of office for more than twenty years. The first involved a suggestion from
■Hie
the Liberal Country League Government in 1953 thatAUnited Trades and Labor 
Council (T. and L.C.) should nominate a representative to an advisory comm­
ittee which was to consider amendments to the Workmens Compenscation Act.
Labor political leaders opposed acceptance of the invitation: workers' com­
pensation was a stick with which the State Parliamentary Labor Party had 
been accustomed to beat the Government. The T. and L.C., on the other 
hand, showed itself to be less concerned with party-political advantage.
r 1 f .( e
Despite attempts by some delegates prominent in the A.L.P. to have it ref-
49erred to the Party leadership, the Governments invitation was finally acc- 
50
epted - though the election of the State Secretary of the Australian Workers 
Union (an opponent of participation) as representative was curious if ex­
plainable in terms of a complex set of personal factors. A further move to 
oblige the representative to confer on request with leaders of the Parlia­
mentary Labor Party was defeated in favour of a direction that he should
51
confer only with the Executive of the T. and L.C. The importance placed on 
the issue was demonstrated by later events. The first report of the Work­
mens Compensation Advisory Committee in 1954 was accompanied by a minority 
report from the T. and L.C.’s representative (also a member of the A. L.P. 
State Executive) strongly criticizing the majority recommendations. The 
Executive of the T. and L.C. promptly instructed withdrawal of the minority 
report on the ground that, although the majority recommendations were inade­
quate, any delay in their enactment would deprive employees of the benefits
they nevertheless involved. The full T. and L.C. endorsed the Executive’s
52
action by a vote of 73 to 39* A later, less well-attended T. and L.C. meet­
ing carried by 48 to 43 a resolution, moved by a State A.L.P. Executive mem-
53
ber, reversing the 1953 decision to take part in the W.C.A. Committee.
However, a. subsequent special meeting rescinded the withdrawal decision, and
rejected, by 73 votes to 32, a proposal to have the matter considered by a
54joint meeting of the T. and L.C. and the State A.L.P. executives.
The second South Australian episode concerned the long-service leave 
legislation enacted by the Playford Government in 1957. Some time earlier,
the Government had granted long-service leave on generous terms to its own
49 Minutes, United Trades and Labor Council of S.A., 1/5/1953
50 Ibid., 15/5/1953
51 Ibid., 15/5/1953; 29/5/1953
52 Ibid., 10/12/1954
53 Ibid., 18/2/1955 .
54 Ibid., 29/4/1955.
employees in  order to compensate fo r  the fa c t  th a t public servants were 
paid no more than the minimum award wage. S h ortly  afterw ards, the S ta te  
A.L.P. Convention adopted these terms as part o f i t s  p o lic y  advocating long- 
serv ice  leave  fo r  private employees. The le g is la t io n  ^ p o s e d  by the Gov­
ernment e a r ly  in  1957 provided lo n g -serv ice  leave fo r  p rivate  employees on 
much le s s  generous terms. The S tate  A.L.P. th erefore committed i t s e l f  to  
unequivocal opposition  o f the B i l l .  On the other hand, the T. and L.C. >s 
reaction  was to  'welcome* the Governments in ten tio n  to  bring down the B i l l ,  
wm le claim ing that the conditions i t  was to  embody were not sa tis fa c to ry ?  
The meeting which carried th is  r eso lu tio n  r e jec ted  an amendment, moved by 
supporters o f the A.L.P. S tate E xecutive, th a t would have d e le ted  the part 
welcoming the Government's in ten tio n  to  take a c tio n . The subsequent clash es  
on the matter between the T. and L.C. and the A.L.P. hinged on the P arty 's  
d ec isio n  th a t the Labor parliam entarians should vote aga in st the B i l l  in  
Parliam ent. The T. and L.C. was more in te r e s te d  in  obtain ing such b e n e fits  
as the B i l l  did provide than in  making p o l i t i c a l  c a p ita l out o f the fa c t  th at 
-Lne B i l l  su ffered  by comparison with the corresponding le g is la t io n  in  other 
S ta te s . The controversy reached a p o in t where a t  l e a s t  one union threaten-
6d d isa^ i l i a t io n  A .L.P. i f  the Party p e r s is te d  in  i t s  ou trigh t op­
p o s it io n . A fter the Premier refused  union req uests to  extend the B i l l ' s  
p ro v is io n s, two amendments supporting the d ec is io n  o f the A.L.P. »to f ig h t  
and vote' a ga in st the measure were re jec ted  by the T. and L.C. in  favour o f a 
motion th at merely 'expressed d is sa tis fa c tio n »  w ith i t s  term s!
ihe c o n i l ic t  apparent in  the two South A ustralian  episodes r e f le c t s  the 
standard a ttitu d e  o f cen tra l union organ ization s on the q u estion  o f which
uody should make p o licy  d e c is io n s . A delegate to  the A.C.T.U. Congress o f
55 Ib id ., 10/5/1957
56 Adyertiser__(Adelaide), 25/ 6/1957
57 Minutes, United T. and L .D ., 19 /7/1957.
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1940 indicated the previous position in relation to this problem and a pop- 
ular union view on its solution:
There had been a long standing controversy ever since Labor repre­
sentatives had gained seats in Parliament, as to whether the Indus­
trial Movement or the politicians should make the first declaration 
of policy. He definitely stood for the Industrial Movement being 
the leaders in matters of policy.58
Realiocic union leaders make a rather narrower claim (and the delegate quot­
ed may well have meant this) . It is that the appropriate organs of the 
trade union movement, and not those of the A.L.P., should formulate all pol­
icy decisions on industrial matters.
The Party has not always accepted this claim. On occasion it has made 
decisions on industrial matters without consulting the appropriate central 
union organization, or even against its express wishes. Situations of this 
sort tend to arise most frequently at the Federal level where it is often a
matter of the wishes of the A.C.T.U. being pitted against those of the Aus­
tralian Workers Union. Thus the 1957 A.L.P. Federal Conference, meeting
some months before the A.C.T.U. Congress, replaced its previous policy of
59compulsory unionism with a plank advocating preference to unionists. It
did this despite an earlier resolution of the A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive,
which stated in part: 'That the Federal A.L.P. be requested not to decide
policy on the question of preference to unionists until the A.C.T.U. Congress
60...has determined trade union policy on this important issue'.
Feeling among union leaders is strong on this point. On the other hand 
they do not usually regard themselves as being bound to defer to the A.L.P. 
where non-industrial policies are concerned. The A.C.T.U., for example, has 
made policy decisions relating to child endowment even though A.L.P. leaders
have asked it to refrain from doing so.
58 Minutes. A.C.T.U., General Congress, April 1940, 18.
59“Official Report.A.L.P.. 22nd Commonwealth Conference, March 1957, 69.
60 Minutes, A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive, February 1957, 26.
The un ion  a t t i tu d e  on the q u es tio n  of policy-m aking i s  to  some e x te n t
a r e f l e c t io n  of the  a t t i tu d e  of many union  le a d e rs  to  p o l i t i c i a n s  as a c la s s
61
-  men ’who a re  in e v ita b ly  o u t of touch w ith  the I n d u s t r ia l i s t s *  cause*. As 
dem onstrated  by th i s  comment, which was made in  1926, the  a t t i t u d e  i s  no t a 
new one. P a r t ly  i t  i s  based on the  p a s t  perform ance o f Labor governments, 
and p a r t ly  on d i s t r u s t  of the  m otives o f p o l i t i c i a n s  them selves. The po l­
i t i c i a n s  ( ’p o llie s*  as th ey  a re  d isp a ra g in g ly  c a l le d  in  some union  q u a rte rs )  
a re  o f te n  f e l t  to  be a breed  a p a r t ,  whose o f f ic e  removes them from the d a i ly  
g rin d  o f o rd in a ry  m o rta ls  and makes them le s s  s e n s i t iv e  to  union  a s p ir a t io n s .  
The a t t i tu d e  has been re in fo rc e d  by the  in e v ita b le  tendency o f th e  p a r ty  sys­
tem to  broaden th e  b a s is  of the  A .L .P .’ s membership beyond the  ranks of the 
u n io n s . U n io n is ts  a re  o f te n  su sp ic io u s  of parliam entarians who have r is e n  
s o le ly  through the  p o l i t i c a l  branch s t r u c tu r e ,  e s p e c ia l ly  where, as i s  f r e ­
q u e n tly  the  c ase , th ey  are  men of means from the  p ro fe s s io n a l ,  commercial o r
land-ow ning walks o f l i f e .  Union a n tip a th y  towards 'B .A .’ s and b a r r is te r s *
62
as Labor p o l i t i c i a n s  i s  by no means a th in g  of th e  p a s t .  And a lthough  occ­
a s io n a l  c a l l s  a re  s t i l l  made f o r  the e le c t io n  of Labor men who have ’r is e n
.  . 63irom among the  working c la s s e s ’ , experience  has shown th a t  such men are  no 
more immune to  what many u n io n is ts  reg a rd  as the d e b i l i t a t in g  e f f e c t s  of
64
p o l i t i c a l  o f f ic e .
The need o f the A .L .P . to  broaden i t s  appeal in  o rd e r to  a t t r a c t  e le c t ­
o ra l  sup p o rt o u ts id e  th e  u n io n s , and the consequent tendency to  s o f t-p e d a l
s e c t io n a l  union  p o l i c i e s ,  has long prov ided  a focus f o r  c r i t ic is m  by union
le a d e rs  im p a tie n t o f compromise -  o r w ith  p o l i t i c a l  ambit! ons o f t h e i r  own.
The e f f o r t  wras made in  the  p a s t  to  p u t tra d e  union re p re s e n ta t iv e s  
in to  P a rliam e n t, bu t the m istake was made o f c re a tin g  the  A .L .P . which 
gave f in a n c ie rs  and o th e r  moneyed people the o p p o rtu n ity  o f g e t t in g
^ l ^ i u t e s , U nited  T. and L .C ., 24 /9 /1926 .
62 See Rawson, The O rgan iza tion  o f the A u s tra lia n  la b o r P a r ty , 1916-1941, 139
63 Sydney ^ Morning H e ra ld ". T /2 /1937— ------------------ — ----------------— *----------
64 See Chi3.de, How Labour G overns. 59-60
into the A.L.P., with the result that it did not reflect the mental 
attitude of the trade unionists of this country.&5
This view still appeals in some union quarters. Added force is given to it
by the knowledge that the election campaign funds of parliamentary Labor partie^
not infrequently benefit from donations received from sources outside the A.L.P,
and the unions.
---  - 0O0 - - -
Relations between the A.L.P. and the bulk of the unions were further strain­
ed in the post-war period following the Party’s decision to sponsor Industrial
Groups within the union movement as a means of combatting the growing influence
66
oi the Communist Party in the unions. The A.UP. Groups found a ready-made 
nucleus in various anti-Communist union groups active during the later war year$ 
of which the most numerous and well organized were those of Catholics with a 
political outlook that was in many respects more conservative than that of most 
non-Communist union leaders. Many non-Catholic leaders of the Industrial 
Groups also shared this conservative outlook. By 1953^industrial Groups, with 
the help of Federal legislation regulating the conduct of union elections, had 
succeeded in reducing Communist influence within the unions to nearj>re-war 
level. At the same time the Group leaders had made considerable strides within 
the A.L.P. itself. By the end of 1954 they controlled the Party executives in 
uhe three States where they functioned on the largest scale (New South Wales, 
Victoria and Queensland) and were influential in the parliamentary Labor parties 
at both the State and Federal levels. But while they held a number of large 
and important unions, the Group leaders were never in a position to dominate the
central union organizations in the way they were able to dominate the corres­
ponding Labor Party bodies. Within the A.L.P. itself, they drew a large part
of their strength from the political branches. The Industrial Groups therefore
65 Official Report, All-Australian Trade Union Congress, May 1927, $.
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came to assume the form of a movement functioning within the unions but 
directed from the A.L.P., though as originally conceived and accepted by 
many union leaders it was apparently to operate in the industrial field alone, 
relying on the Party only for its endorsement as an anti-Communist force.
Opposition to the Groups had come earliest from union leaders who had 
themselves defeated the Communist threat within their own unions 'without
67altering the traditional structure of the Labour movement' in order to do so. 
They were soon joined by others who were uneasy about the conservative pol­
itical policies favoured by Group leaders, or, as in the case of the Austral­
ian Workers Union leadership in Victoria from as early as 1950, found that 
their claims to membership of the Party's main executive bodies were not 
recognized by Group leaders. Opposition mounted when the Groups extended 
their activities to unions with non-Communist leaders, and nominated candi­
dates against officials who were members of the A.L.P. This policy, which 
appears to have first operated on an important scale in South Australia, was
one of the principal reasons why the Groups were banned by the Party in that
68
State as early as 1951• Union leaders prepared to accept the Groups while 
they were restricted to Communist-controlled unions^were naturally unenthus- 
iastic at the prospect of facing Group candidates in their own union elect­
ions. The result was summed up by an official speaking to other officials 
of his union:
We were not really and truly 100 per cent, opposed to this industrial 
group until when? Until it started to put its nose into our business. 
That is when we opposed it. '
From this point on, the support of the great bulk of trade union leaders was 
^TSwson, ibi4*, 42.
öo Official Report. A.L.P,, S.A., 40th Annual State Convention, Oct. 1951, 
item 125. It has been suggested that, in the case of the A.W.U. leadership 
in S.A., the experience of their counterparts in Victoria (who were refus­
ed a place on the Group-controlled 'ticket' for the State Executive elec­
tions from 1950 on) was also a reason for the early stand taken in that 
State: see Officnl Report, A.W.U., 69th Annual Convention, Jan.1955,147.
69 Official Report. A.W.U., ibid.. 193*
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assured for the withdrawal of A.L.P. recognition from the Industrial Groups,
70as carried out by the 1955 Federal Conference.
ror some non—Communist union leaders, opposition to the Industrial Groups 
was primarily a function of the struggle for control of the A.L.P. machine, 
in which the withdrawal of the A.L.P. imprimatur from the Groups was an inci­
dent. But for many others the withdrawal achieved their main aim by depriv­
ing the Groups oi a prestige and assured support in union elections that was 
not otherwise available. This attitude was reflected in the general disin­
clination to carry the light raging in the A.L.P. into the union movement as 
a whole. There have been bitter struggles within individual unions on the 
question of the Groupg, But by and large the leaders of central union org­
anizations have been able to resist attempts to import the A.L.P, split into 
the union movement. Perhaps the only major exception to this policy was the 
Hobart Trades Hall Council*s expulsion of a delegate on the ground that his 
position of State President of the Anti—Communist Labor Party was incompatible 
with the position of delegate. The Council’s action was, however, strongly 
criticized by other union leaders no less opposed to the Industrial Groups. 
Moreover, preservation of the industrial wing’s unity was not only desirable 
in principle but, as a matter of practical politics, was possible because 
Group-controlled unions were in a distinct minority in common council.
The union movement*s success in preserving a unity that was in marked 
contrast to the situation in the A.L.P., reflects the extent to which it was 
possible to insulate the union movement as a whole despite the fact that many 
union officials were intimately involved as individuals in the struggle with—
J° Official Report,A.L.P.. 21st Commonwealth Conference, March 1955, $1-2.
/1 Minutes, Hobart Trades Hall Council, 15/11/1956. It is not unlikely that 
the expulsion of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners from 
the Melbourne Trades Hall Council had something to do with its Federal Sec- 
retary’s support for the Groups (he stood as a candidate against the Labor 
Premier in the 1955 elections); but there was also a solid basis to the 
industrial reasons given for the expulsion.
pr
in the Party. The gap this indicates between the two was widened by the 
tendency of many union leaders to turn their backs on the bitterness and
disunity permeating the A.L.P. and to devote their energies to union affairs
- - - 0O0 ------
As the events discussed above in relation to the smaller States show,
union preference for action independent of the A.L.P. is not confined to the
three larger and more highly industrialized States where, particularly in
New South Wales, the distinction between the industrial and political wings
72
is traditionally a firm one. On the other hand, it is also apparent that 
there is considerable variation between the attitudes of different unions.
inis is ox particular importance in relation to one union, the Australian 
Workers Union (A.W.U.).
Tne A.W.U.’s leadership has traditionally placed special emphasis on
party-political activity, an emphasis which is exemplified by the fact that
in South Australia the union is affiliated with the A.L.P. on its full State
membership of something over 12,000, but is affiliated with the United Trades
and Labor Council on a membership of only 3,000. The role of the A.W.U.
73within the A.L.P. has been a consistently important one; and its represent­
atives have normally exhibited a marked unity of outlook in the Party’s coun- 
. 74
cils. As we have seen, clashes between the industrial interests of the
A..-.U. and those of other unions are not infrequent and its relations with
75one A.C.T.U. and many of its affiliated unions are usually strained. Con­
flict between the A.W.U. and other unions or central union organizations is
often carried over into the A.L.P., where the A.W.U. is in an exceptionally
strong position. This constitutes a further element in the suspicion shown
72 CrisP> The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.
73 See Chapter 12.
/4 An exception was the different attitudes of the various A.W.U. State lead- 
erships up to 1954 (when uniformity was enforced) to the Industrial Groups 
fn Victoria ana S.A. the A.W.U. leaders were early in conflict with the 1 
75 See Chapter 3* (note 74 continued over page.)
by many union leaders towards the A.L.P. Thus the decision of the 1957 
A.L.P• Federal Conference to ignore the A.C.T.U.’s request that it should 
postpone consideration of the compulsory unionism plank, was widely attrib­
uted to the anti-A.C.T.U. influence of the A.W.U. At the State level, the 
Tasmanian A.L.P. executive’s attempts in 1956 and 1957 to form a body that 
would nave largely supplanted the trades and labour councils was also regard­
ed as inspired by the A.W.U., which is influential in the State Party machine 
but is affiliated with only a single provincial trades and labour council and 
has chronically strained relations with the State Branch of the A.C.T.U.,
the Hobart Trades Hall Council.
- - - oOo-- --
iiie growing preference of union leaders for working through the indus­
trial rather than the political organizations of the Labor movement, what­
ever their reasons may be, indicate a diminished reliance on the A.L.P. It 
would be a mistake, however, to assume that the ties between the trade union 
movement and the Party are more than loosened. Quite apart from the 
union leaders who play an active role in A.L.P. affairs, many of whom still 
regard party-political action as being of supreme importance, there is no 
question of the overwhelming majority of the unions ending their traditional 
allegiance to the Party. The disputes and the suspicions which scar the 
relationship, and the ability of the unions to tak;e independent action for 
the achievement of their ains, has not eliminated the fundamental ’unity of 
thought' that is implicit in the continuing tendency of'both sections tö id­
entify themselves as different ’wings’ of the same ’movement^
This is partly a matter of a tradition dying hard. Unionists’ belief 
in the A.L.P. as the political spearhead of a labour crusade has disappeared, 
except from occasional platform speeches, with the early years of the century
Some may still regard the Party, in the words of one union official, as 'the 
political expression of the trade union movement*, even though the correl­
ation between expression and performance is admittedly erratic. Others 
certainly share the disenchantment with party-political action expressed
by the union delegate whose 1 earlier belief that Labor Governments would
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carry out the policy of the Movement had been shattered1. Most recognize, 
however, that the Party and, most important, the politicians, for a variety 
of reasons can be expected to have at least a sympathy with union aims 
that is less prevalent in their non-Labor counterparts - as a union reso­
lution put it, ’the Labor Political Movement in Australia has been broadly
78consistent in its support of Union principles’. This is the realistic 
school that regards favourable legislation by Labor governments as flowing 
not simply ’from the formation of the Labor Party with the fullest cooper­
ation of the Trades Union Movement’, but rather from the ’continuous press-
79ure of the Unions on the Party and its Parliamentary representatives’.
So long as the unions can exert pressure to this end more effectively and 
more consistently on and through Labor’s political organization than in 
the case of any other, they cannot be expected to forgo party-political 
action as a means of achieving politically those ends which they cannot 
achieve industrially. Moreover, for those union officials who regard the 
bohds between the trade union movement and the A.L.P. primarily in the 
light of o. personal stairway to political office, there is no question 
of severing those bonds.
These considerations explain why, at the height of the controversy 
with the A.L.P. over the question of its representation on the Workmens
77 Minutes, A.C.T.U., Conference of Key Unions, Sept. 1930, 13
78 Minutes. Melbourne Trades Hall Council, 3l/l/l952
79 J.H.O’Neill (Secretary, Hobart Trades Hall Council), ’The Trades Union 
Movement in Australia’ (unpublished article), 13
Compensation Advisory Committee, the United Trades and Labor Council
of South Australia could respond unanimously to a non-Labor political
leader’s criticism of the ’close relationship’ between the unions and the
Party with the statement: ’This Council, realising that the A.L.P. is
the political party of the Trade Union Movement, further confirms this
SOunity and will continue to retain and consolidate it’•
SO Minutes, United Trades and Labor Council of S.A., 29/5/1953
PART II
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The formal relationship between trade unions and the state 
is found in the terms of the law relating to the unions. In Australia 
the state has for long given close and direct attention to industrial 
relations, with the result that the formal relationship between unions 
and state is set out in considerable detail.
Discussion of the relationship is, however, complicated by- 
two factors. In the first place, the existence of the Federal system 
in Australia means that there are seven bodies of law (the Commonwealth 
and six States) to be taken into account. In the second place, for a 
clear understanding of certain aspects of the relationship, it is 
necessary to consider not only the special industrial legislation found 
in all jurisdictions, but also what we may call the general law relating 
to trade unions which reflects English law on the subject. Much of the 
general law is rendered redundant by the special industrial legislation 
which now covers the great bulk of Australian unions. But, to a varying 
degree in the different jurisdictions, the general law is still signifi­
cant at a number of points and therefore cannot be ignored.
The legal framework in which Australian trade unionism 
operates is considered below in terms of five categories: the nature
of the state’s intervention in industrial bargaining; regulation of the 
strike; legal enforcement of preference of employment to unionists and 
compulsory unionism; regulation of unions’ internal affairs; and the 
legal status of trade unions.
0  '•
CHAPTER 5
THE STATE AND THE INDUSTRIAL BARGAINING PROCESS 
There are two key stages in the process of industrial bargaining: the 
stage at which the bargain is struck, and the stage at which it is enforced. 
In Australia the state is directly involved in both the formulation and en­
forcement of standard wages and conditions of employment in industry gener- 
ally* In part its involvement derives from the extent to which governments! 
primarily State governments, have embodied industrial standards in legis­
lation; in this case the bargaining process takes place at the political
rather than the industrial level, a feature that is discussed in a later 
1
chapter. But here we are concerned with such involvement so far as it re­
sults from the statutory establishment of tribunals which take part in the 
bargaining process at the industrial level. Tribunals with this function 
play an important part in industrial bargaining in Australia. In all juris­
dictions, machinery has been established for the formulation and legal en­
forcement of wages and conditions of employment; and in most of the States, 
provision is made for the legal enforcement of agreements concluded by ord­
inary collective bargaining procedures. The measure of government concern 
in this field is given by the estimate that a total of SB.6 per cent, of
Australian male (and 92.1 per cent, of female) employees are covered by leg-
2
ally enforceable awards, determinations and industrial agreements.
This chapter deals, in the first place, with the structure of the var­
ious systems of industrial regulation. But primarily it is concerned with 
the role of the trade union within those systems - the extent to which the
systems depend on the union for their effective operation and the wsys in
1 See Chapter 14»
2 C*wealth Bureau of Census & Statistics, Bulletin, 2l/2/l956.The figures 
are as at April 1954»The only major industry in which industrial bargain­
ing is conducted completely outside any statutory system is the Broken 
Hill metal mining industry.
which the  union has been f i t t e d  in to  them. D iscussion  of the  u n io n ’ s ro le
i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  those a sp e c ts  of th a t  ro le  which are d i r e c t ly  re le v a n t  to  
th e  fo rm u la tio n , in te r p r e ta t io n  and enforcem ent of norms of employment w ith ­
in  the  ju r i s d ic t io n  of the  s ta tu to r y  t r i b u n a ls .  However, q u e s tio n s  r e l a t ­
in g  to  the  s t r ik e  and o th e r  forms o f d i r e c t  a c tio n  are d e a l t  w ith  in  a sub­
sequen t ch ap te r: union a c t i v i t y  o f t h i s  type i s  the most f re q u e n t cause o f 
enforcem ent a c tio n  a g a in s t  u n io n s , bu t occupies a sp e c ia l p o s i t io n  in  t h i s  
r e s p e c t ,  which j u s t i f i e s  sep a ra te  tre a tm e n t.
N e ith e r the e f fe c t iv e n e s s  nor the  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f the v a rio u s  system s 
o f in d u s t r i a l  re g u la tio n  i s  a t  is su e  h e re . Nor i s  i t  in ten d ed  to  g ive an
exhaustive  tre a tm en t o f th e  many and complex le g a l  problems a r i s in g  in  t h i s
3
f i e l d  owing to  the A u s tra lia n  F ed era l s t r u c tu r e .  Thus many c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
q u e s tio n s  o f im portance a re  no t d e a l t  w ith .
1. The I n d u s t r ia l  Power
Broadly speaking , the l in e  between the  powers of the  Commonwealth and 
the  powers of the  S ta te s  may be f ix e d  by re fe re n c e  to  the  scope o f th e  Comm­
onw ealth ju r i s d ic t io n ,  the  re s id u a l  powers a tta c h in g  to  the S ta te s .  Source 
o f the  in d u s t r ia l  power o f the  Commonwealth may be found in  a number of p ro ­
v is io n s  in  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n . But the  g e n e ra l , and most im p o rtan t, i s  the  
power given th e  Commonwealth P arliam en t to  l e g i s l a t e  in  reg a rd  to  ’c o n c i l i ­
a t io n  and a r b i t r a t io n  f o r  the p rev en tio n  and se tt le m e n t o f in d u s t r i a l  d i s -
4p u tes  ex tend ing  beyond the l im i t s  of any one S t a t e ’ . Under t h i s  p ro v is io n  
the F ed e ra l P a rliam e n t’ s in d u s t r i a l  power i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  laws p ro v id in g  
f o r  means o f c o n c i l ia t io n  and a r b i t r a t io n .  I t  cannot l e g i s l a t e  d i r e c t l y
3 As to  such problem s, see g e n e ra lly  R.M. E gg lesto n , ’I n d u s t r ia l  R e la t io n s ’ 
in  Essays on the  A u s tra lia n  C o n s ti tu tio n  (E lse -M itc h e ll, ed .) , i&S-f-f . ,  
D.C. Thomson, A Comparative Survey o f the  A u s tra lia n  I n d u s t r ia l  T rib u n a ls  
(roneoed ); 0 . de.R. Foenander, S tu d ies in  A u s tra lian  Labour Law and R e la t-
/ io n s , and B e tte r  Employment R e la tio n s .
4 5T5T (xxxv)• For o th e r  so u rces , o r p o s s ib le  so u rces , of i n d u s t r i a l  power, 
see Foenander, S tu d ie s  in  A u stra lian  Labour Law and R e la t io n s . 1-46*.
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either lor the prevention or settlement of industrial^lsputes, deregulate 
industrial conditions in general.
Tne central feature of conciliation is the interposition of an inde­
pendent body or person between the parties to a dispute with the function of 
facilitating agreement between them, the conciliator having no direct res­
ponsibility ior the terms of the agreement. In the case of arbitration 
the independent body or person settles the dispute by making a decision,
Gn award> which is not dependent on the agreement of the parties but is sole­
ly the arbitrator's responsibility. The arbitral function is the more
important aspect of the Commonwealth's role in the industrial bargaining 
process.
Arbitration, under the Constitution, is not confined to the voluntary
submission of industrial disputes, but includes the compulsory submission
°f disputes to arbitration before an arbitrator who is not chosen by the
6
parties. The Federal arbitral power is exercisable only in relation to
7
matters involved in an industrial dispute. Initially, the courts were in­
clined to interpret the term ’industrial dispute’ in a way that predicated 
ihe existence of some form of direct action, but it is now accepted that an
industrial dispute may be constituted by any genuine demand made by one part;
on another which the latter refuses to accept: it is necessary to show only
that there is a disagreement between the parties and not that discontent or
9
dissatisfaction exists. To fall within the constitutional meaning, an in- 
austrial dispute must extend beyond the limits of any one State. The tnter-
5 ’^ dc^iation in the Commonwealth Jurisdiction - A Legal Anal-
jsis (1952), 2 University of Queensland L.J.(No.2), 40.
ttjnwC W: f ^ hLCn  °f C°nciliation & Arbitration; Ex parte Whvbrow & Co.,
7 See J.H Prrtus, 'The Necessity for an Industrial Dispute' (1956), 30Australian Law Journal 250 p ;
8 & Motor Omnibus Employees Association v Commissioner foi
9 g ^ a a e B Ö r O ^ ^  C.L.RT436:------ -----  ”7 bee Eggleston, op. cit., 197.
s ta t e  requ irem ent has been given  a f le x ib le  in te r p r e ta t io n .  I*  inc lu d es
a d isp u te  a r is in g  from demands made by employees in  more than  one S ta te  on
thefr re s p e c tiv e  em ployers, whose business a c t i v i t i e s  need n o t ex tend  o u ts id e
the  borders of any one S ta te  so long as they  have a community o f in d u s t r ia l  
10
i n t e r e s t .  Once an in t e r s t a t e  d isp u te  has been found to  e x i s t  and an award 
has been made, the ju r i s d ic t io n  o f the award-making a u th o r i ty  con tinues so 
long  as the  award i s  in  fo rce  s in ce  the q u estio n  of w hether any f u r th e r  d is ­
pute u ncer th e  award i s  i n t e r s t a t e  o r no t i s  regarded  as s e t t l e d  u n t i l  a new 
award i s  sough t. This i s  im p o rtan t fo r  the v a r ia t io n  of aw ards.
ihe C o n s ti tu tio n  p ro v id es  th a t  in  the even t o f in c o n s is te n c y  between a
law of the  Commonwealth and a law o f a. S ta te  the Commonwealth law is  to  p re -  
11
v a i l .  Awards made by F ed e ra l in d u s t r ia l  a u th o r i t ie s  have th e  fo rce  of
Commonwealtn law , ana a F ed e ra l award th e re fo re  p re v a i ls  over an in c o n s is te n t
S ta te  law o r the award o f a S ta te  in d u s t r ia l  a u th o r i ty  to  the e x te n t o f such 
12
in c o n s is te n c y . As a r e s u l t ,  where a F ed era l award i s  in  fo rc e , the  p a r t ie s  
bound by i t  cannot be brought w ith in  the  scope of an award made by a S ta te  
in d u s t r i a l  a u th o r i ty  or o f a c o n f l ic t in g  law enacted  by a S ta te  l e g i s l a tu r e .
ih e re  i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  th e  Commonwealth bulks very  much la rg e r  in  
the in d u s t r i a l  f i e l d  than  was a n t ic ip a te d ,  o r perhaps in te n d e d ,a t  the  time 
the F ed era l C o n s ti tu tio n  was drawn up . N ev erth e le ss , the  l im i ta t io n s  im­
posed on i t  in  th i s  f i e l d  a re  s u b s ta n t ia l :
The h is to r y  o f the i n d u s t r i a l  r e la t io n s  power su p p lie s  p robab ly  the 
c le a r e s t  A u s tra lia n  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  o f the  d e f e c t s . . . t h a t  Dicey consid­
ered  were c h a r a c te r i s t i c  o f a f e d e ra l  system . Legalism , in  th a t  p rac ­
t i c a l l y  every  m ajor developm ent o f p o l i c y . h a s  gone to  the  High C ourt. 
C onservatism , in  t h a t  n o t a s i r g l e  a l t e r a t io n  in  s .51 (xxxv) has been 
made in  f i f t y  y e a rs , n o tw ith s tan d in g  many a ttem p ts  to  en la rg e  and sim­
p l i f y  i t .  Weak governm ent, as compared w ith  a u n i ta ry  system , in  th a t ,  
i o r  example, the  P a rliam en t cannot d ea l w ith  in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s
1u R. v . Cjwejl_th Court o f C o n c ilia t io n  & Arb i t r a t io n  and A u s tra lia n  B u ilders 
t o u re r s  F ed e ra tio n  (191AK 18 C.L.R.  227,. "  ------------------------
11 S .109 ~
12 Clyde Engin e e r in g  Co. L td , v. Cowburn (1926), 37 C.L.R. 466
generally, but only with interstate industrial disputes; it cannot 
deal even with those disputes by any methods other than those of con­
ciliation and arbitration, it cannot take the direct responsibility 
that a unitary State does as a matter of course.13
On the other hand, while the industrial powers of the States are re­
stricted by the extent of the Commonwealth’s powers, they are, apart from 
this limitation, very much wider. Thus while the main Federal industrial 
power is restricted to the procedures of conciliation and arbitration which 
may operate only in the event of an industrial dispute, State legislatures
have a free hand over industrial matters, and may delegate their powers in
14any way and on any matter regardless of the existence of a dispute? Stat­
utory industrial authorities functioning on this basis have been established 
in all States with regulative powers involving both compulsory submission 
of disputes to them and legal enforcement of their decisions. At the same 
time, State parliaments have not hesitated to legislate directly in this 
field, whether by the general provisions of Factories, Shops and Mining Acts 
or by specifying standard conditions of employment otherwise within the jur­
isdiction of a State industrial authority, or by statutorily instructing
the authority to award specified conditions or to act on certain principles 
1 5in making awards.
The extent to which Federal awards exclude the application of State 
awards and determinations varies from State to State. It has been estim­
ated that in 1954 44«3 per cent, of male employees in Australia were covered
13 K.H.Bailey, ’Fifty Years of the Australian Constitution’ (1951), 25 
Australian Law Journal, at 318.
14 See Portus, op. cit., 250
15 E.g., under Queensland legislation, State awards automatically include 
standard provisions related to working hours, statutory holidays, annual 
holidays and sick leave; the State Industrial Court is directed to insert 
detailed long-service leave clauses in all its awards, and similar pro­
visions are applied directly to employees outside State awards. The Comm­
onwealth can legislate directly in relation to working conditions, but 
this power is restricted to certain industries, places or circumstances, 
and has nothing to do with its general industrial power.
orr
by Commonwealth aw ards, and the  same p ro p o r tio n , 44*3 p e r  c e n t . ,  were
16
covered by S ta te  aw ards. However, in  s in g le  S ta te s  the  p ro p o r tio n  of male 
employees covered by S ta te  awards v a r ie d  from 77.1 p e r  c e n t ,  in  W estern 
A u s tra lia  and 73 .5  p e r c e n t, in  Queensland, to  4 5 .4  p e r  c e n t, in  New South 
W ales, 31*7 p e r c e n t, in  Tasmania, 2 9 .S p e r c e n t, in  South A u s tra l ia  and 
2 7 .4  p e r  c e n t, in  V ic to r ia .  The corresponding  p e rcen tag es  o f male employ­
ees covered by Commonwealth awards in  each S ta te  were: 12.5 in  W estern Aus­
t r a l i a ,  19 .4  in  Q ueensland, 43 .5  in  New South W ales, 52.6 in  Tasmania, 57.1 
in  South A u s tra l ia ,  and 59.4  in  V ic to r ia .  Thus in  ev ery  S ta te  two system s 
of in d u s t r i a l  re g u la t io n , F ed e ra l and S ta te ,  o p e ra te  s id e  by s id e ,  no f ix e d  
p r in c ip le  de term in ing  which employees o r what p ro p o r tio n  o f them a re  cover­
ed by each system .
2 . The Systems o f I n d u s t r ia l  R egulation
The s tru c tu re s  of the  v a rio u s  system s th a t  have been s e t  up to  re g u la te  
in d u s t r ia l  co n d itio n s  in  A u s tra lia  show l i t t l e  u n ifo rm ity . On th e  o th e r  
hand, w ith  some im portan t e x c e p tio n s , th e re  i s  r a th e r  le s s  v a r ia t io n  between 
the powers e x e rc ise d  by th e  t r ib u n a ls  o p e ra tin g  th e  system s.
The prim ary  fu n c tio n s  o f th e  t r ib u n a ls  a re  making, in te r p r e t in g  and 
en fo rc in g  the  term s o f s tan d a rd  co n d itio n s  of employment -  though in  any 
one system no s in g le  t r ib u n a l  may be competent to  c a r ry  ou t a l l  th re e  func­
t io n s .  The in s tru m en ts  th a t  embody th ese  term s a re  th e  awards o f a r b i t r a l  
bo d ies, wages b o a rd s1 d e te rm in a tio n s  (which f r e q u e n tly  re p re s e n t ,  in  f a c t  
i f  no t in  th e o ry , a r b i t r a l  d e c is io n s ) , c o n c i l ia t io n  agreem ents o b ta in ed  in  
s ta tu to ry  c o n c i l ia t io n  p ro ceed in g s , and in d u s t r i a l  agreem ents o b ta in ed  by 
f re e  c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g  p rocedu res bu t e n fo rceab le  by the  t r i b u n a ls .
T6 For th e  source o f th e se  and th e  fo llow ing  f ig u r e s ,  see no te  2 above.
’Awards1 here in c lu d es  r e g is te r e d  agreem ents.
The Tribunals:
The make-up and powers of the major industrial tribunals and other 
bodies operating in the Federal and State jurisdictions are detailed in 
Appendix 1. In the first place, only those bodies covering industry in 
general and competent to deal with a wide range of industrial matters are 
included in the Appendix. It therefore excludes a number of tribunals 
whose operation is restricted to particular industries or occupations - for 
example, the Federal Coal Industry Tribunal, the Western Australian Coal 
Industry Tribunal, and various tribunals operating in the Federal and State 
public services and instrumentalities. It also excludes tribunals concerned 
with a limited set of industrial matters — for example, the various State 
tribunals dealing with apprenticeship and workers’ compensation. In the 
second place, the powers of tribunals dealt with in the Appendix are those 
which relate directly to the tribunals’ primary functions of making, inter­
preting and enforcing the instruments of industrial regulation. A wide 
range of powers which, though important, are incidental to these main func­
tions are deferred for consideration in later chapters.
In the Federal sphere there are two main bodies, the Commonwealth Con­
ciliation and Arbitration Commission and the Commonwealth Industrial Court. 
The Commission is concerned chiefly with making awards and conciliation ag­
reements while the work of interpreting and enforcing them is largely carried 
out by the Court. Until 1956 all these functions wäre exercised finally 
by one body, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. In that year, how­
ever, a majority of the High Court, in a decision later upheld by the Privy 
Council, ruled that the Arbitration Court could not enforce awards. The 
Commonwealth Parliament, it was held, was not competent to combine in the 
one body both the arbitral power of making awards and the judicial power of
enforcing them - the dominant function of the Arbitration Court being ar-
1
bitral rather than judicial in character. This decision was the immediate 
cause of the present division of functions between the Commission and the 
Court. i’he division is not absolute: the Commission, as shown in Appendix 
If has certain powers which, while not judicial powers as the High Court 
views them, may be used as sanctions in cases of non-compliance with awards. 
In its work of making awards and conciliation agreements, the Commission, 
among whose members there is some differentiation of function and powers, 
is assisted by a number of ancillary bodies including boards of reference, 
conciliators and local industrial boards.
The main body in the New South Wales system is the Industrial Commiss­
ion assisted by four conciliation comraisioners, more than four hundred con-
2ciliation committees and a number of industrial magistrates. There is no 
single industrial tribunal with general State-wide jurisdiction in Victoria: 
the main bodies are more than two hundred wages boards, an Industrial App­
eals Court ana a Metropolitan Industrial Court. The Queensland system is 
simple in structure, an industrial Court functioning with the aid of a 
number of industrial magistrates. In South Australia an Industrial Court 
operates alongside a specialized body known as the Board of Industry, to­
gether with over sixty industrial boards and a number of special magistrates. 
The Western Australian Court of Arbitration is assisted by a single concil­
iation commissioner, a number of boards of reference and industrial magis­
trates. No single industrial body with State-wide jurisdiction exists in 
Tasmania, where the functions of industrial regulation are carried out by 
seventy opers.ting wages boards and the police magistrates.
1 ^ Cfrs»; Sx parte Boilermakers Society (1956). 94 C.L.R. 254
^ Statutory provision is made for special commissioners with conciliation 
powers bub it has not been used. Similarly, in other States, statutory 
powers enabling the appointment of boards of reference (Vic. and Qd.),
(P.T.O.)
The Instruments:
C r
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The instruments of industrial regulation fall into three classes: 
the arbitral award and determination, the conciliation agreement and the 
industrial agreement. The nature of these instruments and the tribunals’ 
control over them in the various jurisdictions are detailed in Appendix II.
By far the most important, both in number and in the extent of their 
application, are awards and determinations. In their pure form these 
instruments represent an exercise of the arbitral power, that is they em­
body the decision of an independent third party on issues over which employ­
ers and employees have been unable to reach agreement - whether that third 
party is the judge of an arbitration court or the chairman of a \mges board. 
In practice, however, the wide range of matters dealt with by existing 
awards and determinations means that in all cases both sides of the bargain­
ing table are in agreement, or readily come to agreement, on a large 
proportion of these matters. The arbitral power is in fact usually exer­
cised only in relation to certain key issues such as wage rates, or to 
claims for new privileges or concessions, or the extension or modification 
of old privileges. Moreover, in many cases the parties are able to agree 
on all matters and their agreement is embodied in an award or determination, 
an award of this character being known as a consent award. Thus many award: 
are awards in name only: agreement on their provisions has been reached by
private negotiation outside the statutory machinery, and the terms of the
"ft®*agreement have then been submitted toAarbitral authority for its imprimatur.
What may be termed the conciliation agreement represents an exercise
by an industrial authority of its power of conciliation. In other words,
and of commissioners, industrial boards and conciliation committees (W.A.) 
are either rarely used or have fallen into disuse altogether. But the Ind­
ustrial Court of S.A., with no statutory power to do so, has occasionally 
set up boards of reference under consent awards.
it is an agreement reached after the authority’s jurisdiction has been
invoked but before the stage of arbitration is reached. Where provision
is made for conciliation agreements it is usual for the tribunal concerned
to convert them into consent awards. Only in thd Commonwealth jurisdiction
are conciliation agreements published apart from awards - though here, too,
most of them are converted into consent awards. The legal force of a
conciliation agreement is no different from that of an award. But the
distinction between a conciliation agreement against which the certifying
authority has no objection to offer and an award, whether or not it is made
by consent, which is the direct responsibility of the authority may in some
3circumstances be of practical importance.
The third class is the industrial agreement. The distinguishing mark 
of this instrument is that it is the result of private negotiation between 
the parties. To this extent it resembles the collective bargaining agree­
ment of the United Kingdom; but there the resemblance ends because the nor­
mal British collective agreement is not enforceable at law. By contrast, 
once the Australian industrial agreement has been registered under an appro­
priate Act it is enforceable by the relevant industrial authority in the 
same way as an award. Like its British counterpart, an unregistered col-
4lective agreement is not enforceable at law in Australia. Indushtrial 
agreements may be registered and legally enforced in all arbitration court 
systems, but not in the wages boards systems of Victoria and Tasmania.
The content of State awards and determinations usually follows more
or less closely that of Federal awards, embodying provisions dealing with
a basic wage for all workers covered, a marginal allowance for skill,
3 See Foenander, Industrial Regulation in Australia, 7.
4 Australian Agricultural Co. v. Federated Engine Drivers & Firemens Ass’n 
(1 9 1 3), 17 C.L.R. 261. See also D.G.Thomson, ’Voluntary Collective Agree­
ments in Australia and New Zealand’ (194&)> 1 Annual Law Review (.W.A.) BO
1 r-
5working hours, and with a number of general industrial conditions. Since
the establishment of compulsory arbitration in Australia, the content of
awards has greatly expanded as a result of the trend towards more detailed
regulation of general industrial conditions, a trend in which the Federal
6tribunals have played the leading part. It is noticeable, however, that
the determinations of Victorian and Tasmanian wages boards are usually rather
less comprehensive than the awards made by the industrial courts in other 
7
jurisdictions. The conciliation agreement normally covers the same range 
of matters as an award. The industrial agreement may cover a similar range
of matters, but often it merely supplements a current award in relation to
8certain matters with which the award may or may not deal.
3. Unions in the Industrial Regulation Systems
The position of unions in the statutory systems of industrial regu­
lation in Australia may be dealt with under five heads: first, the extent 
to which the systems’ effective operation depends on unions; second, the 
unions’ functions within each system; third, the formal recognition of unions; 
lourth, the ways in which unions are legally equipped to carry out their 
functions; and finally, the ways in which union organization is legally pro­
tected and encouraged. The divisions made in the case of the last four 
headings are largely a matter of convenience because the allocation of func­
tions, the provision of equipment to carry them out and the protection of 
organization, are a.ll in a sense forms of recognition.
*he discussion throughout is, unless specified otherwise, concerned 
solely with employees and their organizations. It should be kept in mind,
5 See Foenander, op. cit., 26-33.
6 See Thomson, A Comparative Survey of the Australian Industrial Tribunals.41
7 See Foenander, Better Employment Relations. 129
8 This applies only to State industrial agi^ements; those in the Common­
wealth jurisdiction, as Appendix II shows, are very much more limited as 
to their legally-enforceable content. i
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th e r e f o r e ,  th a t  in  th e  case of the s ta tu to r y  powers co n fe rred  on em ployees’ 
dnions e q u iv a le n t powers a re  a lm ost in v a r ia b ly  c o n fe rre d , where a p p ro p r ia te , 
on in d iv id u a l  em ployers, em ployers’ o rg a n iz a tio n s , government bod ies and 
o f f i c i a l s ,  such as in sp e c to rs  and in d u s t r i a l  r e g i s t r a r s .  Perhaps the  most 
im p o rtan t f e a tu re  to  emphasize in  th i s  connec tion  i s  th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l 
em ployer -  u n lik e  the  in d iv id u a l employee, as w i l l  be shown -  in v a r ia b ly  
has s ta tu to r y  powers corresponding  to  those  o f th e  em ployers’ and em ployees’ 
o rg a n iz a t io n s .
R eferences to  the r e g i s t r a t io n  o f un ions a re  r e s t r i c t e d ,  u n le ss  o th e r­
wise s ta t e d ,  to  unions r e g is te r e d  under th e  i n d u s t r i a l  a r b i t r a t i o n  Acts o f
th e  Commonwealth, New South W ales, Q ueensland, South A u s tra lia  o r W estern 
1
A u s tr a l ia .  A union  r e g is te r e d  on ly  under one of the S ta te  tra d e  un ion  Acts 
i s  regarded  as u n re g is te re d  f o r  p re s e n t p u rp o ses .
The Need f o r  Unions:
A ll the  A u s tra lia n  systems of i n d u s t r i a l  r e g u la t io n ,  w hether the  t r i ­
bunals concerned are  co u rts  o r wages b o ards, in  th e  l a s t  r e s o r t  f a l l  back 
on the  d e c is io n  of an im p a r t ia l  th i r d  p a r ty  when em ployers and employees 
f a i l  to  reach  agreem ent on th e  term s of such re g u la t io n .  To t h i s  e x te n t 
a t  l e a s t ,  a r b i t r a t i o n  i s  an elem ent in  a l l  system s.
The f i r s t  p r in c ip le  on which the  n o tio n  of a r b i t r a t i o n  i s  based i s  t h a t  
of a body o r p e rso n , in te rp o se d  between and independent o f the p a r t i e s  to  a 
d is p u te , with, the  fu n c tio n  o f d ec id in g  the  is su e  in  d is p u te .  The second 
p r in c ip le  i s  th a t  the p a r t i e s  must each be ab le  to  p u t t h e i r  case to  the 
a r b i t r a t o r  in  o rd e r th a t  he may reach  h is  d e c is io n . in  f u l l  knowledge o f the  
r e le v a n t  f a c t s  and argum ents. In  c e r ta in  c ircum stances the second p r in c ip le  
may be of d im in ish in g  im portance . This depends, on th e  one hand, on the
" r  ■ — -  ■
A ll b u t the  South A u s tra lia n  Act p rov ide  f o r  the  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f em ployers 
o rg a n iz a tio n s  a ls o .  ^
area ana complexity of the field covered and the arbitrators familiarity 
with it; and, on the other hand, with the arbitrator’s approach to his role 
- whether he regards his functions, using Perlman’s terms, as ’administrat­
ive' or ‘autonomous' in character, the principle being of greater importance
2
in the latter than in the former case.
The field covered by most industrial tribunals or persons with arbitral 
powers in Australia is so extensive and so detailed that it would be im­
possible for them to function adequately in the absence of something more 
than the bare claims and counter-claims of employers and employees. The 
need for information is the more pressing where, as is so often the case, 
the arbitrators are men with legal training but without first-hand indus­
trial experience.
It is clear that if a system involving arbitration at some stage and 
dealing with great numbers of individuals is to function effectively, or is 
even to function at all, the claims made before the arbitrator, if they are 
to be given weight, must be consistent - consistent in the sense that not 
more than one claim at one time should be made on a given matter concerning 
a particular class of employee. Further, such claims must be backed by 
coherent argument if the arbitrator is to give an informed decision. The 
obvious means by which the numerous voices of individual employees can be 
given sufficient consistency and coherence is through a representative union. 
This does not necessarily preclude the individual voice, and in point of 
fact there are marked variations in the extent to which the different systems 
of industrial regulation depend on unions. In many cases, it is true, the 
variations are only formal. But differences in the structure of industrial
regulation systems are not infrequently significant enough to lead to
2 See Mark Perlman, ’An Analytical Theory of Labour Arbitration in Australia1 
(195-4) y 1 Sydney Law Review 20G7
variations in the reliance placed on union organization, variations which 
arc reflected not only in the formal terms of legislation but also in the 
oay—to-day operation of the regulatory machinery.
The first distinction on these lines is between the court and wages 
board systems. The wages board has least need of the union for the fulfil­
ment of its functions. Each wages board covers the whole or a section of 
a Particular industry or trade., Its chairman, who exercises the arbitral 
power, is usually chairman also of a large number of other boards which 
together cover a wide and diversified industrial area. In this case the 
problem of unifying employee-demands (or at least of reducing any differ­
ences in them to manageable proportions), and of securing the facts and 
argument necessary to inform the arbitrator’s decision, is solved by the 
appointment to the board of permanent employees’ representatives who are 
actually employed in the industry or trade concerned? The qualification 
oi the employee-member is not that he represents a particular union, but 
that he is an employee with first-hand experience in the matters dealt with 
by the board. In these circumstances, union organization is not imperative. 
Ill fact, the wages board system was initially evolved as a means of protect­
ing workers in weakly-organized industries. On the other hand, the need 
for employees to be organized is much more pressing where the tribunal covers 
a wide industrial area and does not change its membership according to the 
inaustry dealt with. The members of these tribunals cannot be expected to 
have the detailed knowledge necessary for adequate consideration of the 
great variety of matters arising for their decision. Moreover, the judicial 
procedures usually followed by such tribunals are often costly: this means,
in many cases, that participation in proceedings before them is practicable 
3 in practice, however, Victorian and Tasmanian wages boards often follow the 
arbitration court practice of hearing witnesses: see Sawer, 'Conciliation 
ana Arbitration of Industrial Disputes’ (1947), 23 Economic Record, at 269.
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*or employees only through organizations with substan'bairEMb-~fm.ancial reserves4
ine second distinction is between the Federal and State industrial 
courts. The need for unions is less in the States than in the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction. In New South Wales and particularly in South Australia, 
this situation may be partly a result of the extent to which bodies on the 
wages board model are utilized. But the more general and significant rea­
son arises from the difference between the Federal and State industrial power. 
The Commonwealth’s main industrial power, as we have seen, restricts the 
jurisdiction of Federal industrial tribunals to matters involved in an inter­
state industrial dispute and to the parties to such a dispute. State tri­
bunals are not restricted in this way. They may deal with any industrial 
matter regardless of whether it is in dispute, and their decision may bind 
not only parties to proceedings before them but all other relevant employers 
and employees. This means that a. State tribunal is not forced to specify 
the parties in proceedings before it in order to indicate those bound by its 
award. In effect, it can disregard the parties and merely specify a local­
ity and a calling within which its award is binding on all persons. In 
these circumstances, the question of whether a particular employee can be 
regarded as a party to the original proceedings, and therefore as being 
sound by the subsequent award, is irrelevant. But the same question is 
vital in the Federal jurisdiction, where it is essential for there to be 
some means by which the great and ’ever changing body of workmen that con­
stitute the trade’ can be readily defined as parties to a dispute and thus 
to an award.
Any attempt to eflectively prevent and settle industrial disputes by 
either ([conciliation or arbitration) would be idle if individual work—
4 The proolem of expense is especially acute in the Federal jurisdictionj its 
importance varies in the State arbitration court systems.
5 Jumbunna Coal Mine (No Liability) v. Victorian Coal Miners’ Ass’n. f1QO^
b C.L.R., at 359. ----------------------------- ■ 19
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men and employees only could be dea.lt. with...If the judicial power 
of the Commonwealth is to be effectively exercised by way of concil­
iation and arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes, it 
must be by bringing it to bear on representative bodies standing for 
groups of workmen. Further...the representative body must have some 
permanent existence, irrespective of the change in personnel of its 
members from time to time which is always going on. b
Thus the only feasible means of achieving the degree of precision dictated 
by the terms of the Federal industrial power is by recognizing unions as 
parties to disputes and by making awards binding, through them, on their 
membership, in this way defining the individual employees the award is in­
tended to bind. This situation alone is sufficient justification for the
for the contention that the Commonwealth system is not only »based on union-
7 3
ism», but it »could not be worked without unions». It follows that one
of the chief objects of the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Act must
be »to encourage the organization of representative bodies of employers and 
9
employees...»
However, when it comes to enforcing awards, as distinct from making 
them, Federal and State tribunals are closer in their reliance on union 
organization.
It is essential not only that the Court should have the representative 
body before it in the hearing of the dispute, but that it should be 
able to make that body responsible for the observance of [the] award 
by those whom it represents...The Court must be able to enforce obed­
ience on the representative bodies.^
These remarks refer to the Federal arbitration system, but they are 
also applicate to the State systems. A Queensland parliamentarian pointed
.^ -is out in terms which implied that a choice was open, even in this respect, 
to the State tribunals:
Our experience goes to show that where the union can be held liable 
_for the payment of penalties and the union official can be utlized 
b Ibid., ät,358-60; approved by the Full Court in Federated Ironworkers» Asshi
v. Comiflonwealtfr (1951), 84 C.L.R., at 279. " -----
7 H.B. Higgins, A New Province for law and Order. 15
9 c f & ’i.4Ait!es!2S?i)!*g” ^ 91^  5 C'A -R ->at 25; (1935) 35 C.A.R.,at 131
10 Jumbunna Case, supra. at 359.
by th e  Court to  induce the  members o f th e  union to  obey an award, 
i t  i s  much b e t t e r  to  d e a l w ith  the un ions th an  to  d ea l w ith  groups 
of in d iv id u a ls .  ^
The Role of the  Unions:
The unions* ro le  in  th e  system s of i n d u s t r i a l  re g u la tio n  i s  made up, 
in  the  f i r s t  p la c e , of fu n c tio n s  ex p re ss ly  co n fe rred  on them by s ta tu te  and, 
in  the  second p la c e , of fu n c tio n s  which th e  unions are as a m a tte r  o f p rac ­
t i c e  expected  to  c a r ry  o u t. S ta tu to ry  p ro v is io n s  s e t  ou t th e  u n io n s ’ ro le  
in  minimal term s on ly .
The F e d e ra l, New South W ales, Queensland and Tasmanian l e g i s l a t i o n  does
n o t e x p re ss ly  give unions a vo ice  in  aopointm ents to  the  re le v a n t  in d u s t r i a l  
12
t r ib u n a ls ;  bu t th a t  o f South A u s tra l ia ,  W estern A u s tra lia  and V is to r ia
does g ive them such a v o ic e . In  South A u s tra l ia  only  the  Board o f In d u s try
i s  a f fe c te d  in  th i s  way, i t s  two em ployees’ re p re se n a tiv e s  being  nom inated
13
by the  U nited  Trades and Labor Council of South A u s tra l ia .  The em ployees’ 
re p re s e n ta t iv e  on the  W estern A u s tra lian  A rb itr a t io n  Court i s  nom inated by 
th e  unions g e n e ra lly , w hile th e  Melbourne Trades H all Council nom inates a l l
14
such re p re s e n ta t iv e s  on th e  V ic to r ia n  G eneral Board. Unions a re  empowered 
to  nominate persons as employee-members o f o rd in a ry  wages boards in  V ic to r ia  
b u t such nom inations need n o t be accep ted ; however, u n lik e  the s i tu a t io n  in  
Tasmania and South A u s tra l ia ,  no l im i t  i s  s e t  to  the number o f members who 
may be un ion  o f f i c i a l s .
In  p ra c t ic e  unions o p e ra tin g  in  the  system s of New South W ales, South 
A u s t r a l ia ,  V ic to r ia  and Tasmania have a l a r g e r  voice in  t h i s  r e s p e c t  than  
the  s ta tu to r y  p ro v is io n s  in d ic a te .  In  th e se  S ta te s  em ployees’ re p re se n t­
a t iv e s  on c o n c i l ia t io n  com m ittees, in d u s t r i a l  boards and wages b o a rd s , as
11 (1929) 154 Qd. P a r i .  D eb s., 2043
12 In  Tas. one member of a wages board may be a fu l l - t im e  union o f f ic ia l*
13 In d . Code, s .2 5 3 . There i s  a lso  a p e rm issive  p ro v is io n , a f f e c t in g  indus­
t r i a l  boards, s im ila r  to  t h a t  in  Tasmania: see note 12.
14 W .A .jInd. Arb. A ct, s .4 5 ; V ic .,  Lab. & In d . A ct, s .  21 (3)
the case may be, are almost invariably appointed on the nomination of the 
15
union concerned. In each case these bodies are usually established on the
suggestion of an interested union. Moreover, although all that is required
of the employees’ representative on the Victorian Industrial Appeals Court
16
is that he should have 'industrial experience’ , this member has invariably 
been the Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council.
------0 O 0 -------
In the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, but in
no other jurisdiction, unions are under a statutory obligation to notify
the appropriate industrial authorities of existing or impending industrial 
17
disputes. As a matter of practice, however, unions in the other juris­
dictions are normally expected to perform the same function.
Under Federal, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australian and West­
ern Australian legislation, unions are empowered to initiate proceedings 
before the appropriate industrial tribunals for awards, determinations and
orders and, where such jurisdiction exists, for the interpretation of these 
18
instruments. In the Victorian and Tasmanian wages boards systems, the only
corresponding power explicitly conferred on unions is the right, in Victoria,
19
to appeal to the Industrial Appeals Court against a wages board determination, 
But owing to the way in which the employees' representatives on wages boards 
in both States are selected, unions may, in effect, initiate proceedings 
for determinations, and frequently do so.
Under all Acts providing for the registration and enforcement of
1^ The problem faced by^the S.A. Industrial Court, when four nominations were 
made for three positions on an industrial board, rarely arises, and is ei/en 
more rarely resolved in the manner the Court chose - by excluding the one 
union official (not an employee) nominated :see (1953) 2$ S.A.I.R. 208.
16 Lab. & Ind. Act, s.42(3)
17 Cwealth, C.& A., s.28(2); N.S.W.,Ind.Arb ., s.25A; Qd., I.C.& A., s.21A; 
Vic., Lab. & Ind., s.41(2)
18 C’wealth, C. & A., ss.24,110; N.3.W.? Ind. Arb., s.74> Qd., I.C. & A., s. 
7(1) (i), Sched.jS.A., Ind.Code, ss. 17,176,260; W.A., Ind.Arb., ss.6,61 $0,91.
19 Lab. & Ind. Act., s.45(1)
i n d u s t r i a l  agreem ents, unions may be p a r ty  to  such agreem ents.
------- -  0 O 0  -  -------
In  most of idie A u s tra lia n  system s o f in d u s t r ia l  re g u la t io n , the  u n io n ’s 
ro le  in  r e l a t io n  to  the  enforcem ent o f awards and d e te rm in a tio n s  has two 
a sp e c ts  which correspond , in  e f f e c t ,  t o  the two s tag es  in  the  enforcem ent 
p ro cess : on the one hand, the  union as an e n t i t y  to  which enforcem ent p ro ­
cedures may be d i r e c t ly  a p p lie d ; and on the o th e r  hand, the  union as an 
agency f o r  secu rin g  compliance w ith  awards aud agreem ents on the  p a r t  of 
both i t s  members and em ployers.
In  a l l  ju r i s d ic t io n s  ex cep t those  o f V ic to r ia  and Tasmania, un ions a re
l i a b le  to  m onetary p e n a l t ie s  f o r  a b reach  o r non-observance of aw ards, o rd e rs
21
and in d u s t r i a l  agreem ents committed by them selves or t h e i r  members. The
F ed era l and W estern A u s tra lia n  Acts s p e c ify  th a t  in  s im ila r  c ircum stances an
award o r agreem ent, o r any p a r t  of i t ,  may be suspended o r c a n c e lle d  so f a r
22
as i t  a p p lie s  to  a union and i t s  members, a procedure which i s  e q u a lly  a v a i l ­
ab le  in  a l l  o th e r ju r i s d ic t io n s  under th e  t r i b u n a l s ’ g en era l power to  r e s -  
cind  o r a t  l e a s t  vary  t h e i r  awards o r d e te rm in a tio n s . The u lt im a te  sa n c tio n  
w ith in  the  power of th e  c h ie f  in d u s t r i a l  a u th o r i ty  in  every  j u r i s d ic t io n  
a p a r t  from V ic to r ia  and Tasmania i s  the  c a n c e lla t io n  of a u n io n ’ s r e g is ­
t r a t i o n  under the  re le v a n t a r b i t r a t i o n  Act^
The F e d e ra l, New bouth  W ales, Q ueensland, South A u s tra lian  and W estern 
A u s tra lia n  a r b i t r a t i o n  Acts empower un ions o r union  o f f i c i a l s  to  i n s t i t u t e
le g a l  p roceed ings f o r  the  enforcem ent o f awards and agreem ents a g a in s t
20 C w e a lth , G. & A ., s .1 7 2 ; N.S.W., In d . A rb ., s s .1 1 ,1 2 ; Qd., I .C . & A ., s .  
4 2 (1 ); S .A ., Ind . Code, s .8 8 ; W.A., In d . A rb ., s .3 7 .
21 C’w ea lth , C. & A ., s s .4 1 , 111,177; N.S.W ., I n d .A rb ., ss .9 3 ,1 1 9 ; Q d., I .C . & 
A ., S .61; S .A ., Ind.C ode, s s . 93*120,128; W.A., Ind . A rb ., a s .9 9 ,1 0 0 .Those 
in  N.S.W. are  fo rm a lly  a p p lic a b le  to  in d iv id u a l union  members, b u t i t  i s  
s p e c if ie d  th a t  un ion  p ro p e r ty  i s  a v a ila b le  to  meet such p e n a l t ie s .
22 C w e a lth , C. & A ., s .6 2 ; W.A., Ind . A rb ., s.98A.
23 C’w ea lth , C. & A ., s .143*(1)5 N.S.W ., Ind . A rb ., s .8  (8 ) ; Qd* I .C . & A ., 
S.4O; S .A ., In d . Code, s .8 5  (1 ) ; W.A., In d .A rb ., s .2 9 (2 ) .
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em ployers. The same power in  V ic to r ia  and Tasmania i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  ap­
p ro p r ia te  government o f f i c e r s .  But the  fo rm al a b i l i t y  to  launch p ro se ­
cu tio n s  i s  le s s  im portan t th an  the  u n io n s ’ in fo rm al fu n c tio n  o f p o lic in g  
awards and agreem ents.
Government in sp e c to rs  in  a l l  ju r i s d ic t io n s  p o lic e  r e le v a n t  awards and 
d e te rm in a tio n s  by making re g u la r  in s p e c tio n s  o f w orkplaces. In  a d d i t io n ,  
th ey  in v e s t ig a te  com plaints r e f e r r e d  to  them by unions o r by in d iv id u a l  em­
p lo y e es . Most unions go no f u r th e r  th an  in d ic a t in g  members’ co m p la in ts , 
o r m erely  sending the  com plainant to  the a p p ro p ria te  government departm ent, 
and a sk in g  th a t  they  be in v e s t ig a te d .  In  one o r two S ta te s ,  though i t  i s  
o f f i c i a l l y  d isco u rag ed , union o f f i c i a l s  may accompany in d u s t r i a l  in s p e c to rs  
in v e s t ig a t in g  com plaints r a is e d  by th e  u n io n s . The p ra c t ic e  i s  ra re  in  
most S ta te s ,  bu t i s  n o t uncommon in  New South Wales and was s tan d a rd  proced­
u re  in  Queensland u n t i l  the  d e fe a t  in  1957 of the  Labor gov rnment whose 
su ccesso r ab o lish ed  th e  p r a c t ic e .  Some un ions p re fe r  to  c a r ry  ou t the  
p o lic in g  and en fo rc in g  fu n c tio n  e n t i r e ly  on t h e i r  own. T heir o f f i c i a l s ,  
e i th e r  fu l l - t im e  o r a t  the shop stew ard  le v e l ,  in v e s t ig a te  com plain ts from 
members and, in  a few c a se s , c a r ry  o u t ro u tin e  in sp e c tio n s  in  th e  same way 
as government in s p e c to rs .  Where th e y  a re  com petent to  do so , th e se  unions 
may, and o f te n  do, i n s t i t u t e  l e g a l  p roceed ings a g a in s t  em ployers. Even 
unions who do n o t take  such an a c tiv e  i n t e r e s t  in  p o lic in g  f re q u e n tly  take  
le g a l  a c tio n  when government o f f ic e r s  re fu se  to  p ro secu te  on th e  ground th a t  
a m a tte r  i s  t r i v i a l  o r  t h a t  the a c t io n  re q u e s te d  i s  a g a in s t  dep artm en ta l 
p o lic y . For many y e a r s ,  f o r  exam ple, th e  p o l ic y  of the  Q ueensland D epart­
ment o f Labour and In d u s try  has been to  leav e  the  le g a l  enforcem ent o f the
v*. •• . . . . . . . .  ?  * »n  ; n T-'s .• - • * • • . —
K / J. •— Ju. dl. W«.i.'WW X .» - ' U» • C  . • ■„•..i. O O V. J. J- V r »
24 C*w ea lth , C .& A .,ss.119,177; N .S.W .,Ind. A rb ., ss .9 3 ,1 2 7 ; Q d., I .  C. & A ., 
s s . 55,63; W.A., In d . A rb ., ss.99> 100.
25 See, e . g . ,  Walker, In d u str ia l R elations in  A u stra lia . 61.
preference clause found in most State awards completely to the unions.
But many of the unions most active in policing their awards prefer as far 
as possible to settle enforcement questions by direct negotiation with em­
ployers; in such cases, since breaches often arise from varying interpret­
ations of awards, the only legal action necessary may be an application to 
an industrial tribunal for an interpretation.
the extent to which unions police their awards is in the first place a 
xunction partly of their size (small unions with part-time officials or 
overworked full-time officials are in no position to operate adequately in 
this field) and partly of the personal vigour of their officials. It also 
seems to depend on the militancy of the union or, in cases where direct 
action is loss common, on the degree to which the industry concerned lends 
itself to small-scale, competitive enterprises. In the militant group, 
unions operating in the maritime, stevedoring and mining (particularly coal 
mining) industries carry out all the policing of their own awards, and a 
similar policy is to a great extent followed by unions in the metal trades 
and building and meat industries. A large amount of award-policing is also 
done by unions connected with the baking, clothing and furniture-making 
trades, and covering employees in hotels and shops; all these are industries 
in which small enterprises abound and the undercutting of award conditions, 
either through ignorance or intent, is not uncommon. To some degree the 
envision between the militant unions and those covering small-scale industries 
is reflected in the methods of enforcement preferred: in the case of the 
xormer, direct negotiation with employers is usually employed as far as poss­
ible; in the latter, there seems to be somewhat greater emphasis on legal 
prosecution - probably on the principle that it is more important to make
an example than merely to rectify the specific complaint.
26 See ibid., 50.
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The union role in policing and enforcing awards against employers,
even where the union does no more than transmit members1 complaints to
industrial inspectors, is important. But it is perhaps less important than
in the days before government inspectorates were established and operated
27
as extensively as at present. There has, however, been no corresponding 
diminution in their role as a means of enforcing awards against employees.
1 It is essential that the representative body should be strong enough to 
secure obedience by individual workers of the conditions of the agreement 
or award'll the expectation implicit in this statement, made in 1908, is 
held no less firmly by present-day industrial tribunals. Unions are ex­
pected to secure their members’ observance of awards and agreements by using
29any sanctions available under their rules. Tb this end unions are held 
responsible for breaches committed by any section of their members? Natur­
ally enough, flitj display considerably greater reluctance to act against 
their own members than against employers. But, while it is not frequent, 
disciplinary action is not uncommon against union members breaking award 
conditions, particularly in the case of craft unionsj and in rare cases even 
legal prosecution has been usecl. The question of union responsibility in 
this connection arises most frequently and in its most significant form in 
relation to strike action, which is discussed fully in the next chapter.
Recognition of the Unions:
In most jurisdictions provision is made for the registration of unions
as the formal mark of their recognition by industrial tribunals? But
~7 bee, e.g., (1905) 4 W.A.A.R, 49 and (1935) 15 W.A.I.G. 24. Provisions for 
a Federal inspectorate were enacted only in 1928, and no appointments were 
made until some years after: see (1932) 31 C.A.R., at 440. '
28 Jumbunna Case. supra. at 359.
29 See (1941) 45 C.A.R., at 314-6.
30 See (1954) 78 C.A.R. 249.
31 See Walker, op. cit., 56.
32 Registration under a State Trade Union Act does not of itself constitute 
recognition in this sense.
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p ro v is io n s  o f t h i s  s o r t  do n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  c o n s t i tu te  an exh au stiv e  des­
c r ip t io n  o f the  bodies o r p e rso n s , on the  em ployees' s id e , th a t  may have 
stan d in g  b e fo re  an in d u s t r ia l  t r i b u n a l .  The assignm ent o f fu n c tio n s  i s  in  
i t s e l f  a lo rn  o f re c o g n itio n . Thus, to  t e s t  the  im portance of form al re ­
co g n itio n  by r e g i s t r a t io n  i t  i s  n ecessa ry  to  determ ine w hether such recog­
n i t io n  i s  e q u iv a le n t to  ex c lu s iv e  re c o g n itio n . This invo lves f i r s t  the 
q u es tio n  o f w hether the fo rm a lly  recogn ized  un ion  i s  the  only  body on th e  
em ployees' s id e  competent to  e x e rc is e  th e  r ig h t s  and d u tie s  con fe rred  by 
s t a t u t e .  I f  i t  i s  n o t, th en  th e  f u r th e r  q u e s tio n  i s  r a is e d  as to  the  ex­
te n t  to  which those  r ig h ts  and d u t ie s  may be ex e rc ise d  by un ions t h a t  are  
n o t fo rm ally  re c o g n ize d ,o r by unorgan ized  in d iv id u a l employees.
Unions may o b ta in  fo rm al re c o g n itio n  by r e g i s t r a t io n  in  a l l  a r b i t r a t io n  
co u rt ju r i s d ic t io n s .  No co rrespond ing  p ro v is io n  i s  made in  the wages boards
S ta te s  o f V ic to r ia  and Tasmania; the s i tu a t io n  in  th ese  S ta te s  i s  d iscu ssed  
l a t e r .
In  tile Commonwealth, New South W ales, Queensland, South A ustrali?  and 
Western A u s tra l ia ,  only r e g is te r e d  unions are competent to  i n i t i a t e  proceed­
ings i o r  awards; and, ex cep t in  South A u s tra l ia ,  only  r e g is te r e d  unions may 
take p a r t  in  such p roceed ings and be made p a r t i e s  to  the subsequent aw ard! 
in  South A u s t r a l ia ,  u n re g is te re d  u n io n s , a t  the d is c r e t io n  o f th e  In d u s t r ia l
C ourt, may take  p a r t  in  p ro ceed ings f o r  an award in s t i t u t e d  by a r e g is te r e d  
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union , anci the award may b ind  the u n re g is te re d  u n io n 's  members.’ M oreover,
the u n re g is te re d  (and u n in co rp o ra ted ) union i s  p laced  on th e  same fo o tin g  as
a r e g i s t e r ed (and in co rp o ra ted ) un ion  in  r e l a t io n  to  th e  aw ard 's  enforcem ent,
33 ^ 'w e a lth , C. & A.', s .1 3 2 ; N.S.W ., In d .A rb ., s .8 ( 1 ) ;  Qd., I.C .& A ., s .2 8 (1 ) ; 
^ .A ., Ind.C ode, s .6 3 ; W.A., I n d .A r b . ,s .8(1)
34 (1929) 28 C.A.R. 333.
„<5 Ind.Code, s .3 5 . See a lso  (1929) 10 S .A .I .R . 107 and (1943) 17 S .A .I .R .314. 
oroceeding°n ru ^e avard  raay bind  u n re g is te re d  unions no t p a r ty  to  the
36 ‘(1945), 19 S .A .I .R . 1.
penalties for its breach being recoverable from the unregistered union’s
property‘in the same manner as if the association were an incorporated 
37company’.
Only a registered union can be party to an industrial agreement filed 
under the Federal and Western Australian Acts. On the other hand, unregis­
tered as well as registered unions in New South Wales, Queensland and South
3SAustralia can make and file such agreements.
The status of the individual employee who is not a member of a recog­
nized union varies considerably. In New South Wales and Western Australia
39he cannot institute proceedings for an award, but is bound by a common 
rule award in the same way as the member of a registered union. However,
in Queensland and South Australia any twenty employees who are not members
40of a registered union can apply for an award; in both States the terms of
a common rule award (or determination) binds non-unionist employees. Under
the Commonwealth legislation individual employees can be party to an indus-
41trial dispute and can therefore be made parties to an award. This procedure
is rarely used because the award can bind only the named employees and does
42
not affect other or new employees. There appears to be only one case
43where employers have chosen to create a dispute with individual employees; 
in most of the few cases where individual employees have been
37 Ind. Code, s.131.
38 N.S.W., Ind.Arb., ss.12,111(c); Qd., I.C.&A., s.42(l); S.A., Ind. Code, 
s.88. In N.S.W., unlike the other two States, this power extends only to 
unions registered under the State Trade Union Act and not to those al­
together unregistered: see [1917] A.R. (N.S.W.) 404.
39 See (1913) 13 W.A.A.R., at 43.
40 Qd., I.C.&A., S.7(l); S.A., Ind.Code, ss.l7(l),176(2). In Qd. only one 
award of this kind was in force (covering physiotherapists) in 1954; and 
in S.A. the provision has been used by a few branches of Federal Unions.
41 See Foenander, Studies in Australian Labour Law and Relations. 55.
42 See Portus, 'The Necessity for an Industrial Dispute' (1956), 30 
Australian Law Journal, at 252.
43 (19.26) 36 0 .A.R., at 127. Some of the employees cited were members of 
an unregistered union; the others were apparently unorganized.
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made parties to an award, the dispute has been initiated on behalf of a 
logiotered union as well as on their behali^ Except 'where he is named as 
a party, the non-unionist employee cannot be bound by a Federal award out­
side those restricted areas of the Commonwealth jurisdiction where a common 
rule award can be made. A non-unionist employee is normally affected by 
the terms of a Federal award only where it binds an employer in relation to 
all his employees regardless of union membership; the award does not bind
une non-unionist but merely extends to him in the sense that his employer
45is obliged, for example, to pay him the award wage-rate.
The individual non-unionist employee bound by a State common rule award 
can instituffe.proceedings for the enforcement of the award against his em-
jjL
ployer in Queensland and South Australia. But in New South Wales and West­
ern Australia he has no such power, and neither has the non-unionist affect­
ed by a Federal award.
Unorganized employees in the Commonwealth, New South Wales and South 
Australian jurisoictions cannot make, nor are they bound by, a registered 
industrial agreement. They are similarly unable to conclude such an agree­
ment in Queensland and Western Australia, but here they may be bound by one
because ordinary agreements, as well as those declared common rules, bind
47
all the employees of an employer affected.
In the matter of the nomination of employees* representatives to in­
dustrial tribunals, registered unions are given the exclusive right to nomin­
ate the employees* representative on the Western Australian Arbitration Court
no specification is given as to who may nominate such representatives on
44 See, e.g., (194^) 46 C.A.R., at 620. The employees cited were members of 
an unregistered union.
45 See (1954) 78 C.A.R. 249.
46 Qd., I.C. & A., s.63; S.A., Ind. Code, s.36.
In S.A., provisions enabling the conclusion of special common rule agree­
ments by individual employees and binding on them (Ind. Code., s.98 ?1)) 
have fallen into disuse.
•J -? c.
New South Wales c o n c i l ia t io n  committees o r South A u s tra lia n  in d u s t r ia l  boards
-  -  -  0 O 0 ------ ----
Express re fe re n c e s  to  unions a re  ra re  in  th e  wages boards l e g i s l a t i o n  
ol V ic to r ia  and Tasmania. Since no p ro v is io n  i s  made in  e i th e r  case fo r  
the  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f u n io n s , such re fe re n ce s  as th e re  a re  r e la te  on ly  to  
unions th a t  a re  n o t r e g is te r e d  in  the  sense in  which the  term has been used 
above -  t h a t  i s ,  th ey  a re  r e g is te r e d  under a S ta te  tra d e  union Act alone 
o r a re  r e g is te r e d  under no A ct.
ihe s ta tu to r y  em phasis, though not n e c e s s a r i ly  the  emphasis in  p r a c t ic e ,  
tends to  be on the  in d iv id u a l employee re g a rd le s s  o f union a f f i l i a t i o n  -  
th i s  emphasis being  s tro n g e r  in  Tasmania than  in  V ic to r ia .  Any employee
in  the  tra d e  a f fe c te d  may nominate persons fo r  appointm ent as em ployee-repre-
4.8
s e n ta t iv e s  on a Tasmanian wages board , no m ention being  made of u n io n s .
The V ic to r ia n  A ct, on the  o th e r  hand, confers  power o f nom ination eq u a lly  
on a r e le v a n t  un ion  and any group of employees; i t  a lso  adds a s ig n i f ic a n t
r id e r ,  which c le a r ly  favou rs union  nominees, re q u ir in g  the M in is te r  to  have
due reg a rd  to  th e  s tan d in g  in  th e  tra d e  of the nom inator? The Melbourne
Trades H all C ouncil has the  ex c lu s iv e  power to  nominate em ployees’ re p re -
50
s e n ta t iv e s  on th e  V ic to r ia n  G eneral Board.
The fo rm al power to  i n i t i a t e  proceedings f o r  a wages board determ in­
a t io n ,  and f o r  th e  enforcem ent o f a d e te rm in a tio n , i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  goverri-
51
ment o f f i c i a l s  in  both  S ta te s .
In  Tasmania a d e te rm in a tio n  can be ch a llen g ed  on the  ground o f i l l e g ­
a l i t y  by any in d iv id u a l ,  w hile  an ap p ro p ria te  un io n , as w e ll as a m a jo rity
ol the em ployees’ re p re s e n ta t iv e s  on th e  wages board concerned, may appeal
52to  the  V ic to r ia n  I n d u s t r ia l  Appeals Court a g a in s t  a de term ina tion? '
48 Wages Bds. A ct, s .1 6 (1 ) 52 V ic .,  Lab. & I n d . ,  s .4 5 (1 ) ; T a s .,  Wages
$  a i d . *  s?2i(3)C t’ S>23(5) Bds*> S,62(1)
51 ViQ., ’Lab, f  I n d . ,  s.28(1),191; Xas.,Waees B d s., s .2 2 (1 ) . 70.
The common rule nature of wages board determinations means that they 
are binding on all employees in the trade and locality concerned. They 
are not, however, legally binding on trade unions as such, though the exist­
ence of relevant unions is usually recognized in the terms of determinations. 
Equipping the Unions;
The assignment of specific functions to the union at once constitutes 
implicit recognition of it and gives cadded meaning to any formal expression
doof rdcognition. So, too,Astatutory and award provisions which add to the 
union's capacity to carry out its assigned functions. Provisions in this 
category relate to the incorporation of unions; the right of union officials 
to enter and inspect workplaces and employment records; and the ability of 
unions to recover fines they have imposed on their members.
The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act provides for the in-
53
corporation of unions registered under it. As a corporate body, the reg­
istered union is more than a mere agent of its members; it stands in their 
place and may itself be party to an industrial dispute forming the basis of
54the Arbitration Commission's jurisdiction. A union wishing to obtain an
award is thus relieved from any obligation to seek the authorization of an
individual employee or to show that a dispute exists between a particular
employee and his employer. It would be difficult to over-emphasize the
importance of the incorporation provision to the working of the Federal ar- 
55bitration system.
On the other hand, because the jurisdiction of State industrial courts
is based on industrial matters regardless of whether those matters s.re in
53 S.136.
54 Burwood Cinema Ltd, v. Aust'n. Theatrical & Amusement Employees Ass'n. 
(1925),35 C.L.R. 528 (approved by Full Court! (1951) 84 C.L.R.265).
55 A body capable of carrying out the functions assigned to unions 'could be 
constituted only by the creation of some legal entity': Jumbunna Case, 
supra. at 36O.
diqpute, there is not the same imperative need for the formal incorpor­
ation of recognized State unions. Unlike those registered under the Queens« 
land, South Australian and Western Australian Acts, unions registered under 
the New South Wales Industrial Arbitration Act are not incorporated. How­
ever, under the Act’s terms the capacity of the registered union to act and
57be acted upon as an entity is, as the legislature intended, no less a 
feature of the New South Wales system than it is of the other State ar­
bitration court systems.
- - - 0O0 - - -
If unions are to police awards and determinations effectively, their 
ofxicials must be able to enter and inspect workplaces, interview employees 
on the job and sight employers’ employment records.
xiie minimum requirement is the ability to inspect employment records 
dealing with wages and hours since these are the two most important matters 
dealt with by industrial tribunals. Federal awards usually direct employers 
to keep a time and wages book, or similar record, which is to be open to
5Öinspection by a duly accredited official of the union or unions concerned*
xn New South Wales tne obligation to keep time and wages sheets is embodied 
in legislation, as is the power of union officials to inspect them. Que^is— 
land and South Australian legislation imposes the same obligation but confers
h^e right oi inspection only on industrial inspectors. Nevertheless most
59awards in these two States give union officials this right. The Western
It S.A., Ind. Code, s.68; W.A., Ind.Arb. ,s*13*57 See (1912) 41 N.S W. Pari. Debs. (2nd series) I64S.
Many clauses specify the number of demands for an inspection that may be 
made in a given time, the notice to be given, and the circumstances justi- 
-■-yifrg such a demand - normally only where a breach of award is suspected: 
e*g*> Wool & Basil Workers Award (1952), 73 C.A.R., at 601 
59 E-g-> Sawmilling Award (1953), 38 Q.I.G., at 123; Service Stations Emolov- 
ggg-Award, [1954] 2 S.A.G.G. 408. ‘-- *
Australian Act does not expressly require the keeping of timd and wages
records, though it does empower inspectors to inspect such records: on the
other hand, State awards almost invariably direct that these records be
60
kept and enable union officials to inspect them. In Victoria and Tasmania 
employers are obliged by statute to keep time and wages records which may 
be inspected by industrial inspectors. Most Victorian, and a number of 
Tasmanian, wages board determinations repeat the employers' statutory ob­
ligation in this respect, and in addition authorize union representatives
61
to sight such records.
The ability of union officials to inspect time and wages records is 
frequently supplemented by right of entry powers which can be used for a 
wider range of purposes related to the policing of awards and determinations 
Any member of the Federal Arbitration Commission, the Industrial Reg­
istrar or his deputies may authorize a person to enter a workplace during
working hours and to inspect any work, material, machinery, book or docu-
62
ment and interview any employee. Officials of a union may be so authorized
provided the union shows reasonable grounds for suspecting that an award is
$3
being infringed and that the infringement affects parties to the sward, the 
last requirement usually excluding non-unionist employees. This right of 
entry is restricted to a specified time and place. It is not often used 
by union officials since very nearly half of all Federal awards include
clauses giving union officials right of entry to workplaces covered by the 
6/award. Most clauses do not confer the wide powers available under the
statutory right of entry; they are restricted to permitting the official to
interview employees on 'legitimate union business', such as complaints about
60 E.g., Dairy Factories Employees Award (1953), 33 W.A.I.G., at 557.
61 E.g., Meat Preservers Bd. Determ. [1953] 4 Vic. G.G., at 5693; Hospital 
Wage s M . De term., [19531 Tas. G TG ., at 1391.
62 C. & A. Act, S.42.
63 See (192$) 21 C.A.R. 319, and (1934) 33 C.A.R. 558.64 This proportion is based on awards in force at 3* August 1954*
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on.; .ap p lica tio n  o f awards. U sually  th i s  r ig h t  of e n try  may be ex e rc ise d
66only  du rin g  m eal-breaks and o th e r  non-working p e r io d s , b u t under some awards 
i t  may be e x e rc ise d  a t  any tim§7 A number o f awards g ive w ider d e f in i t io n s  
of the purposes f o r  which r i g h t  o f e n try  may be u sed , and, s u b je c t to  de­
t a i l e d  c o n d itio n s , no t only  p e rm it union re p re s e n ta t iv e s  to  in te rv ie w  em­
ployees du rin g  m eal-breaks b u t a lso  d i r e c t  t h a t  th ey  be given ’reasonab le
f a c i l i t i e s ’ to  e n te r  a workshop during  working hours in  o rd e r to  in v e s t ig -
68
a te  em ployees’ c o m p la in ts .  A part from the s p e c i f ic  term s o f awards, i t
appears t h a t  employers are  norm ally  expected  to  g ive r i g h t  o f e n try  to  union
o f f i c i a l s  in  view o f the  p o lic y  th a t  an a p p ro p ria te  c lau se  w i l l  be awarded
where th e re  i s  evidence of ’a c tiv e  o b s tru c t io n ’ by em ployers in  t h i s  conn- 
69
e c tio n . C onversely , in d iv id u a l  union o f f i c i a l s  have been s tr ip p e d  of t h e i r
r ig h t  o f e n try  when they  have abused the  power o r f a i l e d  to  e x e rc ise  i t  in
accordance w ith  th e  te rn s  o f the  award, o r where i t s  use  may le a d  to  u n re s t  
70
among em ployees. The c lau se  i t s e l f  has been d e le te d  from an award a f t e r
71
i t s  use had r e s u l te d  in  the  union  members ta k in g  d i r e c t  a c t io n .
In New South Wales th e  I n d u s t r ia l  R e g is tra r  i s  empowered to  is su e  a 
permanent e n try  and in sp e c tio n  perm it to  a duly  a c c re d ite d  re p re s e n ta t iv e
72
of a union w ith  members covered by a S ta te  award o r i n d u s t r i a l  agreem ent.
65 See (1935) 35 C .A .R., a t  130, 132.
66 E .g . ,  F u rn ish ing  Trades Award (1952), 75 C .A .R ., a t  430
67 E .g . ,  W ineries Award (1952). 74 C .A .R., a t  615
68 E .g . ,  Railways M etal Trades Grades Award (S .A .) (1953), 76 C .A .R ., a t  797. 
The c o n d itio n s  a re : f o r  in te rv iew in g  employees, t h a t  th e  o f f i c i a l  produces 
h is  a u th o r i ty ,  conducts in te rv iew s  a t  m ea l-p lace s , v i s i t s  no more than  
once a week, i s  unaccompanied, and does n o t unduly  in te r f e r e  w ith  work or 
c re a te  d is a f f e c t io n ;  fo r  e n t r y  in  working h o u rs , t h a t  the  o f f i c i a l  d is ­
c lo se s  the com plaint to  the em ployer, i f  d e s ire d  makes h is  in v e s t ig a t io n s  
in  the em ployer's  p re sen c e , does no t in te r f e r e  w ith  th e  work and 'conducts  
h im se lf p ro p e r ly ’ •
69 (1950) 66 C .A .R., a t  1003; and see (1930) 28 C .A .R ., a t  978.
70 (1944) 53 C.A.R. 598, and (1946) 56 C.A.R. 697.
71 (1946) 57 C.A.R. 462.
72 Ind. Arb. A ct, S.129A.
^ne Pe m ü  may ^e revoked i f  used  in  an ‘im proper m an n er^  i t  a llow s the
re p re s e n ta t iv e  to  e n te r  a workplace covered by a re le v a n t award o r in dustria l: 
agreem ent, du ring  m eal-b reaks, in  o rd er to  in te rv ie w  employees on ‘le g it im ­
a te  union b u s in e s s ' and, a t  any time during  working h o u rs , f o r  th e  purpose
74
0J" inves t ig a t in g  a su sp ec ted  breach of the A ct, the aw ard o r the ag reem en t.
ihe p re s id e n t and s e c re ta ry  o f any union  r e g is te r e d  under the  Queens­
land  Act may au th o rize  an o f f i c i a l  o f the  union to  e n te r  w orkplaces during
working hours su b je c t to  the  o o n d itio n  th a t  he does n o t w i l f u l ly  h in d e r  the 
75
or;, of em ployees. The r i g h t  o f e n try  can be u sed  on ly  d u ring  m eal-b reaks
or o th e r  non-working tim e fo r  th e  purpose o f in te rv ie w in g  em ployees. The
S ta te  I n d u s t r ia l  Court may suspend a union o f f i c i a l ' s  r ig h t  of e n try ,  or
d i r e c t  him to  observe any co n d itio n s  in  i t s  e x e rc is e , where he has used  i t
in  an ‘unreasonab le  and v e x a tio u s ' manner.
The P re s id e n t of the  gouth A u s tra lia n  I n d u s t r ia l  Court may co n fe r a
; 76
r ig h t  of e n try  and in sp e c tio n  on 'any  p e r s o n '.  A union s e c re ta ry  i s  en-
77
t i t l e d  to  use these  powers when so a u th o riz ed . The g ra n t i s  l im ite d  to  a 
p a r t i c u la r  time and p la c e , bu t the purposes f o r  which i t  may be used  a re  as 
wide as under the corresponding  F ed e ra l A c t 's  p ro v is io n s . The S ta te  indus­
t r i a l  boards have no ju r i s d ic t io n  to  d ea l w ith  r i g h t  o f e n try  u n le s s  i t  
Happens to  be a 'custom o r u sag e ' o f th e  in d u s try  concerned; few board de­
te rm in a tio n s  inc lude  such c la u s e s . On the  o th e r  hand, th e  m a tte r  i s  w ith in  
the  g en era l pox^ers o f the  I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt. Thus where i t  i s  o u ts id e  the  
j u r i s d ic t io n  of an in d u s t r i a l  board , th e  Court may make an award d e a lin g  w ith
i t .  There a re  r ig h t  o f e n try  c lau se s  in  a number o f awards but th ey  are
73 See g f f ie y  Morning H e ra ld , 17 /9/1957, f o r  the  f i r s t  in s tan ce  of such a 
re v o c a tio n  -  in  the s p e c i f ic  case f o r  conducting  a stopwork m eeting w ith­
ou t em ployers' perm issio n .
V t  power in c lu d es  the  in sp e c tio n  o f time and wages books. ___ _
1 5  i .  C. & A. A c ts, s .7 7
76 Ind . Code, s .3 0 . , . . n  'V -
77 Ü 934D S .A .8 .R . 229. \  *
78 (1947) 21 S .A .I.R . 273*
1more r e s t r i c t i v e  th an  i s  u su a l in  o th e r  ju r i s d ic t io n s .  The s tan d a rd  type
p re s c r ib e s  th a t  a union o f f i c i a l  may e n te r  a w orkplace d u ring  working hours
to  in s p e c t th e  tim e and wages book and to  in te rv iew  any employee a f f e c te d  -
79
bu t on ly  ’concern ing  such tim e book’ .
In  n e i th e r  W estern A u s tra lia  nor V ic to r ia  i s  s ta tu to r y  p ro v is io n  made
io r  c o n fe rr in g  r i g h t  of e n try  on persons o th e r th an  government o f f i c i a l s .
In  W estern A u s tra l ia ,  however, i t  appears th a t  employers a re  norm ally
expected  to  g ra n t th e  p r iv i le g e  to  union o f f i c i a l s ,  th e  S ta te  A rb i t r a t io n
Court be ing  p rep ared  to  award a r ig h t  o f e n try  c la u se , a g a in s t  em ployers’
o p p o s itio n , where i t  i s  shown th a t  union o f f i c i a l s  a re  u n reasonab ly  o b s tru c t— 
80
ed by th e  a n p lo y e rs . A f a i r  p ro p o rtio n  o f awards in c lu d e  such c la u s e s ,
many in s e r te d  by agreem ent. The s tan d ard  form i s  r a th e r  l im ite d  in  scope.
I t  p ro v id es  t h a t  an a c c re d ite d  union  re p re se n ta tiv e  may in te rv ie w  employees
during  lunch  h o u rs , bu t only  in  the  even t o f d isagreem ent about the  aw ard 's
a p p l ic a t io n ,  and the  power may be used only  onee a week u n le ss  the  employer 
81
ag rees o th e rw ise . On the  o th e r hand, a number o f awards do n o t l im i t  th e
82
circum stances in  which r ig h t  o f e n t ry  i s  a v a ila b le  to  union o f f i c i a l s ;  and
83
some perm it employees to  be in te rv iew ed  a t  any tim e d u ring  working h o u rs .
I f  a union o f f i c i a l  abuses h is  r ig h t  of e n try , th e  A rb itr a t io n  C ourt w i l l
re fu se  to  en fo rce  the  c lause  a g a in s t  an employer so f a r  as the  o f f i c i a l
84
i s  concerned.
S im ila r ly , many d e te rm in a tio n s  o f V ic to r ia n  wages boards in c lu d e  r ig h t
of e n try  c la u s e s . Most r e s t r i c t  use of the  r ig h t  to  in te rv ie w in g  employees
35
during  the midday meal hour on 'le g i t im a te  union b u s in e s s '.  In  some cases
79 S erv ice  S ta t io n s Employees Award [1954] 2 S.A .G .G ., a t  410.
80 See (1948) 28 W .A .I.G ., a t  110.
81 S . g . , A.W.U. (Apple & Pear Packing) Award (1954), 34 W .A.I.G . 44.
82 S .g . ,  Broom & Brushmaking Award (1954) , 34 W .A .I.G ., a t  151.
83 E .g . ,  P a in te rs  (T ick e t W rite rs) Award (1953), 33 W .A .I.G ., a t  573.
84 (1948) 28 W .A .I.G ., a t  109.
S .g . ,  P la te  G lass Bd. De te rm . [1953] 4 V ic.G .G ., a t  5641.
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it may be exercised also during working hours for the purpose of invest-
86
igating a complaint. The availability of right of entry is usually subject
87
to specified conditions,* and an employer is entitled to refuse entry, if
the union representative contravenes these conditions, interferes with work
being carried on, creates disaffection among employees, or is offensive.
The Wages Board Act of Tasmania does not directly confer power of entry
on union officials. But it does specify that a wages board determination
may confer the power on officials to enable them to interview employees in
88
connection with the ’business or affairs’ of the union concerned. A number
of determinations include right of entry clauses. Some merely empower
the Chief Inspector of Factories to authorize relevant union officials to
enter workplaces covered by the determination at such times as he specifies,
but direct that if entry is permitted during working hours only union job
representatives or, with the onployer's consent, unionist employees may be 
89interviewed. Other Clauses directly confer right of entry, either in
relation to non-working hours only, or, in connection with the investigation
90
of a complaint, during working hours as well - in the latter case subject 
to the same conditions found in the crresponding Federal, New South Wales 
and Victorian right of entry clauses.
- - - oOo - - -
The awara-enforcing functions of unions are directed not only against
86 E.g., Mineral Earths Bd. Determ. [1953] 4 Vic.G.G., at 5731.
87 The conditions relate to the number of representatives with right of entry 
at one time, production of the entry authority, and the frequency with 
which the right may be used.
88 Wages Bds. Act, s.73
89 E.g., Builders & Painters Wages 3d. Determ. Ö953] Tas. G.G., at 2671.
Such clauses permit refusal of entry, and cancellation of the authority, 
if the official causes dissatisfaction among employees, is offensive, un­
duly interferes with the work, or breaches any other conditions attaching 
to his authority.
90 E.g., Electrical Engineers Wages Bd. Determ. p952] Tas.G.G., at 3142; 
and Electrode Wages Bd. Determ. [1953J Tas. G.G., at 1150.
employers - but, as has been shown, also against their own members. Their
ultimate disciplinary power is expulsion. There is no legislation express-
91ly guaranteeing the legal enforcement of expulsion decisions, but there 
are such guarantees in relation to the unions’ lesser disciplinary power to 
impose monetary penalties on their members.
Unions registered under the industrial arbitration measures of the 
Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia are empower­
ed to sue for and recover fines or penalties they have imposed on members
92in accordance with their rules. In no case do these provisions disting­
uish between penalties imposed for breach of awards and agreements and pen­
alties imposed for contravention of union rules concerned with other matters; 
they are not expressly concerned with the unions’ ability to enforce awards 
against their members, but they can be used for this purpose. There are no 
provisions in the legislation of South Australia, Victoria or Tasmania en­
abling the legal recovery of union-imposed fines.
Protecting and Encouraging the Unions:
The kind of protection and encouragement considered here is that found
in statutory and award provisions — that is, protection and encouragement 
which is legally enforceable. There are a number of ways in which the law 
protects union organization, activities and members, and encourages unions 
by enhancing their ability to recruit new members. In many cases the rele­
vant provisions operate not only in relation to antagonistic employers but 
also in reLation to actual or possible competition from other unions.
In the arbitration court jurisdictions, a union already registered re­
ceives considerable protection against the registration and competition of
rival unions. The Commonwealth Industrial Regixtrarmay refuse to register
91 Regarding union expulsions and the courts, see Chapter 8.
92 C»wealth, C. & A., S.I4B; N.S.W., Ind.Arb., s.118; Qd., I.C. W.A., Ind. Arb., s.175. & A . , s.65;
1 ? . '  -
an a p p lic a n t  un ion  i f  th e re  i s  a r e g is te r e d  union to  which i t s  members
93
m ight ’co n v en ien tly  be lo n g ’ . Although a number o f competing un iohs a re  in  
r e g is te r e d ,  m ainly d u ring  the e a r ly  s tag e s  o f th e  a r b i t r a t i o n  system ’s 
o p e ra tio n , the  g en era l view o f the  F edera l in d u s t r i a l  a u th o r i t i e s  i s  t h a t  
th e  e x is te n c e  o f r i v a l  unions competing fo r  members i s  in im ic a l to  in d u stria l! 
peace; and i t  has been h e ld  th a t  th e  o b je c t o f the s ta tu to r y  p ro v is io n s
o /
r e f e r r e d  to  above i s  to  p rev en t such a s i tu a t io n  a r is in g ?  S im ila r ly ,  in  
New South Wales r e g i s t r a t io n  may be re fu sed  where the  i n t e r e s t s  o f an a p p li­
cant u n io n ’ü members can be p ro te c te d  by a p re v io u s ly  r e g is te r e d  u n io n , w hile 
in  South A u s tra l ia  and W estern A u s tra lia  a r e f u s a l  o f r e g i s t r a t i o n  may be 
based on the  ’co n v en ien tly  b e lo n g ’ form ula of the  F ed e ra l A ct. In  each
case the s ta tu to r y  p ro v is io n s  are  aimed a t  p rev en tin g  a m u l t ip l i c i ty  o f 
96
competing u n io n s . Of the  a r b i t r a t io n  A cts, only  th a t  of (Queensland makes 
no re fe re n ce  to  p r in c ip le s  on which r e g i s t r a t io n  may be re fu s e d , b u t the
I n d u s t r ia l  R e g is tr a r  may re fu se  a p p lic a tio n s  f o r  r e g i s t r a t i o n ,  and has in
97
f a c t  done so .
The g e n e ra l e f f e c t  o f the  r e g i s t r a t io n  p ro v is io n s  and t h e i r  a p p lic a t io n  
has been to  ensure th a t  once a union i s  r e g is te r e d  i t  has ’a v i r t u a l  monop­
o ly  o f the in d u s t r i a l  c a re , guidance and d i s c ip l in e ' o f the  employees in
98
the in d u s try  (o r  c r a f t )  and lo c a l i t y  i t  covers -  excep t where f o r  some 
reason  the members o f an a p p lic a n t o rg a n iz a tio n  cannot ’co n v en ien tly  belong '
99
up i t . ihe r e a l i t y  ol th e  monopoly depends, o f co u rse , on th e  e x te n t  to
93
94
95
96
97
C. & A. A ct, S .142.
(1919) 13 C.A.R. 4
N J M ,  Irv^ArK, s .8 ( 3 ) ;  S .A ., Ind . Code, s .6 6 (a ) ;  W.A., Ind . A rb., s .2 1 .
See [1919] A.R. (N.S.W.) 7; (1923) 6 S .A .I .R . 123; (1946) 26 W .A .I.G . 416. 
j.his measure i s  unique in  t h a t  i t  e x p re ss ly  p rov ides f o r  the  r e g i s t r a t io n  
o f two o r more un ions in  the  seme c a l l in g ,  and f o r  them to  be ’b ra c k e te d ’ 
to^g ive  them jo in t  r ig h t s  under the  A ct.
9Ö B uild ing  Workers I n d u s t r ia l  Union v . Amalgamated E ng ineering  Union (19521 
'4  C .A .R ., a t  67 ----------- “----------
^  ^ ? , e . g . ,  where th e  a p p lic a n t  u n io n ’ s members o b je c t to  the  o o l i t i c a l  a f f i  
l i a t i o n  o f the r e g is te r e d  union: [1927]A .R.(N .S.W .)45; (1933) 13W7a?I?G .275.
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which participation in proceedings before the relevant industrial tribunal 
is, on the employees1 side, exclusive to registered unions. Thus the'monö- 
poly’ conferred by registration under the South Australian Industrial Code - 
which, as we have seen, gives substantial recognition to unregistered organ­
izations - means very much less than the monopoly obtained by unions reg­
istered under the Commonwealth Act. As the wages boards legislation of 
Victoria and Tasmania does not provide for the registration of unions, this 
formof protection is not available in those States.
- - - 0 O 0 --- --
All industrial arbitration Acts include provisions aimed at protecting 
unionists in their employment. Employers are forbidden to dismiss an em­
ployee, to injure him in his employment or to alter his position to his pre­
judice merely because he is an officer, delegate or member of a registered 
1
union. The Queensland provision also forbids a refusal of employment on 
the same grounds, while the Commonwealth Act extends the prohibition to the 
case of an employee intending to become an official, delegate or member of a 
registered union. There are no corresponding provisions in the wages boards 
measures of Victoria and Tasmania.
The Queensland Act, as has been mentioned, extends its protection of 
unionists to the point of engagement of labour. Mö similar provision is 
found in any other Act, but a number of Federal and Western Australian 
awards include clauses which prescribe that when taking on labour, employers 
are not to discriminate against union members merely on the ground of their 
membership. The anti-discrimination provision is regarded as first cousin
to preference to unionists, and Federal and Western Australian tribunals
1 Cwealth, C.&A., s .5(1)jN.S.W., Ind.Arb.,s.95; Qd., I.C. & A., s.53(1); S.A 
Ind.Code, s.122;W.A.,Ind.Arb., s.135. These provisions apply to members of 
unions applying for registration in the C‘wealth, Qd.^nd W.A., of unions 
registered under the Trade Union Act in N.S.W., and unregistered unions 
in S.A.
nave often awarded it where they considered circumstances did not justify 
a grant of preference. The preference clause, requiring employers to give 
oieference in employment to members of a specified union or unions, or to 
unionists generally, provides a stronger form of protection than the anti­
discrimination clause, but also includes an element of positive encourage­
ment to union organization. Arbitration courts, particularly in the Fed­
eral and Western Australian jurisdictions (and in New South Wales before the 
introduction of statutory compulsory unionism), regard preference as being 
piimaiily pioüective in character. But unions today va,lue legally—enforce­
able preference clauses less for the protection they give than for the way 
in which uhey facilitate the recruitment of *hard—core* non-unionists, a 
feature which has been stressed by the Queensland Industrial Court at least. 
Both elements are present, too, in compulsory unionism provisions - either 
in awards or in legislation - but the emphasis on enanuragement rather than 
protection is even greater than in the case of preference. A legally-bind­
ing obligation on all employees in a given calling and locality to be or 
become financial members of the appropriate union on pain of dismissal or 
refusal of employment is probably the ultimate form that legal encouragement 
(and recognition) of unionism can take.
------0O0 - - -
Union officials* right of entry to workplaces plays an important part 
in encouraging union organization. Most right of entry provisions in award, 
determinations and statutes are framed in a way that allows them to be used 
as a means of getting in touch with non-unionists on the job in order to 
persuade them to take out a union ticket. The main exception is the stand­
ard right of entry clause found in South Australian awards, the terms of
ilie question of aiiti-discrimina.tibn, preference and compulsory unicsnism
provisions is discussed fully in Chapter 7.
o p
v/hich limit its use to award-policing purposes. The normal right of ©n-trv 
iovision is almost invariably used to recruit membership, and where there 
-s cioubt about whether its terms extend this far unions usually press for 
it to be interpreted in this way/*'
Ri; I.it o .l entry is important in the protection, as well as the encour—
;_c.iaent, of union organization. It is usually granted in terms wide enough
to allow union officials to collect union subscriptions on the job - dues-
collection being one of the main components of ‘legitimate union business’,
£
uxlj phrase most commonly hound in right of antry provisions. Right of 
entry is almost invariably used, where possiMe^for this purpose, which is 
expressly referred to in some award clauses.
The collection of union subscriptions is facilitated under a few Feder- 
a1’ Kew South Wales and Queensland awards by a clause directing the employer 
° • written request of an employee, to deduct the employee’s union sub­
scription from his wages and pay it direct to the appropriate union? Much 
rarer is the award requirement that the employer, without further notific­
ation, is oo deduct regularly all membership contributions from the wages 
of his unionist employees and transmit them to the union.
xxpart irom easing the task of dues-collection, all industrial arbit­
ration measures empower unions registered under them to sue for and recover
9
subscriptions owed by members. This statutory power is important because
dues owed by members of unions not so registered are not recoverable at law,
3 See (1935) 35 C.A.R., at 131.
4 See (1939) 40 C.A.R. 166.
5 See (1935) 35 C.A.R., at 130, 132.
6 E.g., C ’wealth, Cjnthing Trades Award (1953). 76 C.A.R., at 457: W.A., 2$ews 
r gaper Award (1953), 33 W.A.I.G., at 587.
-.g., Cwealth, Dried Fruits etc. Industry Award (1952), 75 C.A.R., at 395* 
Sugar Field Workers Award (1954), 9 I.I.B., at 727; Qd.f Sawmilline’
. Award (1953), 38 Q.I.G., at 124. ---------
° f c o * . :,weal'?h ’ Railways (Miscellaneous Grades) Award (1953), 76 C.A.R. at
Qd., Brisbane City Council Labourers Award flQ^ /,1 n t n „+ oo-i
9 ?naeacod; F F v ™- A-t,., s. 1 is 4 Qrr si:,ma. noae, s. 76; W.A., Ind. Arb., s.175.
ex cep t in  New oouth Wales where a s im ila r  power i s  co n fe rred  on unions
10
r e g is te r e d  only  under the  S ta te  Trade Union A ct.
----------- 0 O 0  -  -  -
The g en e ra l p ro te c t io n  given to  union  members and o f f i c i a l s  in  t h e i r  
employment has a lre a d y  been d isc u sse d . In  some cases a d d it io n a l  p ro te c t io n  
i s  g iven  to  a c t i v i t i e s  undertaken  by an employee as a union o f f i c i a l .  A 
number o f F e d e ra l, New South Wales and W estern A u s tra lia n  aw ards, and Vic­
to r i a n  and Tasmanian wages board d e te rm in a tio n s , inc lude  a c lau se  i n s t r u c t ­
in g  the  employer to  recognize as a c c re d ite d  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  of the  union 
concerned any of h is  employees who a re  appo in ted  shop stew ards; and he must
a llow  a shop stew ard , w ith o u t lo s s  of pay, to  in te rv ie w  him o r h is  re p re se n t-
11a t iv e  d u ring  working h o u rs . Some V ic to r ia n  d e te rm in a tio n s  p e rm it th e  em­
p lo y e r to  re fu se  to  recognize a shop stew ard appoin ted  by the  u n io n .b u t, i f
he does so , ob lige  him to  recogn ize  a d e leg a te  elected by and from h is  employ- 
12
e e s . The In d u s t r ia l  Court o f South A u s tra lia  has doubted i t s  power to  awoid.
. 13a c lau se  re q u ir in g  employers to  recognize shop stew ards; but a few awards
14
inc lu d e  a p ro v is io n  o f th i s  s o r t  in s e r te d  by co n sen t. I t  appears th a t
in  Queensland th e re  has been no need f e l t  to  o b ta in  s im ila r  p ro v is io n s  as
th e re  a re  none in  S ta te  aw ards. A m ajor p a r t  o f the shop stew ards* d u tie s
i s  the  c o l le c t in g  of union dues; indeed , in  many cases t h i s  appears to  be
15
the  only  fu n c tio n  th ey  a re  re q u ire d  to  f u l f i l  under union  r u le s .
In  a d d itio n  to  th e  p ro te c t io n  of shop s tew ards, the  Commonwealth and
10 See C hapter 8.
11 E .g . ,  C*wealth, Transport Workers (Milk Carters) Award (1951) 70 C.A.R.,
a t 757; N.S.W., S te e l Works Engine Drivers" (B.H.P.) Award (1953), 111 I.G . 
(N .S.W .), a t 181; W.A., P rin ti ng Award (l~950) 30 W .A .I.G ., a t  122; V ic.
In d u str ia l Cases Bd. Determ. 1/19531 4 V ic. G.G., a t 5665; T a s., Builders & 
Painters Wages Bd. De term. [19533 Tas.G.G., a t  2668.
12 E .g . ,  F u rn itu re  Bd. De te rm . ,  [1953] 4 V ic. G.G., a t  5654.
13 (1945) 19 S .A .I .R ., a t 257.
14 E .g . ,  D rivers Award. 0956J 3.A .G .G ., a t 1498.
15 See Kuhn, ’S tr ik es and A u stra lia ’s In d u stria liza tion *  (Sept. 1956), 28 
A ustralian  Quarter l y , a t 62.
New South Wales legislation debars employers from dismissing, or in any
way injuring in his employment, an employee who has absented himself from
work without leave in order to discharge his duties or rights as a union
official, and whose previous application for leave without pay was unreas-
16onably refused by the employer. More positively, a number of Federal
awards direct employers to grant leave without pay to employees who are
17union delegates in order that they may attend union conferences. Ina
few cases, employers are required to grant leave in order to allow an em-
18
ployee to attend to ’any’ union business. Some Western Australian awards
and Victorian determinations also include clauses prescribing that union
19officials are to be granted leave without pay to carry out their duties.
Finally, a number of awafcds and determinations in all jurisdictions 
protect the ability of unions to communicate with their members by requir­
ing employers to permit the display of union notices (sometimes limited to 
'formal1 notices, or simply to notices of meetings) in a prominent posit­
ion in workplaces, usually on condition that they are signed by an accred­
ited union representative and occasionally on condition that they are
20first approved by the employer. The same purpose is achieved by right
of entry provisions, which are in many cases used to conduct lunch-hour 
meetings of union members.
16 Cwealth, G. &A., s .5(1); N.S.W., Ind. Arb., s.95.
17 E.g., Wool & Basil Workers Award (1952) 73 C.A.R., at 602.
18 E.g., Meat Industry (Clerks & Cashiers) Award (1952), 73 C.A.R., at 787.
19 E.g., Municipal & Road Board Employees Award (1948), 28 W.A.I.G., at 457; 
Cordage Bd. De term. 11953*) Vic.G.G., at 5627.
20 E.g., C'wealth, Vehicle Industry Award(1953), 76 C.A.R., at 399; N.S.W., 
Government Road Transport £ Tramways (Building Trades) Award (1953)» 111 
I.G. (N.S.W.). at 643; Qd., Mount Morgan Ltd. Award (1953)» 38 Q.I.G., at 
541; S.A., Drivers Award 0956J 3 .A.G.G., at 1498; W.A., Broom £ Brush­
making Award (1954), 34 W.A.I.G., at 151; Vic., Glassworkers Bd. De term. 
09533 4 Vic.G.G., at 5674; Tas., Electrical Engineers Wages Bd. Determ. 
D952] Tas.G.G., at 3U2.
CHAPTER 6 i 9 ' ■JL c_3 \
STRIKES AND THE LAW
The legal position of the strike in Australia is complicated.^
It is a product partly of the development of the English law relating 
to strikes, and partly of the way in which the strike is treated in 
the various systems of industrial regulation peculiar to Australia.
The complexity arises not merely from this combination, but more from 
the fact that neither the adaptation of English law nor the creation 
of the industrial law has taken place in a uniform or coherent fashion 
throughout the seven Australian jurisdictions.
1. The General Setting
The legal position of the strike in the United Kingdom is based 
on statute law, a law which has been enacted piece-meal largely in 
order to meet situations created by judicial decisions. These 
decisions related partly to interpretations of the Act of 1825 amending 
the measure of the previous year that had repealed the repressive 
Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, and partly to interpretations of 
the common law status of the strike.
1 Attention here is concentrated on legal provisions that are 
directly concerned with strikes, and no attempt is made to deal 
with the variety of other measures which may be directed against 
strikers according to circumstances, such as the (S.A.) Public 
Meetings Act 1912-34 and legislation relating to processions: 
see Perlman, Judges in Industry. 165. For English examples, see 
Knowles, Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict. 120.
1.1. « ' i t )
The English Act of 1825 conferred a severely limited right to strike
on workers. Against this meagre right the courts developed the common
law doctrine of criminal conspiracy. In the first place the strike was
attacked as being a criminal conspiracy in restraint of trade. This
principle was over-ruled by the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871. But
in a subsequent case it was held that although a strike could no longer
be regarded as a conspiracy in restraint of trade, it could be acted
2
against as a conspiracy to coerce. The attack by way of criminal cons­
piracy was then cut off altogether by the Conspiracy and Protection of 
Property Act of 1875 which exempted from this category any action by a 
combination of persons ’in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute* 
where the action ’if...committed by one person would not be punishable
3
as a crime’. Similar provisions have been enacted in all the Australian
4
States except New South Wales, where strikers were convicted of criminal
5
conspiracy at least as late as 1909.
Ousted from the field of criminal law as a means of combating direct
action by trade unions, the English courts turned to the civil law and
6
developed the tort of civil conspiracy, which postulated that a combin­
ation acting with the intention of injuring a man in his trade or other 
interests was unlawful and, in the event of actual damage arising, action­
able as a conspiracy. This doctrine made unlawful, as had the law of 
criminal conspiracy, acts done by persons in combination which were not
2 R. v. Bunn (1872), 12 Cox. 316.
3 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875» s.3.
4 Vic., Employers and Employees Act 1928, s.55; Qd., Criminal Code 1899» 
S.543A; S.A., Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935» s .260(1); W.A., 
Criminal Code 1913, s.561; Tas., Conspiracy and Protection of Property 
Act 1889, s.2.
5 See Evatt, Australian Labour Leader, 241.
6 See Kahn-Freund, ’Legal Framework' in The System of Industrial Relations 
in Great Britain (eds., Flanders and Clegg), 116.
unlawful if done by an individual. As applied by the House of Lords in 
7
Quinn v. Leathern, it struck only at the individual members and officials
of trade unions. This was, of course, serious enough for the unions, but
it meant that their funds were still not directly liable for damages for
strike action. In the same year that Quinn’s Case was decided, however,
the decision of the House of Lords in the Taff Vale Case swept aside this
immunity by establishing that a trade union could be sued in tort as a
party to a conspiracy and that its funds were therefore directly available
8
in the event of damages being awarded. But again the judges were over­
ruled by Parliament. The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 repeated, in relation 
to the doctrine of civil conspiracy, the principle laid down by Act of 
1875, and also restored the immunity enjoyed by trade union funds before
9
the Taff Vale decision. In Australia, these provisions have been enacted
10
only in Queensland. In all other States, union members and officials
may be sued for civil conspiracy, and a trade union itself may be held
11
liable for damages for conspiring with its own officers or members.
The only general legal restriction on the right to strike in the 
United Kingdom is the employee’s liability for breach of his contract of 
employment. In these terms the lawfulness of a strike turns on the 
question of whether strikers have given the required notice before term­
inating their employment. Thus in industries where the customary contract 
period is one week, each striker is legally bound to give at least a 
week’s notice of his intention to cease work. On the other hand, where 
contracts may be terminated without notice, as in casual employment, the
7 [1901] A.C. 495.
8 D901J A.C. 426.
9 Trade Disputes Act 1906, ss.1, 4«
10 Trade Union Act 1915, ss.28(l), 30(1).
11 See (1906) 3 C.L.R. 686; (1917) 17 S.R. (N.S.W.) 243; (1916) S.R. 
(N.S.W.) 323.
Under the Master andquestion of breach of contract does not arise.
Servant Act of 1867 breach of the contract of employment could be treated 
as a criminal offence subject to a statutory penalty. This measure was 
replaced in 1875 by the Employers and Workmen Act (the change in title is 
perhaps significant) which provided, with certain exceptions considered 
below, that the only legal remedy for breach of a contract of emoloyment
13
was a civil action by way of damages. These provisions have been re-
14peated in the legislation of only one of the Australian States, Victoria.
In the other States the principles of the earlier English Act of 1867 
15
are followed.
12
- - - oOo - - -
In all jurisdictions special measures have been enacted or can be 
enacted in relation to strikes in essential industries or strikes that 
are considered to constitute a threat to the livelihood and well-being of 
the community. Most strikes and most industries share these character­
istics in some degree. The measures considered here are those which 
deal with strikes in certain industries statutorily classified as 
’essential' and with certain strikes regarded as creating an ’emergency’. 
There is, of course, a great deal of overlapping between the two notions.
The distinction adopted here is based on permanency of application: 
restrictions on strikes in essential industries are permanent in operation,
12 Go-slows, bans or limitations of work always constitute breach of the 
contract of employment, since employees are failing to work in ac­
cordance with their contract: Kahn-Freund, op. cit., 106.
13 Employers and Workmen Act 1875, s.4.
14 Employers and Employees Act 1928, s.44*
15 N.S.W., Masters and Servants Act 1902, s.4; Qd., Wages Act 1918, s.30(1)(b); 
S.A., Masters and Servants Act 1878-1935, s.7; W.A., Masters and 
Servants Act 1892, s.7; Tas., Master and Servant Act 1896, s.8. The 
penal provisions have been used, in N.S.W. at least, against strikers: 
see Sutcliffe, A History of Trade Unionism in Australia. 72.
1 ?,r
w hile s ta tu to r y  powers p rov ided  fo r  d ea lin g  w ith  s tr ik e -e m erg en c ie s , 
which may o r may n o t r e la te  to  in d u s tr ie s  s p e c if ie d  as 'e s s e n t i a l ’ , 
enable the  tem porary a p p lic a t io n  o f r e s t r i c t i o n s  to  d e a l w ith  a p a r t i c u la r  
s i tu a t io n .
In  the  U nited  Kingdom the  p r in c ip le  th a t  s t r ik in g  i s  no t a c rim in a l
offence  i s  waived in  the case of c e r ta in  in d u s tr ie s  and c e r ta in  types o f
work. I t  i s  a p en a l o ffence f o r  any person  'w i l f u l ly  and m a lic io u s ly '
to  break h is  c o n tra c t  of employment in  the  knowledge th a t  h is  a c tio n  w i l l
p robab ly  'endanger human l i f e ,  o r cause se r io u s  b o d ily  in ju ry , o r to
16
expose va lu ab le  p r o p e r ty , . . to  d e s tru c t io n  o r s e r io u s  i n j u r y '.  A
s im ila r  embargo co v ers, s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  w orkers in  gas, w ater and e l e c t r i c i t y
u n d e rtak in g s; bu t in  th ese  cases the  'p ro b ab le  consequences' involved
inc lude  sim ply the  d e p r iv a tio n  of g as, w ater o r e l e c t r i c i t y  as th e  case 
17
may be.
The g en era l p ro h ib i t io n  o f the  E n g lish  measure has been rep ea ted  in
the  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f th re e  A u s tra lia n  S ta te s ,  V ic to r ia ,  South A u s tra lia
18
and W estern A u s tra l ia .  The embargo on breach of c o n tra c t  by employees 
in  gas and w ater undertak ings i s  found in  the  l e g i s l a t i o n  of fo u r S ta te s :  
V ic to r ia ,  where l i g h t  and sewerage a re  a lso  in c lu d ed ; South A u s tra l ia ,
where ra ilw ays and tramways a re  a lso  inc luded ; W estern A u s tra lia , where
19
e l e c t r i c  l i g h t  i s  a lso  in c luded ; and Tasmania.
The s ig n i f ic a n t  fe a tu re  o f th e se  p ro h ib i t io n s  i s ,  in  the  f i r s t  p la c e , 
th a t  c rim in a l law san c tio n s  are  ap p lied  no t in  term s o f the in te r e s t s
16 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, s .5 .
17 Ib id ., s.4 ; E lectric ity  (Supply) Act 1919, s.31 .
18 V ic ., Employers and Employees Act 1928, s.57; S.A ., Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935, s.262; W.A., Conspiracy and Protection of 
Property Act 1900, s.4*
19 V ic ., E. & E. Act, s .56; S.A ., C.L.C. Act, s.261; W.A., C. & P.P. Act, 
s.3 ; Tas., Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1889, s.3*
20
of th e  employer bu t in  term s o f p u b lic  i n t e r e s t s .  In  the second p la c e , 
i t  i s  n o t s t r ik in g  bu t breach of the c o n tra c t  of employment th a t  i s
21
p ro h ib i te d .  In  o th e r  words, on ly  the  l ig h tn in g  s t r ik e  i s  p ro h ib i te d .
By c o n tr a s t  the  E n g lish  and A u s tra lia n  Commonwealth l e g i s l a t i o n  d e a lin g
w ith  s t r ik e s  and p ic k e tin g  by seamen embody ab so lu te  p ro h ib it io n s  o f 
22
s t r ik e  a c t io n .
These p ro v is io n s  exhaust the  c h ie f  s p e c if ic  r e s t r i c t io n s  on s t r ik e s  
in  e s s e n t ia l  in d u s t r ie s  in  the  U nited Kingdom and in  most of the  A u s tra l­
ia n  S ta te s .  But a d d it io n a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f th i s  c h a ra c te r  i s  in  fo rce  in
23
th e  Commonwealth ju r i s d ic t io n  and in  New South Wales and V ic to r ia .  The 
V ic to r ia n  measure covers the  w id est range o f e s s e n t ia l  in d u s tr ie s  b u t i s  
l im ite d  to  p re s c r ib in g  c o n d itio n s  on which s t r ik e s  in  th ese  in d u s t r ie s  
may be h e ld . The Commonwealth and New South Wales m easures, on th e  o th e r  
hand, cover on ly  government employees and, in  the form er case , in d u s t r ie s  
connected w ith  i n t e r s t a t e  and in te r n a t io n a l  tra d e  and commerce, b u t p lace  
a complete ban on s t r ik e  a c t io n . An o u tlin e  o f th ese  measures i s  g iven  
in  Appendix I I I .
L e g is la tio n  c o n fe rrin g  emergency powers fo r  use a g a in s t p a r t i c u l a r  
s t r ik e s  f a l l s  in to  two c a te g o r ie s : tem porary measures s p e c ia l ly  en ac ted  
to  give a government power to  d ea l w ith  a s p e c if ic  s t r i k e ,  and perm anent 
measures which equip the  government w ith  powers th a t  may be used on ly  
where n ecessa ry  to  meet emergency s i tu a t io n s  c re a te d  by s t r i k e s .
20 See Kahn-Freund, op. c i t . ,  47.
21 But, as to  the o b s ta c le s  which such p ro v is io n s  enable employers to  
p u t in  the  way o f o th e r  s t r i k e s ,  see Knowles, op. c i t . ,  101.
22 U .K ., M erchant Shipping Act 1894> ss .2 2 5 , 236; A u s t., N avigation  
Act 1912-56, SS.100, 103.
23 C’w ea lth , Crimes Act 1914-50, P u b lic  S erv ice  Act 1922-54; N.S.W .,
Ind . Arb. Act 1940-57; V ic .,  E s s e n t ia l  S e rv ices  Act 1948»
1
Temporary emergency l e g i s l a t i o n  is  always w ith in  the  power o f
governments s u b je c t to  p o l i t i c a l  and, in  th e  case of the Commonwealth,
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s . Two re c e n t examples o f such m easures
24
en ac ted  in  A u s tra lia  are  o u tlin e d  in  Appendix I I I .
Permanent emergency l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  in  fo rce  in  most A u s tra lia n
25
ju r i s d ic t io n s .  A ll bu t one o f th e se  measures fo llow  the  p a t te r n  o f th e
E n g lish  Emergency Powers Act 1920 which empowers the  p roc lam ation  o f a
s ta t e  o f emergency and the  making o f re g u la tio n s  f o r  the  purpose o f
26
’ secu rin g  th e  e s s e n t ia l s  o f l i f e  to  the  community’ . The ex cep tio n  i s  
the  South A u s tra lia n  Emergency Powers Act, i n i t i a l l y  enacted  as a wartim e 
m easure, which sim ply con fe rs  a s tan d in g  power to  make re g u la t io n s .  The 
A u s tra lia n  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  o u tlin e d  in  Appendix I I I .
------- oOo -  -  -
Up to  th i s  p o in t i t  has been p o s s ib le  to  d e sc rib e  the le g a l  p o s i t io n  
of th e  s t r ik e  in  A u s tra lia  in  term s o f the  corresponding  s i tu a t io n  in  the  
U nited Kingdom. But from here  on A u s tra lia n  s t r i k e - r e s t r i c t i o n s  have no 
E n g lish  c o u n te rp a r ts .
A part from the  s p e c ia l  p ro v is io n s  a p p lic a b le  w ith in  the  v a rio u s  
system s o f in d u s t r i a l  r e g u la t io n , which are  d iscu ssed  in  the n ex t s e c t io n ,  
g en era l use of the  s t r ik e  i s  s u b je c t to  f u r th e r  r e s t r i c t io n s  imposed by 
the  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f fo u r  S ta te s .  In  New South Wales and Queensland a l l  
s t r ik e s  a re  i l l e g a l  u n le ss  s t r i k e r s  and t h e i r  unions have complied w ith  
c e r ta in  s ta tu to r y  co n d itio n s  befo re  tak in g  such a c tio n ; and in  South
24 C’w e a lth , N a tio n a l Emergency (Coal S tr ik e )  Act 1949; Qd., I n d u s t r ia l  
Law Amendment Act 1948.
25 C’vrealth , Crimes Act 1914-50, S tevedoring  In d u s try  Act 1956; N.S.W ., 
Emergency Powers Act 1949; V ic .,  E s s e n t ia l  S e rv ice s  Act 1948; Q d.,
S ta te  T ranspo rt Act 1938; S .A ., Emergency Powers Act 1941-52.
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A u s tra l ia  and W estern A u s tra l ia ,  no s t r ik e  is  l e g a l .  The re le v a n t p ro­
v is io n s  a re  d e sc rib ed  in  Appendix I I I .  M oreover, in  th re e  S ta te s ,  New 
South W ales, Queensland and W estern A u s tra l ia ,  p ro v is io n  has been made 
(as o u tlin e d  in  the  Appendix) f o r  the  ho ld ing  o f s e c re t  b a l lo ts  on s t r ik e  
a c t io n  conducted by unions o u ts id e  the  re sp e c tiv e  in d u s t r ia l  a r b i t r a t io n  
system s.
2 . The S tr ik e  and In d u s t r ia l  R egulation
The development o f E n g lish  law has been in  the  g en era l d ir e c t io n  of
secu rin g  and p ro te c t in g  the  r ig h t  to  s t r i k e .  The Acts o f 1875 and 1906
r e f le c te d  the  l e g i s l a t u r e ’ s aim to  secure  t h i s  r ig h t  in  the  face  o f a
ju d ic ia ry  c le a r ly  h o s t i le  to  tra d e  union a c tio n  -  a c o n f l ic t  o f view th a t
has been la rg e ly  re so lv ed  s in ce  by ju d ic ia l  acceptance of unionism  as a
1
le g i t im a te  form of economic o rg a n iz a tio n . P ro te c tio n  of the  r ig h t  to  
s t r ik e  i s  a lo g ic a l  consequence o f the E ng lish  re c o g n itio n  of f re e  c o l­
le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g  as the  b a s is  of in d u s t r ia l  r e l a t io n s .  On the  o th e r
hand, the  f a i lu r e  o f A u s tra lia n  S ta te  l e g is la tu r e s  to  adopt the  same
2
p o lic y , w hile p a r t ly  a m a tte r o f p o l i t i c a l  a c c id e n t, seems to  have been 
p r im a r i ly  a r e s u l t  o f the  purposes and le g a l  co n tex t of t h e i r  systems of 
in d u s t r ia l  r e g u la t io n .
I t  w i l l  be observed th a t  the S ta te s  in  which the  g en era l r ig h t  to  
s t r ik e  has been e i th e r  g re a t ly  r e s t r i c t e d  or withdrawn a l to g e th e r  (the  
Commonwealth having no power to  l e g i s l a t e  in  r e l a t io n  to  s t r ik e s  in  ge­
n e ra l)  are  those  w ith  in d u s t r ia l  a r b i t r a t io n  c o u r ts . The c h ie f  impulse
1 See Kahn-Freund in  The System of In d u s t r ia l  R e la tio n s  in  G reat 
B r i t a in , 117-20.
2 The p o s i t io n  d id  n o t go by d e fa u lt  on the  p a r t  o f the  u n io n s , which 
e a r ly  p re ssed  fo r  rem edial l e g i s l a t i o n  d ea lin g  w ith  consp iracy  and 
c o n tra c ts  o f employment: see E v a tt, A u s tra lia n  Labour Leader, 149; 
Spence, A u s t r a l ia ’s Awakening, 605, £ l1 , 617; L ig h tfo o t & S u tc l i f f e  
in  Trade Unionism in  A u s tra lia  (A tkinson, e d . ) ,  70-1 .
behind the establishment of arbitration court systems was the attempt to
3
obviate direct action as an incident of industrial bargaining. In these 
circumstances the search was not for means of legally protecting the 
right to strike, but rather for means of making the strike unnecessary 
and, ultimately, unusable. The tendency therefore, has been to prohibit 
or at least discourage strike action, whether inside or outside the 
arbitration system.
Australian legislatures have usually approached questions of 
industrial disputes.•.and the combined action of workmen, from 
a standpoint very different from that of England, where the mere 
act of ’striking’ has not been penalized by Act of Parliament.
Here, the act of striking has frequently been made punishable.
This has not been because Australian legislative bodies have been 
hostile to the claims of organized labour. The reason is that 
they have established Courts, tribunals and boards, for the very 
purpose of making recourse to the instrument of strike and lock­
out unnecessary.^-
There is no point in protecting strikers from actions for criminal
conspiracy when they and their unions are already subject to heavy
statutory penalties. The same consideration applies in the case of civil
conspiracy and penal provisions relating to breach of the contract of 
5
employment.
Arbitration or Strike:
State intervention in the industrial bargaining process in Australia 
involves two distinct propositions that deny the right to strike. One 
relates to the form of such intervention, the other to its purpose. Of
3 This contrasts with the social protectionist impulse behind the pure 
wages board systems of Vic. and Tas., though strike-prevention is now 
an important element in these systems also.
4 Per Evatt, J., McKernan v. Fraser (1931)> 4& C.L.R., at 373. This 
point is discussed more fully below in this section.
5 Against the simpler and more certain procedures available under ar­
bitration legislation, action by way of civil conspiracy also involves 
the burden of proving damage. As a result such actions are usually 
brought in this connection only by non-unionists dismissed because
of a union strike-threat or strike: see McKernan’s Case, ibid., at 380.
th e  two, th e  f i r s t  i s  narrow er in  scope.
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The s tan d a rd  form taken  by s ta t e  in te rv e n tio n  in  in d u s t r ia l  ba rg a in ­
ing in  A u s tra lia  i s ,  as we have seen , the in te r p o s i t io n  of an independent 
a r b i t r a t o r  between the  p a r t i e s  to  an in d u s t r ia l  d is p u te . The p ro p o s itio n  
developed from th i s  form of in te rv e n tio n  has been expounded by Is a a c s , J . ,  
in  th e  High C ourt. He argued th a t  use of the  s t r ik e  i s  no t in c o n s is te n t 
w ith  a r b i t r a t i o n  so f a r  as r e s o r t  to  a r b i t r a t io n  i s  v o lu n ta ry ; bu t once 
a r b i t r a t i o n  i s  accep ted  (w hether to  s e t t l e  a l l  p re s e n t and fu tu re  d isp u te s  
o r only  a s p e c if ic  d is p u te ) , a compulsory elem ent i s  im ported in to  the 
s i tu a t io n .
Compulsion to  do a given th in g  excludes ev ery th in g  in c o n s is te n t .
And the n a tu re  o f subm ission to  a r b i t r a t io n  i s  in c o n s is te n t  w ith  
s e l f - r e d r e s s .  I f  the  subm ission i s  v o lu n ta ry , no one would doubt 
th a t  any a ttem p t a t  s e l f - r e d r e s s  would be in c o n s is te n t  w ith  the 
subm ission . I f  i t  i s  com pulsory, the  in c o n s is te n c y  m ust, of co u rse , 
be as g r e a t . . . .  I f  a p a r ty  w hile bound to  a r b i t r a t e  a ttem p ts  to  
decide the  m a tte r  fo r  h im se lf , i t  i s  an in c o n s is te n t  a c t ,  and i t  
i s  a breach  of h is  o b lig a tio n  which binds him to  ab ide by the 
d e c is io n  o f the  d is in te r e s te d  th i r d  p a r ty .^
This i s  the  reason ing  behind the a s s e r t io n  th a t  employees cannot
7
•have a s t r ik e  and a r b i t r a t io n  too* -  th a t  they  cannot ’work under an
8
aw ard ...a n d  a t  the  same time have the  r ig h t  to  s t r i k e ’ . The p r in c ip le  
has been la id  down re p e a te d ly  by a r b i t r a l  a u th o r i t ie s  and i s  given com­
p u ls iv e  fo rce  by an ex ten s iv e  p a t te r n  o f s t r ik e  p ro h ib it io n s  and san c tio n s  
a f f e c t in g  employees and t h e i r  o rg a n iz a tio n s  recognized  by the a u th o r i t i e s .
R esort to  the  p ro cesses  o f compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  in  A u s tra lia  i s ,  
in  th e  f i r s t  in s ta n c e , le g a l ly  a v o lu n ta ry  a c t  on the  p a r t  of employees 
and t h e i r  u n io n s . U sually  i t  in v o lves a union r e g is te r in g  under an
6 Stemp v . A u st'n  Glass M anufacturers Go. Ltd. (1917), 23 C .L .R ., 
a t  237, 240.
7 (1913) 7 C .A .R., a t  255.
8 (1938) 39 C.A.R., a t  1263-4.
appropriate Act, and thus undertaking to submit to arbitral decision.
In these circumstances the compulsory principle applies to all disputes
with which the union or any of its members may be concerned while it is 
9
registered.
Registration of employees’ unions implied the election of 
arbitration instead of direct action as the better means of settling 
disputes. The [unions in question] made this election but now in 
fact contend that after securing awards they are free to aid 
strikes for claims refused by the Court after judicial inquiry.
If this right is conceded the whole scheme of the Act falls to 
pieces.^
In these terms, unions and employees are assumed to have chosen 
between two mutually exclusive procedures. But the choice is more 
apparent than real. In the first place, as was shown in the previous 
chapter, the effect of registration in most arbitration court systems on 
the organizing ability of unions (particularly where registration is 
restricted) constitutes a compelling reason, quite apart from the possible 
benefits of arbitration, why a union should seek registration. In the 
second place, the ability of State arbitration courts to make common 
rule awards means that employees and members of unions that have not 
chosen to submit to arbitration procedures may in fact find themselves 
bound by those procedures: this applies equally in the wages board juris­
dictions since board determinations are automatically common rules. 
Finally, as we have seen, statutory restrictions imposed on strikes within 
the State arbitration court systems are usually extended to cover strikes 
outside those systems. In South Australia and Western Australia, there
9 The original N.S.W. Ind. Arb. Act of 1901, however, prohibited strikes 
only during the time a matter was the subject of arbitration court 
proceedings: see Evatt, Australian Labour Leader, 136.
10 Metal Trades Employers Ass’n v. Amalfi’1d Engineering Union (1936),
39 C.A.R., at 9. See also, (1942) 46 C.A.R., at 52$; [1936] A.R. 
(N.S.W.) 25; (1928) 8 W.A.I.G., at 106.
is no question of choice since all strikes are illegal. It is at this 
point that it is relevant to consider the second proposition denying the 
right to strike which follows from the purpose of state intervention in 
the industrial bargaining process in Australia.
The fundamental purpose underlying all Australian systems of in­
dustrial regulation as they operate today is to provide means by which 
’fair play’ and not ’economic resource’ (meaning principally ’the rude
and barbarous processes of strike and lock-out’) can be established as the
11
determinant of the industrial bargain. As H.B. Higgins, a founder and
President of the Federal Arbitration Court, declaimed:
Reason is to displace force; the might of the State is to enforce 
peace between industrial combatants as well as between other 
combatants; and all in the interest of the public. ^
In less lyrical vein, Mr Justice Isaac's measured statement of the
ramifications of the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Act serves to
emphasize this point.
It is a statute embodying a great public policy. Its purpose...is 
to encourage and maintain industrial peace in the Commonwealth.... 
Industrial disputes, of course, involve wages, hours of labour, 
safety, sanitation and other incidents of industry. The modifica­
tion of legal relations between employers and employees...is of 
course involved, and that means alteration of rights and obligations. 
But that is not the prime purpose of the legislation; it is the 
necessary means of achieving the great object in view - the elimina­
tion of stoppage in industries that serve the people of the Common­
wealth as a whole. The interests of the disputants are great; but 
it is because struggles over their individual interests are detri­
mental to the great general interests of the Commonwealth that the 
incidental alteration of legal relations of those engaged in in­
dustry is undertaken. ^
The emphasis placed in these statements on 'the interest of the 
public’, in Higgins' phrase, and ’the great general interests of the
11 Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order, 2, 40.
12 Ibid., 2
13 George Hudson Ltd, v. Aust’n Timber Workers Union (1923)» 32 C.L.R., 
at 434-5.
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Commonwealth', in Isaacs', leads naturally to the adoption by the pro­
ponents and practitioners of industrial arbitration of a concept of 
justice which is concerned less with the opposing sectional interests of 
industrial disputants, than with resolving their dispute in a way that 
conforms most closely with what are interpreted as public interests. In 
these terras, a former President of the A.C.T.U. has pointed out, industrial 
arbitration involves not 'arbitration between two parties, but arbitration
14
between two parties and a third party - the community as a whole'. In 
practice the extent to which the arbitration process operates on this
15
pattern varies with circumstances and the personalities of arbitrators.
But arbitral machinery established on this premise is aimed at providing
a substitute for all direct action in accordance with the view that such
action is, in itself, detrimental to the public interest.
In a policy which provides for the adjustment of grievances by 
means of adjudication unhampered by legislative restrictions, so 
that if a claim be in accord with natural justice it shall be 
allowed, the right to strike, postulated by social philosophers 
who speak of an industrial and economic system in which no such 
adjudication has been provided, does not survive.
It follows that a government setting up a system on these lines is
in some degree bound to take steps to discourage strikes occurring outside
the system. For their part, the tribunals concerned are committed to the
17
elimination of strikes within their jurisdiction. Australian strike 
statistics indicate that the commitment is larger than the tribunals' 
power to fulfil it - perhaps larger than the power which the government of
14 Sydney Morning Herald. 7/3/1956.
15 See, e.g., Perlman, Judges in Industry, ISO.
16 Per Kelly, J., Kemira Tunnel Case [1949J A.R. (N.S.W.), at 184.
17 A symptom of this commitment is the growing tendency, on the part of 
both legislatures and tribunals, to extend the legal definition of a 
strike beyond a concerted cessation of work to a concerted refusal to 
accept employment - an extension which, as embodied in a now-repealed 
English Act dealing with emergency strikes, has been described as a 
'startling widening of the term strike': Knowles, Strikes: A Study in 
Industrial Conflict. 115.
V :
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a political democracy is prepared to grant or to use in most circumstances. 
Nevertheless, it remains, and is most strongly emphasized in relation to 
unions functioning within arbitration court systems.
The Union1s Responsibilities:
The question of the union’s responsibilities under compulsory arbitra­
tion has been developed in a far-reaching manner by judicial decision. 
Basically, as we have seen, union participation in industrial arbitration 
procedures has been judicially regarded as involving acceptance of two 
principles. First, that the union will submit all disputes in which it is 
involved for the decision of the relevant tribunal. Second, that it will 
abide by the tribunal's decision. The tribunals regard acceptance of 
these principles by the unions as 'the quid pro quo for the benefits they
19
derive from registration*. But, as viewed by the judges, a union's 
responsibility goes deep into its organization; it does not stop short at 
the official policies and official actions of the union as a representative 
body.
The union is held to have the duty of ensuring that its 'individual
members...pursue their claims through the arbitration system set up by
20
the Act and...abide by the awards made under the Act*. It is responsible
21
for the actions of its branches and any group of its members. Thus the
13 See Evatt, 'Control of Labour Relations in the Commonwealth of Australia' 
(1939), 6 Chicago Law Review, at 548; Perlman, op. cit., 50-1.
19 Per Kelly, C.J., Basic Wage Inquiry (1950), 68 C.A.R., at 726.
20 Ibid. See also, (1953) 75 C.A.R., at 143.
21 (1949) 64 C.A.R. 288; (1948) 61 C.A.R. 128. The High Court held in an 
early case that a union, in the absence of express authorization or 
ratification, was not liable for strike action by a branch acting with­
out the knowledge of the union's governing body: (1916) 21 C.L.R. 129. 
The union's rules allowed branches to conduct local business independ­
ently of the union. But later Arbitration Court decisions, requiring 
unions to equip themselves with rules enabling them adequately to 
fulfil their responsibilities (see below), appear to have robbed 
unions of this defence.
un ion  i t s e l f  i s  l i a b l e  f o r  s t r ik e  a c tio n  taken  by any o f i t s  members; and
i t  i s  l i a b l e  i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f the  e x is ten c e  o f 'fo rm a l te c h n ic a l  p ro o f ' o f
22
i t s  p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  o f the  reaso n ab len ess  o f i t s  advice to  members to  
23
tak e  such a c t io n ,  and re g a rd le s s  o f w hether i t  has ex p re ss ly  l e f t  the
24
s t r i k e  d e c is io n  to  th e  members concerned. The union  i s  under an o b lig a ­
t io n  to  keep i t s e l f  inform ed on such m a tte rs , and mere knowledge o f a
s t r ik e  o r an in te n t io n  to  s t r ik e  i s  s u f f ic ie n t  to  invoke i t s  r e s p o n s ib i l -  
25
i t y .  A un ion  may, th e re fo re ,  be h e ld  re sp o n sib le  f o r  s t r ik e s  which i t  
has n e i th e r  a u th o riz ed  nor co n sid ered .
In  fu lf i lm e n t  o f i t s  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s ,  the  union i s  expected where 
n ecessa ry  to  employ a l l  i t s  powers to  p rev en t o r to  end a s t r ik e  by i t s  
members•
Now i t  cannot be h e ld  s u f f i c i e n t  t h a t  the ex ecu tiv e  body has 
d ire c te d  [s tr ik in g )  members to  abandon t h e i r  s t r i k e .  Those respons­
ib le  to  a c t  f o r  the o rg a n iz a tio n  must be p rep ared  to  go f u r th e r .
They m ust, on b e h a lf  o f  the  o rg a n iz a tio n , app ly  w hatever d is c ip l in a r y  
san c tio n s  a re  a v a ila b le  to  i t  under i t s  r u le s ,  e i th e r  to  en fo rce  i t s  
d i r e c t io n  (as expressed  by them) o r to  d iv e s t  i t s e l f  o f the  member­
sh ip  o f i t s  r e c a l c i t r a n t  members. F a ilu re  to  do t h i s ,  from w hatever 
m otives, w hether from f e a r  o f the  lo s s  of a  branch o r a sub-branch 
^/hich may be su p p o rtin g  the  s t r ik e )  o r from f e a r  even of complete 
d is s o lu t io n ,  must be h e ld  to  be tantam ount to  a condonation . Such 
a f a i lu r e  amounts to  t h i s :  th a t  the  o rg a n iz a tio n  i s  u n w illin g  to  
face  up to  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  in cu rred  by i t s  r e g i s t r a t io n  under 
th e  A ct.
M oreover, th e  union  i s  under an o b lig a tio n  to  ensure  t h a t  i t  has adequate
27
ru le s  which enable i t  to  c a r ry  ou t th e se  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s .
In  th re e  S ta te s  th e  e x te n t o f th e  u n io n 's  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  i s  ex­
p re s s ly  recogn ized  by s t a t u t e .  The I n d u s t r ia l  A rb itr a t io n  Acts o f New
22 ^  927] A.R. (N.S.W.) 118.
23 (1922) 30 C .L.R. 570.
24 0  917] A.R. (N.S.W.) 350.
25 (1952) 74 C .A .R ., a t  91.
26 P er K e lly , J . ,  M etal Trades Employers A ss 'n  v . F ed 'd  Engine D riv ers  & 
Firem ens A ss 'n  (1949), 64 C .A .R ., a t  289-90. See a lso  (1949) 64 C.A.R. 
288; ( 1948) 61 C.A.R. 128; [1950] A.R. (N.S.W.) 245 , 501.
27 (1950) 67 C .A .R ., a t  364; [1919] A.R. (N.S.W.) 39.
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South Wales and W estern A u s tra lia  la y  down th a t  in  any a c tio n  a g a in s t  a 
union  f o r  th e  im p o sitio n  o f a s t r ik e  p e n a lty , i t  i s  a defence th a t  the
28
un ion  a ttem p ted  to  p rev en t i t s  members ta k in g  and co n tin u in g  such a c t io n .
In  s im ila r  p ro ceed in g s , th e  South A u s tra lia n  I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt may n o t
impose a p e n a lty  i f  i t  i s  proved th a t  the  union  h a s , ’by such means as
29
appear re a so n a b le ’ , t r i e d  to  b rin g  about the  same r e s u l t .  In  Queensland
30
th e  u n io n ’ s r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  has been h e ld  to  be no l e s s .
The r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  unions are  expected  to  sh o u ld er in  r e l a t io n  to  
s t r ik e  a c tio n  sh a rp ly  d is t in g u is h  the  c h a ra c te r  o f a union o p e ra tin g  in  
th e  c o n tex t o f f r e e  c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g  from th e  c h a ra c te r  o f a union 
fu n c tio n in g  under compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  in  A u s tra l ia .  The d i s t in c t io n  
i s  between an o rg a n iz a tio n  whose u ltim a te  purpose i s  to  c o -o rd in a te  th e  
c o l le c t iv e  economic power o f employees as a means o f fo rc in g  em ployers to  
concede in d u s t r i a l  demands; and an o rg a n iz a tio n  whose 'p rim ary  fu n c tio n  i s  
to  h e lp  in  the  e f f o r t  to  m a in ta in  in d u s t r i a l  peace as a conven ien t in s t r u ­
ment to  secure  f o r  those  whose in t e r e s t s  i t  re p re se n ts  in d u s t r i a l  ju s t i c e
31
where n e ce ssa ry , b u t to  secure  th a t  ju s t i c e  accord ing  to  l a w '• In  the
l a t t e r  c a se , the  union  ' i s  n o t m erely a  convenien t method o f o b ta in in g
[ i t s  members']] j u s t  r ig h t s  b u t i s  a lso  a p u b lic  in s tru m en t f o r  e f f e c t iv e ly
a d m in is te r in g  an im p o rtan t s ta tu te  o f p u b lic  p o lic y  f o r  the  g e n e ra l 
32
w e lfa re ’ .
28 N.S.W. In d . A rb ., s .1 0 1 ; W.A., In d . A rb ., s .1 4 1 (5 )(b ) .
29 In d . Code, s .1 0 6 (2 ) (b ) .
30 (1925) 9 Q .I .G ., a t  16. But th e  I .C . & A. Acts p rov ide  t h a t  a  union  
( r e g is te r e d  o r u n re g is te re d )  i s  n o t l i a b le  f o r  the  a c ts  o r  words of 
an agen t who a c ts  w ith o u t th e  knowledge of th e  u n io n 's  ex ecu tiv e  body 
o r  a g a in s t  i t s  in s t ru c t io n s  in  connection  w ith  a s t r ik e :  s .5 2 .
31 P er I s a a c s , J . ,  C w e a lth  Shipping Board v . Fed’d Seamens Union (1925), 
35 C .L .R ., a t  475.
32 I b id .  My em phasis.
Prohibitions and Sanctions:
Prohibitions of strikes by unions operating within the various systems 
of industrial regulation are found in legislation, in the instruments of 
industrial regulation (awards, determinations and registered agreements) 
and in labour injunctions - the last usually being designated merely as 
'orders'. Disobedience of prohibitions in any of these forms is almost 
invariably subject to a monetary penalty laid down by statute and, in 
some cases, imprisonment. Prohibitions and sanctions of this sort, and 
their availability in the different jurisdictions, are set out in 
Appendix III,
In all jurisdictions there are in addition various sanctions available 
other than the standard penalties of fines and imprisonment. These sanc­
tions may be considered under three heads: refusal to continue award- 
making proceedings; the withdrawal or modification of standard conditions 
of employment or other privileges; and the cancellation of a union's 
registration.
Industrial tribunals in most jurisdictions have on occasion refused
to entertain proceedings instituted by unions with members who are striking
33
or threaten to do so. This policy flows logically from the view that 
unions are not entitled to both the strike and legal regulation of in­
dustrial conditions. It is usually applied in connection with union claims 
34 35
for an award or, less commonly, union appeals from an award. It 
usually takes the form of a refusal to continue proceedings, or to give 
effect to a decision already handed down, until the union has ended the
33 In wages board jurisdictions, this policy takes the form of a refusal 
to convene a wages board.
34 See (1950), 68 C.A.R., a t 722 f f ;  [19U ] A.R. (N.S.W.) 88.
35 See [1914] A.R. (N.S.W.) 216.
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strike or persuaded its members to do so. It may involve rejection of
the union’s claims altogether or dismissal of the union as a party to the 
37
proceedings.
Industrial tribunals are not formally required to adopt this policy,
which has been applied with varying rigour in different jurisdictions and
at different times. In practice, proceedings are not uncommonly continued
while strikes are in progress, the tribunal concerned considering that
other sanctions may be more effective or equitable in the circumstances,
38
or that this course appears to conform better with the public interest 
which may in effect mean merely that the gravity of the situation is such 
as to require the sacrifice of principle for the sake of a speedy settle-
39
ment. Moreover, it appears that greater use of the power to summon
40
compulsory conferences may have led to some relaxation of the policy.
Practice has also varied on the question of the matters which should 
be involved in a strike before a refusal to hear union claims can be 
justified. The New South Vales Industrial Commission is apparently in-
41
dined to apply the policy regardless of the strike’s nature or object.
But in the Federal jurisdiction it is apparently to be applied only where 
the strike is about matters related to those raised in the relevant
36
36 See (1945) 55 C.A.R., at 196, 199. The Qd. Industrial Court can apply 
this policy only in relation to those members of a union who are 
actually taking part in the strike: I.C. & A. Acts, s.7(7).
37 (1950), 68 C.A.R., at 722 ff; [1934] A.R. (N.S.W.), at 271; (1952),
32 W.A.I.G. 81. It may also involve the waiving of a lockout penalty 
where the union applying for the penalty subsequently conducts an 
illegal strike: see [1926] A.R. (N.S.V.) 46.
38 See (1952) 73 C.A.R., at 333.
39 For a case in which this consideration seems to have played an 
important part, see Perlman, op. cit., 119.
40 See Foenander, Studies in Australian Labour Law and Relations, xiv-xv.
41 See Sydney Morning Herald. 19/2/1957.
42
proceedings. In South Australia its use has been limited still further
to cases where the strike is directly in support of union claims before
43
the tribunal.
The policy of refusing to entertain a striking union’s claims has 
occasionally been carried to its logical conclusion - a refusal to incor­
porate in awards concessions won by strike action. Thus an arbitration
court has refused to allow the award of a lower tribunal to enter into
44
force where the award’s terms had been influenced by a strike. In the 
same way, some arbitral authorities have refused to recognize any pre­
scriptive right to a condition of employment in favour of employees who
45
have gained it from their employers by striking or by threat of a strike.
46
But it has not always been felt necessary to push this view too far.
Usually the question does not arise because employers consent to the 
union claim.
-  -  -  oOo -------
The withdrawal or modification of standard conditions of employment, 
or of other privileges, as a strike sanction may be accomplished by the 
cancellation or suspension of complete awards and determinations, or by 
varying their terms (that is, deleting certain clauses or altering their 
content), or by attaching conditions to particular privileges.
Only in the Commonwealth and Western Australia are there explicit 
statutory provisions empowering the suspension or cancellation of an 
award so far as it affects a registered union and its members; this may 
be done for any reason, including breach of the award or an order and a
42 (1950) 68 C.A.R., at 731; see also Higgins, op. cit., 80.
43 (1949) 23 S.A.I.R. 49.
44 09163 A.R. (N.S.W.) 271.45 (1952) 73 C.A.R., at 159; (1917) 11 C.A.R., at 516.
46 E.g. (1922) 16 C.A.R., at 392; (1941) 45 C.A.R., at 264-5.
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r e f u s a l  to  accep t employment on th e  aw ard 's  te rm s. The same a b i l i t y  i s
im p l ic i t  in  the  g en e ra l powers of the  a r b i t r a t io n  c o u rts  in  New South
48
W ales, Queensland and South A u s tra l ia ,  b u t i s  n o t, a p p a re n tly , in  th e
case  o f  V ic to r ia n  and Tasmanian wages b o a rd s . In  V ic to r ia ,  however, th e
Governor in  C ouncil may suspend a d e te rm in a tio n  d ea lin g  w ith  a m a tte r
49
which i s  th e  s u b je c t o f an 'o rg a n ize d  s t r i k e ' .  A part from s ta tu to r y
p ro v is io n s , some s t r ik e - p r o h ib i t io n  c lau se s  in  F ed e ra l awards s p e c ify  t h a t
50
th e  award may be suspended o r c an c e lled  f o r  c o n trav en tio n  o f  th e  c la u s e .
A number o f New South Wales awards co n ta in  a warning th a t  they  a re  ' l i a b l e
51
to  be cancelled*  in  th e  even t o f a s t r ik e ;  and some W estern A u s tra l ia n
awards p rov ide  t h a t  th ey  s h a l l  'a u to m a tic a lly  cease to  opera te  and have
52
e f f e c t '  in  the  same e v e n tu a l i ty .
I n d u s t r ia l  t r ib u n a ls  in  a l l  ju r i s d ic t io n s  can a t ta c h  c o n d itio n s  to  
th e  term s o f t h e i r  awards and d e te rm in a tio n s , and, under t h e i r  g e n e ra l
53
powers o f v a r ia t io n ,  can d e le te  o r suspend p a r t i c u la r  c la u se s . I t  
appears th a t  th e se  powers have n o t been used to  any g re a t e x te n t to  low er 
p re s c r ib e d  s tan d a rd s  o f employment m erely as a sa n c tio n  a g a in s t  s t r i k e s  — 
though a r b i t r a l  a u th o r i t ie s  have n o t f a i l e d  to  th re a te n  s t r ik in g  un io n s
54
w ith  a c t io n  o f th i s  k in d . The procedure u s u a lly  adopted i s  to  w ithdraw  
a l to g e th e r ,  o r to  p rov ide  f o r  th e  w ithdraw al o f ,  em ployees' o r u n io n s ' 
e n ti t le m e n t to  c e r ta in  co n d itio n s  o r p r iv i le g e s .  In  ap p ro p ria te  c i r c u i t
47 C'wealth, C. & A., s . 62; W.A., Ind. Arb., s . 98A.
48 See [19293 A.R. (N.S.W.) 230 and [1914] A.R. (N.S.W.) 216.
49 Lab. & Ind. Act. , s.41 .
50 E.G., Marine Cooks Award (1950), 68 C.A.R., at $47.
$1 E.G., Galvanized Iron Manufacturers Award (1954), 112 I.G. (N.S.W.) 397. 
$2 E.G., Dock. Rivers & Harbour Workers Award (1950), 30 W.A.I.G., at 92.
53 In the C'wealth and W.A. th is power is  d irectly  related to strike  
action: see note 47 above.
54 See Higgins, op. c i t . ,  24; Foenander, Industrial Regulation in  
Australia. 80.
stances it may involve, as in the case of a crew that refused to take a
ship to sea, a withdrawal of the men's right to wages, overtime and other
payments earned since the stoppage began, and of their right to notice
55
before being dismissed. But the most common sanctions of this nature
directed against individual employees are connected with annual leave
provisions in awards, a practice which appears to have originated in
Queensland but is nöw followed chiefly by Federal and Western Australian
56
industrial tribunals.
Annual leave provisions normally direct that days lost through un­
authorized absence from work are not to count towards such leave, the 
employee merely being required to make up the time so lost. But the 
annual leave clause in a number of Federal awards is accompanied by con­
ditions which amount to giving employers a means of penalizing strikers.
In one form, the employer may deduct one day from an employee's accruing
57
annual leave for every day the employee is absent from work without cause.
A more severe provision enables the employer to treat such absence as a
58
break in the employee’s continuity of service, in which case the employee
loses all time that previously counted towards his annual leave. In the
stevedoring industry a legally-enforceable order originally made by the
Stevedoring Industry Commission prescribes that, at the employer's option,
no annual leave credits shall be given to a waterside worker who takes
59
part in a strike of not less than forty-eight hours duration. Clauses 
of this character are usually awarded by the Western Australian Arbitration
55 Sydney Morning Herald, 7/3/1956.
56 See (1934) U  W.A.I.G., at 231.
57 E.g., Storemen & Packers (Wool Stores) Award (1951)» 73 C.A.R., at 541«
58 E.g., Food Preservers Award (1951)» 73 C.A.R., at 227. The intention 
of the provision is indicated by its reference to 'collective or 
concerted absenteeism'.
59 See (1952) 75 C.A.R. 37; Sydney Morning Herald. 10/2/1956.
Court only  when a s t r ik e  e x is t s  o r i s  impending, and are  norm ally  w ith ­
drawn a f te rw a rd s . The s tan d a rd  c lau se  lay s  down th a t  a s t r i k e r  's h a l l
f o r f e i t '  one day o f th e  annual leave  owing to  him f o r  each day o r p a r t
60
o f a day he ta k es  p a r t  in  the  s toppage . On occasion  th e  p e n a lty  has
61
been ra is e d  to  two days o f leav e  f o r  each day o f th e  s t r i k e .  In  th e
New South Wales co a l mining in d u s try , tinder the  ju r i s d ic t io n  o f F ed e ra l
t r i b u n a ls ,  s im i la r  use has been made o f p ro v is io n s  d e a lin g  w ith  lo n g -
62
s e rv ic e  le a v e .
In  the  p e c u l ia r  c ircum stances o f the  s tev ed o rin g  in d u s try , a n o tab le  
s p e c ia l  s a n c tio n  a v a ila b le  f o r  use a g a in s t  in d iv id u a l s t r ik e r s  i s  th e  
s ta tu to r y  power to  suspend o r can ce l a s t r ik in g  w atersid e  w o rk e r 's  r e -
63
g i s t r a t i o n ,  thus d e b a rrin g  him from o b ta in in g  work in  the  in d u s try .
S tr ik e  san c tio n s  in  th e  ca teg o ry  considered  h e re , however, a re  
u s u a lly  d ire c te d  a g a in s t  unions r a th e r  than  in d iv id u a l employees. An 
a r b i t r a t o r  may, and has th re a te n e d  to ,  vary  an award in  such a way as to
64
invo lve  a union  in  long and expensive le g a l  p ro ceed in g s . But more com­
monly the  s a n c tio n  tak es  the  form of d e le t in g  award c lau se s  t h a t  d i r e c t ly  
b e n e f i t  the  union  connected w ith  a s t r i k e .  For example, in  a case o f th i s  
n a tu re  a F ed era l a r b i t r a t o r  d e le te d  from an award c lau se s  d e a lin g  w ith  
the  un ion  o f f i c i a l s '  r ig h t  of e n try ,  t h e i r  r ig h t  to  in sp e c t tim e and wages
63
re c o rd s , and w ith  the  p o s tin g  o f union n o tic e s  in  w orkplaces. S im ila r­
ly ,  th e  s tan d a rd  r ig h t  of e n try  c lau se  found in  New South Wales awards 
up to  1953 (when such c lau se s  were rendered  redundant by s ta tu to r y
60 E .g ., Boilermakers Award (1952), 32 W.A.I.G., at 73.
61 See (1933) 40~W.A.L.R. 81.
62 See (1950) C.R., No.683; (1951) C.R., No.807; Sydney Morning Herald.
6/ 3/ 1957.
63 Stevedoring Industry Act 1954-56, s s . 36, 39.
64 See Perlman, op. c i t . ,  50.
65 (1946) 57 C.A.R. 462.
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provision) provided for automatic suspension of the clause in the event66
of a strike. But the provision most frequently used in this way is 
the preference to unionists clause, a sanction that is, of course, avail­
able only where industrial tribunals have discretionary power to award
preference. It is relevant, therefore, only in the Federal, Queensland,
67
Western Australian and, up to 1953, New South Wales jurisdictions. Even 
in these cases availability is conditional on the extent to which prefer­
ence clauses are a feature of awards. Thus the sanction is almost in­
variably available in Queensland and was usually so in New South Wales 
before 1953. It is often available in Western Australia, but less common­
ly in the Federal jurisdiction.
Only in Western Australia are a substantial number of preference
clauses in State awards coupled with a proviso relating to strike action:
most provide for automatic cancellation of the clause in the event of a
strike, while a few merely stipulate that the clause is not to apply to68
individual strikers. A few Queensland preference clauses provide that 
the clause may be suspended or cancelled in the event of strike action, 
though this constitutes a warning rather than a necessary authorization.
But deletion of the preference clause as a sanction against strikes has 
been used in all relevant jurisdictions. Its use has naturally been 
greatest in 'Queensland where it has been emphasized that preference is
69
granted on condition the union concerned does not resort to direct action.
70
The Court has deleted preference clauses on this ground, and has expressed
£6 E.g., Firemen & Deckhands Award (1953), 111 I*G. (N.8.V.), at 651-2.
67 See Chapter 7.
68 See Table 6.
69 McCawley, J., 'Industrial Arbitration in Queensland* (1922), 5 Inter­
national Labour Review, at 406.
70 See (T947) “32 Q.T.G. ~S03.
its determination to do so regardless of whether a strike has been author-
71
ized in accordance with the Act. Correspondingly, the Court will not
restore a deleted preference clause without evidence of the union’s in-
72
tention to abandon the use of strike action; nor will it make a grant of
preference, otherwise warranted, if it considers the union cannot effect-
73
ively guarantee that its members will not strike. In New South Wales
before 1953 preference clauses were deleted from awards for illegal strike
74
action on a number of occasions. Preference has been included in a
Federal award on the implied condition that there should be no strikes by
75
members of the union concerned; the grant has been cancelled because of 
76
strike action, and withheld because of a union’s strike record and its
77
failure to offer guarantees for the future.
---- oOo--- --
Cancellation of a union's registration as a sanction against strikes
is available in all arbitration court systems. The statutory powers of
arbitration courts in this connection are outlined in Appendix III, to
which is appended a brief description of the effects of deregistration.
78
Technically, deregistration is not a distinctly punitive power,
a view that has received particular emphasis from Federal tribunals.
An order for deregistration...is not a punishment. It is merely 
the assertion by the Court that registered unions cannot maintain
71 (1946) 31 Q.I.G. 229.
72 (1952) 37 Q.I.G. 457; (1947) 32 Q.I.G. 802.
73 (1919) 4 Q.I.G. 513.
74 See Ü1936J A.R. (N.S.W.), 1, 25. Between 1912 and 1918 the State Act 
required the cancellation of preference clauses for strike action.
75 (1928) 26 C.A.R., at 886.
76 (1928) 26 C.A.R. 1097.
77 (1918) 12 C.A.R., at 284, 286; (1923) 18 C.A.R., at 1216; (1930)
29 C.A.R. 136; (1932) 31 C.A.R. 23.
78 See (1917) 11 C.A.R., at 985.
a concurrent right to approach this Court and to resort to direct 
action. '
In practice, however, deregistration is widely regarded, in the terms
of a former President of the Western Australian Arbitration Court, as ‘one80
of the severest punishments’ available for use against striking unions.
In an early Federal decision, Higgins, J., viewed deregistration, to the
extent that it constituted a punishment, as being unjust because it could
affect union members who had nothing to do with a strike - if ‘punishment
is to be any good in its object of getting the work of the country done, it
81
must discriminate between the innocent and the guilty'. In later Federal 
judgements, Higgin's distinction between 'the innocent and the guilty' was 
discarded.
It was...urged that even if deregistration were not a punitive 
act its result would be the deprivation of large bodies of workmen... 
not concerned in the strike in question of their right to approach 
the Court. This is true but all men so deprived must be presumed 
to support the actions of their Federal Executives. If they do not - 
if they wish to rely on arbitration as against direct action - they 
must see that effect is given to their choice. ^
In short, 'The rank and file of the Union must accept responsibility
83
for the utterances and actions of their executive bodies'. The converse, 
as has been shown earlier in this chapter, also applies. On this view, 
responsibility within the registered union is not divisible. The Federal 
authorities on occasions, however, have been forced to modify the principle 
as when an application for deregistration of a union because of the actions
79 Metal Trades Employers Ass'n v. Amalg'd Engineering Union (1938),
39 C.A.R., at 10. See also (1940) 42 C.A.R., at 567; (1948) 61 C.A.R., 
at 136-7; (1949) 64 C.A.R. 288; (1950) 66 C.A.R. 345.
80 Per Dwyer, P., (1936) 16 W.A.I.G., at 107; and see also, [1917] A.R. 
(N.S.W.), at 476.
81 Re Waterside Workers Fed'n: Ex parte the Attorney-General (C'wealth) 
(1917), 11 C.A.R., at 606.
82 Metal Trades Case (see note 79 above), at 10.
83 Commissioner for Railways. N.S.W. v. Aust'n Railways Union (1940),
42 C.A.R., at 568.
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of one of its branches was held over in order to give the 'rank and file 
of the Union an opportunity of declaring what really is the policy of their
84
Union'. Indeed, despite general judicial acceptance of the view that
deregistration is the logical outcome of a refusal to adhere to arbitral
processes, arbitration courts have used the power sparingly - usually on
85
the stated ground that it is applicable only in extreme cases.
A union deregistered for striking may apply for, but is not automatic-
86
ally granted, re-registration, which is usually granted only if it is
shown that the union intends to abandon use of the strike and to observe 
87
award terms.
---- oOo------
Apart from the sanctions considered above, it may be mentioned that in 
all jurisdictions there are statutory provisions aimed at enabling industrial 
authorities to anticipate or control the incidence or conduct of strikes. 
These measures fall into three categories: notification of disputes, com­
pulsory conferences and strike ballots.
Unions in all jurisdictions are required, either by statute or as a
matter of practice, to notify an appropriate industrial authority of likely
88
or existing strikes. In all cases except Victoria power is provided to
89
enable the calling of compulsory conferences; by this means the parties 
to an industrial dispute can be forced to resume negotiations, or at least
84 Ibid., at 569.
85 See [1922] A.R. (N.S.W.) 218; (1936) 16 W.A.I.G. 106.
86 (1917) 24 C.L.R. 85; (1929) 27 C.A.R. 1208. If another union applies 
earlier for registration in its place, the new union is prima facie 
entitled to registration: [19183 A.R. (N.S.W.) 23.
87 See (1929) 27 C.A.R., at 1210; (1938) 39 C.A.R. 1263; (1952) 74 C.A.R., 
at 56.
88 See Chapter 5.
89 C*wealth, C. & A., s.29; N.S.W,, Ind. Arb., s. 25(1); Qd., I.C, & A,, 
s. 23(l); S.A., Ind. Code, s. 20; W.A., Ind. Arb., s. 171(l); Tas., 
Wages Bds., s. 77.
to return to their seats at the bargaining table. Statutory provision for 
ballots to be held either before or during a strike operate in the Federal,
New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australian jurisdictions, as shown 
in Appendix III.
3• The Right to Strike
The Australian trade union movement does not argue about the right to 
strike as a principle. Privately, some union leaders on the conservative 
fringe may be prepared to do so, but this is not evident in official state­
ments which undoubtedly reflect general union opinion. Strike action is
aregarded in a light which gives it the status of„natural right. Union
leaders consistently use the terms 'inherent1, 'inalienable' and 'fundamental'
in connection with the right to strike, and the unions have repeatedly affirm-
1
ed that they will 'never give up the right to strike'. Acceptance of this 
principle does not, however, entail automatic support for all strikes - 
though there are union leaders who subscribe to the maxim, attributed to 
Henry Boote, 'some strikes are damnably ill-advised, but all are justified'. 
Strikes may be opposed because they are considered abortive or capricious, 
which, in the latter case, often means simply that they have not first been 
approved by a relevant central union organization. Unofficial strikes (that 
is, those not authorized by union executive bodies or officials) are usually 
frowned on; and most union leaders express strong opposition to political 
strikes, though their definition of such a strike tends to be somewhat im­
precise.
It follows from their insistence on a right to strike that union leaders, 
unlike the arbitration court judges, prefer to regard the strike as a supple­
ment and not an alternative to arbitration. Thus while the judges hold that
1 Executive Report. A.G.T.U., Sept. 1955, 9.
conditions above the minimum standards embodied in awards should be secured
2
by 'individual bargaining' alone, the unions maintain the right to use
3
collective bargaining methods, and thus the strike, for this purpose.
Union leaders argue that beyond the minima of arbitral awards the 'higgling 
of the market' principle operates - 'in unfavourable times', as one said, 
'employers pay us not a penny more than the award rate; when things are 
favourable, it's our job to turn the tables on them'. And strike action, 
union leaders are convinced, has often achieved results unobtainable in any 
other way. Thus the right-wing leader of the Federated Ironworkers Associ­
ation: 'He said that for every pound increase which the union had secured
in the Courts, it had obtained two pounds by industrial action and negoti- 
4
ation'.
But the union attitude towards the strike goes deeper than this. It
is an attitude to the principle of arbitration itself. The President of the
A.C.T.U. put it this way: 'The Trade Union Movement subscribed to arbitration5
with equity and not...when there was distinct inequity*. The unions, in 
other words, are not prepared to accept arbitration courts as ultimate re­
positories of 'industrial justice'. Their leaders therefore maintain that 
the right to strike 'could never be sacrificed...because the right is quite
often the only economic weapon that workers can use when their just claims6
are refused by employers and wage-fixing tribunals'. Moreover, union
2 (1933) 39 C.A.R., at 9. See also (1950) 67 C.A.R., at 365; (1916)
10 C.A.R., at 429.
3 Executive Report, op. cit., 9.
4 Sydney Mnming Herald. 16/6/1955. The same official stated that during 
previous months, under his leadership, the union (formerly Communist- 
controlled) had conducted more strikes than in any similar period in its 
history.
5 Minutes. A.C.T.U. Special Congress, Sept. 1952, 8.
6 A.E. Monk, 'The Future Responsibility of Trade Unions', in Report and 
Proceedings, vol. I, Duke of Edinburgh's Study Conference, 1956, 182.
leaders not only feel free to question arbitral decisions, but they are
convinced that arbitration courts, despite judicial protestations, are in« 
fluenced in their decisions by the industrial strength of the parties. 
J.A. Cranwell, for nearly twenty years head of the powerful Amalgamated
Engineering Union, drew this lesson from the history of his organization:
[it] is a clear indication that when presenting claims to wage-fixing 
tribunals it is nearly always necessary to support such claims with 
strong demands that they be conceded. Tribunals...are only prepared 
to grant the standards and conditions that the workers concerned are 
strong enough to effectively demand. Reforms secured by strong 
groups are gradually recognised and ultimately receive legislative 
and judicial sanction. The«* application is then extended but it is 
doubtful if any worthwhile improvement in standards ever originated 
in the courts of law.... Unless it is prepared to use its economic 
power, a trade union has little chance of securing wage rates com­
patible with the value of the services its members render to the 
community.'
A leading official of the Australian Workers Union, an organization long
noted for its allegiance to arbitration, put the same point more bluntly.
Unless you are poi^erful you cannot put up an argument in the Court. 
If you are weak they will kick you to death. That's arbitration 
today.
And reliance on industrial strength as much as on legal process is implicit
in the A.C.T.U. Congress declaration that the union movement 'must retain
its right to strike in order to maintain and improve living standards and
9
working conditions’.
In line with this attitude the unions have rejected judicial moves to
obtain 'completely unequivocal' renunciations of direct action from unions
10
seeking registration. They have also pressed vigorously and constantly 
for the repeal of all statutory strike penalties, and for amendments to
7 Souvenir. A.E.U., 25th Anniversary, 340«
8 Sydney Morning Herald. 2/2/1956.
9 Decisions. All Australian Trade Union Congress, Sept. 1951> 7.
10 Decisions. Special A.C.T.U. Congress, Sept. 1952, 7.
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prevent tribunals deregistering unions and refusing to entertain proceedings
11
because of strike action. More important, the unions have continued to use 
the strike weapon.
- - - 0O0 - - -
In the Federal Arbitration Court, Higgins, J., once asserted that 'the
12
power to punish is meant to deter rather than to avenge'. Power to punish 
strikers and their unions at law is almost invariably available to employers 
and industrial tribunals in Australia, with little evidence that its use has 
deterred as well as avenged.
The statutory procedures and penalties directed against individual
strikers and common to Australia and the United Kingdom have failed to deter
13
strikes as much in the former as in the latter case. The special penalties
available for use against individual strikers and union officials under the
Australian systems of industrial regulation appear to have accomplished noU
more.
It is equally clear that strike ballot provisions have not fulfilled
the intention behind their enactment. Unions have rarely held pre-strike
ballots in accordance with statutory requirements, which are in any event
subject to the obvious weakness that a supporting vote clothes a strike with
1$
an 'air of sanctified legality' and strengthens the strikers' resolve.
Ballots held during a strike have the same weakness, though on one or two
11 See, e.g. (penalties) Decisions. Special A.A.T.U.C., June 1956, 5; (de- 
registration) Minutes. A.A.T.U.C., Sept 1955, 12; (refusal to hear claims) 
(Sept. 1956) 3 A.C.T.U. Bulletin (No.1), 5.
12 (1917) 11 C.A.R., at 823.
13 See Knowles, Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict. 100-1, 114-9; also 
Wrottesley, 'Strikes and the Law' (1951), 5 Industrial Law Review. 257.
14 The same lesson has been learnt in the New Zealand arbitrate on system: 
see Martin, 'Twenty Years of Compulsory Unionism' (1956), 8 Political 
Science, at 110.
15 Sen. McKenna (1949), 203 Cwealth Pari. Dehp. 1618.
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occasio n s  such b a l lo t s  have le d  to  a re tu rn  to  work; b u t i f ,  as i s  u s u a lly
th e  c a se , th e  union i s  a n ta g o n is t ic ,  i t  may be im possib le  to  fo llo w  th i s  
17
p ro ced u re . These c o n s id e ra tio n s  were f a t a l ,  f o r  example, to  th e  p roposa l
18
th a t  a b a l l o t  should be tak en  during  th e  co a l m iners’ s t r ik e  o f 1949.
The w ithdraw al o r m o d if ica tio n  o f s tan d a rd  co n d itio n s  o f  employment and
o th e r  p r iv i le g e s  has been employed to  a v a ry in g  e x te n t as  a s t r ik e  san c tio n .
For exam ple, th e  power to  suspend V ic to r ia n  d e te rm in a tio n s  has n o t been used
fo r  many y e a r s ,  w hile  th e  Queensland I n d u s t r ia l  Court has fre q u e n tly  d e le te d
p re fe re n c e  c la u s e s . I t  i s  d o u b tfu l i f  a c tio n  on th e se  l in e s  has m a te r ia l ly
a s s i s te d  th e  ending o f s t r i k e s ,  and i t s  va lue  as  a d e te r re n t  i s  le ssen ed  by
th e  u su a l p r a c t ic e  of r e s to r in g  th e  p r e - s t r ik e  s i tu a t io n  as p a r t  o f the
s e tt le m e n t te rm s. The e x p l i c i t  th r e a t  o f san c tio n s  o f t h i s  k ind  may have
proved an e f f e c t iv e  s tr ik e -p re v e n tiv e  in  some c a s e s , b u t i t  has a lso  f a i le d  
19
in  o th e rs .
But th e  san c tio n s  th a t  have been used w ith  g re a te s t  d e te rm in a tio n , and 
c o n s t i tu te  th e  c h ie f  a n t i - s t r i k e  weapons in  th e  armoury o f in d u s t r i a l  re g u la ­
t io n  system s, a re  d ire c te d  a g a in s t  unions as such: th ey  a re  d e r e g is t r a t io n  
and f in e s  le v ie d  on union funds.
D e re g is tr a t io n  has been used as  a san c tio n  on a number o f occasions in  
W estern A u s tra l ia ,  com parative ly  fre q u e n tly  by F e d e ra l, New South Wales and 
Queensland t r ib u n a ls ,  and l e a s t  o f  a l l  in  South A u s tra l ia .  Regarded by 
t r ib u n a ls  as t h e i r  s tro n g e s t  weapon a g a in s t  s t r ik in g  u n io n s , d e r e g is t r a t io n ’ s 
e f fe c t iv e n e s s  as  a s t r ik e - d e te r r e n t  may be judged by i t s  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  as  a 
punishm ent, in  which r o l e ,  as one le g a l  ob serv er c laim ed , i t  has met w ith
16 See, e . g . , Foenander, I n d u s t r ia l  R egu la tion  in  A u s t r a l ia . 191-3.
17 See, e . g . ,  F i tz p a t r ic k ,  A S h o rt H is to ry  o f th e  A u s tra lia n  Labor Movement. 
155; a ls o  [1934J A.R. (N .S .W .), a t  270-1.
18 See H.V. E v a tt (1949)> 204 C*wealth Par i .  Debs. 481.
19 See Perlm an, op. c i t . ,  50.
’considerable success'. It proves little about its effectiveness merely
to cite the invariable application for re-registration which follows de- 
21
registration. It is perhaps more revealing that such applications have in
the end usually been granted - in fact, have sometimes been encouraged by
the tribunal concerned. In 1938 the Federal Arbitration Court deregistered
the powerful Amalgamated Engineering Union because some of its members were
on strike. A few months later, with the encouragement of the non-Labor22
Federal Government, the union applied for and was granted re-registration 
despite the fact that another union covering the same field had earlier been 
re—registered, and despite the fact that a large number of its members were 
striking at the time. The remarks made by Beeby, J., on this occasion are 
significant:
It may be that deregistration was the wrong remedy for the incidents 
that took place. It is obvious that the Union not being registered 
completely disorganizes the industry, and the award, which was one of 
the most important ever made by the Court. The Union should be back 
in the fold, and if afterevents occur, there are other remedies that 
the Court will not hesitate to apply. ^
The Federal tribunal has not been so forgiving in the case of the 
Building Workers Industrial Union, which was deregistered in 1948. The union 
has applied at least four times for re-registration; it was still unregistered 
at the end of 1957. The tribunal's attitude has no doubt been fortified by 
the fact that the B.W.I.U, is Communist-dominated, and by the subsequent 
registration of a new union covering largely the same field and under an anti­
communist leadership. Nevertheless, the B.W.I.U. has shown no signs of 
withering away in its exile. It has substantially maintained its membership 
in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, and in Queensland has successfully
20 Thomson, A Comparative Survey of the Australian Industrial Tribunals. 46.
21 Ibid., 46n; Foenander, Studies in Australian Labour Law and Relations. 51-2.
22 Souvenir. A.E.U., 220.
23 Quoted by Perlman, op. cit., 109-110.
headed-off attempts to establish the rival organization. It operates under
£>*id
State awards, determinations and collective bargaining agreements,^has
2$
apparently overcome attempts by employers and governments to bypass it.
Its rival (though still affiliated with the New South Wales Labor Council
26
and, in somewhat different circumstances, with the South Australian Trades 
and Labor Council) is barred from affiliation with the main central union 
organizations under a 1950 recommendation of the A,C.T,U, Interstate 
Executive, Moreover, the B.W.I.U. has continued to use the strike weapon - 
to such an extent that in 1957 the New South Wales Industrial Commission 
handed down, but later rescinded, an order for the deregistration of its 
State branch.
In a State jurisdiction, the New South Wales branch of the Federated 
Engine Drivers and Firemens Association was deregistered by the State In­
dustrial Commission early in 1955 and was still so at the end of 1957.
Members of the union, which had suffered previous deregistrations under both
Federal and State Acts, have continued to use the strike weapon despite
27
judicial condemnation of their strikes as ’wicked and wanton’ and the im­
position of strike penalties on their union totalling well over £1000.
The claim that deregistration has an ’added advantage’ as a strike 
sanction because a union seeking re-registration ’comes back on the Court’s
24
24 This was finally accomplished in 1953 by a Federal arbitrator’s refusal 
to certify an agreement between the other union and Qd. employers on the 
ground that this would mean the formation of a second carpenters' union 
in Qd., which was not in the public interest: Courier-Mailr 30/l2/l953.
25 For example, the Bolte non-Labor Victorian Government was finally persuaded 
after both its Labor and non-Labor predecessors had refused, to give the 
B.W.I.U. as well as its rival representation on the Carpenters Wages 
Board.
26 In S.A. the B.W.I.U.’s rival was a separate State union, established 
earlier with a larger membership and not connected with the other Federal 
union. The B.W.I.U. accepted the result of a ballot of building workers 
in S.A. conducted by the A.C.T.U. and favouring the State union, which,
unlike its Federal counterpart, has been granted affiliation with theA.C.T.U.
27 Sydney Morning HeraldT 12/4/1956.
28
own terms which means an undertaking to behave itself in future', makes 
two questionable assumptions. In the first place, it is doubtful whether 
deregistered unions in every case do re-register on the tribunal's terms.
As Beeby's statement quoted above seems to indicate, the Amalgamated Engineer­
ing Union's re-registration in 1938 was not wanted only by the union. It is 
also reported that the undertaking given by the union,before its re-registra- 
tion.was actually drafted by Beeby and was the best version he could get
29
from the union as a face-saver for the Court. In the second place, an 
undertaking may cover everything or nothing. The undertaking given by the 
A.E.U. in 1938 was in these terms:
The said Union undertakes that it will not support any of its members 
who go on strike without first giving the Executive an opportunity of 
bringing the subject-matter of the dispute before the Court and the 
Union will use all its influence to induce its members to observe the 
terms of the award.ü
The limited character of this undertaking - its application solely to un­
official strikes, and its use of the mild term 'induce' - is clear. Indeed, 
an identical undertaking later offered by the Building Workers Industrial 
Union in support of its application for re-registration was rejected by the
same Court because it did not cover official strikes and was not sufficiently 
31
unequivocal. The B.W.I.U. refused to agree to re-registration at the
price of a stronger undertaking, and its stand was endorsed by the A.C.T.U.
32
Congress. The union would not 'come back' on the Court's terms.
In view of the B.W.I.U,'s record since deregistration, the judicial 
contention that the members of a deregistered union 'are without guide in
33
the industrial field, they wander about and get lost', appears to overstate
28 Thomson, op. cit., 46.
29 Perlman, op. cit., 109n.
30 (1938) 39 C.A.R., at 1264-
31 (1952) 74 C.A.R. $3.
32 Decisions. Special A.C.T.U. Congress, Sept. 1952, 7.
33 (1936) 16 W.A.I.G., at 107.
the case. Deregistration has certainly placed the B.W.I.U. at a disadvantage 
in many respects. But its survival as one of the largest and most powerful 
unions, combined with the circumstances of the A.E.U.'s deregistration in 
1938, gives colour to the doubt expressed publicly by at least one judge of 
the effectiveness of deregistration. In 1917 Higgins, J., described de- 
registration for strike action as a ’reckless, hysterical, fatuous step’, 
claiming that 'destruction of such control [of unions} as has already been 
secured by registration would be the very negation of strong and sane
34
action': 'What is wanted is more control, not less control, on the part
3$
of the Court. Deregistration means less control'. To a large extent his 
argument was confined to the Federal tribunal's inability to deal with un­
registered unions. The argument therefore does not apply with the same 
force to State jurisdictions where industrial tribunals are competent to 
penalize striking unions not registered under them. But it is of some 
significance that employers and their organizations, the usual initiators 
of disciplinary proceedings, have in recent years shown a marked tendency to 
apply for monetary penalties rather than deregistration, not only in the 
Federal jurisdiction but also under the New South Wales arbitration system.
Legislation empowering the imposition of strike-fines on unions, in­
stead of their members or officials, is in force in all jurisdictions except 
Victoria. In South Australia a strike penalty was last imposed on a union 
in 1954, the first for a considerable time previously; unions have not been 
penalized in this way in Western Australia since the big metal trades strike 
of 1952; and the Tasmanian penal provision has never been used against a 
union. The Queensland Industrial Court has fined striking unions on a number
34 Be Waterside Workers Federation; Ex parte Attorney-General for the 
C'wealth (1917). 11 C.A.R.f at 605-6.
35 ibid., at 602.
of occasions, the last being in 1956, but has tended to place greatest
emphasis on deletion of preference clauses as a penalty. The practice of
fining unions has been followed most extensively in the Commonwealth and
New South Wales jurisdictions, which together with Queensland cover the
most militant sectors of Australian industry.
In the five years to September 1955, six Federal unions were fined a
total of £5,300; and the New South Wales Industrial Commission imposed fines
36
totalling £5,156 on ten unions on various occasions. Apart from the fines
legal costs awarded against the unions were usually considerable, often ex-
37
ceeding the fine imposed: the Amalgamated Engineering Union, for example,
was fined a total of £4,700 in both jurisdictions and spent 'almost the same
38
amount' in legal expenses. Even where a union has been found guilty of 
striking but, for various reasons, no penalty has been imposed, it is often
39
obliged to pay the costs of the plaintiff as well as its own. It is
probably an overstatement to say that the fines were financially crippling,
though the leading official of the union most affected, the A.E.U., has said
40
'No union can stand such penalties'. But certainly, a continuation over 
a period of fines on this scale would constitute a serious threat to a 
union's existence. The penalties are in any event an unwelcome additional 
burden on union finances which, in both jurisdictions, are already heavily 
committed to the expenses involved in conducting normal award proceedings. 
These considerations probably played a major part in ensuring that the 
unions complied with twenty-one of the twenty-six orders to end a strike 
which were handed down by the Federal Arbitration Court in relation to the
36 Executive Report. A.C.T.U., Sept. 1955, 13-4«
37 Ibid., 3.
38 Sydney Morning Herald. 17/10/1955 *
39 See, e•g., ibid., 30/6/1955. In this example, awarded costs were £150 
and £50, respectively, in two cases involving one union.
40 Ibid., 17/10/1955.
On the other hand, the existence of themetal trades during 1952-5$.
Court’s punitive powers did not prevent the strikes.
- - - 0 O 0 ------
It is impossible to assess with any accuracy the extent to which the
presence or use of legal sanctions in Australia has prevented strikes.
Available statistics are inadequate, and in any event would be incapable of
allowing for a complex of variable factors which make strict comparisons in
42
time or between different countries of questionable value. One thing,
however, is certain: legal sanctions have not eliminated strikes in Austral- 
43
ia. On the other hand, it is apparent that the enactment of anti-strike
measures, the threat to impose penalties, and the actual imposition of
penalties have on many occasions actually provoked strike action. There is
also some evidence to suggest that the incidence of strikes in Australia is
44
greater than in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada or Sweden,
and that the man-days lost through stoppages is fairly high on an inter-
45
national comparison.
Of the industrial tribunals' role in this context, therefore, the most
that can be said (and it is little more than guess-work) was expressed by a
Federal arbitrator: 'Arbitration has achieved no more than some mitigation
46
of the industrial warfare that is endemic in all capitalist communities’. 
Emergency powers exercised directly by governments appear to have accomplished
41 Ibid., 25/7/1955. These figures were given by the Secretary of the Metal 
Trades Employers Association.
42 See Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia. 354-5.
43 See Tables, ibid., 356-7.
44 Ross & Irwin, ’Strike Experience in Five Countries, 1927-47: An Inter­
pretation' (1951), 4 Industrial and Labor Relations Review, at 328.
45 See Table, Walker, op. cit., 355.
46 Per Foster, J., (1948) 61 C.A.R., at 136. It has also been argued that
arbitration has changed the character of strikes: Kuhn, 'Strikes and 
Australia's Industrialization' (Sept. 1956). 28 Australian Quarterlv. 
at 58-60, 68. ---
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no more in this respect. So far as they have achieved anything, it has
been the ending rather than the prevention of strikes; and it is these
powers rather than those of industrial tribunals which have been brought to
47
bear in the case of the most serious industrial conflicts. Moreover, the
industrial tribunals have not only failed to eliminate the strike but
apparently play a comparatively minor part in ending the strikes that do
occur, the overwhelming majority of which are settled outside the framework
4&
of industrial regulation systems.
In part, the failure to eliminate the strike, particularly so far as
penalties imposed on unions themselves are concerned, is explained by the
49
fact that ‘strikes often happen in defiance of the unions'. Under instruc­
tions from tribunals, unions have occasionally taken steps to discipline 
striking members; but these have usually been belated and half-hearted, and 
penalties imposed for this reason are usually rescinded after the crisis 
has passed. Even union leaders who sincerely wish to end a strike are faced 
with difficulties arising from their usually elective positions, or 'dif­
ficulties which could be created with non-unionists' if a union's ultimate
50
sanction of emulsion is employed. In the Federal and New South Wales
jurisdictions in particular, industrial judges have on the whole preferred
to emphasize legal requirements at the expense of social realities. But at
least one Federal arbitrator, Kirby, J., now President of the Arbitration
Commission, has recognized the problems involved.
I feel that the organizations may well have done more than they have 
actually done towards having the bans lifted and the Court's order 
literally obeyed. But those in charge of the organizations are 
dealing with members, not servants. They have had years of experience 
in the trade-union world and I do not feel competent to substitute
47 Walker, op. cit., 362.
48 See Table, ibid., 361.
49 Knowles, op. cit., 116.
50 Executive Report. A.C.T.U., Sept. 1955, 9.
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my judgement f o r  t h e i r s  and say th a t  i f  o rd e rs  had been g iven  and 
d i s c ip l in a r y  powers e x e rc ise d  th ey  would have succeeded in  having 
th e  bans l i f t e d ,  by such a c tio n s  they  may have s p l i t  t h e i r  
o rg a n iz a tio n s  in  tw a in , caused them selves to  be thrown o u t o f 
o f f ic e  and y e t  -  as  th e  C hief Judge has so p a te n t ly  dem onstrated  -  
s t i l l  be in  contem pt o f t h i s  C ourt i f  th ey  f a i l e d  in  secu rin g  
l i t e r a l  obedience to  th e  C o u rt’s o r d e r .51
But th e  main elem ent in  th e  f a i l u r e  to  e lim in a te  th e  s t r i k e  i s  the  
union a t t i t u d e  to  th e  r i g h t  to  s t r ik e  a s  a g e n e ra l p r in c ip le ,  which was d is ­
cussed  above. As F o s te r ,  J . ,  a s s e r te d ,  th e  unions have n o t only  ’always
claim ed th a t  th e  " r ig h t"  to  s t r ik e  was a sacred  one which th ey  would never
52
g ive  u p ’ , b u t ,  ' i n  p o in t o f f a c t  they  never have g iven  i t  u p '.  I t  fo llow s 
th a t  in  th e  l a s t  a n a ly s is  th e  un ions cannot a cc e p t t h e i r  le g a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ­
t i e s  as  in te r p r e te d  by th e  t r ib u n a ls .  Thus th e  F ed e ra l A r b i t r a t io n  C o u rt 's  
a ttem p t to  e x t r a c t  an u n d e rtak in g  from th e  A .C .T .U ., to  i n s t r u c t  i t s  member- 
un ions to  r e f r a in  from s t r ik in g  during  a b a s ic  wage h e a r in g , was met w ith
th e  r e t o r t  t h a t  'u n d er no c ircum stances would th e  A.C.T.U. g ive  such an
53
assu ran ce  to  th e  C o u r t '.
By law , th e n , th e  r i g h t  to  s t r ik e  in  A u s tra l ia  i s  a t  l e a s t  c ircum scribed
in  a l l  j u r i s d ic t io n s ,  and w ith in  most system s o f  i n d u s t r i a l  r e g u la t io n  i s
a b o lish e d . In  f a c t ,  th e  r i g h t  to  s t r ik e  i s  e x e rc ise d  d e s p i te  th e  law and
th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  g iven  i t  by in d u s t r ia l  t r ib u n a ls .  The dichotom y between
law and p ra c t ic e  has been a p t ly  summarized by th e  P re s id e n t o f  th e  A.C.T.U.
in  m a t te r - o f - f a c t  term s which r e f l e c t  th e  u n io n s ' a t t i t u d e  to  th e  s t a t e 's
in te rv e n t io n  in  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  b a rg a in in g  p ro cess :
In  A u s tra l ia  t h i s  r ig h t  [ to  s tr ik e ]  i s  den ied  th e o r e t i c a l l y ,  and 
th e  law  imposes p e n a l t ie s  f o r . • . s t r i k e s  a g a in s t  awards o r  determ ina­
t io n s  made by w age-fix ing  t r ib u n a ls .  T h is , o f  c o u rse , does n o t p rev en t 
s t r ik e s  a c tu a l ly  ta k in g  p lace  to  remedy what th e  tra d e  un ions fe e l  i s  
_____ an award th a t  does n o t p ro p e rly  remedy in d u s t r i a l  g r ie v a n c e s .54
51 M etal T rades Employers A ss 'n  v . Amalg'd E ngineering  Union (1950), 67 C.A.R.
52 ?19Ü T '61 C .A .R ., a t  136.
53 P r e s id e n t ,  A .C .T .U ., in  M inu tes. T rades & Labor C ouncil o f  Q d., 12/ 4/ 1950.
54 Monk, 'The F uture  R e s p o n s ib il i ty  of Trade U n io n s ', op. c i t . , 181-2.
CHAPTER 7
PREFERENCE TO UNIONISTS AND COMPULSORY UNIONISM
L e g a l  r e q u ir e m e n ts  t h a t  e m p lo y e rs  sh o u ld  g iv e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a tm e n t  
t o  u n io n  members a r e  common in  A u s t r a l i a .  They u s u a l l y  a p p ly  t o  th e  e n g a g e ­
m ent o f  new l a b o u r ,  b u t  may a l s o  be  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  th e  c o n tin u a n c e  o f  em ploy­
m ent o r  a t  th e  p o i n t  o f  d i s m i s s a l .  F o r  p r e s e n t  p u rp o se s  two c a te g o r i e s  may 
be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  te rm s  in  w hich p r e f e r e n c e  t o  u n i o n i s t s  
can  be p r e s c r i b e d .  T hese  a r e :  a b s o lu t e  p r e f e r e n c e  and q u a l i f i e d  p r e f e r e n c e .^  
U nder an  a b s o lu te  p r e f e r e n c e  p r o v i s i o n ,  t h e  em ployer i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
g iv e  p r e f e r e n c e  in  em ploym ent u n c o n d i t io n a l lv  t o  u n i o n i s t  a s  a g a i n s t  n o n -  
u n i o n i s t  a p p l i c a n t s ,  and he i s  f r e e  t o  em ploy n o n - u n io n i s t s  o n ly  i f  no  
u n i o n i s t  i s  a v a i l a b l e .  On th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a t u r e  o f th e  
q u a l i f i e d  p r e f e r e n c e  p r o v is io n  i s  t h a t  th e  u n i o n i s t  m ust have some q u a l i f i c a ­
t i o n  o th e r  th a n  a u n io n  t i c k e t  b e fo r e  he can  c la im  p r e f e r e n c e .  A v a i l a b i l i t y  
and w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  jo b  o f f e r in g  a r e  n o t  re g a rd e d  h e re  a s  in d e ­
p e n d e n t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ;  th e y  a r e  s e l f - e v i d e n t ,  and c la u s e s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  
th e s e  a lo n e  p r o p e r ly  p r e s c r ib e  a b s o lu te  r a t h e r  th a n  q u a l i f i e d  p r e f e r e n c e .
The n o rm al r e q u ir e m e n ts  a r e  t h a t  th e  u n i o n i s t  s h o u ld  be e q u a l  in  com petence  
a n d , w here a p p l i c a b l e ,  i n  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  t o  a  n o n - u n io n i s t  a p p ly in g  a t  th e  
same tim e  f o r  th e  same jo b  -  o r ,  more v a g u e ly ,  t h a t  th e  u n i o n i s t  sh o u ld  be 
’ s u i t a b l e ’ . The u s u a l  form  o f  th e  q u a l i f i e d  p r e f e r e n c e  p r o v i s io n  r e l i e s  on 
th e  a l l - i n c l u s i v e  ’ o th e r  th in g s  b e in g  e q u a l ’ fo rm u la .
B oth  a b s o lu te  and q u a l i f i e d  p r e f e r e n c e  a r e  q u i te  d i s t i n c t  from  w hat i s  
known a s  co m p u lso ry  u n io n is m . The e s s e n c e  o f co m p u lso ry  u n io n ism  i s  t h a t
1 P r o h ib i t i o n s  o f  d i s c r im in a t io n  a g a in s t  u n i o n i s t s  a r e  n o t  in  t h e  p r e ­
f e r e n c e  c a te g o r y ,  b u t  i n  v iew  o f  t h e i r  c lo s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  i t  (n o te d  
in  C h a p te r  5) t h e i r  in c id e n c e  i s  i n d ic a te d  b e lo w .
union membership i s  p re sc r ib e d  no t as a p r e r e q u is i te  fo r  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t ­
ment in  th e  m a tte r  o f  engagement o r d is m is s a l ,  b u t as  a c o n d itio n  o f employ­
ment. A compulsory unionism  p ro v is io n , a s  th e  term  i s  used h e re , may p re ­
s c r ib e  p re fe ren ce  a t  th e  p o in t o f engagement to  members o f th e  un ion ; i t  
may p re s c r ib e  equal o r secondary p re fe re n ce  to  n o n -u n io n is ts  who g ive an
u n d ertak in g  to  jo in  th e  union once th ey  a re  engaged. I t  may make no p ro ­
v is io n  f o r  p r e f e r e n t ia l  tre a tm e n t to  be g iven  to  u n io n is ts ,  o r  i t  may
a u to m a tic a lly ^ d isq u a lify  from being  engaged any man who i s  n o t a lre a d y  a
union member. The common f a c to r  in  a l l  th e se  case s  i s  t h a t  a t  some s tag e
a l l  th e  employees a f fe c te d  must be o r become, and must rem ain , members o f
3
th e  union o r unions concerned . To d e sc r ib e  t h i s  as  's u p e r - p r e f e r e n c e ',  a
term used in  Queensland tw enty  y ea rs  ago, i s  m is lead in g : in  th e  l a s t  a n a ly s is
no q u es tio n  o f p re fe ren ce  i s  invo lved  because th e  n o n -u n io n is t 's  competing
4
claim  to  employment i s  excluded a l to g e th e r .  As th e  High C ourt has p o in ted
o u t, a compulsory unionism  c lau se  i s  d i f f e r e n t  in  k ind  from one p re s c r ib in g
p re fe ren ce  in  employment in  th a t  i t  p ro v id es  fo r  a monopoly o f  employment 
5  ‘
fo r  union members.
The p r a c t ic a l  e f f e c t s  o f th e  o p e ra tio n  o f compulsory unionism  and
6
ab so lu te  p re fe re n c e , bu t n o t q u a lif ie d  p re fe re n c e , p robab ly  tend  to  be
2 These two types o f p ro v is io n  a re  e q u iv a le n t to  th e  ‘union shop' and 
'c lo se d  shop' p ro v is io n s , r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  o f B r i t i s h  and American c o l le c t iv e  
agreem ents.
3 The requ irem en t need n o t apply  to  a l l  an em plo y er's  em ployees. A number 
of o p e ra tiv e  c la u se s  app ly  only to  new em ployees; th e  p r in c ip le  i s  th e  
same fo r  those  a f f e c te d .
This i s  recognized  by an agreem ent in  W.A. which re q u ire s  a l l  employees 
to  be u n io n is ts  and a ls o  p ro h ib i ts  d is c r im in a tio n  a g a in s t  u n io n is ts  a t  
th e  p o in t o f  engagement: C leaners & C are tak e rs  Agreement (1939). 19 
W.A.I.G. 246. ~ ~
M etal T rades Employers A ss’n v . Amalg'd E ngineering  Union ( 1936) .  54 
C.L.R. 387; R. T T W aH i’s“ '(1949) fr.L'.ft. *& 9.— ------- --
As A.B. P idd ing ton  p o in te d  o u t, q u a l i f ie d  p re fe re n c e  i s  in  f a c t  of ' l i t t l e  
use to  unions excep t a s  an 'e x te r n a l ly  a t t r a c t i v e  p r iv i le g e ' to  induce 
n o n -u n io n is ts  to  jo in  th e  union: R ep o rt, Royal Commission on I n d u s t r ia l  
A rb itr a t io n  in N .S .W ., 1913, cxx iv . For c o rro b o ra to ry  o p in io n , see 
11 C .A .R ., a t  287; 31 C.A.R, $93; 33 C.A.R. 1159; 39 C.A.R. 312.
similar in the long-run. But the distinction between them is not wholly a 
technical one, turning as it does on the recognition of non-unionists: 
absolute preference clauses place no legal obligation on non-unionist 
employees to take out a union ticket and thus, by contrast with compulsory 
unionism provisions, require some measure of independent organization on 
the part of the union concerned.
The distinction between compulsory unionism and preference to union­
ists is held to throughout this chapter. But for the sake of simplicity 
the general term 'preference1, unless otherwise qualified, may be taken to 
include compulsory unionism - a practice with which almost all awards and 
industrial agreements providing for compulsory unionism are in accord,
------0 O 0 -------
In Australia the policy®preference to unionists may be applied by way 
of direct statutory provision, the terms of a tribunal's award or deter­
mination, the terms of a legally-enforceable or an extra-legal collective 
agreement, or it may be the result of an employer's decision - whether 
taken on his own initiative or under union pressure. The following dis­
cussion is restricted to cases where the policy of preference is enforceable 8
at law - that is, where it is embodied in statutes, awards and determina-
7 Thus under an award prescribing absolute preference an employer may con­
tinue to employ an employee expelled from his union: (1933) 18 Q.I.G. 615,
8 This chapter deals only with preference based on union membership. But 
it should be noted that such preference is subject to qualified prefer­
ence given to ex-servicemen (Re-establishment & Employment Act 1945-56) 
and to specified tradesmen, mainly in the metal trades (Tradesmen's 
Rights Regulations Act 1946-55) - the latter Act having precedence over 
the former. Both are Federal wartime measures; their operation was ex­
tended to Sept, 1958, Apart from these, some N.S.W. awards give prefer­
ence in re-employment to employees dismissed in slack periods (e.g.
(1947) 85 I.G. (N,S.W.), at 1132); and two provisions still in force 
give preference to 'white' over 'coloured' labour ((1951) 36 Q.I.G. 881; 
(1926) 6 W.A.I.G. 175)* Preference of service to members of employers' 
organizations is prescribed in two W.A. awards; application for a 
similar provision was rejected by the Qd. Industrial Court in 1947.
tions, and formal agreements.
9
1• Statutes
Two Australian measures directly impose compulsory unionism: the
Commonwealth Stevedoring Industry Act 1954-56 and the New South Wales
Industrial Arbitration Act 1940-57.
The federal measure lays down that, except in special circumstances,
only persons registered by the Stevedoring Industry Authority are to be
10
employed as waterside workers. An applicant for registration must either
be a member, or have applied for membership, of, the union recognized by
11
the Authority at the port concerned. At all major ports except Darwin, 
where the North Australian Workers Union is specified, the recognized 
union is the Waterside Workers Federation.
12
The New South Wales provision was enacted in 1953. In the first
place, it requires employers in industries covered by a State award or
industrial agreement to give ’absolute preference of employment’ to members
13
of the relevant union or unions registered under the Act. In the second 
place, an adult employee in such an industry is liable to dismissal if he
fails to join an appropriate union within twenty-eight days of his engage­
ment, or of the entry into force of the relevant award or agreement or the
14
Act. These provisions are accompanied by certain conditions. Unions
9 This includes the awards of tribunals other than the main ones discussed 
in Chapter 5. Only in this way can the extent to which preference is a 
feature of industrial regulation in Australia be fully appreciated.
10 Stevedoring Industry Act 1954-56, ss. 39, 40.
11 Ibid., s. 29(l). Moreover, normally only applications submitted through 
the union can be accepted: ibid., s. 31(l).
12 Between 1901 and 1953 preference to unionists in one form or another was 
always within the power of State industrial tribunals, though the extent 
of the power was altered on a number of occasions: see ’Preference to 
Unionists Since 1900' (1953)> 111 I.G. (N.S.W.) 429. The 1953 amendment 
by-passed the tribunals for the first time.
13 Ind. Arb. Act, s. 129B (l).
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must adm it to  membership any person  under a s ta tu to ry  o b lig a tio n  to  jo in ;
a l im i t  i s  p laced  on th e  amount of th e  annual membership fee  th a t  a member
may be re q u ire d  to  pay in  advance; a  p ro p o sa l to  expel a union member can
be c a r r ie d  o u t, i f  th e  member w ishes to  ch allen g e  i t ,  only i f  approved by
1$
th e  I n d u s t r ia l  Commission. In  a d d it io n , a d e ta i le d  procedure i s  l a id
down fo r  th e  exemption o f co n sc ie n tio u s  o b je c to rs  to  union membership from
16
th e  compulsory unionism  requ irem en t.
T his measure came in to  fo rc e  in  December 1953, b u t e a r ly  in  1954 i t s  
v a l id i t y  was ch a llen g ed . The High C ourt had s t i l l  n o t heard  th e  case by 
e a r ly  195S; in  th e  meantime the  compulsory unionism  p ro v is io n s  have been 
in o p e ra tiv e  because th e  unions a re  unable to  launch enforcem ent p roceed ings 
w hile th e  m a tte r  i s  on ap p ea l.
2 . T rib u n a ls
Commonwealth:
There a re  th re e  in d u s t r i a l  t r ib u n a ls  w ith power to  g ra n t p re fe ren ce  
to  u n io n is ts  under F ed era l l e g i s l a t i o n :  th e  A rb itr a t io n  Commission, th e  
Coal In d u s try  T rib u n al and th e  P ub lic  S erv ice  A r b i t r a to r .
Inc luded  in  th e  s ta tu to r y  d e f in i t io n  o f in d u s t r i a l  m a tte rs  which may 
form th e  su b je c t o f  a d isp u te  w ith in  th e  A rb itr a t io n  Commission’ s j u r i s ­
d ic t io n  i s  ’th e  p r e f e r e n t ia l  employment o r th e  non-employment o f any p a r­
t i c u l a r  person  o r c la s s  o f persons o r o f persons being  o r n o t being  members
1
e f  an o rg a n iz a tio n ’ . T his c o n s t i tu te s  th e  b a s is  o f the Commission’ s
2
power to  award p re fe re n ce  to  members o f  unions r e g is te r e d  under i t .  The
15 I b i d . ,  s .  129B (4 ) ,  ( 5 ) ,  (7 ) .
16 I b id . ,  s . 129B (1 1 ) . T his widened th e  grounds of o b je c tio n  a v a ila b le  
under an amendment o f 1951. For an e la b o ra tio n  o f th e  p re se n t p ro­
v is io n ,  see [19541 A.R. (N.S.W.) 71. Up to  th e  end o f 1957, l e s s  than  
4,000 c e r t i f i c a t e s  o f exemption had been is su e d .
1 C. & A. A ct, s .4 ( j )  •
2 M etaL ^rades_Jm ployers A ss’n v . Amalg’d Engineering  Union (1936),
54 C.L.R. 387; R. v . W allis  (19491, 78 C.L.R. 529.
Act goes on to empower the Commission to direct that preference shall be 
given to members of any registered union 'in relation to such matters',
and in such manner and subject to such conditions, as the Commission lays
3
down. This provision, it has been ruled, assumes the existence of the
preference-awarding power and merely sets out the conditions of its exer-
4
cise.
It is apparent that the Commission is able to award absolute prefer-5
ence. The opinion of one Federal arbitrator, that in view of 'recent
6
decisions of the High Court' he had no power to award absolute preference, 
appears to be a somewhat restricted interpretation of the Act and a ques­
tionable interpretation of the decisions in question, which were concerned
with the Act's authority in relation to compulsory unionism and not to
7
preference as strictly defined. Absolute preference has, in fact, been
provided for in a number of Federal awards.
On the other hand, it is settled that nothing in the Act enables the
8
Commission to grant compulsory unionism. There are, however, discre­
pancies between the law and practice in this respect which indicate that 
something more than the nature of the statutory power conferred on arbitral 
authorities is involved.
The limits set to the jurisdiction conferred by the Act are, in the 
first place, of particular importance where employers oppose a grant of
3 C. & A. Act, s.47(l).
4 Metal Trades Case, see note 2 above.
5 Up to 1947, when the reservation was deleted from the Act, preference 
could be awarded to unionists only subject to 'other things being equal'.
6 (1952) 73 C.A.R., at 728.
7 See Wallis’ Case. note 2 above; R. v. Findlav (1950), 81 C.L.R. 537. In 
view of dicta in the latter case, it appears that though absolute pre­
ference may be granted, the terms in which this is usually done would 
be held invalid as not being sufficiently specific in order to comply 
with the Act.
8 Wallis' Case, see note 2 above.
preference. That such limitations are intended primarily to meet situations 
of this nature is shown by the provision giving the Commission a discretion­
ary power to refuse to certifv an agreement containing terms which the
9
Commission has ‘no power to insert in an award*. It seems, therefore,
that a compulsory unionism clause in a certified agreement is not ultra
vires the Act. On the other hand, even where an award is made with the
consent of all parties, and to this extent resembles a certified agreement,
the Commission is formally responsible for the award in a way it is not for
10
a certified agreement. This means that the statutory limitations relat­
ing to preference apply equally to a consent award as to a disputed award. 
Thus, there appear to be no statutory grounds for the reservation made by 
a former President of the Arbitration Court (expressed at a time when the 
Act provided only for qualified preference) that the 'Act only allows this
Court, except by consent, to make awards for preference subject to “other
11
things being equal“'. Nevertheless, a number of awards made before 1947,
when the Act's terms were broadened to cover absolute preference, did in-
12
elude consent clauses prescribing absolute preference and compulsory 
13
unionism. Since the High Court's ruling that the 1947 amendment did not
9 C. & A. Act, s. 31(3).
10 See Foenander, Industrial Regulation in Australia. 7; and see Chapter 5.
11 (1925) 22 C.A.R., at 422 (my emphasis). It is noteworthy that the 
practice of the New Zealand Arbitration Court, operating under substant­
ially similar statutory provisions, of awarding compulsory unionism by 
consent was held to be outside its powers by the N.Z. Court of Appeal: 
Magner v. Gohns [1916] N.Z.L.R. 529; Butt v. Frazer [1929] N.Z.L.R, 636.
12 E.G., Bond and Free Stores Award (1927), 25 C.A.R., at 1214; an award 
made by Dethridge, C.J., who was later to maintain that the Act con­
ferred no power to grant absolute preference: (193S) 39 C.A.R., at 314*
13 E.G., Journalists (Worker Newspaper Ltd.) Award (1943), 50 C.A.R., at 5; 
an award made by Piper, C.J., who had earlier maintained that the Act 
permitted a grant of no more than qualified preference: (1941) 44 C.A.R., 
at 319.
1cover compulsory unionism, a number of consent awards have been handed down
14
with compulsory unionism clauses. But compulsory unionism is not a
feature only of consent awards. A high proportion of the awards restricted
in application to the Australian Capital Territory include compulsory
unionism clauses, the insertion of which was in most cases opposed by the
15
employers concerned. These clauses represent a continuation of the policy 
of the Industrial Board which functioned in the Territory up to 1949 under 
special legislation. They are clearly outside the powers conferred by the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act under which they are made; but, like 
similar clauses inserted by consent, they are effective law until 
challenged. However, apart from the special case of A.C.T. awards, it 
appears that the few preference clauses which have been inserted over 
employers’ opposition do not go beyond the statutory limits.
The Act sets out grounds on which the Arbitration Commission may grant 
preference to unionists. These include circumstances in which the Com­
mission considers such a grant is necessary to prevent or settle an in­
dustrial dispute, to ensure the effectiveness of an award, to maintain
16
industrial peace or for the 'welfare of society'. Within this broad
frame of reference, the Commission has considerable freedom in laying down
17
more specific principles of action.
18
A disputed claim for preference is granted only for a special reason.
Greatest emphasis has consistently been placed on unjust discrimination
14 B.g., Meat Industry (Shops & Smallgoods Factories) Award (1952),
73 C.A.R., at ?93.
1$ See, e.g., (1951) 72 C.A.R. $16.
16 C. & A. Act, s.47(2). Between 1904 and 1910 the Act allowed the Court 
to grant preference only if the grant was approved by a majority of 
employees affected by the award.
17 See (1941) 44 C.A.R. 319.
18 (1935) 34 C.A.R. 841.
shown against unionists, which constitutes an abuse of the employer’s free-
19
dom to choose his employees. A grant of preference is an appropriate
means of preventing (in the dramatic phraseology of Higgins, J.) this
20
'gradual bleeding of unionism by the feeding of non-unionism'. In the
application of this principle, the arbitral authorities have required clear
21
proof of unfair treatment. Given such proof, the preference clause
awarded may affect all employers bound by the award or may be restricted
22
to those who have followed a discriminatory policy - and then, usually,
23
only if they refuse to abandon the practice. Where there is some doubt 
on the question of proof, a clause forbidding employers to discriminate 
against unionists is often awarded in place of preference.
It has proved difficult for unions to give a clear demonstration of
unfair discrimination, and the reliance placed on this ground is reflected
in the Federal tribunal’s 'oft-repeated disinclination to act' in the
24
matter of preference claims. This emphasis, evident from the first, has
2$
been maintained in recent years. But it has not precluded reference 
to, and occasionally use of, other grounds.
19 (1912) 6 C.A.R. 130; (1913) 7 C.A.R. 132.
20 (1913) 7 C.A.R., at 233.
21 (1913) 7 C.A.R. 132; (1911) 5 C.A.R. 147.
22 (1939) 41 C.A.R. 285. There are some cases where preference has been 
awarded in relation to individual firms only: see Foenander, Towards 
Industrial Peace in Australia. 177.
23 (1912) 6 C.A.R. 130. It has been held that where the discrimination 
favours another registered union, preference should not be granted 
(1940) 42 C.A.R. 135); but a lay arbitrator later stated he would 
grant preference in these circumstances ((1949) 63 C.A.R., at 280).
24 Foenander, Towards Industrial Peace in Australia. 180. For example, 
disputed preference claims were granted only twice up to 1923? see 
(1923) 18 C.A.R. 1216.
25 See 60 C.A.R. 832; 62 C.A.R. 654; 63 C.A.R. 243; 70 C.A.R. 726; 71 C.A.R. 
313; 73 C.A.R. 873. An award made in 1954 states that since there is 
'no suggestion’ of discrimination, no preference is to be given to 
unionists: 79 C.A.R., at 246.
The maintenance of industrial peace, specified in the Act, has occasion-
26
ally been noted by Federal arbitrators. One gave it somewhat limited
scope as a ground when he held that the fact that a non-unionist working
alongside unionists 'provokes discontent' did not justify an award of pre- 
27
ference. On the other hand, the arbitrator responsible for Australian
Capital Territory awards indicated in conversation that his main reason for
continuing the compulsory unionism policy was that it had proved to be
conducive to industrial peace in the Territory.
The statutory ground of the 'welfare of society', inserted in the Act
in 1910, does not appear to have assumed any importance until 1932, when
Drake-Brockman, J., suggested that 'in the interests of social welfare,
preference may properly be granted to unionists for the purpose of prevent-
28
ing the exploitation of female labour'. Implicit in his conception of
social welfare was the need to give effect to the objectives of the award,
a consideration now included in the Act as a separate ground for granting
preference. Thus he inserted a preference clause in the Clothing Industry
Award as a means of ensuring the enforcement of award conditions in view
29
of the High Court ruling, later reversed, that the Arbitration Court
could not make an award binding on employers in relation to their non-
30
unionist employees. A similar consideration had earlier influenced 
Beeby, J., who stressed the importance of the union to the effective opera­
tion of the arbitration system when he inserted a preference clause in the
26 See, e.g., (1911) $ C.A.R. 9; (1928) 26 C.A.R. 866.
27 (1951) 71 C.A.R. 319.
28 Amalg'd Clothing & Allied Trades Union v. D.E, Arnall & Sons (1932),
31 C.A.R., at 438.
29 (1929) 43 C.L.R. 29; reversed, (1936) 54 C.L.R. 387.
30 Drake-Brockman's award included an absolute preference provision, which 
he was obliged to amend to conform with the Act when it was declared 
invalid by the High Court: (1932) 47 C.L.R. 1.
31
Tramways Award. As a ground fo r  awarding p re fe re n c e , th i s  re p re se n ts  a 
much more p o s i t iv e  approach th an  where p ro o f o f d is c r im in a tio n  i s  r e l i e d  
on. In  th e  l a t t e r  case  p re fe ren ce  i s  g ran ted  as  a means o f p ro te c t in g  a 
union  r a th e r  th an  f a c i l i t a t i n g  th e  perform ance o f i t s  s ta tu to ry  fu n c tio n s .
Acceptance o f th e  views expressed  by Drake-Brockman and Beeby was 
ev id en t in  two l a t e r  d e c is io n s  by a la y  a r b i t r a t o r .  In  th e  f i r s t  case he 
d ism issed  a claim  fo r  p re fe re n ce  where employers a lre ad y  engaged lab o u r 
th rough th e  union by in fo rm al agreem ent, b u t in d ic a te d  th a t  i f  t h i s  a rran g e ­
ment was in te r f e r e d  w ith  he would g ra n t a fu r th e r  a p p lic a t io n  'because  of 
th e  c a su a l n a tu re  o f th e  in d u s try ' -  ' i n  a c a su a l in d u s try , u n le ss  th e re
i s  some form o f c o n tro l o f la b o u r , no one i s  in  a p o s i t io n  to  p o lic e  th e  
32
aw ard '. In  th e  second c a se , one o f two unions o p e ra tin g  in  th e  same in ­
d u s try  had o r ig in a l ly  ob ta ined  th e  in d u s t r y 's  award w hile th e  o th e r had
given  evidence of a d i s t a s t e  fo r  a r b i t r a l  p ro c e sse s . The a r b i t r a t o r  con­
s id e re d  t h a t ,  in  th e se  c ircu m stan ces , th e  m aintenance o f in d u s t r ia l  peace 
j u s t i f i e d  a p re fe ren ce  c lau se  fav o u rin g  members o f th e  union th a t  had ob­
ta in e d  th e  o r ig in a l  award 'because  they  a re  p repared  to  observe i t s  term s
33
and c o n d i t io n s '.
But d e sp ite  re fe re n c e s  t o ,  and o c ca s io n a lly  a p p lic a t io n  o f , more 
fav o u rab le  grounds fo r  awarding p re fe re n c e , th e  q u estio n  has u su a lly  been 
approached on th e  b a s is  of u n f a i r  d is c r im in a tio n  a g a in s t  u n io n is ts .  As a 
r e s u l t ,  A u s tra lia n  C a p ita l T e r r i to ry  awards a p a r t ,  g ra n ts  o f p re fe ren ce
34
a re  'u n u su a l ' where they  a re  opposed by em ployers. Although th e  ag ree ­
ment o f employers may n o t be a 'g ro u n d ' in  th e  s t r i c t  sen se , i t  i s  in  
p ra c t ic e  a f a c to r  on which c o n sid e ra b le  w eight has been p laced . This i s
31 1927) 25 C .A .R .,
32 (1949) 65 C .A .R .,
33 I b i d . ,  a t  961. -
34 (1952) 73 C .A .R .,
a t  608. 
a t  595.
a t  883.
I P /
ex em p lified  by one la y  a r b i t r a t o r ’ s r e f u s a l  of p re fe re n c e  ’ in  th e  absence
35
of agreem ent or evidence of u n ju s t i f i a b le  d is c r im in a t io n ’ ; and by an ­
o th e r 's  d e c is io n  to  g ra n t a b so lu te  p re fe re n c e  in  view of the  em ployers' 
c o n sen t -  ’n o tw ith s tan d in g  the  f a c t  as o f te n  expressed  by me in  o th e r  d e -
36
c is io n s  th a t  p re fe re n ce  of employment should  n o t o p e ra te  in  any in d u s t r y ’ .
P re fe re n c e , i t  was p o in ted  ou t, i s  ’ g e n e ra lly  a  m a tte r fo r  agreem ent between 
37th e  p a r t i e s ' .
N early  a th i r d  (81) of th e  255 awards made under th e  C o n c i lia t io n  and 
A rb itr a t io n  Act and in  fo rc e  a t  31 August 1954 co n ta in ed  c lau se s  p r e s c r ib ­
ing  some form of p re fe re n ce  to  u n io n is ts .  39 of th e se  prov ided  fo r  com­
p u lso ry  unionism  (23 in  awards a p p lic a b le  only to  th e  A u s tra lia n  C a p ita l
38T e r r i to r y ) ;  16 fo r  ab so lu te  p re fe re n c e ; and 26 fo r  q u a lif ie d  p re fe re n c e ."
A t o t a l  of 25 awards w ithou t p re fe re n ce  c la u se s  inc luded  p ro v is io n s  p ro ­
h ib i t in g  employers from d is c r im in a tin g  a g a in s t  u n io n is ts .  The number and 
p ro p o rtio n s  of the  v a rio u s  ty p es  of p re fe re n c e  c lau se s  a re  s e t  out in  
Table 4> and th e i r  term s a re  o u tlin e d  in  Appendix IV.
The p re fe re n ce  c lau se s  in  th e  awards examined showed no u n ifo rm ity
39in  th e  m a tte r  of co n d itio n s  a tta ch e d  to  them. None prov ided  fo r  c a n c e l­
l a t io n  of th e  c lau se  in  the  even t of s t r i k e  a c t io n .  But n e a r ly  h a l f
35 (1948) 60 C .A .R ., a t  832.
36 (1949) 65 C .A .R ., a t  172.
37 (1952) 73 C .A .R ., a t  882. But even w ith  agreem ent i t  appears th a t  p r e ­
fe ren ce  i s  n o t in v a r ia b ly  awarded, as shown by th e  A .C .T .U .'s  u n su ccess­
f u l  a ttem p t to  secu re  a  s ta tu to r y  d i r e c t io n  to  t h i s  e f f e c t :  (S ep t. 1956) 
3 A.C.T.U. B u lle tin  5.
38 The l im i t s  imposed by th e  C. & A. Act on th e  kind of p re fe re n ce  th a t  
could  be awarded were te m p o ra rily  removed by wartime re g u la t io n  (1942 
S .R ., No.143), b u t t h i s  does n o t appear to  have been used to  j u s t i f y  
any of th e  a b so lu te  p re fe re n ce  or compulsory unionism  c lau se s  in s e r te d  
du rin g  th e  r e g u la t io n ’s cu rren cy .
39 Between 1904 and 1910 th e  G. & A. Act la id  down, in  e f f e c t  as c o n d itio n s  
of any g ran t o f p re fe re n c e , th a t  th e  union should be n o n - p o l i t ic a l  and 
i t s  ru le s  should n o t be o p p re ss iv e .
(37) required the unions concerned to admit all applicants for membership,
a requirement now applicable to all registered unions under a 1952 amend- 
40
ment to the Act. One clause made the operation of preference conditional
on the union’s fees and subscription being kept within specified limits.
Only six of the 39 compulsory unionism clauses provided for the exemption
of conscientious objectors; but since 1956 this condition has been attached
41
to all preference clauses by statutory provision. The incidence of the 
conditions accompanying these preference clauses is set out in Table 6, 
and their terms are outlined in Appendix IV.
--  - oOo - - -
The statutory definition of industrial matters within the jurisdiction
of the Coal Industry Tribunal includes a provision similar to that from
42
which the Arbitration Commission derives its preference power. But un­
like the Commission, the Tribunal is not expressly limited by statute as 
to the kind of preference it may award. Nevertheless, the Tribunal appears 
to regard its jurisdiction as being identical to the Commission’s. This 
was implied in its comment, when awarding a qualified preference clause,
that the provision ‘follows the principles enunciated by the High Court’
43
in two cases concerning the Arbitration Commission’s preference powers.
The Coal Industry Tribunal has also been ready to follow the Commission's 
example and exceed its jurisdiction by awarding compulsory unionism with 
employers' consent:
The existing [compulsory unionism] provision...has been in the award 
for some years and was there inserted by the Commonwealth Court of
40 C. & A. Act, S.144. Where a union closed its books to new membership, 
its preference claim was rejected: (1936) 36 C.A.R., at 99.
41 C. & A. Act, s.47 (3)-(7). Little use was made of these provisions up 
to the beginning of 195S.
42 Coal Industry Act 1946-56, s.4(j).
43 Q952] C.R., Ho.936.
Conciliation and Arbitration. The Federation asks that it be in­
cluded in the new award. This is not opposed by the employers, but 
it has been pointed out that doubt exists as to the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal to frame the clause in its present form. I share this 
doubt but having regard to the length of time for which the provision 
has existed as a condition of employment...and also to the circum­
stance that it has apparently worked to the satisfaction of employers 
and employees alike, I propose...to insert the clause in the new 
award. 4^
Seven of the thirteen general awards made by the Coal Industry Tribunal
and in force at 31 December 1954 included a preference clause of some kind.
Of these clauses, two prescribed compulsory unionism; four, absolute pre-
45
ference; and one, qualified preference. In only one case was a condition 
attached: a compulsory unionism clause included a provision limiting the 
entrance fee of the union concerned.
-----o O o ------
The Commonwealth Public Service Arbitrator is empowered to determine
'all matters submitted to him', including the 'conditions of service or
46
employment' of Federal Public Service employees. In the absence of any 
specific reference to preference, these terms appear wide enough to admit 
the matter and to permit a grant in any terms the Arbitrator chooses, in­
cluding compulsory unionism. The question has arisen on only a few oc­
casions since the original Act was passed in 1920. On the first of these,
the Arbitrator rejected a claim for absolute preference to unionists as
47
'impracticable', without enlarging on his decision. But subsequently he
showed that he intended to follow the prevailing policy of the main Federal
arbitral body. 'It is the practice of the Arbitration Court not to grant
preference unless discrimination against members of the Union has been
48
proved. No such proof was forthcoming in this case.' These cases in-
44 Ü1954] C.R., No. 1056.
45 See Table 4 and Appendix IV.
46 Public Service Arbitration Act 1920-56, s.12 (l).
47 (1922) 2 C.P.S.A.R., at 91.
48 (1924) 4 C.P.S.A.R., at 351; see also (1928) 8 C.P.S.A.R., at 257.
volved absolute preference claims. A later application for a provision
applying the Arbitrator’s determination exclusively to members of the
applicant union, an implicit form of compulsory unionism, was recognized
49
by the Arbitrator as such and refused.
However, as a means of obtaining preference in the Federal Public
Service, the unions look primarily to Labor governments for favourable
50
employment policies. Nevertheless, two of the 10$ general determinations
made by the Arbitrator and in force at 31 December 19$4 included absolute
51
preference clauses, both inserted by consent in 1949*
Queensland:
The Industrial Court is the only State body with power to award pre­
ference to unionists. If the High Court’s interpretation of the corres­
ponding Federal legislation is adopted, the source of the Industrial Court’s 
preference power is found in the definition of industrial matters within 
the Court’s jurisdiction, which includes the ’employment...of any person
or persons or class of persons...or a claim to dismiss or to refuse to
52
employ any person or persons or class of persons’. The further require­
ment that the Court should grant preference where it is agreed to by the
53
parties concerned or considered advisable by the Court, merely sets out
49 (1942) 22 C.P.S.A.R., at 191.
$0 See Chapter 14»
$1 29 C.P.S.A.R. 17, 685. See Table 4 and Appendix IV.
$2 I.C. & A. Acts, s.4(c). The Legislative Council blocked a Labor govern­
ment’s attempt to enact an express preference power in 1916. But the 
Court found such power first in the statutory direction that any matter 
likely to cause a strike was within its jurisdiction ((1917) 2 Q.I.G. 
376), and later in the more general terms of the provision quoted in 
the text: (1917) 2 Q.I.G. 450.
53 I.C. & A. Acts, s.8(2). This provision was first enacted in 1929 (in 
company with limits on the form of preference to be awarded) by the 
non-Labor government which in 1930 abolished the preference power and 
annulled existing preference clauses. A Labor government restored the 
provision in 1932.
the conditions on which the power is to be exercised.
The last of these provisions refers only to 'preference1. On the inter­
pretation given its counterpart in the Federal Act, it therefore supports 
grants of absolute preference, but equally does not include power to grant 
compulsory unionism, a 'monopoly of employment'. The distinction was re­
cognized by a S-fcate arbitration judge when he made the point that 'an ex­
clusive right of employment is something quite distinct from a mere right
54
of preference'. But the Industrial Court has consistently interpreted 
and applied its powers as enabling it to award compulsory unionism, with or
55
without the consent of employers.
The grounds held to justify a disputed grant of preference are much
wider in Queensland than in other jurisdictions. Initially, the State Court
adopted the Federal Court's policy of relying on proof of discrimination
56
against union members. But it soon showed indications of a readiness to
view preference as something more than a means of protecting a union against
hostile employers. The first sign of this was the Court's acceptance of the
argument advanced by one union advocate:
The unions and the employers...were both vitally interested in the 
uninterrupted working of the industry, and the accomplishment of 
this object would be facilitated by the employers strengthening, 
rather than by weakening, the power of the [union] executive. The 
strength of the unions and the effectiveness of their control over 
their members was, in a large measure due to the fact that [under 
the previous agreement] it was to the unions the employer must come 
if he wanted an employee, and that it was by the permit of the unions 
that the employee worked. If, as proposed by the employers, the
54 (1919) 4 Q.I.G. 435.
55 Such an award is within its wide jurisdiction over matters likely to 
cause a strike (see note 52), but compulsory unionism has been awarded 
in other circumstances against employers' opposition.
56 (1917) 2 Q.I.G. 569; 2 Q.I.G. 771; (1918) 3 Q.I.G. 10. These cases 
were based on the Court's general preference powers (see note 52) as 
were those discussed further in the text.
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employers and not the unions were empowered to nominate the workers, 
it would strike at and perhaps destroy the authority of the unions.57
The shift of emphasis foreshadox^ed by acceptance of this argument was
later given expression by the President of the Court.
I approach the question of granting preference to unionists with a 
favourable inclination, for a well-organized union, intent on ob­
taining the best conditions for the employees by peaceful methods, 
deserves every encouragement which the Court can give.^°
Subsequently he granted an application for preference, contending that the
clause would ’strengthen the hands of the union in forcing discipline, and
in preventing the disintegration and frustration of its policy by mal-
59
contents’. The other member of the Court at the time put his finger on 
the point of central concern when he explained that the Court had abandoned 
its earlier restrictive policy of insisting on proof of discrimination be­
cause ’the experience of both the Judges has been that preference is a
60
potent instrument in securing industrial peace’. Thus preference is given
’as a protection against non-unionists and in order to obtain due observance
61
of awards'. In short, the Court 'uses preference,,»as a means of en—
62
couraging unions to abide by arbitration’.
The Industrial Court’s attitude to the purposes of preference has meant 
that preference clauses have been obtained with comparative ease in Queens­
land, though the Court has usually insisted that an applicant union should
63
first have enrolled as members the bulk of employees in the industry covered. 
Almost ninety per cent (275) of the Court’s 308 awards in force at 31 December
57 (1918) 3 Q.I.G., at 223.
58 (1919) 4 Q.I.G., at 519.
59 (1920) 5 Q.I.G., at 592.
60 (1921) 6 Q.I.G., at 470.
61 (1946) 166 Qd. G.G,, at 718.
62 McCawley, J., ’Arbitration and Conciliation’, lecture notes (1924)>
9 Q.I.G., at 506.
63 See, e.g., (1921) 6 Q.I.G. 468; (1950) 35 Q.I.G. 346.
1954 included preference clauses. The great bulk of these (245) provided 
for compulsory unionism, while 25 prescribed absolute preference, and a
64
mere five gave qualified preference. Two awards without preference 
clauses contained anti-discrimination provisions. The number and proportions 
of the various types of preference clauses are set out in Table 4> and their 
terms are outlined in Appendix V.
It follows from the principles influencing the Industrial Court’s ap­
proach to preference that the main condition attached to its grant is that 
the union should settle its industrial problems through the Court and not by
direct action. The Court has repeatedly made its attitude clear on this 
65
point. Thus the attachment to six preference clauses of provisions 
threatening their cancellation in the event of strike action seems intended
66
merely to give a close warning in the case of certain strike-prone industries.
The Court’s view of preference as a means of strengthening unions’ 
disciplinary powers over their members, primarily in order to ensure com­
pliance with arbitral decisions, is subject to the condition that these
67
powers may not be used 'autocratically or unfairly'. This condition is 
not, however,specified in any award.
64 Of the 31 awards without preference or anti-discrimination clauses, 21 
covered State government employees who have been subject to compulsory 
unionism in another form (see Chapter 14)5 the preference clause in
one had been deleted for strike action; one could include no such clause 
since it was made on the application of individual employees and not of 
a union; two merely adopted Federal awards, neither of which prescribed 
preference; and one provided that the ’customary practice' of engaging 
labour be continued, probably through the union office as provided in 
an industrial agreement between the same employer and another union.
65 See Chapter 6.
66 These awards related to the meat, shearing and sugar industries.
67 (1946) 166 Qd. G.G. 717. In this case the Court amended a preference 
clause to remove an employer’s obligation to discharge men penalized by 
their union for failing to adopt a restrictive practice.
The Industrial Court has emphasized the condition of the admission of
all applicants for union membership primarily in relation to non-unionists
68
employed at the time preference is inserted in the award. No more than 
twenty-two of the preference clauses examined included open union require-
69
ments, of which nearly half applied only to non-unionists already employed.
The Court has been prepared to examine the reasonableness of union
admission fees under the Act’s requirements in relation to registration of 
70
unions. In the early stages it was common practice for the operation of
preference clauses to be made conditional on the union’s entrance fee not
71
exceeding a specified amount. But only three clauses in awards applicable
72
in 1954 were coupled with a provision of this type.
None of the preference clauses examined made provision for the exemption 
of conscientious objectors to union membership. The Industrial Court ap­
parently did not even consider the question until 1943, when it made a 
general order setting out the circumstances in which a certificate might be 
obtained exempting a person from taking out a union ticket. The Court added
that, without safeguards, the exemption of individuals from obligations im-
73
posed by preference clauses would be a 'very dangerous principle to adopt'. 
Western Australia:
There are three tribunals with power to grant preference to unionists
under Western Australian legislation: the Arbitration Court, the Western
68 SelT(l934) 19 Q.I.G. 285.
69 The Court apparently relies on the Act's requirement of reasonable faci­
lities for the admission of members to registered unions. A non-Labor 
government's provision, inserted in 1929, that preference was to operate 
only while an open union policy was maintained, was deleted by a Labor 
government.
70 I.C. & A. Acts, s.28(3)(c). See (1937) 31 Q.J.P. 28.
71 The non-Labor government's 1929 Act specified maximum admission fees and 
subscriptions for unions affected by preference; the provision was deleted 
by a Labor government.
72 For the incidence and terms of these and the other attached conditions, 
see Table 6 and Appendix V.
73 (1943) 33 Q.I.G. 1012.
Australian Coal Industry Tribunal and the Railways Classification Board.
For many years after the Arbitration Court was set up it was considered
to have no power to award preference. In 1934> however, Dwyer, J., held
74
that in a ‘proper case’ the Court could award preference to unionists. He 
found the power in the inclusion of the ’status of workers’ and the ’employ­
ment., .of any class of persons’ in the statutory definition of industrial
matters, and in the provision giving the Court general power to make rules
7$
for the peaceful conduct of an industry. Dwyer’s reasoning was subsequent-
76
1y adopted by Wolff, J., whose decision was upheld by the Supreme Court.
In the 1934 case, Dwyer granted a qualified preference clause, while 
Wolff, in 1938, awarded compulsory unionism. In a third case, decided be­
fore Wolff's decision was handed down, Dwyer had referred to the ’wide dis­
tinction between giving preference to workers of a certain class...and a
provision to prohibit the employment of persons’, and had declared that the
77
Court was powerless to award the latter. This opinion was not followed 
by Wolff; and since then a number of compulsory unionism clauses have been
74 W.A. Meat Fxport Co. v. W.A. Meat Industry Employees Union (1934), 14 
W.A.I.G. 132. An express preference power was deleted from the Bill 
which became the original W.A. arbitration measure in 1900. The Act of 
1902 included both the provisions relied upon by Dwyer in 1934> but the 
Court's President in 1903 disclaimed a preference power solely because 
of the withdrawal of the 1900 provision ((1903) 1 W.A.A.R, 125). His 
successor. Parker, J., first supported this decision ((1903) 2 W.A.A.R. 
64 and 71j, then held that 'on the whole’ preference could be awarded in 
'special circumstances' ((1905) 4 W.A.A.R. 58), and later reverted to 
his first opinion ((1905) 4 W.A.A.R. 139). Until Dwyer’s decision, 
Parker’s last opinion was accepted by the Court (e.g., (1910) 9 W.A.A.R. 
58; (1926) 6 W.A.I.G. 9).
75 Ind. Arb. Act, ss. 6(b) & (c), 94(l)(b).
76 Re Building Trades Award (1938), 18 W.A.I.G., at 530; (1938) 41 W.A.L.R. 
59. In the appeal from this decision, the Supreme Court considered only 
the question of general jurisdiction; that of the form of preference 
which could be awarded was not raised.
77 (1935) 15 W.A.I.G., at 238.
inserted in awards of the Court, most of them by consent. The question of 
whether its jurisdiction includes compulsory unionism does not appear to 
have been argued before the Arbitration Court, nor was it raised in the ap­
peal from Wolff’s decision to the Supreme Court, which dealt only with the 
question of general jurisdiction. But the matter was considered at some
length in 1953 by the Arbitration Court’s subordinate officer, the Con-
78
ciliation Commissioner. The Commissioner agreed with the employers’ con­
tention that the Supreme Court’s decision had left the matter open. On 
their argument that 'substantially similar' preference powers in the corres­
ponding Acts of the Commonwealth, New South Wales and New Zealand had been 
declared to stop short of compulsory unionism, he pointed out a difference 
between those Acts and the Western Australian measure. This was the pro­
vision giving the Arbitration Court final power to determine whether any
79
matter referred to it is an industrial dispute within its jurisdiction.
In view of a reference made in the Supreme Court to the finality of this 
80
power, the Commissioner ruled that the Arbitration Court could award com­
pulsory unionism.
The Arbitration Court does not grant disputed claims for preference as
81
a matter of course, each case being considered on its merits. Preference
will not be awarded merely to facilitate the recruitment of union members,
nor is the elimination of friction between unionists and non-unionists
82
sufficient reason for its award. But the consideration of industrial 
peace has not been ignored by the Court: it was the main ground on which 
Dwyer made the first preference award, and was referred to by Wolff in his
83
1938 decision on the matter. Preference has been granted on other grounds 
78" ' ( 1953) 33 W.A.I.G. 396.
79 Ind. Arb. Act, s.64.
80 (1938) 41 W.A.L.R., at 65.81 (1934) 14 W.A.I.G. 132; (1940) 19 W.A.I.G. 466.
82 (1951) 31 W.A.I.G. 574.
83 (1934) 14 W.A.I.G., at 133; (1938) 18 W.A.I.G., at 530.
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also. Wolff’s award of compulsory unionism in the building industry, cited 
above, was aimed at eliminating jobbing operatives whom the Court found to
S4
be undercutting standard wage rates and lowering the quality of work done.
And a preference clause was inserted in an award covering other workers in
85
the same industry in order to 'create uniformity'. However, as in the
Federal jurisdiction, proved discrimination against union members has come
to be regarded by the State Court as the major ground justifying a disputed86
grant of preference. Lack of such proof has been the chief reason advanced 
in recent years for refusing preference claims.
Over a quarter (83) of the Arbitration Court's 293 awards in force at 
31 December 1954 contained preference clauses, most of them inserted by 
consent. 30 provided for compulsory unionism, 25 for absolute preference, 
and 28 for qualified preference. A total of 14 awards without preference 
clauses contained anti-discrimination provisions. The number and proportions 
of the various types of preference clauses are set out in Table 4, and their 
terms are outlined in Appendix VI.
The Arbitration Court has not emphasized preference as a means of en­
couraging unions to abide by arbitration as has the Queensland Industrial 
Court, but a direct link between preference and industrial peace has been 
specified with much greater frequency in Western Australian than in either 
Queensland or Federal awards. A third (27) of the preference clauses 
examined included a provision directing cancellation of the clause in the
event of strike action. More than a quarter (22) of the clauses were
87
coupled with an open union requirement. None of them placed limits on
84 18 W.A.I.G., at 530.
85 (1949) 29 W.A.I.G. 348.
86 (1948) 28 W.A.I.G. 392.
87 Apart from these provisions, the Act prohibits rules which impose un­
reasonable conditions on new members or fail to provide reasonable 
facilities for their admission.
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union fees or subscriptions. Only one compulsory unionism clause provided
88
for the exemption of conscientious objectors from its requirements.
- - - 0 O 0 ------
The Western Australian Coal Industry Tribunal is empowered to settle
disputes in the State coal industry on any matter ’likely to affect the
89
amicable relations of employers and employees', a broad definition which
clearly includes preference and compulsory unionism. Four awards made by
the Tribunal were in force at 31 December 1954? each of them included a com-
90
pulsory unionism clause, to which was attached an open union requirement.
The Railways Classification Board is empowered to determine specified
matters affecting the salaried staff of the Western Australian Government
Railways, and also 'any other matter submitted by mutual consent', which
91
appears to include preference. Both of the Board's two awards in force
at 31 December 1954 prescribed absolute preference for unionists without
92
attaching any conditions.
Other Jurisdictions;
In New South Wales, the application of compulsory unionism directly by
legislation removes preference from the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction, 
The South Australian Industrial Court is expressly debarred from directing
that preference in employment should in any circumstances or manner be given
93
to either unionists or non-unionists. A similar statutory proviso is
88 See Table 6 and Appendix VI regarding conditions attached to preference 
clauses.
89 Mining Act 1904-55, s.313.
90 §e?-,Tat>les 4 and#6, and Appendix VI. . w  w  .91 Railways Classification Board Act 1920-50, s.15(2)(e)(xi). The arrange­
ment of sub.-sec. (2) is curious: the interpretation given here is the only one possible if, as it apparently considers itself to have, the
Board is to have power to award preference.
92 See Table 4 and Appendix VI.
93 Ind. Code, S.2l(l)(e). Under this provision the Court refused a claim
for a clause excluding non-unionists from entitlement to award provisions 
concerning payment for public holidays, annual leave and sick leave: the 
0°urt tae union advocate's admission that this was a 'straight out
attempt to get preference': (1949) 23 S.A.I.R. 3 5 4 . A Federal award 
includes a clause of this type: see Appendix IV.
94
applicable to the powers of wages boards in Victoria, There is no express 
prohibition against Tasmanian wages boards dealing with preference to union­
ists, but the State Crown Solicitor has expressed the opinion that no such
95
power can be implied from the terms of the Wages Boards Act. There are 
no preference clauses in Tasmanian determinations.
The Queensland Comparison:
One of the most striking features of the incidence of preference 
clauses awarded by industrial tribunals is the contrast between their oc­
currence in the awards of the Queensland Industrial Court and in those of 
the main Federal and Western Australian tribunals. As Table 4 shows, the 
contrast is marked not only in relation to the incidence of all types of 
preference clause, but also in relation to the proportion of clauses that 
prescribe compulsory unionism.
This contrast seems to stem largely from the different ways in which 
the various tribunals have approached the question of preference when its 
grant is opposed by employers. The Federal tribunal and, by and large, that 
of Western Australia have relied primarily on proof of discrimination against 
unionists as a ground for awarding a disputed claim for preference. The 
rarity with which this ground has been held to support such an award testi­
fies to its weakness from the union viewpoint. The Queensland Court's early 
abandonment of discrimination as the pre-eminent ground has resulted in an 
approach more favourable to union aims.
In the first case, the approach is negative: preference should 'only
96
be granted when the conduct of the employers justifies' such action,
94 Lab. & Ind. Act, s.30(l).
95 This opinion is supported by a legally-qualified student of industrial 
law: Foenander, Better Employment Relations, 125n.
96 (1923) 18 C.A.R., at 1217 (my emphasis). The judge added, somewhat para­
doxically, that preference must also 'be earned by a union before it 
should be granted': it is, on this view, something for which unions must 
pay in^advance, without the certainty of a return, whereas on the Queens-
7iew ,\see text below) payment is made after the grant. See also,\ 1931 / 3C • A. R*, at 111«
P re fe ren ce  i s  viewed p r im a rily  as a means o f en ab lin g  th e  t r ib u n a l  to  'p ro te c t
men in  t h e i r  e x e rc is e  o f t h e i r  r ig h t  as f r e e  men to  combine fo r  t h e i r  m utual 
97
b e n e f i t '  -  in  o th e r  words, as a means o f  p ro te c t in g  un ions a g a in s t  an un­
f a i r  p r a c t ic e .  By i t s  adop tion  o f t h i s  view , as  a  P re s id e n t o f th e  Queens­
lan d  C ourt p o in ted  o u t, th e  F ed e ra l t r ib u n a l  may be tak en  to  're g a rd  th e
98
argum ents a g a in s t  p re fe re n ce  as th e  s t r o n g e r '.
In  th e  second c a se , th e  approach i s  p o s i t iv e :  p re fe re n c e  i s  g ran ted  in
o rd e r to  'en co u rag e ' un ions to  co n tinue  to  r e s o r t  to  a r b i t r a t i o n .  I t  i s ,  on
th e  one hand, a p r iv i le g e  which a union may lo se  by r e s o r t in g  to  d i r e c t
a c t io n ,  and, on th e  o th e r  hand, a d is c ip l in a r y  weapon which th e  union  can
use to  ensure  th a t  i t s  members ab ide  by a r b i t r a t i o n  -  ' t h e  union o rg an ize r
f in d s  h is  ta sk  of o rg an iz in g  s im p lif ie d , and th e  governing  o f f i c i a l s  a re
99
a ided  in  th e  c o n tro l of t h e i r  mem bers'. P re fe ren ce  i s  viewed l e s s  as  a 
p ro te c t iv e  d ev ice  th an  as  a means of o b ta in in g  th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f c e r ta in  
p o l ic ie s  by th e  un ions. H ere, th e  g en era l argument f o r  p re fe re n ce  c a r r ie s  
g r e a te s t  w eigh t, and th e  p r o b a b i l i ty  o f a d isp u te d  c la im  f o r  p re fe ren ce  
being  g ran ted  i s  enhanced because th e  t r ib u n a l  i s  concerned m ainly w ith  th e  
fu tu re  behav iour o f  employees r a th e r  than  th e  p a s t  behav iou r of em ployers.
A part from th e  form al approach of t r ib u n a ls ,  a f a c to r  o f some im­
p o rtan ce  in  ex p la in in g  th e  high p ro p o rtio n  of Queensland p re fe re n ce  c la u se s
seems to  have been th e  in f lu e n c e  ex e rted  by S ta te  Labor governments on th e
100
I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt. T his q u estio n  i s  d iscu ssed  in  a l a t e r  c h a p te r .
97 (1913) 7 C .A .R ., a t  233.
98 McCawley, J . ,  'A r b i t r a t io n  and C o n c i l ia t io n ',  l e c tu r e  n o te s  (1924) > 
9 Q .I .G ., a t  506.
99 Ib id .
100 See C hapter 14.
3. Formal Agreements
Legally-enforceable agreements may be filed or certified under legis-
1
lation in the Commonwealth and all States except Victoria and Tasmania.
No question of statutory jurisdiction is involved in making these agreements
2
(provided they do not offend against public policy), and they may contain 
terms which the relevant tribunal has no power to insert in its awards. 
Moreover, because they are concluded through negotiation between employers 
and unions, the reason for the inclusion of preference clauses in them is 
largely irrelevant for present purposes - except in so far as the policies 
of industrial tribunals exert some influence, a point that is discussed 
below.
The extent to which preference clauses have been embodied in formal 
agreements, the terms in which they have been framed and the conditions ex­
pressly attached to them are set out in Table 5 and in the appropriate 
3
Appendices. Industrial agreements filed under the New South Wales Indus­
trial Arbitration Act are excluded from consideration because the compulsory 
unionism provisions of the Act apply equally to employees covered by such 
agreements as to those covered by State awards. On the other hand, agree­
ments certified by the Commonwealth Arbitration Commission are dealt with 
in the present category as if they corresponded to State industrial agree­
ments. In fact, if not formally, they are closer to the consent awards into 
which similar agreements reached in conciliation proceedings are invariably 
converted in the State jurisdictions. The terms of legally-enforceable in­
dustrial agreements in the Federal jurisdiction, as was shown in an earlier
1 See Chapter 5.
2 McWilliam, ’Compulsory Unionism in Australia’ (1950), 23 Australian Law 
Journal, at 600.
3 Cwealth, Appendix IV; Qd., Appendix V ; W.A. Appendix VI; S.A. Appendix 
VII.
1.P6
chapter, are so limited that they cannot include preference clauses.
---  - 0O0 ------
From the analysis of formal agreements set out in Table 5 it is evident 
that there is a rough correlation between the incidence of preference clauses 
in these agreements and their incidence in the awards of relevant industrial 
tribunals. In each jurisdiction the proportion of agreements with prefer­
ence clauses is higher than the corresponding proportion of awards. But, 
as shown in Table 7, the variations in the proportions of such agreements, 
as between the different jurisdictions, broadly follow the corresponding 
award variations. A similar pattern is evident in the type of preference 
prescribed, the formal agreements tending to include a higher proportion 
of the stronger preferenee-forms.
These correlations suggest that the readiness of the appropriate in­
dustrial tribunal to award preference is in some measure reflected in the
4
readiness of employers to agree to give preference to unionists. In this
connection, it is appropriate to note the industrial agreements which are
filed under the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Act but deal with in-
5
dustrial conditions in general. They are the only published collective 
agreements that are not enforceable at law. As shown in Table 7, the in­
cidence and character of preference clauses in them exhibit the same cor­
relation as in the case of legally-enforceable agreements. This argument, 
of course, can be carried too far if it is overlooked that strong unions are 
often able to force employers to give preference to their members irrespec­
tive of the policy of the appropriate industrial tribunal.
4 As has been noted previously, most preference clauses in Federal and 
Western Australian awards at least have been inserted by consent. This 
should be taken into account, but it does not appear to affect materially 
the conclusion suggested in the text.
$ See Table 5.
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CHAPTER 8
INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND STATE INTERVENTION
There i s  w ith in  an a s s o c ia t io n  such as a tra d e  union a r e p e t i t io n  of 
the  f a m il ia r  two-pronged p ro cess  of government, law-making and law -en fo rc in g . 
The f i r s t  i s  a m atte r o f making and amending r u le s  governing th e  conduct of 
th e  u n io n ’s a f f a i r s  and th e  r ig h ts  and d u tie s  of i t s  members; th e  second a 
m a tte r  of ad m in is te r in g  or app ly ing  those  r u le s .  These fu n c tio n s  a re  n o t 
always ’ i n t e r n a l 1 in  th e  sense th a t  they  a f f e c t  only members, though in  
most cases  t h e i r  d i r e c t  e f f e c t  i s  l im ite d  in  th i s  way.^ They a re  ’ i n t e r n a l ’ , 
however, in  th e  sense t h a t ,  sav ing  the  su p e r io r  law of th e  s t a t e ,  they  a re  
fu n c tio n s  c a r r ie d  out s o le ly  through bodies s e t  up by and w ith in  th e  un ion .
The s t a t e  in  A u s tra l ia  has concerned i t s e l f  w ith  in te r n a l  tra d e  union 
fu n c tio n s  to  an in c re a s in g  e x te n t .  On th e  one hand, i t s  concern has been 
r e f le c te d  in  th e  ju d i c i a l  developm ent of the  law r e la t in g  to  v o lu n ta ry  a s ­
s o c ia tio n s  in  g e n e ra l, a developm ent t h a t  i s  in  la rg e  measure a p ro d u c t of 
p o l ic ie s  o r ig in a l ly  e s ta b lis h e d  by E ng lish  c o u r ts .  On th e  o th er hand, and 
more im portan t, th i s  concern has been r e f le c te d  in  a growing in c l in a t io n  to  
re g u la te  th e  in te r n a l  a f f a i r s  of unions by le g i s l a t i o n .
The p r in c ip le s  developed by th e  c o u r ts  as p a r t  of th e  law of v o lu n ta ry  
a s s o c ia tio n s  a re  in  A u s tra lia  p r im a r i ly  a p p lic a b le  to  unions r e g is te r e d  
under l e g i s l a t i o n  m odelled on th e  E n g lish  Trade Union Act of 1871, and sub ­
sequen t amendments, and to  unions which a re  no t r e g is te r e d  a t  a l l .  By 
c o n t r a s t ,  l e g i s l a t i v e in te rv e n tio n  in  union in te r n a l  a f f a i r s  has been main­
ly ,  b u t n o t e x c lu s iv e ly , d ire c te d  a t  un ions r e g is te r e d  under l e g i s l a t i o n
1 The main excep tions r e l a t e  to  ru le s  d e a lin g  w ith  adm ission to  membership 
which, of co u rse , d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  non-members.
2
providing for compulsory industrial arbitration.
Measures on the lines of the English Trade Union Act have been enacted
in all Australian States, the Commonwealth having no power to do so. In
Victoria and Tasmania, as we have seen, these are the only State measures
under which unions can register. But in the other four States, as in the
Commonwealth, unions may register under industrial arbitration legislation.
In Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia a union may register
under both the relevant industrial arbitration Act and the relevant trade
3
union Act, or it may register under only one of these measures. In New 
South Wales, however, registration under the Trade Union Act is a prere­
quisite for registration under the State's Industrial Arbitration Act. For 
the sake of convenience in the following discussion, use of the term 'trade 
union' is restricted to unions which are either unregistered or are re­
gistered only under a State trade union Act; the term 'industrial union' is 
reserved for unions registered under industrial arbitration measures, most
4
of which use the term in this way.
1. Rule-making
British courts have traditionally viewed the constitution and rules of 
the trade union as forming the terms of the contract to which each member, 
of his own free will, becomes a party at the time he takes up member—
2 It is chiefly in N.S.W., where a union registered in this way must also 
be registered under the State Trade Union Act, that legislative inter­
vention in this field is applicable to unions other than those registered 
under industrial arbitration measures.
3 Though there is no legal requirement in Qd. that an industrial union 
should first be registered as a trade union, it has been claimed that as 
a matter of practice a requirement of this sort operates: Building 
Workers Industrial Union (Qd. Branch), circular letter, 13/9/1957, 6.
4 These terms are used here in a strictly legal sense and have nothing to 
do with the nature of union organization, i.e., with whether it is 
carried out on an industry or craft basis.
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ship. Australian courts have followed this view, which places trade 
unions on the same plane as voluntary associations in general.
Regarded as a contract freely entered into, trade union rules are 
subject to court supervision only to the extent that they are unlawful in 
general terms or, more particularly, to the extent that their contents go 
beyond the matters which a union is permitted by statute to include in its 
rules* In such circumstances the courts may disallow rules* The courts
also have what amounts to a restricted ability to alter trade union rules.
6
This is found in their common law power to intervene, given jurisdiction,
in the internal affairs of voluntary associations by requiring that the
decisions of domestic tribunals should be reached in accordance with the7
principles of natural justice. A requirement of this kind involves an 
implicit addition to rules which do not expressly include such principles.
Under the State trade union Acts, as under the corresponding English
measure, registered trade unions are required to provide for certain
enumerated matters in their rules, to keep certain records, and to make
returns on specified matters to appropriate government officers - require-
8
ments that constitute implicit additions to the unions» roles. The crdi-
9
nary courts are given no special powers in this connection. But they have
5 See, e.g., Lord Atkinson, Amalg»d Society of Carpenters. Cabinet Makers 
& Joiners v. Braithwaite, D922J 2 A.C., at 445. There are signs that 
widespread operation of compulsory unionism policies may be leading to 
some modification of this view: see Denning & Römer, L. JJ., Lee v. 
.Showmen »s Guild of Great Britain. [1952] 1 All E.R. at 1181, 1188; and 
Denning, L.J., Bonsor v. Musicians» Union. [1954] 1 All E.R., at 826, 838,
6 This question is discussed below in section 2 of this chapter.
7 The principles involved are primarily that the member knows the charge 
he has to answer; that he is given a proper opportunity of defending 
himself and a fair hearing; and that the decision arrived at is an honest 
one: see Citrine, Trade Union Law. 214ff.
8 See Appendix VIII.
9 But in N.S*W* the Industrial Commission has such powers: see Appendix 
VIII.
exercised their general power of statutory interpretation (noted above) to 
hold that the terms of these measures preclude trade union rules from deal­
ing with certain matters. This question has arisen in its most important 
form in relation to rules authorizing a union to expend funds for political
purposes. The key decision is that handed down by the House of Lords in the 
10
Osborne Case. A majority of the law lords ruled that the statutory defi­
nition of a trade union given in the Trade Union Act of 1871 was restrictive 
and that it therefore prevented a registered trade union from having rules
allowing it to contribute to political activities. This interpretation was
11
later applied also to the rule-making powers of unregistered trade unions.
The principle of ultra vires the statute, propounded in the Osborne
Case, has been adopted by Australian courts in relation to registered trade 
12
unions. But only in New South Wales and Queensland has legislation been 
enacted, after the pattern of the English Trade Union Act of 1913> expressly 
permitting trade unions to make provision in their rules for any lawful
13
matter, including expenditure of funds for political purposes. In all 
other States, therefore, it appears that registered trade unions are liable 
to application of the principle that political provisions are beyond their
14
rule-making powers.
----- o O o -----
10 Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne, 0910] A.C. 87.
11 Wilson v. Scottish Typographical Association, [19lä S.C. 534.
12 O'Sullivan V. Finch. 11914] ITr. Y n .S.WJ 279; Allen v. Gorton (1918),
18 S.R. (N.S.W.) 202; True v. Aust'n Coal & Shale Employees Fed'n (1949), 
51 W.A.L.R. 73» These cases, as was the Osborne Case, were preceded by 
contrary decisions in both Australian and British courts: 09023 A.R. 
(N.S.W.) 16; 0907] 1 K.B. 361.
13 See Appendix VIII. These provisions apply to all trade unions in Qd., 
but only to registered trade unions in N.S.W.
14 This apparently applies equally to unions with double registration 
since registration as an industrial union does not alter the character 
of a trade union: 0951] A.R. (N.S.W.) 100; (1949) 51 W.A.L.R. 73.
I n d u s t r ia l  un ions in  most o f the  re le v a n t ju r i s d ic t io n s  a re  re q u ire d ,
as  a c o n d itio n  o f r e g i s t r a t i o n ,  to  have ru le s  p ro v id in g  f o r  c e r ta in  m a tte rs
which a re  u s u a l ly  l a i d  down in  co n sid e rab ly  g re a te r  d e t a i l  than  the c o rre s -
15
ponding requ irem en ts  a p p lic ab le  to  r e g is te r e d  tra d e  u n io n s . This i s  a lso  
th e  case w ith  s ta tu to r y  d ire c t io n s  about the  p re s e rv a tio n  o f s p e c if ie d  re ­
cords and th e  making o f re tu rn s  on c e r ta in  m a tte rs  to  government o f f i c e r s ,  
which s im i la r ly  c o n s t i tu te  im p l ic i t  a d d itio n s  to  the  ru le s  o f in d u s t r ia l
u n io n s . But such a d d itio n s  to  i n d u s t r i a l  u n io n s ’ ru le s  do not s to p  sh o r t
16
a t  th i s  p o in t  as th ey  do in  r e l a t io n  to  tra d e  u n io n s . Most re le v a n t
l e g i s l a t i o n  la y s  down term s o f adm ission and re s ig n a tio n  fo r  union members,
p ro v id es  f o r  union  e le c t io n s  to  be conducted by government o f f ic e r s  in
c e r ta in  c ircu m stan ces , s p e c i f ie s  m a tte rs  on which and ways in  which b a l lo ts
o f union op in ion  a re  to  be conducted, and, in  New South W ales, s e ts  out the
17
procedure to  be fo llow ed when e x p e llin g  a union member. A part from t h i s ,  
in d u s t r i a l  un ions in  a l l  ju r i s d ic t io n s  may make ru le s  p ro v id ing  fo r  any 
o th e r m a tte rs  ’n o tc o n tra ry  to  law ’ .
The s ta tu to r y  'n o t  c o n tra ry  to  law ’ form ula has p rov ided  the b a s is  fo r  
the  A u s tra lia n  c o u r ts ' adop tion  o f a d o c tr in e  o f im plied  powers in  r e la t io n  
to  th e  ru le-m aking  a b i l i t y  of i n d u s t r i a l  unions -  a d o c tr in e  th a t  i s  d i r e c t ­
ly  c o n tra ry  to  the  p r in c ip le s  l a id  down in  the  Osborne Case in  r e l a t io n  to  
18
tra d e  u n io n s . With one e x ce p tio n , i t  has been h e ld  th a t  the  ru le s  o f an
19
in d u s t r i a l  un ion  may p ro p e rly  d ea l w ith  p o l i t i c a l  and re la te d  m a tte rs .
15 See Appendix VIII.
16 Registered trade unions in N.S.W. are excepted from th is generalization  
since most of the following requirements, applicable to State industrial 
unions, are equally applicable to them.
17 See Appendix VIII.
18 See R.M. Martin, 'Legal Personality and the Trade Union’ , in Legal 
Personality and P o lit ica l Pluralism (L.C. Webb, e d .) , for a detailed  
discussion of th is point.
19 Aust’n Workers Union v . Coles. [1917] V.L.R. 332; [1930] V.L.R. 130; 
Aust'n Railways Union v. National Union of Railwaymen (1933)> 32 C.A.R. 
TOV" ( ,l938j"39'"n:A‘.Tr: 319; (T947) 58 'C.AX 98; (1948) 61 C.A.R. 726.
The exception was a decision by the Supreme Court of Western Australia, in
which the Court held that the power to impose a levy for political purposes
1 appears foreign to the principle of operating a system of industrial ar-
20
bitration' and was therefore outside an industrial union’s competence.
Most of the existing Australian precedents are against acceptance of this
view in the other jurisdictions where no express statutory power to have
21
political rules is conferred on industrial unions.
Again, by contrast with trade unions, court supervision of the indus­
trial union’s rule-making powers do not end at this point. Not only are the 
statutory requirements affecting alterations to the registered rules of an 
industrial union usually more detailed, but the Federal and Western Austral­
ian industrial tribunals have extensive power to disallow or alter such
rules, the Industrial Commission of New South Wales having a similar though
22
more limited ability. In addition, the power of all the main industrial
20 True’s Case, supra (1949), 51 W.A.L.R. 73« In an earlier N.S.W. case it 
was held that a registered trade union’s powers in this respect were not 
enlarged by its registration also under the State Industrial Arbitration 
Act: 0’Sullivan v. Finch, [l914] A.R. (N.S.W.) 270. But this case is 
not strictly comparable with True * s Case. since the N.S.W. Act at that 
time did not include the 'not contrary to law' rule-making formula as 
did the Act of W.A. On the other hand, under the corresponding New Zea­
land measure including this formula, the principles of the Osborne Case 
have been consistently applied to industrial unions: see Auckland Freez­
ing Works Industrial Union v. N.Z. Freezing Works Industrial Ass’n ,
D951J N.Z.L.R. 341; a lso  see , (1913) 16 G.L.R. 309 and [1917] N.Z.L.R. 
829.
21 The Federal Minister for Labour's announcement that he was considering 
legislation similar to the N.S.W. provisions was the result of an inten­
tion to protect unionists who refuse to contribute to political funds
as does the N.S.W* measure: see 1957 C’wealth Pari. Debs. (1st series), 
990-1j also, Sydney Morning Herald. 21/4/1958. There is no need to give 
Federal unions express statutory power to make political rules.
22 See Appendix VIII. The N.S.W. power applies also to registered trade 
unions. The Federal disallowance power has been used, for example, 
against rules specifying offences and penalties with insufficient pre­
cision (56 C.A.R. 561), giving a union executive 'general and unfettered’ 
power to disband branches (56 C.A.R. 347), failing to give an internal 
right of appeal against disciplinary action (31 C.A.R. 401), threatening 
expulsion for divulging union business (39 C.A.R. 322). and requiring 
members to give reasons for resignation (39 C.A.R. 326;.
tribunals to deregister industrial unions is conferred in terms which enable 
them to exercise it whenever they consider any of a union's rules suffic-
23
iently objectionable.
2. Rule-Enforcing
The ordinary courts in Australia have no express statutory powers to
1
enforce the rules of either registered or unregistered trade unions. Their 
jurisdiction in this field, like that of the English courts, is therefore 
a product of the policies they have adopted in relation to voluntary as­
sociations in general. The body of law developed in this way has arisen 
chiefly from decisions given in cases involving expulsions from membership.
The courts have customarily avowed reluctance to interfere with the2
internal management of voluntary associations. But in recent years there 
has been a trend towards adapting the traditional principles determining 
the courts' jurisdiction in this field in a way that enables a mare flexible 
approach to the problems involved. Before discussing recent developments, 
the basic principles which have been affected may be outlined briefly and 
in simplified form.
When individuals come together in a voluntary association, such as a
trade union, they enter into a series of contracts with each other, the
terms of which are found in the association's rules. A member is therefore
entitled to appeal to the courts to remedy a breach of the rules under the
ordinary law of contract. Technically, the remedies available to him fall
23 See Appendix VIII. By contrast, a trade union may be deregistered only 
where one of its purposes, embodied in its rules, is unlawful.
1 But in N.S.W. the State industrial tribunal is empowered to enforce re­
gistered trade unions' rules: see Appendix VIII. This power is dis­
cussed below in relation to State industrial unions.
2 Dawkins v. Antrobus (1881), 17 Ch.D. 615; Cameron v. Hogan (1934)?
$1 C.L.R. 358.
in to  two c a te g o r ie s , common law and eq u ity . His only common law remedy
4
i s  an action  fo r  damages. As the law stood u n t i l  recen tly , th is  course
posed considerable procedural d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  the case o f members of trade
unions, and probably s t i l l  does so fa r  as members o f most other voluntary
5
a sso c ia tio n s  are concerned. N evertheless, given the ex isten ce  o f ru les  
c o n stitu tin g  the necessary contractual b asis of th e ir  ju r isd ic t io n , the 
courts could in ter fere  with the d ec isio n  of an a sso c ia tio n  to the ex ten t 
th at i t  was su scep tib le  to  an award o f damages. On the other hand, qu ite  
apart from the procedural d i f f i c u l t i e s  of a common lav; action  fo r  damages, 
members o f a sso c ia tio n s  are u su a lly  more concerned w ith obtaining other  
remedies which are not ava ila b le  at common law. For th is  reason, equ ity
3
3 Common law and e q u ity  were ad m in is tered  by sep a ra te  co u rts  in  England up 
to  1875, when th e  two ju r i s d ic t io n s  were ’fu s e d ’ w ith  the  e f f e c t  th a t  
the  one c o u rt could prov ide the  rem edies a v a ila b le  in  both cases and 
could do so in  a s in g le  h e a r in g . This system , which has s in ce  been ap­
p lie d  in  the A u s tra lia n  S ta te s  though w ith  some m o d ifica tio n  in  N.S.W ., 
does n o t in  p r in c ip le  absolve the  c o u rts  from dec id in g  in  a p a r t i c u la r  
case w hether a common law o r an e q u ita b le  remedy i s  a v a ila b le .
4 In  c e r ta in  c ircum stances where th e  members of an a s s o c ia tio n  are  regarded  
as jo in t  owners of the  a s s o c ia t io n ’s p ro p e rty  th e y  have ap p ro p ria te  
common law rem edies to  p ro te c t  t h e i r  share of the  p ro p e rty , b u t th e se  
u s u a lly  involve s a le  o f the  p ro p e rty  and d i s t r ib u t io n  of the  p ro ceed s,
a r e s u l t  which i s  n o t norm ally  a member’s aim.
5 The member of a v o lu n ta ry  a s s o c ia t io n  may n o t only  f in d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  
prove any s p e c if ic  f in a n c ia l  lo s s  on which damages may be based , bu t
he i s  i n i t i a l l y  faced  w ith  the  problem o f how to  p roceed . In  th e  f i r s t  
p lace  he has to  b rin g  the  a c tio n  a g a in s t  each in d iv id u a l member of the  
a s s o c ia t io n  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  the  b reach , and i f  a dom estic t r i b u n a l ’s 
d e c is io n  c o n s t i tu te s  the  breach  i t  may be d i f f i c u l t  to  shov; i t  was 
a u th o rized  by the  o th e r  members. As to  the  d i f f i c u l t y  fa c in g  re p re se n t­
a t iv e  a c tio n s  in  such c ircu m stan ces , see R.M. M artin , ’Legal P e rs o n a lity  
and the Trade Union’ in  Legal P e rs o n a lity  and P o l i t i c a l  P lu ra lism  (ed. 
L.C. Webb). I f  i t  was no t so a u th o riz e d , then  the  d e c is io n  i s  a vo id  
a c t  and no damages can be g iven  because the p l a i n t i f f  i s  unable to  show 
an e f f e c t iv e  breach  o f c o n tra c t  by anyone: see Edgar v . Meade (1916),
23 C.L.R. 29. The p ro ced u ra l d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  v o lu n ta ry  a s s o c ia tio n s  in  
g en e ra l were shown in  a tra d e  union  case : K elly  v . N ational S o c ie ty  of 
O perative P r in te r s  A ss is ta n ts  (1915), 84 L .J.K .B . 2236. But th e se  d i f ­
f i c u l t i e s  have s in ce  been re so lv ed  in  r e la t io n  to  tra d e  unions a t  l e a s t  
by Bonsor v . M usicians Union, I1 9 5 5 j 3 A ll E.R. 518: see C hapter 9 
below. ~ ~
p ro v id es  more u s e fu l  rem edies. These are  the  d e c la ra t io n  -  s ta t in g ,  f o r
example, t h a t  a w rongfu lly  e x p e lled  member i s  s t i l l  a member -  and the
in ju n c tio n  r e s t r a in in g  an un law fu l a c t ,  such as a breach  of the  c o n tra c t
found in  the  ru le s  of an a s s o c ia t io n .  The d i f f i c u l t y  in  th i s  case was th a t
the  c o u rts  doubted t h e i r  ju r i s d ic t io n  to  g ra n t e i t h e r  remedy m erely on the
b a s is  of a breach  o f c o n tra c t .  Thus th ey  in s i s t e d  t h a t  th ey  would in te rv en e
a t  the  in s ta n ce  o f a p r iv a te  member a lle g in g  w ro n |fu l ex p u lsion  only  i f  h is
membership e n t i t l e d  him to  a ‘ r ig h t  o f p ro p e r ty ’ . A wide in te r p r e ta t io n
has been g iven  to  the  n o tio n  o f p ro p e r ty . I t  in c lu d e s , f o r  in s ta n c e , the
7
r ig h t  to  b e n e f i ts  from an a s s o c ia t io n ’ s fun d s, the  r i g h t  to  vote in  e le c -
8
t io n s  f o r  o f f ic e r s  o f an a s s o c ia t io n , and even the  r ig h t  to  share  in  an
9
a s s o c ia t io n ’s a s s e ts  on d is s o lu t io n .  D espite  i t s  wide in te r p r e ta t io n  th e  
n o tio n  has l im ite d  the  c o u r ts ’ a b i l i t y  to  in te rv e n e  in  the  a f f a i r s  o f vo­
lu n ta ry  a s s o c ia t io n s .
The in s is te n c e  on th e  e x is te n c e  o f a p ro p e rty  r ig h t  le ad s  n a tu r a l ly  to
the  co n c lusion  th a t  th e  co u rts  cannot e n te r ta in  an a c tio n  brought a g a in s t
10
an a s s o c ia t io n  which has no p ro p e r ty . However, t h i s  conclusion  and the
prem ise on which i t  i s  founded were im p lied ly  d isp u te d  in  the  re c e n t Abbott 
11
v . S u ll iv a n . a case th a t  seems to  re p re se n t a r a d ic a l  development in  the
6 Rigby v . Connol (1880), 14 Ch.D., a t  487.
7 C arpen ters ' C ase, su p ra , [1922] A.C. a t  448* Agreements fo r  the  p ro v i­
s io n  o f b e n e f i ts  are  n o t d i r e c t l y  en fo rceab le  under A u s tra lian  and 
B r i t i s h  tra d e  union Acts (see Appendix V I I I ) , bu t th i s  does n o t p re v e n t 
such agreem ents form ing the  b a s is  o f ju r i s d ic t io n  fo r  a d e c la ra t io n  
t h a t ,  e . g . ,  an ex p u lsio n  i s  in v a l id :  C a rp en te rs ’ Case, su p ra , 440; 
Amalg’d S o c ie ty  o f Engineers v . Smith (1913V, 16 C. L. R. 537; H iggins v . 
A u st'n  Government Workers A ss1 n , tl92 l] S .A .S .R . 378.
8 Pender v . Lushington (1877), 6 Ch.D. 70; E n g in ee rs’ Case, su p ra , 16 
C.L.R. 537.
9 S tr ic k  v . Swansea Tin P la te  Co. (1887), 36 Ch.D. 558.
10 B aird v . W ells (1890), 44 Ch.D. 661; Graham v . S in c la i r  (1918), 18 S.R . 
(N.S.W.) 75.
11 [1952] 1 A ll E .R . 226.
? ( '  C,
judicial position. The plaintiff had been struck off the register of corn- 
porters in the Port of London by a committee that had for some time operated 
for the purpose of controlling the register and protecting cornporters' in­
terests, The committee was not part of the formal machinery of the trade 
union to which comporters belonged, and no cause of action was shown 
against the union itself. The committee had no constitution or rules and 
was unable to own property. The plaintiff's exclusion from the cornporters' 
register therefore infringed no property right, and his right to work as a 
cornporter, which was so infringed, was not regarded as a property right:
'The right of a man to work is just as important to him as,.,his rights of 
12
property'. Denning, L.J., a member of the Court of Appeal in this case,
was later to cite it as establishing that the courts' jurisdiction, what-
13
ever the remedy sought, was founded on contract and not property. Yet a 
majority of the Court (with Denning dissenting) not only found that there 
was no express or implied contract on which a claim for damages could rest, 
but, it seems, were uncertain that a contract could be implied to support 
the Court's jurisdiction in relation to other remedies. Thus, one of the 
majority, Morris, L.J., after citing with approval an opinion expressed 
forty years earlier that there were rights outside property which the courts
U
should protect in cases of exclusion from voluntary associations, held 
that the Court was entitled to intervene on this basis and remarked that as
12 Per Denning, L.J., ibid., at 234-
13 Lee v. Showmens Guild of Great Britain, [1952] 1 All E.R., at 1180. See 
also Ford, 'The Use of the Injunction to Restrain Wrongful Expulsion 
from Voluntary Associations' (1954) 1 Sydney Law Review, at 197. For an 
argument advanced before Abbott's Case that the courts, if hesitantly, 
were moving towards adoption of this principle, see Lloyd, 'The Dis­
ciplinary Powers of Professional Bodies' (1950), 13 Modern Law Review, 
at 288ff.
14 Per Fletcher Moulton, L.J., Osborne v. Amalg'd Society of Railway 
Servants, fl91 {J 1 Ch.D., at 562.
a result, ’No need arises to explore whether the jurisdiction of the court
15
could alternatively be founded on some contractual basis’.
The importance of the majority decision in Abbott's Case was that it 
seemed to imply that there was no reason why the courts should not intervene 
by way of a declaration (one having been made in the lower court) and, 
possibly, an injunction on the basis of a jurisdiction related to rights 
other than rights of either property or contract. This at least was the
16
construction placed on the decision by Pilcher, J., in Davis v. Carew-Pole. 
in which the same vital point was involved — absence of a property right. 
Pilcher ruled that the Court could interfere with a domestic tribunal’s 
disciplinary decision by way of declaration and injunction despite the lack 
of a property right and, further, despite the lack of^contractual link be­
tween the tribunal and the plaintiff. Moreover, he suggested that even if, 
in the absence of a property right, a contractual relationship was required
as a basis for jurisdiction, such a relationship was implied once the plain-
17
tiff had submitted to the domestic tribunal’s jurisdiction. This opinion
not only supported Denning’s view as to the contractual rather than the
proprietary basis of the courts’ jurisdiction, but also extended the notion
*
of an implied contract.
If the line of development opened up by Abbot’s Case is followed, it 
may be that persons affected by decisions of domestic tribunals need at 
most show only the existence of a contractual relationship (which may be 
created simply by submitting to the tribunal's jurisdiction) in order to 
invoke the courts’ intervention. At the least, they may have to show only
15 Abbott’s Case, supra, at 238-9.
16 I1956J 2 All E.R. 524, at 529.
17 Ibid., at 530. This relationship, he thought, could support a declara­
tion, injunction or damages. He distinguished Abbott’s Case in the 
latter respect on the ground that there the plaintiff had refused to 
accept the domestic tribunal’s jurisdiction.
t h a t  th e  t r i b u n a l 's  d e c is io n  has in f r in g e d  some s u b s ta n t ia l  i n t e r e s t ,  such 
as d e p riv in g  them of the  r ig h t  to  work in  a p a r t i c u la r  c a l l in g  -  a c o n sid e r­
a t io n  o f p a r t i c u l a r  im portance in  r e la t io n  to  tra d e  u n io n s . In  e i t h e r  c ase ,
p ro p e rty  r ig h ts  w i l l  be re le v a n t  n o t to  th e  q u e s tio n  of ju r i s d ic t io n  b u t
18
to  'th e  form of rem edy '.
In  A u s t r a l ia ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, the  High Court has n o t y e t  m odified  
th e  p r in c ip le  t h a t ,  so f a r  as the rem edies o f d e c la ra t io n  and in ju n c tio n  a re  
concerned, i t  w i l l  take  account o f a breach of c o n tra c t  r e la t in g  to  member­
sh ip  o f a v o lu n ta ry  a s s o c ia t io n  only  in  o rd e r to  p ro te c t  a r ig h t  of p ro -
19
p e r ty  -  though by i t s  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  term 'c i v i l  r i g h t ' ,  used  in
th i s  co n n ec tio n , the  Court does appear to  have gone beyond 'p ro p e r ty ' in  
20
the  s t r i c t  sen se . The Court re -a ff irm e d  th i s  p o lic y  in  the  le ad in g  case
of Cameron v . Hogan, bu t i t  i s  a rguab le  th a t  the  d e f in i t io n  given th e re  of
the  a s s o c ia tio n s  to  which th e  p o lic y  a p p lie s  i s  open to  an in te r p r e ta t io n
21
exclud ing  tra d e  u n io n s .
Given ju r i s d ic t io n  to  e n te r ta in  a c tio n s  brought by members o f v o lu n ta ry
a s s o c ia t io n s ,  th e  c o u rts  th en  face  th e  q u e s tio n  o f the  p r in c ip le s  on which
22
th ey  may in te r f e r e  w ith  an a s s o c ia t io n 's  in te r n a l  management. Again, 
t h i s  q u e s tio n  has a r is e n  most f r e q u e n tly  in  ex p u lsion  c a se s . Both E n g lish  
and A u s tra lia n  c o u rts  have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  emphasized th a t  th ey  have no power
18 Lee's Case, supra. at 1180.
19 Macqueen v. Frackleton (1909), 8 C.L.R., at 697; in relation sp ec ific a lly  
to a trade union, see Webster v . Bread Carters' Union (1930), 30 S.R. 
(N.S.W.) 267.
20 See Ford, op. c i t . ,  200.
21 'They are for the most part bodies of persons who have combined to 
further some common end or in terest, which is  soc ia l, sporting, p o lit ic a l  
sc ie n t if ic , relig iou s, a r tis t ic  or humanitarian in character, or other­
wise stands apart from private gain and material advantage’ : per Rich, 
Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan, JJ ., (1934) 51 C.L.R*, at 370-1, 378.
22 For a f u l l  discussion of th is question, see Martin, op. c i t .
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to  review  th e  f a c ts  le ad in g  to  an ex p u lsio n  and so to  determ ine the  c o r re c t­
ness o f  th e  dom estic t r i b u n a l ’s d e c is io n : they  may examine the d e c is io n  only
to  determ ine w hether i t  has been reached in  compliance w ith  the  a s s o c ia t io n ’s
23
ru le s  and in  accordance w ith  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f n a tu ra l  j u s t i c e .  This ap­
proach in v o lv e s , on th e  one hand, en fo rc in g  the  ru le s  o f an a s s o c ia t io n  
such as a tra d e  un io n , and, on the  o th e r hand, where the  p o in t i s  n o t ex­
p re s s ly  covered by th e  r u le s ,  a l t e r in g  them to  in c lu d e  the p r in c ip le s  o f 
n a tu ra l  j u s t i c e .  In  th e se  term s two b asic  problems are  ra is e d : th e  s o r t  o f 
ru le s  the  c o u rts  are  to  e n fo rc e , and the  fo rce  th ey  a re  to  accord those  
ru le s  in  r e la t io n  to  o th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n s  such as the  p r in c ip le s  o f n a tu ra l  
ju s t i c e .
24
In  the  le ad in g  E n g lish  case o f Dawkins v . Antrobus i t  was im p l ic i t  
in  the  C ourt’s judgement th a t  the  on ly  re le v a n t ru le s  were p ro ced u ra l and 
n o t su b s ta n tiv e  -  corresponding  to  the  p u re ly  p ro ced u ra l p r in c ip le s  o f
25
n a tu ra l  j u s t i c e .  F i f ty  y ea rs  l a t e r ,  in  Maclean v . The W orkers’ Union,
th i s  p o lic y  was l a id  down e x p re s s ly . The c o u r ts , i t  was h e ld , had no power
to  go beyond ru le s  p re s c r ib in g  th e  manner in  which th e  ex p u lsio n  power was
ex e rc ise d ; th ey  could  no t construe  re le v a n t ru le s  of substance as ap p lied
to  th e  f a c ts  o f the ca se . W ell befo re  t h i s  d e c is io n , however, A u s tra lia n
c o u rts  had assumed ju r i s d ic t io n  to  construe  su b s ta n tiv e  ru le s  in  a way th a t
26
e n ta i le d  app ly ing  them to  th e  f a c ts  o f th e  ca se . And s in ce  M aclean’ s 
Case, th e  E n g lish  Court of Appeal has h e ld  th a t  i t  has power to  examine any 
d e c is io n  o f a tra d e  u n io n ’s dom estic t r ib u n a l  which invo lves a q u e s tio n  o f
23 Dawkins v . Antrobus (1881), 17 Ch.D. 615; A u stra lia n  W orkers’ Union v . 
Bowen (No.2) (1948), 77 C.L.R. 601.
24 (1881) 17 Ch.D. 615.
25 [1929J 1 Ch. 602.
26 Dickason v . Edwards (1910), 10 C.L.R. 243; Amalg’d S o ciety  of Engineers 
v . Smith, supra; see a lso  Grimwood v . V ictorian  Club (1894)> 20 V.L.R.
193.
27
law, including the true interpretation of any of the union’s rules. The
Court re-affirmed the principle that it could not review the facts in the
manner of a court of appeal, but, as one of its members openly recognized,
the 'construction of the rules is so bound up with the application of the
28
rules to the facts that no one can tell one from the other’. It is ap­
parent then that, legal niceties aside, both English and Australian courts 
are prepared to enforce trade union rules in expulsion cases, regardless 
of whether they are procedural or substantive. But no similar clarity is 
evident on the question of the force to be accorded to existing trade 
union rules as against other considerations.
In Lee’s Case, in which the English Court of Appeal held it could 
construe rules of substance, the Court distinguished the rules of the trade 
union concerned from those of social clubs and professional associations 
involved in earlier cases, and stated that those cases had turned on ethical
rather than legal questions, questions which were primarily matters of
29
opinion and not of legal construction. One member of the Court suggested
that if the trade union's rules had empowered the expulsion of members where
'in the opinion of' or 'in the judgment of’ the domestic tribunal they had
broken the rules, then the plaintiff might have been in difficulty. He
added, however, that considerations of public policy might well influence
the courts to ignore such an attempt to oust their jurisdiction to construe
the rules, especially in the case of a trade union to which employees were
30
compelled to belong. Another member, Denning, L.J., was more outspoken
27 Lee’s Case, supra. [3952] 1 All E.R. 1175. This view has since been 
applied in a New Zealand case: Tucker v. Auckland Racing Club. [1956]
N.Z.L.R. a.
28 Ibid., at 1182.
29 Ibid., at 1180, 1181, 1186. One of the judges, Denning, L.J., by implica­
tion went further than his colleagues to exclude the medical cases from 
this category on the ground, apparently, that they involved questions
of a man’s right to work - unlike the club cases.
30 Ibid., at 1188.
and categorically condemned trade union rules of this sort as contrary to
31
public policy and void. The point has still to be settled by English
courts. In Australia, on the other hand, it appears to have been conceded
that the miles of voluntary associations in general and trade unions in
32
particular can oust the courts' jurisdiction in this way.
The Australian courts have given a similar restricted interpretation of 
their powers in relation to the principles of natural justice. It appears 
that their jurisdiction to apply these principles may be ousted by express 
and unequivocal provision to this effect in the rules of a voluntary asso-
33
ciation, including a trade union. For their part, the English courts
34
have still to settle the question. The claim, made in an early decision,
that they could determine whether rules were contrary to natural justice
33
was refuted in a later decision. More recently, two members of the Court
of Appeal expressed opposing views on whether public policy required that
the rules of voluntary associations should not exclude the principles of
36
natural justice.
Finally, there is the question of whether an expelled member's failure 
to exhaust his right of appeal within the association denies the courts 
jurisdiction. In Australia the question appears settled. Denial of juris-
31 Ibid., at 1181.
32 Macqueen v. Frackleton. supra, at 700; Australian Workers Union v. Bowen, 
supra, at 606. Moreover, while the courts will not recognize a rule ex­
pressly forbidding members to take legal action, they are unable, it was 
held, to interfere where a rule prescribes the expulsion of a member 
taking such action: Macqueen v. Frackleton. supra, at 700-1, 709^10.
33 Dickason v. Edwards, supra, at 255; Edgar v. Meade (1916), 23 C.L.R., 
at 42; Australian Workers Union v. Bowen, supra, at 617, 631.
34 Dawkins v. Antrobus, supra, at 63O.
35 Maclean v. The Workers' Union. [19293 1 Ch., at 623-4»
36 Russell v. Duke of Norfolk. [19493 1 All E.R., at 115, 119. The member 
opposing the exclusion principle, Denning, has since re-affirmed his 
view in two trade union cases: Lee's Case, supra, at 1180-1; Bonsor v. 
Musicians' Union. [19543 1 All E.R., at 826.
d ic t io n  i s  e f fe c te d  on ly  where ru le s  e x p re ss ly  la y  down th a t  the member
37
must exhaust h is  r ig h t  o f appeal befo re  ta k in g  le g a l  a c tio n ; o therw ise
38
he may go s t r a ig h t  to  th e  c o u r ts .  In  the  U nited Kingdom some le g a l  com­
m enta to rs seem to  have in te rp re te d  the  P riv y  C ouncil’ s d e c is io n  in  a
39
Canadian ca se , in v o lv in g  union ru le s  w ith  an express e x h au s tio n -o f-
in te rn a l-a p p e a ls  p ro v is io n , as meaning th a t  wherever an in te r n a l  r ig h t  o f
appea l i s  p rov ided  th e  member must exhaust i t  before  r e s o r t in g  to  the  
40
c o u r ts .  The A u s tra lia n  d e c is io n s  p o in t in  a d i f f e r e n t  d ire c t io n ;  and in
a subsequent E n g lish  ca se , an e x p e lled  union  member’ s f a i lu r e  to  e x e rc ise
41
h is  in te r n a l  r ig h t  o f appeal was re f e r r e d  to  b u t g iven no w eigh t. In  
the  even t o f a d i r e c t  d e c is io n  on th e  p o in t ,  the  E n g lish  co u rts  may w e ll 
fo llow  the  A u s tra lia n  view .
In  m a tte rs  o th e r  than  e x p u ls io n , both  E n g lish  and A u s tra lia n  c o u rts
42
have fo llow ed the  same p r in c ip le s  as to  th e  b a s is  o f t h e i r  j u r i s d ic t io n .  
They w i l l  n o t in te r f e r e  where th e  a c ts  complained of a re  m erely i r r e g u la r -
43
i t i e s  in  connection  w ith  a c tio n s  w ith in  the tra d e  u n io n ’s powers, nor 
where th e  ru le s  prov ide m achinery f o r  the s e tt le m e n t of th e  d isp u te  in
44
q u e s tio n , such as a d isp u te  about e le c t io n  r e s u l t s .  Nor w i l l  a d e c la r ­
a t io n  be g iven  on the  a p p lic a t io n  o f a m in o rity  where i t  would be m erely
37 Macqueen v . F ra c k le to n . su p ra t a t  69$.
38 C arbines v . P i t to c k ,  [1908J V.L.R. 292; Daly v . G a llag h e r. [19253 Q .S .R .1 . 
This i s  a lso  the  im p lic a tio n  of A u s tra lian  Workers Union v . Bowen, su p ra .
39 White v . Kuzych. [1951] 2 A ll E.R . 435.
40 Dennis Lloyd, ’J u d ic ia l  Review o f Expulsion by a Domestic T rib u n a l'
(1952), 1$ Modern Law Review, a t  413; W. Friedmann, Legal Theory. 3rd  e d .,  
339.
41 Bonsor v . M usic ians’ Union. [1954] 1 A ll E .R ., a t  825.
42 See Craddock v . D avidson. [19293 Q.S.R. 328; Bowen v . H in c h c liffe  (1924), 
24 S.R . (N.S.W.) 262.
43 C o tte r  v . N a tio n a l Union o f Seamen. [1928] 2 Ch. 58.
44 T aylor v . Smith (1922). 23 S.R . (N.S.W.) 174; Bowen v . H in c h c li f f e . 
su p ra ; Hughes v . Anthony (1925), 27 W.A.L.R. 134.
45
embarrassing and serve no useful purpose. Otherwise, the courts will 
examine the conduct of a trade union election, for example, with an eye 
to the customary criteria - conformity with the rules and the principles46
of natural justice.
- - - 0O0 - ---
All Australian industrial unions are empowered to recover at law
membership subscriptions owed under their rules; and in most of the relevant
47
jurisdictions, fees, fines and levies are similarly recoverable. There 
is, however, greater variation when it comes to the enforcement of indus­
trial unions1 rules in general. In the Commonwealth, New South Wales and 
Western Australia there is no problem of establishing jurisdiction. In
each case the appropriate industrial court is empowered to enforce any
48
rules of industrial unions registered under it. This power differs from
that enabling the courts to enforce rules relating to subscriptions against
individual members, because it is 'designed for the protection of members
against...arrogant and unjust treatment in defiance of their membership
49
rights under the rules of their registered organizations'.
The New South Wales Industrial Commission interpreted its rule-enforc­
ing power rather narrowly when it echoed the traditional policy of the
45 White-Gourley v. Goonan (1935), 37 W.A.L.R. 99.
46 Craddock v. Davidson, supra. In this case a trade union committee’s 
rejection of a nomination for the presidency was held invalid on the 
grounds it was not reached in accordance with the union's rules (the 
committee had no power to make the decision and its meeting did not 
have a quorum) or with the principles of natural justice (the opposing 
candidate presided over the meeting and the plaintiff had no opportunity 
to state his case).
47 See Appendix VIII. These provisions apply to registered trade unions 
in N.S.W.
48 See Appendix VIII. This, as Latham, C.J., indicated, confers a much 
wider jurisdiction than that of the ordinary courts: 77 C.L.R., at 608.
It is equally applicable to registered trade unions in N.S.W.
49 Per Kelly, C.J., & Kirby, J., Joseph v. Elliott (1952), 74 C.A.R., at 43.
ordinary courts to hold that although its jurisdiction did not depend on
property, it would not normally interfere in internal disputes at the in-
50
stance of an individual member unless property rights were involved. More
recently, however, it was suggested that the Commission would not confine
itself in this way where the principle involved ’touched the settled rights
of all the union members in a vital particular', as in the case of a
51
member’s right to nominate for union office. In the Federal jurisdiction 
the interests justifying intervention have consistently been interpreted 
in wide terms. There should be no interference in unions’ domestic dis­
putes, it has been stated, unless there are 'allegations of fraud or of 
some violent breaches of the rules which may disturb the peace of the
52
industry, or prevent the organization properly functioning under the Act'.
In other words, all that is required is that there should be 'some element
53
of public interest’ involved, rather than a private property right, since 
the purpose of the statutory power is not merely to enable individuals to
54
enforce their civil rights against others.
The South Australian Industrial Court finds direct power to enforce
union rules under the statutory requirement that all disputes between an
industrial union and its members must be decided in accordance with the
rules. However, this power has been held to cover only those matters with
55
which the union's rules are required to deal as a condition of registration.
50 Dawson v. Bond. [1946] A.R. (N.S.W.) 156.
51 Carey v. McCarney. [1951] A.R. (N.S.W.), at 784.
52 Griffin v. Amalg'd Society of Carpenters & Joiners (1929), 27 C.A.R., 
at 1064.
53 Chapman v. Sear (1931)> 30 C.A.R., at 165.
54 Stuart v. Heavey (1935), 35 C.A.R. 331» These special statutory powers 
do not, apparently, oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in this 
field: see (1930) 30 S.R. (N.S.W.) 267.
55 Trading Bank Clerks' Case (1931)» 11 S.A.I.R. 350; see also (1948)
22 S.A.I.R. 178.
The Queensland Industrial Court is given no direct statutory power to 
enforce union rules in general, though it may achieve this end by threaten­
ing use of its deregistration power which can be used in any circumstances 
the Court thinks fit. But apart from extreme cases where such a step might
be justified, it seems that the Industrial Court can enforce rules only
56
incidentally to its exercise of other powers. Otherwise, action of this 
nature in relation to industrial unions is a matter for the ordinary courts 
in Queensland.
The general rule-enforcing powers available to the main Federal, New
South Wales, and Western Australian industrial tribunals have been used in
57
a wide variety of circumstances, particularly in the Federal jurisdiction.
They have been held applicable, for example,where an expulsion or a union
5B
election is carried out other than in accordance with the rules. But in
recent years each of the three industrial tribunals has been given specific
59
and more comprehensive powers to deal with disputed elections, while since
1953 the New South Wales Industrial Commission has been able to interfere
with an expulsion from an industrial union before the expulsion is actually 
60
effected. Despite the comparatively limited character of the South
56 Thus, where an award prohibited the continued employment of unfinancial 
unionists, the Industrial Court had to determine whether an employer was 
bound to dismiss employees who had failed to pay fines imposed by their 
unions. In reaching its decision, the Court examined the validity of 
the fines, and ruled against the unions on the ground that the members 
concerned were not guilty of misconduct under the unions’ rules and that 
the fines were therefore illegal: (1946) 166 Qd. G.G. 717. Similarly, 
the Court can intervene where it is alleged that a unionist has been 
penalized for disobeying a union instruction which is contrary to the 
Act or any award: (1949) 43 Q.J.P. 123; (1949) 43 Q.J.P. 134«
57 See Foenander, Industrial Regulation in Australia, 186.
58 Australian Workers Union v. Bowen (No.2) i(l9487, 77 C.L.R. 601; Williams 
v. Fed’d Union of Locomotive Enginemen. [1947] A.R. (N.S.W.) 3 6 1;
O’Grady v. Prior (1946), 56 C.A.R., at 194»
59 See Appendix VIII. These provisions do not, however, exclude resort to 
the general rule-enforcing powers: (1952) 74 C.A.R., at 139.
60 See Appendix VIII. This provision was enacted as part of the legislation 
aimed at imposing compulsory unionism.
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Australian Industrial Court’s power to enforce rules, it appears to cover 
cases involving expulsions and disputed elections because these are among 
the prescribed matters for which the rules of an industrial union in that 
State must provide.
None of the general rule-enforcing provisions, nor the special ex­
pulsion provision in the New South Wales legislation, indicate' the force 
that is to be given to union rules as against the other considerations 
mentioned above in relation to trade unions.
The Federal provisions were given a restrictive interpretation by the 
Chief Judge who held that a union tribunal's decision as to the meaning and 
application of the rules could be interfered with only if it was made in 
bad faith, or if the member disciplined had not been given reasonable notice
of the tribunal’s proceedings and a reasonable opportunity of defending
61
himself. In other words, the Court could not intervene if the decision
was reached in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Since
this opinion was expressed, however, the Federal Arbitration Court (now
the Industrial Court) has shown by its actions that it is not inclined to
regard as final the construction of an industrial union’s rules by a do-
62
raestic tribunal. Moreover, the Court has not only construed and applied 
the specific terms of rules, but it has interfered with union decisions on
63
the basis of conditions it considered to be implied by rules. Industrial
64
courts have also applied the principles of natural justice.
It appears that industrial unions, like Australian trade unions, may 
oust the jurisdiction of industrial courts to construe rules by relating
65
their interpretation to the opinion of a domestic body,
61 Newberry v. Gale (1930), 29 C.A.R., at 56-7.
62 See, e.g., (1950) 66 C.A.R. 154; (1952) 73 C.A.R. 122.
63 Short V, Wellings (1951), 72 C.A.R. 84.
64 See, e.g.” (1952) 74 C.A.R., at 43; [194Ü A.R, (N.S.W.) 41.
65 Australian Workers Union v. Bowen, supra, at 606, 634-5; also (1950)
66'C.A.R. , at 159. -----
An e a r ly  New South Wales d e c is io n , a ffirm in g  th a t  th e  ru le s  of an
in d u s t r i a l  un ion  could  exclude the  p r in c ip le s  o f n a tu ra l  ju s t ic e  from con-
66
s id e r a t io n  by th e  c o u r ts ,  was l a t e r  echoed by a High Court judge when
he s ta te d  th a t  the  p r in c ip le s  of n a tu ra l  ju s t i c e  ’cannot o v e rrid e  the  ex-
67
p re ss  p ro v is io n s  of the  r u l e s ’ . But i t  i s  apparen t th a t  the  m a jo rity  
d e c is io n  of the  Court in  the  same case o v erru led  th i s  view by im p lic a tio n .
On the  q u e s tio n  o f the  ex h au stio n  o f an in d u s t r i a l  union member’s in ­
te r n a l  r ig h t  o f a p p ea l, a F ed era l in d u s t r i a l  judge h e ld  th a t  the  s ta tu to r y  
ru le -e n fo rc in g  power should n o t be ex e rc ise d  u n t i l  the  a p p lic a n t had used
every  avenue o f r e l i e f  a v a ila b le  w ith in  h is  un ion , an op in ion  th a t  has a lso
68
been expressed  by th e  New South Wales I n d u s t r ia l  Commission. In  both 
c a se s , however, i t  was emphasized th a t  a p p lic a t io n  of th i s  p o lic y  was d is ­
c re t io n a ry  and n o t m andatory. I n d u s t r ia l  co u rts  are  th e re fo re  f r e e  to
69
fo llow  the  High C ourt’ s d e c is io n  in  Bowen’s C ase, of which a c le a r  im­
p l ic a t io n  was t h a t  an i n d u s t r i a l  un ion member need n o t exhaust h is  in te r n a l  
r ig h t  o f appeal where the  ru le s  do n o t s p e c i f ic a l ly  re q u ire  him to  do so .
The e f f e c t  o f a ru le  w ith  an express requirem ent o f th i s  n a tu re  does n o t 
appear to  have been con sid ered  in  connection  w ith  an in d u s t r ia l  u n io n , b u t 
i t  i s  p robab le  th a t  the  in d u s t r i a l  c o u rts  would fo llow  the p r in c ip le  ap­
p lic a b le  to  tra d e  unions th a t  ex h au stio n  of appeal i s  o b lig a to ry  in  th e se  
c ircu m stan ces .
The a b i l i t y  of i n d u s t r i a l  un ions to  o u s t the  ju r i s d ic t io n  of in d u s t r ia l  
c o u rts  by th e  term s o f t h e i r  ru le s  has been d iscu ssed  above on the l in e s  of 
th e  corresponding  powers of tra d e  un ions in  r e la t io n  to  the  o rd in a ry  c o u r ts .
66 l_190al A.R. (N.S.W.) 1.
67 A u s tra lia n  Workers Union v . Bowen, su p ra , a t  638-9.
68 (1949) 65 C.A.R. 413; f t947} A.R. (N.S.W.) 361.
69 (1943) 77 C .L .R ., a t  618, 619, 632.
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But it must be emphasized that the rules of industrial unions are subject 
to much greater supervision than those of trade unions or voluntary asso­
ciations in general.
In the first place, the rules of a union seeking registration as an 
industrial union, and any alterations to its rules after registration, are 
usually closely scrutinized by the authorities to ensure their compliance 
with the relevant industrial arbitration Act. All these measures contain 
provisions which in effect, if not always expressly, give wide powers to 
refuse the registration of rules. In all cases, for example, ’tyrannical 
or oppressive’ rules are indicated as illegal. Unless it is registered, 
a rule is not recognized by the industrial courts.
In the second place, all industrial courts can disallow or direct the 
alteration of rules already registered, whether this jurisdiction is ex­
pressly given them or may in fact be exercised in the shadow of the power 
to deregister industrial unions. Thus, even if an industrial union’s rule 
could be held to oust the jurisdiction of the relevant industrial court, the
court may find the power to remove the obstruction on the ground that it
70
contravenes the Act. Recognition of these powers has led frequently to 
applications to industrial courts asking, either concurrently or alternat­
ively, for orders enforcing a rule, disallowing it, and deregistering the
71
union because of the rule.
70 But a Federal industrial judge has refused to disallow a rule empowering 
expulsion where, 'in the opinion of’ a domestic tribunal, a member's 
conduct came within the meaning of the rule: see, ibid., at 603, 606. 
This does not mean, however, that the Federal Industrial Court will 
refuse disallowance of a similar rule in another case.
71 See, e.g., (1947) 59 C.A.R. 85; (1951) 70 C.A.R. 432.
CHAPTER 9 2*9
THE LEGAL STATUS OF TRADE UNIONS
The legal status of a group such as a trade union is determined at
a given time by the nature and extent of legal regulation affecting it.
Traditionally, legal status has been viewed primarily in terms of whether
or not the group constitutes a legal entity, a characteristic usually
1
acquired by incorporation under appropriate legislation. A number of 
consequences flow from the definition of a group as a legal entity, which 
is thus merely a brief way of indicating that the group, in a corporate 
capacity, may, for example, act by agents, sue or be sued for a civil 
wrong, enter into contracts and be liable for their breach.
On the other hand, if the group is not a legal entity these consequen­
ces do not necessarily follow - indeed, as the courts have traditionally 
viewed the question, the rights and duties accompanying incorporation are 
exclusive to groups expressly designated as legal entities. For in these 
terms a group which is not a legal entity has no corporate existence distinct 
from its individual members, and its rights and duties are merely the rights 
and duties attaching to each of its members in their personal legal capacity.
In Australia, as in the United Kingdom, the organization of individuals 
into trade unions has for many years been recognized by statute, and trade 
union Acts provide for the registration of these associations. But none of 
the Acts expressly define the trade union as a legal entity by incorporating 
it. The question of whether the Trade Union Act of 1871 can be regarded as 
conferring legal entity by implication on trade unions registered under it
1 See Dennis Lloyd, The Law of Unincorporated Associations. 147.
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has been ra is e d  on a number of occasions before  th e  E n g lish  c o u r ts . Opinions
have been expressed  by some judges th a t  the  e f f e c t  o f the  Act i s  to  make
2 3
the  r e g is te r e d  un ion  a ’le g a l  e n t i t y ’ , a ’co rp o ra te  body’ ; o th e rs  have
4 $
viewed i t s  e f f e c t  as c re a tin g  a ’q u a s i-c o rp o ra t io n ’ , a ’te r tiu m  q u id ’ , 
which has le g a l  p e r s o n a l i ty ,  and th e re fo re  i s  n o t an u n in co rp o ra ted  assoc­
i a t io n ,  but i s  u n lik e  e i th e r  an in d iv id u a l o r a c o rp o ra tio n . However, in  
on ly  one of th e se  cases (and th a t  the  l e a s t  a u th o r i ta t iv e )  d id  the  c o u rt
d e c is iv e ly  accep t th e  p ro p o s itio n  th a t  a r e g is te r e d  tra d e  union i s  a le g a l
6
e n t i t y  d i s t i n c t  from i t s  membership. In  A u s tra l ia ,  a S ta te  Supreme Court
considered  th a t  the  r e g is te r e d  tra d e  union  had ’a t  l e a s t  a q u a s i-c o rp o ra te  
7
s t a t u s ’ . But th e  a u th o r i ty  o f t h i s  d e c is io n  may be qu estio n ed  in  view of
8
th e  more re c e n t op in ions expressed  in  the House o f Lords in  Bonsor’s C ase,
though in  th a t  case the  am biguity of th e  judgement th a t  h e ld  the  balance on
o
th e  p o in t may w ell leave  the  m a tte r  open.
In  most ju r i s d ic t io n s  th e re  i s  much le s s  u n c e r ta in ty  about the  form al
c h a ra c te r  of the  A u s tra lia n  in d u s t r i a l  un ion  -  the  d is t in c t io n  between the
in d u s t r ia l  union and the  tra d e  un ion , as noted in  the  p rev ious ch ap te r ,
10
being  continued  fo r  p re s e n t p u rp o ses. The in d u s tr ia l ,  a r b i t r a t io n  m easures
2 P er Lord Morton, Bonsor v . The M usic ians’ Union, £1955] 3 A ll E .R ., a t  
524.
3 Per Lord Brampton, Taff Vale Railway Co. v . Amalg’d S oc ie ty  of Railway 
S ervants. [1901] A .C ., a t 442.
4 Per Lord Atkinson, Amalg’d S o c ie ty  o f Railway Servants v . Osborne, 0910] 
A.C ., a t 102.
5 Per S c o tt , L .J .,  N ational Union of General and Municipal Workers v . 
G ill ia n . 0 9 4 5 ] 2 A ll E .R ., a t 603.
6 See M artin , ’Legal P e rs o n a li ty  and the  Trade Union’ , in  Legal P e rs o n a lity  
and P o l i t i c a l  P lu ra lism  (Webb, e d . ) , fo r  a f u l l  d isc u ss io n  o f th e se  
d e c is io n s .
7 Egan v . Barrier Branch of Amalg’d. Miners A ss’n (1917), 17 S.R. (N .S.W .), 
a t 257, 262-3.
0 Supra, [1955]  3 A ll E.R. 518.
9 This judgement was t h a t  handed down by Lord K eith : fo r  a d isc u ss io n  of 
i t ,  see M artin , op. c i t .
10 That i s ,  ’i n d u s t r i a l  u n io n ’ as a union  r e g is te r e d  under an in d u s t r ia l  
a r b i t r a t i o n  Act; ’tra d e  u n io n ’ as a union r e g is te r e d  under a tra d e  union 
Act o r under no A ct.
o f th e  Commonwealth, Queensland, South A u s tra lia  and W estern A u s tra lia  each
11
in c o rp o ra te  unions r e g is te r e d  under them. The New South Wales I n d u s t r ia l
12
A rb itr a t io n  Act alone i s  s i l e n t  on the  p o in t .  I t  i s  the  p o s i t io n  o f the  
fo rm ally  u n in co rp o ra ted  in d u s t r ia l  un ion  o f New South Wales which in d ic a te s  
th e  shortcom ings o f the  d i s t in c t io n  between the in co rp o ra ted  and u n inco r­
p o ra ted  body as a d e s c r ip tio n  o f th e  u n io n ’s le g a l  s ta tu s ,  and p o in ts  to  
th e  v i t a l  d i s t in c t io n  based on the  e x te n t to  which the  union i s  s u b je c t to  
le g a l  r e g u la t io n .  For although  i t  i s  w ithou t exp ress le g a l  e n t i ty  under 
th e  A ct, th e re  i s  no dem onstrable d if fe re n c e  between the ro le  of th e  New 
South Wales in d u s t r i a l  union in  the  S ta te  a r b i t r a t i o n  machinery and th a t
o f in d u s t r ia l  un ions in  o th e r  ju r i s d ic t io n s  whose le g a l  c h a ra c te r  i s  in
13
form al terms w holly  d i f f e r e n t .  The p o s i t io n  o f tra d e  unions in  South 
A u s tra l ia  p o in ts  in  the  same d i r e c t io n .  They have poirers w ith in  the  S ta te  
a r b i t r a t io n  system which a.re alm ost as g re a t as those  o f in co rp o ra ted  in ­
d u s t r i a l  un io n s; and to  enable th e  enforcem ent o f awards a g a in s t them, i t  
i s  l a id  down th a t  D e n s itie s  are  reco v erab le  from a tra d e  union in  the  same
14
manner as i f  i t  were an ’in co rp o ra ted  company’ .
These examples in d ic a te  th a t  th e  form al d e f in i t io n  (o r la c k  o f i t )  o f 
a un ion  as a le g a l  e n t i t y  t e l l s  very  much le s s  th an  th e  f u l l  s to ry  about 
the  u n io n ’s e f f e c t iv e  s ta tu s ,  which i s  le s s  a m a tte r  o f le g a l  d e f in i t io n
11 C’w ea lth , C. & A. A ct, s . 136; Qd., I .C . & A. A c ts , s .4 1 ; S.A ., Ind . Code, 
s . 68; W.A., In d . Arb. A ct, s .1 3 . The in c o rp o ra tin g  p ro v is io n  in  the 
F ed e ra l Act i s  a l i t t l e  le s s  e x p l i c i t  than  th o se  in  the  S ta te  A cts, bu t 
i t s  e f f e c t  i s  no d i f f e r e n t :  see Jumbunna Coal Mine v . V ic to r ia n  Coal 
Miners A ss’n (1908), 6 C .L .R ., a t  336.
12 The in c o rp o ra tio n  p ro v is io n  in  th e  o r ig in a l  Act o f 1901 was om itted  from 
l a t e r  m easures.
13 I t  may be noted  th a t  when the  B i l l  which i s  th e  b a s is  o f the  p re se n t 
N.S.W. Ind . Arb. Act was befo re  P a rliam en t, th e  M in is te r  fo r  Labour 
s ta te d  th a t  i t  was in tended  th a t  in d u s t r i a l  unions should be t r e a te d  as 
e n t i t i e s  fo r  th e  purpose o f  l i t i g a t i o n  under the  Act: (1912) 41 N.S.W. 
P a r i .  Debs. I 64S.
14 I n d u s t r ia l  Code, s.131*
than of legal regulation. The distinction between the unincorporated trade 
union and the incorporated industrial union is one of degree, not of kind.
If the position of the English trade union is examined from this point of 
view, a picture of its legal status emerges which is quite unlike the 
picture that can be assumed from the courts* refusal to recognize it as a 
legal entity.
The English trade union, as we have seen, is not a corporation, nor 
have the courts accepted it as some kind of quasi-corporate body. On this 
basis it might with reason be expected that the trade union has none of the 
rights and duties attachable to a legal entity. Nevertheless, the courts 
have in fact attributed to the trade union qualities which have tradition­
ally been thought applicable only to a legal entity. They have held that 
a registered trade union as such (that is, in its registered name) can sue
15
and be sued in tort - an attribute that, as Maitland points out, is not
only ’one of the essential attributes of the corporation’, but one that at
times ’seemed to have appeared as the specific differentia of the corpora- 
16 17
tion’. In the Osborne Case another principle of corporation law, the 
doctrine of ultra vires the statute, was applied to a registered trade union
on the basis of legislation which did not incorporate the union. The courts
18
have also held that a member may sue his union in its registered name,
and may recover damages from its funds for breach of the contract found in 
19
its rules. Moreover, an injunction may be issued against a trade union
15 Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalg’d Society of Railway Servants. [1901]
A.C. 426; National Union of General and Municipal Workers v. Gillian, 
[1945] 2 All E.R. 593.
16 F.W. Maitland, Collected Papers. Vol. Ill, 385.
17 Amalg’d Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne, [1910] A.C. 87.
18 Yorkshire Miners Ass’n v. Howden, [19055 A.C. 256.
19 Bonsor v. Musicians Union. fl955l 3 All E.R. 518.
in  i t s  r e g is te r e d  name, w hether the  a c tio n  is  brought by a member o r by 
21
an o u ts id e r .
The E ng lish  c o u rts  have thus c lo th ed  the r e g is te r e d  tra d e  un ion  in
r ig h ts  and d u tie s  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  of a le g a l  e n t i ty ,  b u t th ey  have done so
w ith o u t d e c is iv e ly  accep tin g  the  un ion  as anyth ing  more than  a v o lu n ta ry
a s s o c ia t io n  which has no le g a l  p e r s o n a l i ty  d i s t i n c t  from the  in d iv id u a ls
form ing i t s  membership. By and la rg e ,  d e sp ite  apparen t lo g ic a l  incon- 
22
s i s te n c ie s ,  th e  c o u rts  have p re fe r re d  to  view the  consequences o f t h e i r
d ec is io n s  as p ro ced u ra l -  'a  more convenient mode o f proceeding* -  r a th e r  
23
than  s u b s ta n tiv e . However c o r re c t  th i s  view may be in  law , i t  i s  c le a r  
th a t  th e  d e c is io n s  i t  has been h e ld  to  j u s t i f y  have b rought about a 
s t a r t l i n g  change in  th e  le g a l  s ta tu s  o f the  r e g is te r e d  tra d e  u n io n .
By com parison w ith  the  E n g lish  tra d e  un ion , the  A u s tra lia n  in d u s t r ia l  
un ion i s  s u b je c t to  c lo s e r  and more ex ten s iv e  re g u la t io n . In  New South 
Wales many a sp ec ts  o f th i s  re g u la t io n  are  e q u a lly  a p p lic ab le  to  r e g is te r e d  
tra d e  u n io n s , b u t tra d e  unions elsew here in  A u s tra lia  are  on b road ly  the  
same fo o tin g  as t h e i r  E n g lish  c o u n te rp a r ts . U nlike th e  developing  le g a l  
re g u la tio n  o f th e  tra d e  un ion , however, th a t  of the  in d u s t r ia l  un ion flow s 
le s s  from ju d ic ia l  d e c is io n  th an  from s ta tu to r y  enactm ent. The in d u s t r ia l  
union i s ,  in  the  f i r s t  p la c e , on a fo o tin g  e n t i r e ly  d i f f e r e n t  from the  tra d e  
u n io n ’s ,  a fo o tin g  which depends on i t s  s ta tu to r y  fu n c tio n s  r a th e r  than  on 
th e  f a c t  th a t  i t  is  fo rm ally  d e fin ed  as a le g a l  e n t i t y .  Thus, before
f y j  i }
20
20 Amalg’d S o c ie ty  o f Carpenters. Cabinet Makes and Joiners v . B raithw aite,
tl922] A.C. 440; Howden’s Case, supra; Osborne’s Case, supra.
21 T aff Vale Case, supra.
22 See Dennis Lloyd, ’Wrongful E xpulsion  from a Trade Union* (1956),
19 Modern Lav; Review, at 129-130.
23 Per Lord L indley, Taff Vale Case, supra, at 445. See a ls o , ib id . ,  a t 
433-440» 442-3; Howden*s Case, supra, a t 280; R u ssell v . Amalg’d S o c ie ty  
of Carpenters and J o in e r s , 0T913J A.C. , a t 429.
legislation had been enacted to enable direct enforcement of Federal in­
dustrial unions' rules, it could be held that the status of these unions 
was such as to justify intervention by the ordinary courts in expulsion 
cases even in the absence of a property right, which was the courts' ne­
cessary basis of jurisdiction in cases involving trade unions and other 
voluntary associations.
This organization is the creature of the Federal Parliament for a 
special reason, and as incidental to a specific power in the con­
stitution. The incorporation of employees in such an organization 
is a matter of public policy, and to effectuate the policy of the 
Act.... The very object of the legislative provisions in incor­
porating such an association and facilitating the settlement of in­
dustrial disputes might be defeated if members and branches could be 
excluded by a governing body, contrary to rules, unless property was 
involved. ^
The emphasis here is on the industrial union as a public rather than a 
private body - the latter being the customary legal conception of unincor­
porated bodies such as trade unions and other voluntary associations. But 
although incorporation is stressed in the passage, it is apparent that the 
principles advanced are applicable to industrial unions whether or not, as 
in New South Wales, they are incorporated. It is their role in the statut­
ory scheme not their formal legal character that is important.
As bodies with statutory public functions, industrial unions do not 
'exist only for the purpose of concerning themselves with the private rights 
and duties of their members', and are thus not entitled to 'freedom from 
interference in the management of affairs and the settlement of matters as
25
between members’. Judicial interference in an industrial union's internal 
affairs does not signify the courts' recognition that members have interests 
justifying protection; it is merely an incidental result of industrial
24 Per Isaacs, J., Sdgar v. Meade (1916), 23 C.L.R., at 43-4.
25 Per O'Mara, J., Thornton v. Mackay (1946), 56 C.A.R., at 603.
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unions being ’treated as part of the machinery for the prevention and settle-
26
ment of industrial disputes*. The right to control the policy and offic­
ers of an industrial union, vested by legislation in the union’s members,
is maintained primarily ’in the interests of the public* rather than those 
27
of the members.
The development of the law relating to trade unions, on the other hand,
has no distinct legal justification of this nature. It is probably true
that the English Trade Union Act of 1871, and its Australian counterparts,
’created a fairly definite demarcation between the trade union and the great
class of voluntary, unincorporated associations to which the law concedes
no legal status apart from that of the individuals composing them’, and that
the distinction ’is none the less real because a trade union...does not
28
possess the status of a corporation or a partnership'. English courts, 
as their developing treatment of trade unions’ internal affairs shows, have 
certainly acted as if this were so. But they have not justified their act­
ions on the ground that the character of the trade union is legally distin­
guishable from that of the voluntary association. On the contrary, they 
have been at pains to emphasize that there is no such distinction. Nor,
29
despite claims to the contrary, does it appear that the process signifies
an acceptance by the courts of realist theories of the personality of 
30
associations.
oOo - - -
26 H.A.J. Ford, 'The Use of the Injunction to Restrain Wrongful Expulsion 
from Voluntary Associations' (1954), 1 Sydney Law Review, at 195.
27 Per O'Mara, J., Hall v. Australian Workers Union (1944). 52 C.A.R. 
at 243.
28 Hedges & Winterbottom, The Legal History of Trade Unionism. 91.
29 See S. & B. Webb, The History of Trade Unionism. 612; Dennis Lloyd,
The Law of Unincorporated Associations. 147.
30 See Martin, op. cit., for a full discussion on this point.
? ,  V ,  £
The n a tu re  and e x te n t o f re le v a n t  le g a l  r e g u la t io n , as has been p o in ted  
ou t e a r l i e r ,  d e lim its  the  le g a l  s ta tu s  of a group a t  a given tim e . Such re­
g u la tio n  a lso  c o n s t i tu te s  an ex p ress io n  o f the  way in  which the group i s  
regarded  by law -m akers, w hether th e se  be le g i s la tu r e s  determ ining  s ta tu te  
law o r c o u rts  de term in ing  common law . In  t h i s  sen se , le g a l  s ta tu s  i s  es­
s e n t i a l ly  a fu n c tio n  of the  law -m akers1 a t t i tu d e  to  the group, an a t t i tu d e  
th a t  i s  im portan t n o t on ly  to  the  g ro u p 's  le g a l  s ta tu s  a t  a p a r t i c u la r  
moment b u t a lso  as the  long -term  d e term inan t o f i t s  fu tu re  le g a l  re g u la t io n . 
M oreover, th i s  a t t i tu d e  may be the  p roduct o f c o n s id e ra tio n s  which have 
l i t t l e  to  do w ith  th e  le g a l  c h a ra c te r  of th e  group a t  any p a r t i c u la r  tim e . 
This i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in  the  ju d ic ia l  development o f th e  law a f f e c t in g  tra d e  
u n io n s . The development has taken  p lace  in  two p h ases , in  both of which i t  
i s  ev id en t t h a t  the  co u rts  have been in flu en ced  by c o n sid e ra tio n s  r e la te d  
to  the  s o c ia l  r a th e r  than  the le g a l  c h a ra c te r  o f the tra d e  un ion .
The f i r s t  phase cu lm inated  in  the  d e c is io n s  handed down in  the  T aff 
31 32
Vale Case and the  Osborne Case, the  one s t r ik in g  a t  the  tra d e  u n io n s ' 
a b i l i t y  to  take  in d u s t r i a l  a c t io n , th e  o th e r  a t  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  take  po-
33
l i t i c a l  a c t io n , and each d ea lin g  a 'sm ashing blow to  tra d e  union  a c t i v i t y ' .  
Before th e se  d ec is io n s  the  c o u rts  had su c c e ss iv e ly  fash ioned  the  weapons of 
c rim in a l co n sp iracy  and c i v i l  co n sp iracy  which were p r im a r i ly  d ire c te d
34
a g a in s t  tra d e  union a c t i v i t y ,  as shown by the c o n tra s tin g  d ec is io n s  given
in  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  s im ila r  cases in v o lv in g , r e s p e c tiv e ly , a business c a r t e l  
35
and a tra d e  u n io n . That j u d ic ia l  p re ju d ic e  a g a in s t  tra d e  unionism  was
31 S u p ra .
32 S upra .
33 C i t r in e ,  Trade Union Law. 17.
34 See Kshn-Freund in  The System of I n d u s t r ia l  R e la tio n s  in  G reat B r i ta in  
( e d s . ,  F lan d ers  & C legg), 116-7; and see C hapter 6 above.
35 Mogul Steam ship Co. v . McGregor. Gow & C o .. [18923 A.C. 25; Quinn v . 
Leathern, [1901J A.C. 495. For a t e l l i n g  com parative a n a ly s is  o f th ese  
two judgem ents, see R o th sch ild , 'Government R egu la tion  of Trade Unions 
in  G reat B r i ta in ' (1933), 33 Columbia Law Review, a t  1337-3.
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a significant factor in the formation of these policies, as has been claimed,
is not unlikely. At least it is evident that the courts were slow to follow
the legislature in its progress from suppression to toleration of unionism.
This argument gains from the ‘transformation of judicial attitudes' which
followed the legislature's reversal of the courts' policies and the enhanced
37
social standing of unionism after the first world war.
The second phase in the judicial development of trade union law has
taken place since the second world war. It has involved greater regulation
not of the unions’ ability to pursue their aims, as in the first phase, but
of their ability to injure their members' vital interests. This development, 
33
as has been shown, has occurred in relation to exclusion from union member­
ship, and it has clearly been influenced by the power trade unions have ob­
tained, as a result of compulsory union membership policies, to deprive 
members of their right to work. Thus, the existence of compulsory unionism 
has evoked judicial doubt about the realism of the traditional view that 
the contract found in trade union rules is one into which a member enters
39
of his own will. Moreover, it has induced the courts to regard expulsion
from a trade union as being quite different from expulsion from most other
voluntary associations. Denning, L.J., as he then was, repeatedly asserted
that the right to work was more important than the property right on which
40
the courts have usually based their jurisdiction in expulsion cases, and
41
other judges have adopted the same view. But perhaps the most significant
36 S. & B. Webb, op. cit., 601, 609> 626.
37 Kahn-Freund, op. cit., 118.
38 See Chapter 8.
39 See Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Great Britain, [1952] 1 All E.R., at 1181, 
1188; also Bonsor v. Musicians Union. [19543 1 All E.R., at 826, 833.
40 Bonsor's Case. [l954l 1 All S.R., at 835; Lee's Case, supra, at 1181; 
Abbott v. Sullivan. 09523 1 All E.R., at 234.
41 See Lee's Case, supra, at 1180, 1184; Bonsor's Case. [19543 1 All E.R.
at 834. Also see Martin, op. cit., for a fuller discussion on the point.
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in d ic a t io n  of th e  im portance o f th i s  f a c to r  was given in  Bonsor’s C ase, in  
which the  law lo rd s  were d iv id ed  on the q u e s tio n  of w hether the  tra d e  union 
was a le g a l  e n t i t y  b u t unanim ously ru le d  th a t  a w rongfu lly  ex p e lled  member 
could reco v er damages from h is  union  -  a d e c is io n  th a t  rev e rsed  e x is t in g  
p reced en ts  and a tta c h e d  to  the  tra d e  union  a l i a b i l i t y  p re v io u s ly  thought 
a p p lic ab le  on ly  to  in co rp o ra ted  b o d ie s . Lord MacDermott gave th e  most lu c id  
and fo r c e fu l  defence o f th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  concep tion  o f the tra d e  union  as 
an u n in co rp o ra ted  a s s o c ia t io n .  Once he had d isca rd ed  the n o tio n  of le g a l  
e n t i ty  as a means o f en ab lin g  damages to  be ob ta in ed  a g a in s t the  un io n , i t  
was ap p aren t th a t  h is  d e c is io n  tu rn ed  la rg e ly  on the  op in ion  (which fo llow ed 
an e a r l i e r  re fe re n ce  in  h is  speech to  the  e f f e c t  of the  u n io n ’s ’c lo sed  
shop’ p o lic y  on th e  p l a i n t i f f ’ s r ig h t  to  work) t h a t  ’ex p u lsion  from member­
sh ip  o f a tra d e  union  s ta n d s , as a breach o f c o n tra c t ,  in  a s p e c ia l  
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c a te g o ry ’ .
The le g a l  s ta tu s  given to  tra d e  unions as a r e s u l t  o f ju d ic ia l  de­
velopment of the  law has emerged p r im a ri ly  from the  c o u r ts ’ re c o g n itio n  o f 
the  power tra d e  unions w ie ld  in  s o c ie ty . Thus, as has been d iscu ssed  a t
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le n g th  e lsew here , th e  T aff Vale d e c is io n , enab ling  the  r e g is te r e d  tra d e  
union  and n o t m erely  some of i t s  members o r o f f i c i a l s  to  be sued fo r  s t r ik e  
a c t io n , was a n ecessa ry  ex ten s io n  o f the  law i f  the in d u s t r ia l  power o f 
unionism  was to  be curbed . The growth of th a t  power rendered  i t  no lo n g e r 
p ra c t ic a b le  to  a t ta c k  unionism  by way of in d iv id u a l u n io n is ts .  S im ila r ly , 
the  c o u r ts ’ p re s e n t in c l in a t io n  to  d is t in g u is h  between expu lsion  from a 
tra d e  union and ex p u lsio n  from v o lu n ta ry  a s s o c ia tio n s  in  g en era l flow s from 
a re c o g n itio n  o f the  compulsory fe a tu re s  o f tra d e  unionism . The e f f e c t  o f
42 Bonsor v . M usicians Union, £19553 3 A ll E .R ., a t  527- 8 , 538.
43 M artin , op. c i t .
these policies has been to emphasize the public character of the modern 
trade union.
Australian industrial courts have reached the same conclusion in re­
lation to industrial unions, but they have been able to state it with less 
circumspection because it is derived from legislation which specifies the 
role of industrial unions and closely regulates their activities. Formally 
speaking, therefore, Australian industrial courts need not take account of 
the power exercised by industrial unions as interest groups - indeed, they 
probably have no jurisdiction to do so since their frame of reference is 
defined by statute and not by the somewhat looser terms of common law and 
equity. Nevertheless, the consideration of the power of modern unionism is 
as relevant to Australian industrial unions as it is to English trade unions 
But it is significant at the political rather than the judicial level. Its 
effective impact is on legislatures rather than courts, because the tradi­
tional bar existing in the United Kingdom to legislation regulating union 
activities does not operate in Australia.
Probably the most common political view of union status is based on 
the effect of industrial arbitration legislation. It is therefore re­
stricted to industrial unions. But since the vast majority of unions 
function within statutory arbitration systems, the restriction is unim­
portant. This view was expounded by R.G. Menzies:
...the effect of the development of industrial arbitration has been 
to increase recruitment to the great unions [and] to increase their 
strength.... As a result, a decision made by an industrial organi­
zation can no longer be regarded as being merely something which 
concerns its own members. An industrial organization is now so 
much a public utility that any major decision made by it affects 
the whole society.^
44 (1949) 203 C»wealth Pari. Debs. 2066.
The more w idely -based  view is  d e riv ed  from a re c o g n itio n  of union power 
as som ething which i s  more th an  m erely a p roduct of a r b i t r a t io n  system s, 
b u t th e  con clu sio n s  a re  the  same. I t  was expressed  by H.V. E v a tt ,  A tto rney- 
G eneral in  th e  C h ifley  Labor Government, in  connection  w ith  the  q u estio n  o f 
union e le c t io n s .
Today the  tra d e  un ion  movement.. . i s  ex trem ely  pow erful; indeed , in  
some r e s p e c ts ,  i t  i s  as pow erful as the  o rgan ized  community i t s e l f . . .  
so t h a t  the  modern tra d e  union b ears  the  stamp o f p u b lic  i n t e r e s t  
and concern -  something which we never recognized  f i f t y ,  o r even 
tw enty , y ea rs  a g o . . . .  There i s . . . a n  analogy between the  conduct 
o f e le c t io n s  in  a r e g is te r e d  tra d e  union and those  o f the N ational 
P a r l ia m e n t . . .  [and] tra d e  union  e le c t io n s  a re  e n te r in g  a sphere 
which i s  as im portan t to  the  w e ll-b e in g  of th e  community as are 
e le c t io n s  fo r  the  Commonwealth o r a S ta te  P a r l i a m e n t .^
This view was h e ld , by a Labor Government, to  j u s t i f y  i t  e n te r in g
what has been c a l le d  a 'new phase ' in  the  re g u la tio n  o f F ed era l in d u s t r ia l
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unions by l e g i s l a t i o n .  Both A u s tra lia n  le g i s la tu r e s  and E ng lish  c o u rts
(th e  l a t t e r  in  f a c t  i f  n o t y e t  in  theory ) have d isca rd ed  the  19th  cen tu ry
47
p ro p o s itio n  th a t  unions a re  'e s s e n t i a l l y  c lu b s '.  The le g a l  s ta tu s  th i s  
has g iven  u n io n s , as bodies which in  the  eyes of lavr-makers should be regu­
la te d  in  im p o rtan t re s p e c ts ,  has a lre ad y  le d  to  g re a te r  re g u la tio n  of union 
a c t i v i t i e s  and c o n ta in s  the  seeds o f f u r th e r  re g u la t io n .
The tre n d  i s  more pronounced in  A u s tra lia  than  in  the  U nited Kingdom 
because le g a l  re g u la t io n  o f A u s tra lia n  unions has reached a s tag e  where i t  
has a momentum of i t s  own, and the  p re v a il in g  tendency i s  to  seek a s o lu tio n  
th rough the  law to  any q u e s tio n  in v o lv in g  the  u n io n s . The very  f a c t  o f ex­
te n s iv e  re g u la t io n , and i t s  g en e ra l accep tance , means th a t  th e re  i s  l i t t l e  
d isp u te  about the  p r in c ip le  of s ta t e  in te rv e n tio n  in  union a c t i v i t i e s .  Thus
45 I b id . ,  1312-3,
46  K.H. B a iley , 'F i f t y  Years o f th e  A u s tra lian  C o n s ti tu t io n ’ (1951),
25 A u s tra lia n  Law J o u rn a l , a t  318.
47 M inority  R ep o rt, Royal Commission on Trade Unions (U.K.) ,  1869, quoted 
by M iln e -B ailey , Trade Unions and the  S t a t e . 203.
Australian legislatures not only operate in a political context widely dif­
ferent in this respect from that of the British Parliament, but they are, 
of course, untrammelled by the problems of jurisdiction which confront the 
English courts.
In addition, legal regulation in Australia is not concerned solely with
imposing conditions on union activity; it has also given benefits sought by 
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the unions. This in itself strengthens the logical argument for greater 
supervision.
The protection of unionism by the State carries with it considerable 
control of unionism by the State. Where the State gives privileges 
it must impose obligations. If it takes special notice of a group 
within its jurisdiction it must interest itself in the constitution 
and action of that group. ^
Some idea of the extent to which this argument has been carried into practice, 
and an indication of its continuing force, is given by a statement made in 
1914 by the Attorney-General of a non-Labor Federal Government on the ques­
tion of prescribing compulsory union membership by legislation:
...before any civilised community would consent to give public re­
cognition and compulsion to any union, it would insist on the per­
formance of certain conditions. It would insist, in the first 
place, that the doors of that union should be absolutely open... 
to all persons belonging to that particular trade, who knew their 
business and were not of bad character. We know also that no 
compulsory unionism could possibly be brought about, as long as 
there was any discretion in the unions as to the amount of entrance 
fee to be paid by new members joining.... Another condition... 
would be the imposition of a definite law against striking at all....
A further condition would certainly be that the funds of the unions 
should be under the control of a public trustee, and that the 
expenditure of those funds should be subject to audit.*0
48 See especially Chapters 5 and 7 above.
49 Hancock, Australia. 21S.
50 (1914) 73 C 1wealth Pari. Debs. 1063-4» In this connection, see the con­
ditions set down in the Stevedoring Industry Act 1954-56 (s.43)> which 
imposes compulsory unionism on waterside workers, and also those ac­
companying a similar imposition in the N.S.W. Industrial Arbitration 
Act 1940-57, S.129B.
ooo
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The list is exemplary if not exhaustive. Its significance arises from
the fact that although it was outlined on the assumption of a situation
$1
where the law ’not only recognised unions but made them compulsory’, the 
conditions it embodies have since been largely applied to Federal unions - 
in company with other far-reaching conditions such as the empowering of 
industrial authorities to enforce or disallow union rules and to supervise 
union elections - despite the lack of any general compulsory unionism re­
quirement favouring those unions. The extension of regulation is thus 
the result of more general considerations which do not depend on specific 
privileges granted by the state, but are a function of the social stature 
of Australian trade unionism and the total environment in which unionism 
operates. On the basis of these considerations, Australian unions have 
acquired a legal status that renders them susceptible to continuing and 
increasing legal regulation.
51 Ibid., 1064.
PART I I I
O
:  'S
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
A study published in 1941 on wartime collaboration between
employers, workers and governments defined ’collaboration* as
free, confident, and organized co-operation of employ­
ers and workers with each other and with the public 
authorities for the determination of conditions of 
employment, the framing and application of industrial 
and social leg isla tion , the prevention and settlement 
of industrial disputes, and the formulation and applic­
ation of social and economic policies, both generally and 
in relation to particular industries and particular prob­
lems, ‘
Here we are concerned with cooperation, of th is character and fbr a l l  
or any of these purposes, between workers organized in trade unions and 
the public authorities. The purposes set out in the definition f a l l  
into two categories in terms of which the union’s role in the s ta te ’s 
administrative framework may conveniently be described.
In the f i r s t  place, such a description is  concerned with the ways 
in which trade unions may influence government policy decisions a t th e ir  
source, whatever the level a t which such decisions are made and whether 
they rela te  to the enactment of leg islation or simply to the administ­
ration of existing law or practice. Attention here is  directed to the 
existing institu tions and procedures which are, or may be, u tilized  
by the unions in order to present th e ir views a t the policy-making 
levels erf* government. This is  the area of consultation and advice T?here 
the trade union movement functions as a p o litica l pressure group.
In the second place, such a description is  concerned with the ways
1 I.L.O ., Wartime Developments in Gdvemment-Emnloyer-Worker
Collaboration, v i i .
and extent to which unions and unionists take part in the actual 
administration of government. This is the area where the unions may 
function as organs of government, or their members may function, either in 
a personal or representative capacity, as public servants.
There are three points to be noted on the question of union-govern­
ment collaboration. First, the two categories distinguished above are in 
many cases overlapping: government bodies with trade union representation
may both formulate and execute policy. This does not, however, rob the 
the distinction of any usefulness. Whatever the policy-making powers of 
administrative bodies, the fact that they execute policies decided by or 
above them sets them apart from bodies concerned exclusively with the formu­
lation of policy, whether in an advisory or direct policy-making capacity.
Second, Australian unions have greater opportunities to influence 
government policy in the case of Labor than of nonp.Labor governments.
They can hope to influence Labor government policies not only by direct 
negotiation with government leaders but also by acting on and within the 
Labor Party machine. Moreovey in their direct dealings with Labor govern­
ments their role within the Party machine adds an implicit weight to their 
views that is not present in their dealings with non-Labor governments.
The question of the special relationship between unions and Labor govem-
2ments is dealt with in later chapters. The present discussion is con­
cerned with the existing administrative relationship between unions and 
governments whatever their political complexion, but with particular
2 ?
2 See Part IV, ’The Party-Political Framework’
emphasis on non-Labor governments since in their case the relationship 
can be expected normally to operate at a minimal level.
Third, the definition of collaboration given above implies not only 
the existence, on the workers* side, of ‘voluntary and representative* 
organizations, but the acceptance of those organizations by the public 
authorities. Conversely, it implies the acceptance of the public auth­
orities themselves by such organizations* This point should not be 
underrated in view of the possible influence of syndicalist or Communist 
theories in trade union circles, or, more normally in Australia, in view 
of the way in which trade unionists as Labor Party supporters may regard 
a non-Labor government. Further, the definition implies some readiness 
on both sides *to settle their problems by negotiation [and] to consult 
together on all matters of common interest*.^ Thus mutual acceptance 
of each other and of the desirability of consultation in some form are 
essential prerequisites to cooperation between trade unions and govern­
ment. If its significance is to be appreciated, a description of the 
union role in the state *s administrative frame-work must be preceded by 
an analysis of trade union and government attitudes to union activity 
in this field.
3* I.L.O., loc. cit
CHAPTER 10
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRADITION
In October 1954 the Commonwealth Government set up the Ministry of 
Labour Advisory Council. For the first time in Australia ’formal arr­
angements had been made for regular and continuing high level consult­
ation among the Commonwealth Government, employers and the Trade Union 
movement on labour and employment problems.*^ The Council's formation 
was of considerable significance. In the first place, the Government 
concerned was non-Labor. In the second place, while a similar body had
operated in the United Kingdom for more than a decade, 'neither the trad­
ition nor the machinery of joint consultation and negotiation existed to
2the same extent' in Australia. The establishment of the Advisory Coun­
cil seemed to indicate that the attitudes composing a tradition of this 
sort had, at least to some extent, taken shape.
1• The Trade Unions
Trade union leaders' changing attitudes to consultation with non- 
Labor governments during the 'thirties has been touched on in a previous 
chapter. In both the State and Federal spheres during the 'twenties 
such consultation as did take place was usually of a formal character.
It was conducted more by letter than by deputation and frequently through 
the medium of Labor parliamentarians. The exceptions, where more or less 
informal discussions were held, usually involved serious industrial
1 H.A. Bland, The Work of the Australian Ministry of Labour Advisory 
Council (roneoed);Aust. Inst, of Pol. Sei., Jan., 1957, 1.
2 Ibid, 2.
3 See Chapter 4*
disputes. The customary formal approach meant that issues were seldom 
discussed; instead, a demand was made and a reply given with no further 
exchange of views or attempt to reach a compromise. Even the limited 
amount of more informal consultation that took place was regarded with 
suspicion by many union leaders. A proposal that the A.C.T.U. should 
send a delegation to discuss certain questions with the Bruce-Page Govern-
umon
ment in 1927 inspired a resolution from a central^organization opposing 
all delegations of this sort on the ground that 1there is no reason why 
such matters cannot be dealt with by our Parliamentary Federal members.’^
But the accumulated experience of the shortcomings of party-political 
action, culminating in the controversy over the Premiers* Plan, and renewed 
experience of economic depression made it increasingly apparent that it 
was not sufficient for the unions merely to make declarations on the poli­
cies of non-Labor governments or to demand concessions without discussion. 
Much less was it possible to ignore such governments or to treat with 
them only through Labor parliamentarians. Negotiation with non-Labor 
governments was essential for a union movement that could not expect to 
influence major government policy decisions in any other way. Moreover, 
union leaders were increasingly conscious of the desirability of obtaining 
a voice in the way in which government administrative powers were exercised^ 
a view that was to gain added weight with the onset of war and the extension 
of Federal control over economic and industrial affairs. Implicit in 
these attitudes was the recognition by many union leaders that some 
cooperation with non-Labor governments was inevitable if their aims were
4 Minutes. United Trades & Labor Council of S.A., 18/11/1927.
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to be achieved. This was made clear by the Secretary of the A.C.T.U.
when, with the industrial strength of the union movement consolidated
by wartime conditions, he impressed on the Menzies government the
unions* claim for a share in the administration of the wars
I would suggest that if the Commonwealth Government desires to 
command the utmost possible co-operation of the trade union 
movement, it should immediately follow the example of the Brit­
ish Government by appointing representatives of the trade union 
movement on every body or tribunal set up in connection with the 
war effort.5
Later, the complement to this proposition was submitted to the subse­
quent Labor Government when it was reminded that in return for their 
support, the unions wanted not only to be * consistently consulted.,. 
on industrial matters,*6 but to be represented *on all Boards where the
7interests of the workers were affected by the decisions of such Boards •*
The right to be consulted and the right to be represented on admin­
istrative bodies were not regarded &s temporary measures for use only in 
times of crisis. In 1945 the President of the A.C.T.U. voiced the union*s
determination to continue to insist on these rights:
The trade union movement...is not prepared to see a return to 
conditions operating prior to the war. To this end the move­
ment will exert economic and political pressure to the fullest 
possible extent; it will become politically active on a scale 
unsurpassed. Experience has shown that economic pressure alone 
is not sufficient, that the government of the country day by day 
and year after year is compelled by the complicated conditions 
operating to interfere more and more with the relations between 
employer and worker.3
The intention to deal with governments at all times, and not only when 
they happen to be Labor governments, is clear in this statement. Despite
5 C. Crofts, *The War Time Responsibilities of Trade Unions and Their 
Leaders*, a broadcast printed in THe labor Call (Melbourne), 22/5/1941.
6 The Labor Call. 19/2/1942.
7 Report. Convention of Federal Unions convened by the Federal Govern­
ment, June 1942, 18.
8 P.J. Clarey, in Australia*s Post-War Economy. 258.
continaing ties with the Labor Party the trade union movement, as one 
of its leaders put it, now 1reserves the right to negotiate with all gov­
ernments* ; the day to day problems facing the unions demand that they 
should be free to deal equally, if on somewhat different terms, with Labor 
and non-Labor governments alike.
This do©3 not mean that all union leaders are agreed on procedures 
for dealing with non-Labor governments, or even that, since 1945, they 
have always been united on the need for such dealings. There have been, 
and still are, strong differences of opinion on both counts. The charge 
of ’cooperating* with a non-Labor government can still be a damaging one 
in union circJLes, though there is little doubt that ’cooperation* in this 
sense is given a more restricted meaning today than thirty years ago. 
Acceptance of the need for some measure of cooperation with the Menzies 
Federal Government after its election in 1949 was by no means universally 
automatic, despite the prominence of those union leaders who showed immed­
iate realism in facing the implications of the Labor defeat. In 1950 the 
A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive rejected a proposal, supported by its lead­
ing officials, that it should be represented at an industrial conference 
suggested by the Menzies Government. As one opponent of participation 
said, *it is our duty to work for the defeaT of the Menzies-Fadden Gov­
ernment, and the Trade Union Movement should not in any way co-operate 
with such a G o v e r n m e n t * A n d  a few months later, the strongly left-
wing Trades and Labor Council of Queensland carried a motion recalling
9 Minutes. Trades and Labor Council of Qd., 25/l0/l950
the a ttitude prevalent in the 1920*s: ’We declare that the A.C.T.U.
should not confer as proposed with the Menzies Government, but, on the 
contrary, should demand that the Menzies Government take immediate steps 
to reduce and peg p r ic e s ..* ^  This view a t f i r s t  obtained fa ir ly  gen­
eral support in union c irc les . I ts  firm supporters were largely m ilitant 
left-wing union leaders, including Communist o ffic ia ls , and many of those 
who were most closely involved in p o litica l ac tiv ities  within the Labor 
Party. In addition, many union leaders not committed in either of these 
ways found i t  acceptable because the union movement now, unlike the * th ir tie s  
was able to speak from a position of cd nsiderable industrial strength -  an 
a ttitude that was probably reinforced by an over-optimistic belief in  the 
early return of a labor government. Clear indications that industria l 
strength was not enough and the failu re of the hoped-for Federal Labor 
government to materialize influenced a reversal in the a ttitude of the 
uncommitted union leaders. At the same time, the ranks of those who opp­
osed consultation on principle were depleted by the successes of the right- 
wing Industrial Groups, which on the one hand reduced Communist strength 
and on the other, despite th e ir  close tie s  with the Labor Party, showed a 
greater readiness to cooperate with non-Labor governments.
The A.C.T.U. In terstate Executive’s proposal in 1954 to take part in 
the Ministry of Labour Advisory Council, and i t s  endorsement by a majority 
the A.C.T.U.’s State branches, was in marked contrast to the Executive's 
rejection in 1950 of the Menzies Governments invitation to attend an 
industria l conference -  as i t  was, too, to the pre-war attitude of union
10 Ibid, 25/ 7/ 1951.
11 For examples of the ro le , in  th is  type of context, of union leaders 
p o litica lly  committed in th is way, see Chapter 4.
leaders towards the suggestions of non-Labor Federal governments for 
the formation of a Trade Union Advisory Panel, Even since 1955 and 
the eclipse of the Industrial Groups, however, there does not appear to 
have been any marked swing back to a policy of no-negotiation with non- 
Labor governments. In time, even the earlier harcU-core opponents of 
consultation with the Menzies Government came to recognize that some action 
on these lines was necessary and that this meant cooperation in some form. 
Thus there no longer seems to be serious disagreement among union leaders 
on the need for such consultation. The main debate has shifted to the 
forms consultation should take, which involves the question of union parti­
cipation in formal consultative bodies set up by non-Labor governments# 
After 1954 this debate centred on the A.C.T.U.*s representation on the 
Ministry of Labour Advisory Council.
To the extreme left-wing, participation in the Council smacked of 
1class-collaboration*• To officials closely linked with the Labor Party 
it indicated a consistent policy of by-passing Labor*s parliamentary repre­
sentatives. The stand taken by these groups was strengthened by some 
features of the Government parties* attitude towards the Council. Resent­
ment was felt in union as well as political Labor circles £it the tactics 
of some Government members who sought to embarrass the Labor Opposition by
12 See Section 2 below. Has luck suggests the union attitude was a combin­
ation of distrust of non-Labor governments in general, a personal distrust 
of Prime Minister Menzies, and the influence of union leaders opposed to 
rearmament: The Government and the Pefenle. 1939-A1. 146, 566. The feel­
ing that a non-Labor government * should not be supported in this way* was 
apparently, still very strong when the Panel proposal was revived in 
1940: see E. Ronald Walker, The Australian Economy in War and Reconstr­
uction. 287#
contending that proposals, previously considered by the Council, had there­
by received the approval of the union representatives on that body. I t  
was also a complaint of the union representatives themselves tha t notice 
given of the matters to be discussed a t Council meetings was often too 
short owing to the in trica te  constitutional procedures of th e ir  organization. 
Criticism was brought to a head by the Governments failure in October 1956 
to inform the Council of certain important changes (to which the union 
movement was strongly opposed) i t  proposed to make to the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act, even though the Council had met a short time before the 
amending B ill was introduced. The fac t that the A.C.T.U. President was 
directly  informed of some, though not a l l ,  of the B ill 's  contents between 
the Council meeting and the 8111*3 introduction was not regarded as affect­
ing the principle that Council members should have been given an opportunity 
of expressing the ir opinions -  a view, incidentally, that was also voiced 
strongly by the employers' representatives a t the Council's next meeting.
To many union leaders who had previously accepted participation in 
the Advisory Council, these features of i t s  operation made participation 
of questionable value, and seemed to bear out the early prediction of a 
firm opponent of participation that the Council could 'develop into a 
highly dangerous Committee in relation to compromising the Trade Union 
Movement'P The growing feeling on th is  score was evident in the A.C.T.U. 
In terstate Executive's treatment of proposals that i t  withdraw from the 
Council: in May 1956 i t  rejected a t once a proposal on these lin es , but
when the question was again raised early in 1957 i t  found i t  advisable to 
report back and obtain the approval of a majority of the State branches for
13 Minutes. Trades & Labor Council of Qd., 18/5/1955*
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continued p a rtic ip a tio n .^  Particularly on the side of union leaders 
closely involved in Labor Party ac tiv itie s , the campaign against p artic i­
pation in the Council was in tensified . I t  was widely accepted among 
delegates to the 1957 A.C.T.U. Congress that the agenda pqper item pro­
posing withdrawal from the Council, on the ground that such bodies were 
aimed a t 1welding...the Trade Union Movement to the reactionary policies* 
of the Menzies Government,^ would receive a majority vote. Congress did 
not reach th is  item, but the In terstate Executive*s decision in February 
1958 to accept the proposal contained in the item probably reflected the 
feeling of Congress. In any event, the decision represented a victory
for the alliance on th is question of extreme left-wing union leaders and
16those intimately connected with the Labor Party. I t  remains to be seen
whether the same policy w ill be followed in relation to other Federal 
advisory bodies.
Even those trade union leaders who are firmly convinced of the general 
value of representation on government advisory bodies do not, however, ad­
vocate that invitations from non-Labor governments to take part in the 
ac tiv itie s  of such bodies should be automatically accepted. Each case 
must be decided on i t s  merits. 1ft February 1957, for exanple, the A.C.T.U. 
In terstate Executive dedined the Federal Government*s invitation to i ts  
President to become a member of the Commonwealth Economic Advisory Comm­
itte e , a body which was se t up the previous year and had held i t s  f i r s t  
meetings without trade union representation. The mounting criticism  of
14 Minutes. A.C.T.U. In tersta te  Executive, May 1956, 7; Feb. 1957, 25.
15 Agenda Paper, Australian Trade Union Congress, Sept. 1957, item 130.
16 I t  may well be tha t there was some significance in the resignation from 
the Advisory Council, shortly before the Executive*s decision, of F.E. 
Chamberlain, a member of the Executive and also Federal President of 
the A.L.P.
the A.C.T.U.'s participation in the Ministry of Labour Advisory Council 
had a good deal to do with this decision* But there were also solid 
arguments advanced in support of it* The Economic Advisory Committee, 
as constituted in 1957, included spokesmen for manufacturing, commerce, 
grazing, banking and retailing interests, as well as public servants and 
university economists* Many union leaders otherwise favourable to part­
icipation in advisory bodies considered that a single union spokesman did 
not constitute sufficient representation in a c ommittee so heavily weighted 
with employers' representatives* This contention was linked to a more 
fundamental objection directed at the character of the Committee* The 
Committee was constituted with the intention that it should, as a body, 
submit definite recommendations on eocnomic policy to the Government.^ 
Although, in formal terms, the 4#C*T.U* President had been offered member­
ship in a personal capacity, it was felt by union leaders that his part­
icipation would mean that the trade union movement was binding itself in 
advance to such recommendations. The difference, on this argument, 
between the Economic Advisory Committee and the Ministry of Labour Advis­
ory Council was that while the Committee, which included no Government 
leader, was expected to set out an economic policy for the Government's 
consideration, the Council was more in the nature of a forum under the 
chairmanship of the Minister for Labour and National Service, the Govern­
ment introducing specific topics and inviting comment from the interest- 
groups represented. The emphasis in the case of the Council was less on 
recommendations (though these might be made on a basis of unanimity) than 
on keeping the Government informed of the views of major groups on matters
17 As it happened, the Committee in 1957 did not reach the stage of making 
specific recommendations* ( LIBRARY "i m
of common concern. There was a similar, if less marked, difference 
between the Economic Advisory Committee and the earlier National Security 
Resources Board, set up by the Menzies Government in December 1950 and in 
Active operation for three years. The President of the A.C.T.U. accepted 
membership of the Board in a personal capacity although heavily outweighed 
numerically by employers* representatives. The Board did make recom­
mendations to the Government, but on the basis of its members* concensus 
of opinion. More important, however, the Board was, like the Ministry 
of Labour Advisory Council, presided over by a Government leader, the Prime 
Minister, and other Cabinet ministers occasionally took part in its dis­
cussions. * Largely speaking, the Board functioned by informing the Prime
Minister*s mind*.
While there is disagreement among union leaders on the question of 
participation in consultative bodies set up by non-labor governments, there 
is general agreement on the desirability of having trade union representat­
ives on government administrative bodies. The President of the A.C.T.U. 
in 1945 put the union case in terms which few union leaders would question 
today:
...on all controlling authorities appointed for the express purpose 
of the administration of industry and devising methods for economic 
control, the trade union movement must be represented.. .We are the 
party of the third part in the economic life of the community. It 
is useless to say that there are only two parties, the party of the 
first part, the Government; the party of the second part, the em­
ployer. There is a party of the third part, the workers...In order 
that we can play our part and bring our experience to bear, in order 
that we can put the viewpoint of the masses of the people before those 
who have some influence on the conduct of industry, we say that we 
must be represented on the controlling bodies.
18 Ronald Mendelsohn, The Allocation of Resources as an Administrative 
Problem, (roneoed), 14*
19 Clarey, op. cit., 259-60.
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Even before the second world weir, as we have seen,^® the unions were 
pressing non-Labor Federal governments for union representation on admin­
istrative bodies. More recently, the Trades and Labor Council cf Queens­
land, of all the A,C,T.U.*s branches the most consistent opponent of 
participation in bodies like the Ministry of Labour Advisory Cornell, has 
pressed for union representation on bodies administering the meet industry 
and price control, for example, even though such representatives would be 
outnumbered and out-voted. The emphasis placed on this aim varies from
State to State; it appears to be greatest in New South Wales and Victoria, 
But in all States there is little disagreement on its desirability in 
principle.
Representation on administrative bodies raises somewhat the same prob­
lems of commitment for the unions as in the case of advisory bodies, though 
usually at a lower and therefore less controversial level. The question 
here, and it is applicable to either type of body, is whether unionist- 
members should be considered as direct representatives, that is union dele­
gates, or as acting in a purely personal capacity. The Australian trade 
union movement, unlike the British, has not yet reached the stage of delib­
erately formulating a coherent policy on this question. For exanple, the 
action of J. Shortell, President of the New South Wales Labor Council, in 
relinquishing his union posts on his appointment to the Stevedoring Indust­
ry Authority in 1956, did not reflect a belief that by doing so he would 
release the unions from any implied obligation to accept unpopular decis­
ions of the Authority or would be in a better position to carry cut his
20 See Chapter 4
new functions* It reflected merely the fact that his new position 
was a full-time one and would allow him little time for union activities. 
The problem was easily solved in this case; but it arises in most 
others, since the great majority of positions held by unionists on ad­
ministrative boards, and all those held on advisory bodies, axe part- 
time and the unionist-members continue to hold their union positions.
From a government’s point of view, as is apparent from experience 
in other countries as well as Australia,
the role of ’representative’ has in some instances tended to 
hinder the constructive contribution that may be made either by 
the trade unionist or by the employers’ member in the discussions 
and decisions of tripartite agencies because the representative 
may be bound by instructions, may not wish to go beyond previously 
agreed policy, or may be more eager to serve his group than to 
aid the committee discussion.
It was this sort of situation which brought about the failure of the 
second Stevedoring Industry Commission set up in 1947 with administrat­
ive and arbitral powers. The Commission included two representatives 
of the Waterside Workers Federation who were the union’s top officials 
and also members of the Australian Communist Party. The experiment was 
abandoned in 1949* The immediate reason given by the Federal Labor Gov­
ernment for this action was that the representatives, in their capacity 
as union officials, had incited strikes by their members against the
gaoling of one Communist union leader for a political offence and of
22another for contempt of the Federal Arbitration Court; but throughout 
the life of the Commission the two representatives had shown no great
21 I.L.O., Wartime Developmehts in Government-Employer-Worker Collab­
oration. 150.
22 See Fitzpatrick, The Australian Commonwealth. 72.
readiness to smooth its path in smaller matters, and the head of the 
Commission had recommended earlier that it should be re-constituted.
This problem may be avoided by disqualifying the union represent­
ative from taking part in discussions or exercising his vote on matters 
of direct concern to the unions - a solution which the Commissioner 
of the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Commission attempted to impose on the 
Secretary of the Hobart Trades Hall Council when he was appointed a 
member of the Commission. Clearly, however, this not only debars the 
union representative from discussing or voting on precisely those matters 
in which he has greatest interest and experience, but destroys any value 
his appointment might have had as a means of obtaining union views and 
cooperation.^ The less short-sighted solution favoured in a number of 
countries is the selection of unionist-members as individuals ratheri
than representatives, in the hope that this will give them independence 
as union spokesmen and at the same time achieve the purposes for which 
they are usually appointed. The policy of the personal appointment is 
used extensively in Australia.^4 it is most commonly used by non-Labor
governments, but is often preferred by Labor governments. However, 
before making firm selections on this basis, Labor governments are more 
likely to confer with the relevant central union organization.
The role of Representative* poses problems for unions as well as 
governments. Experience has shown, as one unidn leader put it, that 
*union representatives do not always act as representatives*. They 
have on occasion supported decisions or policies opposed by central 
union organizations or unions other than their own, or even by their own
23 The State Labor Government recognized this and supported the unionist- 
member* s protest.
24 See Table 9*
union. More frequently, they have failed  in the ir accepted and often 
primary function of passing back information. Moreover, on most decision­
making bodies unionists are in a minority and can hope only to influence
25
and not to decide policies. The implication of d irect representation! 
on administrative boards, as the British Trades Union Congress has recog­
nized, is  that the unions are under an obligation to accept board decisions, 
regardless of whether the union representatives have voted in favour of the 
decisions and despite the ir small voice in making them. Even where the 
obligation to abide by the decisions of a body on vhich they are represented 
is  not accepted by the unions, union o ffic ia ls  are aware that many unionists 
and the general public tend to regard the views of representatives as an 
accurate egression  of union policies and th e ir  presence on a body as inr- 
volving the unions* acceptance of i ts  decisions. Many union leaders are 
even inclined to view representation on an advisory body as implying that 
the unions in some degrees accept government policies in the fie ld  covered 
by that body. As a solution to th is problem, the British trade union move­
ment has accepted the notion of the unionist-appointee serving in a personal 
capacity, whose actions involve for the unions neither the right of d irect­
ion nor the obligation of responsibility: ’although in practice they are
nominated by a trade union body they are not trade union representatives 
in the sense of being delegates*?? The Australian trade union movement, 
on the other hand, has shown less readiness to  accept th is  notion,
25 Ibid.
26 British Trade Unionism (3rd ed.), 144 (P.E.P.),
27 Trades Union Congress, Trade Unions and Government Authorities. 6.
The Menzies Government from the inauguration of the Ministry of
Labour Advisory Council was careful to emphasize that its unionist-members
28were appointed strictly in a personal capacity. Union leaders in gen­
eral were not, however, disposed to treat representation on the Council as
a personal matter for those concerned. The A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive
29has itself referred to the *A.C.T.U. representatives to the Council*.
And an item on the agenda of the 1957 Congress observed the technical posit­
ion by confining itself to a firm recommendation that the A,C,T,U, officials 
withdraw from the Council, but clearly indicated the common view of the
character of the officials* membership by declaring that * there can be no
30
participaii on without commitment* for the unions. This view was also 
evident in an earlier proposal for the officials* withdrawal from the Coun­
cil on the ground that their participation *gives the appearance that the
\jstamp of approval of the Labor Movement is being sought for the plans of
31the Federal Government*, Again, when the A,C,T.U, President was invited
in a personal capacity to become a member of the Economic Advisory Committee
in 1957, it was the Interstate Executive that considered and declined the 
32invitation, ~ a procedure that indicated the Executive*s recognition of the 
attitude of most union leaders to appointments of this sort. Six years 
earlier the President had accepted, on his own initiative, a personal invi­
tation to take up membership of the National Security Resources Board. The 
Interstate Executive *s decision that he was acting not as *a representative 
of the trade unions but as an individual* did not prevent protests based on
28 Bland, op. cit., 2.
29 Executive Report. A.C.T.U., Sept. 1955, 42,
30 Agenda Paper, op. cit., item 130.
31 Minutes. A.C.T.U.Interstate Executive, May 1956, 7.
32 Executive Report . A.C.T.U., Sept. 1957, 28.
33th e  assum ption th a t  he was in  e f f e c t ,  i f  n o t fo rm a lly , a r e p r e s e n ta t iv e .  
U n io n is ts  ap p o in ted  in  a p e rso n a l c a p a c ity  as members o f a d m in is tra t­
iv e  bod ies a re  u s u a l ly  reg arded  in  th e  same l i g h t .  For t h e i r  p a r t ,  many 
o f th e se  members them selves p r e f e r  to  emphasize th e  p e rso n a l c h a ra c te r  o f 
t h e i r  appo in tm en ts. But th e  view expressed  by an o f f i c i a l  ap p o in ted  on 
a p e rso n a l b a s is  to  membership o f th e  Tasmanian H y rd ro -E le c tr ic  Commission,
th a t  1I , , . f e e l  th a t  I  am answ erable to  th e  Trades Unions*^ i s  by no means 
34uncommon.
The p o lic y  which i s  a t  p re s e n t most w idely  accep ted  among A u s tra l ia n  
un ions i s  th e re fo re  one which seeks the  b e s t  o f bo th  w o rld s . W ith r e s e r ­
v a tio n s  in  some q u a r te rs  so f a r  as ad v iso ry  bodies a t  l e a s t  a re  concerned , 
d i r e c t  r e p re s e n ta t io n  i s  sought w herever p o s s ib le .  Where a u n io n is t  i s  
ap p o in ted  in  a p e rso n a l c a p a c ity , re p re s e n ta t io n  i s  u s u a lly  assumed a lthough  
th e  appo in tee  h im se lf may n o t a cc e p t t h i s  p r in c ip le ,  e s p e c ia l ly  i f  th e  
p o s i t io n  i s  a  f u l l - t im e  one and re q u ire s  h is  r e s ig n a tio n  from un ion  o f f i c e .
In  l in e  w ith  th e  general v iew , un ion  le a d e rs  ex p ec t in  r e l a t i o n  to  a  Labor 
governm ent, and hope in  r e l a t i o n  to  a non-Labor one, th a t  th e y  w i l l  a t  
l e a s t  be c o n su lted  b e fo re  p e rs o n a l, as  w e ll as  r e p re s e n ta t iv e ,  appointm ents 
a re  made from un ion  ra n k s . But more th an  t h i s ,  th ey  want th e  r i g h t  o f 
nom inating such a p p o in te e s . In  1954* f o r  exam ple, the  V ic to r ia n  Labor 
Government a l t e r e d  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  o f the  Melbourne and M etro p o litan  Tram­
ways Board to  in c lu d e  an employees* re p re s e n ta t iv e .  The subsequen t ap p o in t­
ment o f a u n io n is t  to  f i l l  th e  p o s i t io n  r a is e d  a storm  in  un ion  c i r c l e s  
because he had been nom inated by n e i th e r  the  un ion  concerned nor th e  Melb­
ourne Trades H a ll C ouncil, a p r iv i le g e  which was expected  from a Labor
33 D elegates r e p o r t ,  M inu tes. Trades & Labor C ouncil o f Q d., 28/ 34951*
34 Annual R ep o rt, 1954, S e c re ta ry , Howb a r t  Trades H a ll C ouncil, 5*
government. But perhaps the most striking illustration of the strength
of union feeling on this score was given in the controversy surrounding
the appointment of H.J. Blackburn as employees* representative on the New
South Wales State Mines Control Authority in April 1955. Blackburn was a
prominent member of the Labor Party, President of the Lithgow Labor Council,
an official of one of the mining unions and an employee in the State-owned
mines* But his appointment touched off a strike, supported by the Miners
Federation, in the mines controlled by the Authority* The strike was
directed against the action of the State Minister for Mines in making the
appointment on his own initiative. This he was entitled to do under the
terms of the relevant Act; but in the past it had been the custom to fill
the position by a ballot of the employees concerned. One union spokesman
claimed, even though the Minister was a member of a Labor Government, that
35it was *a case of the boss appointing an employees* representative*.
The Minister pointed out that the representative, whoever he was, could 
hope to have little effect on the Authority*s decisions since he was only 
one of seven members.3& But this was not the issue, and the strike contin­
ued. The Minister’s appointee was obliged to resign within a fortnight 
of his appointment, after which the customary ballot for the employees* rep­
resentative was held.
At the same time as they insist on the representative character of all 
unionist appointments, most union leaders refuse to be bound automatically 
by any decision of a body on which the unions are represented, notwith­
standing that the decision may have been supported by their representatives.
35 Sydney Morning Herald. 3/4/1955
36 Ibid., U / 4/1955.
P F . °
S ta r t in g  from th i s  p rem ise , un ion  le a d e rs  a re  th e re fo re  le s s  concerned 
w ith  th e  te c h n ic a l  n a tu re  o f u n io n is t  appointm ents to  c o n su lta tiv e  and 
a d m in is tra tiv e  bodies th a n , s u b je c t to  the  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  d iscu ssed  e a r l i e r ,  
w ith  secu rin g  appointm ents o f t h i s  s o r t  to  as wide a  range o f  p u b lic  
bod ies a s p o s s ib le .
In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e , t h i s  p o lic y  aims a t  making the  union  vo ice  heard  
a t  as many le v e ls  and p o in ts  o f  in flu en ce  as p o s s ib le .  On a d m in is tra tiv e  
boards i t  can be hoped t h a t  the  vo te  o f u n io n is t  members may c a r ry  some 
w eigh t in  d e c is io n s  made, though th ey  a re  a lm ost in v a r ia b ly  in  a m in o rity : 
a t  l e a s t  th e y  may ensure a more sym pathetic  a t t i t u d e  to  union w ishes -  a 
f a c to r  o f p a r t i c u la r  im portance in  th e  case  o f u n io n is t  appointm ents to  
a r b i t r a l  b o d ie s . On ad v iso ry  bodies un ion  views may be exp ressed  more 
r e g u la r ly  and in  c ircum stances which can be hoped to  give them g re a te r  fo rc e  
th an  t h e i r  ad hoc e x p re ss io n .
In  the  second p la c e , t h i s  p o lic y  aims a t  secu rin g  in fo rm atio n  which 
may n o t be o therw ise  r e a d i ly  a v a ila b le  to  th e  unions — a fe a tu re  o f p a r t i c i ­
p a t io n  in  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f a d v iso ry  and a d m in is tra tiv e  bod ies t h a t ,  a s  one 
un ion  le a d e r  p u t i t ,  * is  n o t to  our d isad van tage* .
In  th e  t h i r d  p la c e , many unioh le a d e rs  recogn ize  t h a t  in  the  case of 
a d m in is tra tiv e  boards and o f ad v iso ry  bodies on which employers a re  re p re ­
se n te d , r e g u la r  m eeting in  c ircum stances o th e r  th an  those  o f  in d u s t r i a l  
c o n f l i c t  may make f o r  a  measure o f  p e rso n a l goodw ill and u n d ers tan d in g  which 
i s  l i k e l y  to  be o f  va lue  when in d u s t r i a l  c r i s e s  do occu r. The A.C.T.U. 
I n t e r s t a t e  E xecutive has p o in te d  o u t, f o r  example, th a t  an in c id e n ta l  b e n e f it  
r e s u l t in g  from th e  o p e ra tio n  o f  the  Tradesmens R igh ts Committees has been 
th a t  th e y  have 'h e lp e d  in  m any.. .ways to  improve r e la t io n s h ip s  between
the parties.’
Finally, for some union leaders the Spoils* motive is not without 
personal relevance* Union office seldom carries financial rewards match­
ing its responsibilities; and the fees or other payments accompanying
38membership of many public bodies, chiefly administrative boards, are 
often welcome• In the case of full-time positions, assured security of
tenure is usually added to a greater financial return.
2, The Governments
It has been argued: ’It is natural, in a time of prosperity, that
unions should lose some of their traditional antagonism towards non-Labour 
parties, and seek good relations from any government from which they may
iexpect co-operation*• But a time of prosperity is precisely the time 
when the unions are industrially powerful and are therefore least depend­
ent on the favours of non-Labor governments to which they make no pretence 
of political allegiance * Moreover, it was during the depression years of 
the * thirties that the weakened Australien trade union movement, faced with 
a non-Labor Federal government and richly experienced in the shortcomings 
of Labor governments, was forced to look for some way of dealing with non- 
Labor governments on a scale not contemplated in the previous forty years. 
The general readiness of union leaders to deal, for example, with the 
Menzies Government since 1949 seems to be less a function of prosperity 
than of the combined effect of the lesson hammered home in the ’thirties 
and the widening role of the Federal Government in economic and industrial
37 Executive Report. A.C.T.U., Sept. 1955* 43*
38 See Table 9»
1 Rawson, ’The A.L.P. Industrial Groups - An Assessment* 1(Dec. 1954)* 26 
Australian Quarterly, at 45*
affairs since the war. On the other hand, what could perhaps be called 
•natural* in this context is the eagerness of the Menzies Government to 
seek cooperation from a union movement strengthened by economic prosperity - 
a situation foreshadowed by the attempts of the Lyons and first Menzies 
non-Labor governments to effect a liaison with a union movement whose power 
was enhanced by war or the -threat of wax.
In Australia, as in the United Kingdom, the need to obtain at least 
minimal cooperation from the unions was brought home to the members of non- 
Labor governments during the war of 1914»-1ö when full and unimpeded pro­
duction was of the utmost national importance. Recognition of this was 
most apparent in the steps taken in 1917 by the Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, 
to facilitate the Governments ambitious shipbuilding programme by obtain­
ing from the unions concerned * guarantees that the policy of the Government 
should not be paralysed by strikes•*2 Similarly, union representatives 
were included in a conference called by the Governor-General to consider 
the question of encouraging voluntary recruiting following the failure of 
the second conscription referendum,^ In each of these cases, the Federal 
Government concerned was non*-Labor; it was also aware that it was regarded 
with particular hostility by the trade union movement because it was led 
by Hughes, the ex-Labor Prime Minister, who had been expelled from the Labor 
Party as a result of the split on the conscription issue. Despite this 
hostility (and possibly, to some extent, because of it), Hughes* Nationals 
ist Government on a number of occasions was obliged to seek from the unions 
a measure of cooperation, which it did not always obtain without making
2 Scott, AustraliaJWmtthe War. Official War History, vol, XI, 629,
3 Evatt, Australian Labour Leader, 457,
concessions. Little in the way of formal machinery of consultation 
was established by contrast with the development on these lines that took 
place under the first Menzies Government in the early stages of the second 
world war. But the desirability of some liaison with the union movement 
in wartime was clearly admitted.
For those leaders of later non-labor governments who wished to see it, 
wartime experience also indicated that consultation might be useful in periods 
of peacetime economic crisis - even if only in circumstances where the crisis 
enhanced union strength. Hughes showed awareness of this in 1922 when he 
called a conference of union leaders and employers to discuss issues in 
the current condition of the Australian economy." But the notion that 
non^Labor administrations should actively encourage consultation with the 
union movement as a general peacetime policy was as slow to take root on 
the side of government as its converse was on the side of the unions. In 
large measure, government reluctance on this score was a reflection of 
the weakness of the unions* bargaining position during much of the inter­
war period, which meant that government leaders preferring to restrict their 
contact with the unions could afford to do so. But it is also apparent, 
and understandable, that non-Labor governments were disinclined on princ­
iple either to give or to seek cooperation in relation to organizations as 
closely involved with their political opponents as were the unions. The 
Bruce-Page Government, for example, might have found it expedient on occa­
sion to relax this policy, as in 1927 when it prepared to add to its anti-
4 For example, the price paid for the cooperation of the shipbuilding un­
ions in the case cited above included the establishment of a special tri­
bunal for the industry which by-passed the Federal Arbitration Court. The 
same procedure had been followed in November 1916 as a means of getting 
the coal miners to end a serious strike.
5 Greenwood (ed.), «Development in the Twenties, 191^-1929* in Australia:
A Social and Political History . 295*
strike legislation and at the same time sought to conciliate union opinion 
odtside the industries primarily concerned by proposing an ‘industrial 
peace conference1 J 3 But this Governments more consistent attitude is 
illustrated by its policy on the question of selecting union representatives 
for conferences of the International Labour Organization - a matter of 
comparatively little moment to the Government, but one which was regarded 
by the unions as involving a principle of considerable importance,
Äccording to the practice initiated by the Hughes Government, the union 
representative to an I.L.O. conference was selected by the combined vote 
of the State trades and labour councils. In 1926, however, the Prime Min­
ister, S.M. Bruce, requested each trades and labour council to submit three 
names from which the Government would select the union representative for 
the I.L.O. conference of that year# When the councils refused to fall in 
with the plan and submitted a single name after the customary election, 
the Government refused to nominate a union representative for the conference 
stating that it was not going to abandon its ‘right of nominating delegates 
or of taking part in their choice ♦* Only sifter intensive negotiations 
was the Government persuaded to accept the councils* nominee. Nevertheless 
later the same year, after the trades and labour councils had each agreed 
to submit three nominations for the four trade unionists to be included in 
a Government-sponsored industrial mission to the United States, the Govern­
ment went outside the councils* nominations in appointing one of the uniong
representatives: the councils thereupon repudiated the scheme.
6 Ibid., 325.
7 Letter from Scy. of Prime Minister’s Dpt., in Minutes. United Trades & 
Labor Council of S.A., 9/4/1926.
8 Scy#‘g Annual Rgport , Jan# 1927, Minutes. United Trades & Labor
Coundl of S.A., 11/3/1927.
The Government’ s experiences in  1926 d id  n o t p rev en t i t  making ano ther 
a tte m p t, again  w ithou t su ccess , to  secu re  more than  one nom ination from 
th e  unions fo r  th e  p o s i t io n  of union re p re s e n ta t iv e  to  th e  n e x t I.L .O . 
co n fe ren ce . However, th e  l a t e r  non-Labor F ed e ra l governments of the  
’ t h i r t i e s  accep ted  th e  p r in c ip le  th a t  such re p re s e n ta t iv e s  should be 
s e le c te d  s o le ly  by the  union movement and nominated by th e  A.C.T.U.
This p o lic y  has s in ce  1949 been follow ed w ithou t question  by th e  Menzies 
Government -  to  th e  e x te n t t h a t  i t  has u n h e s i ta t in g ly  accep ted  th e  
nom ination of one of th e  most prom inent Communist union o f f i c i a l s  fo r
9
a p o s i t io n  of th i s  s o r t .
There seems to  have been some re la x a t io n  d u rin g  th e  ' t h i r t i e s  in  
th e  a t t i tu d e  of non-Labor governments to  c o n su lta tio n  w ith th e  un ions, 
p a r t l y ,  p e rh ap s, as a r e s u l t  o f in c reased  union a c t i v i t y  in  th i s  sph ere , 
p a r t i c u la r ly  a t  th e  F e d e ra l l e v e l .  But i t  was s t i l l  a p e rio d  when, as 
union o f f i c i a l s  r e c a l l ,  a sen io r member of a non-Labor S ta te  c a b in e t could 
boa3 t th a t  in  more than  e ig h t years  o f o f f ic e  the occasions on which he 
had met tra d e  union le a d e rs  o f f i c i a l l y  could be counted on th e  f in g e rs  of 
one hand. The s ig n i f ic a n t  change in  th i s  a t t i tu d e  was to  come w ith the  
second world war; and th e  symptoms of th e  change were not only to  be e v i ­
d en t d u ring  th e  war p e rio d  i t s e l f  on a f a r  g re a te r  s c a le  than  in  1914-18, 
b u t were to  p e r s i s t  beyond th a t  p e r io d .
The com bination of a tra d e  union movement th a t  was, fo r  a v a r ie ty  of 
re a so n s , s tro n g e r  than  i t  had ever been and a g lo b a l war t h a t  reached to  
the  shores of A u s tra lia  im pressed on government le a d e rs  more c o n c lu s iv e ly  
than  ever b e fo re  the  need to  secu re  union c o -o p e ra tio n . The way in  which
9 See Sydney Morning H e ra ld . 26 /2/1957.
this could alone be achieved was clear:
the only method of achieving a synthesis of labor*s own aspirations 
and the requirements of total war is to bring labor*s chosen repre­
sentatives into the formulation of war policv and, indeed, into its 
daily administration at almost every level.
The Federal war administration up to October 1941 was in the hands of non­
labor parties, whose leaders showed themselves quick to perceive the truth 
of this statement - even when there was no more than the threat of war.
As early as 1938 the Lyons Government attempted to set up a comprehensive 
manpower committee, including a Trade Union Advisory Panel, within the Dep­
artment of Defence; and the question of forming a similar panel was explored 
early the following year as a means of promoting the Government’s scheme
for a voluntary national manpower register. Both proposals died because
11
the A.C.T.U. refused to be formally associated witha panel of this sort.
The idea was dropped for the time being. But with the onset of war and 
Australia*s entry into it, the need for the Menzies Government to solvethe 
problem of enlisting the union movement’s cooperation became vital: 'the
questions that came to demand political attention were those of labour re­
lations, that is of the terms on which unions could be persuaded to co-op-
12erate with a non-Labor government*. The importance of these questions
* had been underlined a few months before the outbreak of war by the success-
13ful union boycott, led by the A.C.T.U., of the national manpower register.
At the close of a serious coal miners* strike in May 1940, the Prime 
Minister revived the proposal for a Trade Union Advisory Panel, and publicly 
expressed his anxiety to secure the cooperation of the trade union movement
10 E. Ronald Walker, The Australian Economy in War and Reconstruction. 286.
11 S.J. Butlin, War Economy 1939-A2. 15.
12 Ibid., 346.
13 See Fit*patrick, The Australian Commonwealth , 148, 266-#.
U The functionsin order to eliminate ,unnecessary* industrial stoppages, 
of the proposed Panel were envisaged as two-folds to advise the Govern­
ment on the conduct of i ts  relations with the unions, and to in terpret
15Government policy to the unions# After negotiations on the matter, the
Government accepted a plan suggested by the A#C.T.U. for the structure of
16the proposed Panel# The plan was approved by an A.C.T.U# conference of 
Federal unions early in July, but was rejected by New South Wales and Queens­
land when i t  was referred to the A.C.T.U.*s State branches. In view of 
the importance of these S tates, the Government discarded the plan as unwork­
able, despite i ts  endorsement by the majority of the branches# At the 
same time, the Government abandoned the attempt to work through the A.C.T.U., 
and issued direct invitations to the A.C.T.U# and each of seven key unions 
to nominate representatives for a Panel to be se t up with a more restric ted  
membership than that originally proposed by the A#C#T#U. The establishment
of a Trade Union Advisory Panel on th is pattern was announced la te  in July.
17 _Representatives from six  organizations attended i t s  f i r s t  meeting. The
A.C.T.U. had rejected the invitation , alleging that the Government was try-
18ing to 1 s p li t  the trade union movement1; and the Munitions Workers Union 
had withdrawn i t s  in i t ia l  acceptance in view of the A.C.T.U.*s decision.
The A.C.T.U.*s stand was la te r  endorsed by a majority of i ts  State branches.
14 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-41.2 0 7 , 216#
15 Butlin, op. c i t . ,  243*
16 The plan provided for a Panel consisting of the chairman of each of nine 
subsidiary panels covering different industry groups, together with the 
four top A.C.T.U. o ffic ia ls . The panel as fin a lly  established included %ub- 
panels* providing lia ison  with individual unions.
17 These were: Australian Workers Union, Amalgamated Engineering Union, Mari­
time Transport Council, Road Transport Union, Textile Workers Union, and 
E lectrical Trades Union. All the unions concerned, except the A.W.U., 
were a ff ilia te d  with the A.C.T.U.
18 Walker, op. c i t . ,  287.
On the other hand, John Curtin, Leader of the Federal Parliamentary-
Labor Party, expressed his approval of the Panel as constituted, and
recommended the A.C.T.U. to accept membership of it on the terms offered
19by the Government* Lbss than a year later the Government approached 
the A.C.T.U. on the question of broadening the Panel*s representation.
The attempt was unsuccessful.
During the remainder of 1940 the Menzies administration convened the
Panel on a number of occasions and gave serious consideration to its ad- 
20vice. The Panel also facilitated the settlement of several disputes
involving unions that were directly or indirectly represented on it. But
its restricted membership and the circumstances of its formation limited
its value. Although it continued to meet from time to time in 1941* less
reliance seems to have placed on it. It3 diminished importance in the
Government*s eyes was indicated by the frequency with which it waa found
necessary to by-pass it, examples of which are discussed below. Many
union leaders agreed with the A.C.T.U. in viewing the Panel’s formation
21as an ’unskilful attempt to play trade union politics.’ Thus whije 
the members of the Parliamentary Labor Party on the Advisory War Council 
were pressing the Government to consult more frequently and more extens­
ively with the trade union movement, machinery was lacking for regular 
consultation at the top level with the greater part of the movement, and 
many union leaders resented the existence of such machinery as did exist.
19 Hasluck, op. cit., 235, 292.
20 For an account of these meetings and their results, see Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, Souvenir.25th Anniversary, 1945, 253-5, 261.
21 Butlin, op. cit., 243*
The failure to establish the Trade Union Advisory Panel as a fully 
representative body should not obscure the fact that up to October 1941» 
vhen the Curtin labor Ministry took office, a considerable amount of 
consultation between the Government and unions outside the Panel did in 
fact take place* Indeed, a consequence of this failure was that in many 
cases the Government was obliged to by-pass the Panel despite its wish to 
use it to the greatest possible extent. In November 1940, for example, 
the Government’s proposals to modify the Federal arbitration system were 
discussed not only with the Panel but also with the A.C.T.U. and the State 
trades and labour councils before the necessary regulations were drafted* 
Similarly, a conference called in March 1941 to dscuss industrial measures 
contemplated by the Government was attended by representatives of int­
erested unions not on the Panel as well as of those who were. Moreover, 
from October 1940 ad hoc consultation with unions outside the Panel was 
facilitated by the formation of the Department of Labour and National 
Service which, by centralizing responsibility for industrial problems, 
encouraged the development of closer informal relations between the ad­
ministration and the unions than was possible when responsibility for 
these problems was dispersed*
Government consultation with unions outside the Trade Union Advisory 
Panel was not limited to ad hoc discussions. Union representatives 
were to be found on a number of Federal Government bodies before the Labor 
administration took over* There were, for instance, trade union repre­
sentatives on the Manpower Priority Board set up in July 1941 with advisory 
powers on manpower problems; on the prices advisory committees formed 
in each State; on the Shipbuilding Board established in March 1941 with
22 See Walker, op. cit., 288
?.{'n
extensive administrative as well as advisory powers; on the Central
Reference Board and local reference boards set up in February 1941 to
deal with disputes in the coal-mining industry; and unions concerned in
the munitions industry were represented on the area boards of management
23of the Monitions Department. One of the most significant examples of
consultation between the Menzies Government and unions outside, as well as
within, the Trade Union Advisory Panel took place from early 1940, when
a number of * dilution* agreements were negotiated between the Government,
employers* organizations and the unions «severing skilled labour in the 
24metal industry. The agreements, later embodied in statutory regulations, 
aimed at alleviating the shortage of skilled labour in the trades affected. 
The machinery set up to administer the dilution scheme included repre­
sentatives of the unions concerned, and was still in operation at the 
beginning of 1958*
Thus, although the Federal governments of the immediate pre-war and 
early war periods were non-Labor and were unable tP establish a Trade
Gmon Advisory Panel on a fully representative basis, they nevertheless
fhe
sought and obtained ^cooperation of the trade union movement on a scale 
greater than at any time previous. The governments1 urgent need for such 
cooperation was matched by the unions * realization that some degree of 
cooperation was not only to their advantage but, in the circumstances,
23 The special importance attached to obtaining the cooperation of unions 
connected with the munitions and defence industries was shown by the 
petrol allowance, additional to the normal ration,granted to their off­
icials in order to help them carry out their duties: Butlin, op. cit«453a<
24 The trades concerned were: engineering, boilermaking, blacksmithing, 
metal moulding, and the electrical and sheet metal trades.
politically necessary. After Labor1s succession to the Federal govern­
ment benches in October 1941* it was natural to expect the acceleration 
and extension of this process and a more wholehearted acceptance of it 
by both sides* The Labor Governments position in this respect was at 
stronger and more vulnerable than that of its non-Labor predecessors.
It could make a stronger appeal to unionists for support as their own 
government, and it could, up to a point, count on a hesitation in union 
circles to embarrass it by over-ready use of direct action. At the 
same time, union leaders expected more from it than from a non-Labor gov­
ernment - if no more than prompt and sympathetic consideration of their 
problems and a readiness to discuss and explain government policy. The 
Government early demonstrated its intention to attempt, as far as it conr- 
sidered possible, to live up to these expectations.
In February 1942 E.J. Ward, the Minister for Labour and Rational 
Service, convened a conference including delegates from seventy-six 
Federal unions, all State trades and labour councils and the A.C.T.U., 
for the main purpose of discussing regulations dealing with manpower con­
trol. The Minister emphasized that the Government was *most anxious1
to obtain the unions1 cooperation in view of the difficulties likely to
25arise in the application of the regulations. Four months later the 
Government convened a similar union conference which was attended by 
fifteen members of the Labor Cabinet, the Prime Minister acting ax chair­
man. Most of the conference time was taken up with ministerial explan­
ations of Government policies and answers to questions from the union
25 Report. Conference of Federal Unions, Feb. 1942, 8
delegates. This conference was the model for similar meetings which 
were held annually during the remaining three years of the war.
At the first of the regular conferences in June 1942, the Prime 
Minister was at pains to claim, in reply to complaints from some dele­
gates, that his Ministers, and particularly those in charge of the Army, 
Labour and the War Organization of Industry departments, *had «11 been 
having regular consultations with Trades Union Officials1, and that he 
himself *had always been ready to meet and receive Trades Union Delegates*. 
The Minister for Labour indicated the pressures to which Labor Ministers 
were subject in this connection when he suggested that *only in cases 
where Trades Union leaders had failed to secure satisfaction through the 
ordinary channels should they seek the aid of the Minister or the Govern- 
ment!* The unions expected and, on the whole, appeared to get easier 
access to the ear of government at the ministerial level - despite com­
plaints from a number of union leaders on this score at the 1944 conference
28with the Government. Because of this: 1 There now seemed to be less 
need for formal machinery for consultation between the Government and 
labor than for bringing employers and workers into conference on contro— 
versial issues.* 7 Although Curtin initially moved to establish it on 
a more representative basis, the Trade Union Advisory Panel lapsed while 
the Government concentrated its efforts on setting up machinery to bring 
unions and employers together.
26 Report.Convention of Federal Unions, June 1942, 11.
27 Ibid, 32.
28 A.E.U., Souvenir, op. cit.,
29 Walker, op. cit*, 2£g.
Shortly after the Labor Government took office, it formed an 
Industrial Relations Council including representatives of employers, 
unions and the Government under the chairmanship of a State arbitration 
court judge. The Council*s first meetings held in January 1942 were 
also its last. The employers* representatives withdrew when the chair­
man gave his casting vote in support of a recommendation advocating
compulsory unionism and the Prime Minister declined to alter the Council’s 
30procedure: the error lay, perhaps, in making such a vote possible, A
Womens Employment Board, similarly constituted and charged with the task 
of fixing women’s wages, also failed in its main purpose when the employ­
ers* organizations refused to nominate a representative, leaving it to 
the Government, as an employer of female labour, to appoint the ’employ­
ers* representative *• In the same way, the scheme for joint industry 
advisory committees, promoted by the Department of War Organization of 
Industry, failed to take root in private industry because of most employ­
ers* reluctance to participate in bodies that involved giving unions 
access to business information.
The contention that formal machinery had a s mailer part to play in 
the Labor Government’s relationship with the unions was substantially 
true at the top level at least. But neither the Government nor the 
unions were disposed to rely solely on ad hoc means of consultation at 
all levels. As a result, formal machinery was not neglected and, indeed, 
proliferated during Labor*s wartime administration; *as a general
rule labor was represented henceforth on most important controlling or 
advisory bodies.* Apart from the similar appointments made earlier
30 A.E.U., Souvenir, op. cit. 270.
31 Walker, op. cit., 289.
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by noop-Labor governments, union representatives were appointed to the 
Land Transport Board and to its subsidiary body the War Railways Comm­
ittee, both having extensive administrative powers; to the Aircraft 
Production Advisory Committee; to each of the industry advisory committees 
of the Manpower Directorate; and to the joint production committees set 
up in government munitions factories, A trade union secretary was made 
an additional adviser to the Prices Commission. In the departments of 
Labour and of War Organization of Industry, liaison officers with the 
trade union movement were appointed from union ranks, a practice which 
was also followed on a smaller scale by a number of other departments 
closely concerned with labour problems.
As E.R. Walker, former Director of Reconstruction, has pointed out, 
’These arrangements were not universally satisfactory, but the general 
policy that they reflected made it possible to introduce, with labor*s
support, many measures that would have been fiercely opposed in other 
32circumstances*. And, if on a scale more in keeping with the less 
pressing needs of peacetime, the general policy these arrangements re­
flected has been applied since the wa^r by non-Labor as well as Labor 
governments. The process is evident at both the State and Federal levels. 
In South Australia, for example, where non-labor governments have held 
office continuously since the early ’thirties, union leaders emphasize 
the change that has taken place since the pre-war period in the attitude 
of the State government to consultation with the unions. In both the
32 Ibid
State and Federal spheres there is no comparison between the number
and variety of advisory and administrative bodies with unionist-members
33operating today and twenty years ago* Non-Labor governments have also
shown a greater readiness to follow Labor* s practice of consulting cen­
tral union organizations about appointments to government bodies from 
union ranks* The change has been most marked in the Federal sphere where 
the broadening role of the Commonwealth in economic affairs, combined with 
the * adoption since the war of full employment policies,, the expansion 
of social security measures, and the growing recognition of the bearing
34of industrial relations on the economic well-being of nations*, has 
impressed on non-Labor parties the need for a measure of cooperation 
with the trade union movement. Informal consultation since 1949 between 
the unions and members of the Menzies Government has become as normal as 
consultation with a Labor government - if less palatable to many union 
leaders.
To a large extent the change in government attitude is clearly a 
function of the post-war strength of Australian trade unionism. The 
threat or existence of direct action has time and again in recent years 
drawn the Menzies Government to initiate negotiations with the unions, 
Non-Labor governments had previously taken the same course in similar 
circumstances, though probably less frequently. But government leaders 
now tend to approach such negotiations from a less uncompromising stands 
point than was often evident in the case of pre-war leaders of non-Labor
33 See Table 9*
34 H,A, Bland, The Work of the Australian Ministry of Labour Advisory 
Council (roneoed), 1•
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governments - not that the Menzies Government has hesitated to show 
the mailed fist when it has thought that the occasion warranted it.
In July 1955, for example, when the union campaign against the anti­
strike penal clauses of the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
was at its height, the Minister for labour and National Service convened 
and presided over a conference of employer and union representatives 
for the purpose,a s he said, of obtaining a 'frank interchange of views 
between us all'.35 Again in 1956, when widespread stoppages were threat- 
ened in protest against the Stevedoring Industry Bill then before Parl- 
iaffient, the Minister offered to meet the A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive 
in order to make *a personal explanation of the legislation*
But while the unions* industrial strength is probably a major influ­
ence, the Government*s attitude also seems to include an element derived 
from a »greater recognition of the union movement in its own right, as 
an integral part of community organization.*37 There appeared, for 
instance, to be an indication of this in the Prime Minister*s invitation 
in September 1955 to discuss *the grave uncertainty of the economic situ­
ation* with A.C.T.U. officials as well as with banking and other financ­
ial interests. Moreover, the supplenmting(to some extent the supplant­
ing) of afl hoc consultative procedures by the formation, on the Governments 
initiative, of the Ministry of Labour Advisory Council reflected an 
appreciation of the trade union movement*s stature that was not me*r% a 
product of the movement*s industrial nuisance value to a non-Labor
government.
35 Sydney Morning Herald. 23/7/1955.
36 Ibid., 1/6/1956.
37 Kenneth F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia. 333* 
qft fiyripfty Morning Herald, 20/9/1955.
CHAPTER 11
TRADE UNIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
1. The Organization of the Parties
One of the main problems facing those who favoured greater 
consultation between the Australian trade union movement and Federal 
governments after the experiences of the first world war was the lack 
of any authoritative central union organization at the national level.
In the States, the trades and labour councils were in most cases compet­
ent to act as union spokesmen in relation to State governments. One of 
the councils, the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, in fact played a large 
part in handling such negotiations as took place with Federal governments 
before the site of the Commonwealth Parliament was transferred from 
Melbourne to Canberra in 1927; but the representation of the Council 
fell far short of giving it national authority.
The expansion in consultation involving Federal governments that 
occurred during the 1914^ 8 war affected individual Federal unions and 
State trades and labour councils. The lack of an effective national 
organization not only hindered unified expression of trade union views, 
and consequently diminished the weight government leaders placed on 
such views as were expressed, but it largely stultified any ideas those 
leaders might have entertained about extending their consultative rela­
tions with the union movement. The Bruce-Page Government demonstrated 
the natural preference of government leaders for dealing with a single 
organization when it asked the Commonwealth Council of Federated Unions 
to secure the unions* nominations for their representative to attend the 
I.L.O. conference in 1926. The Council, which restricted its activities
chiefly to handling union claims before the Federal Arbitration Court,
1referred the Government to the State trades and labour councils.
The formation of the A.C.T.U. in 1927 was the first step towards 
an effective national organization that could speak authoritatively for 
the trade union movement and conduct its relations with Federal govern­
ments. But even by 1939 the A.C.T.U.1 23s claims to this role were still 
largely pretensions. Thus the first Menzies Governments attempts to 
establish the Trade Union Advisory Pqnel on a fully representative basis 
in 1940 failed because the A.C.T.U. lacked authority within the union
movement. The structure of the Panel suggested by the A.E.T.U., and
2accepted by the Government, was not considered satisfactory by the 
bigger unions. The Amalgamated Engineering Union, affiliated with the 
A.C.T.U., boycotted an A.C.T.U. conference called to discuss the scheme 
because it was dissatisfied with its representation on the subsidiary 
industry panels provided for? and with the lack of any assurance that it 
would be represented on the Advisory Panel itself.^ The Australian 
Workers Union, not affiliated, opposed the plan for the same reasons, 
and was a major factor in the refusal of the Queensland Trades and Labor 
Council to endorse the proposal. The bigger unions* attitude also 
appears to have played some part in the New South Wales Labor Council*s 
rejection. The Government*s abandonment of the A.C.T.U.*s scheme was 
understandable in the light of these considerations, which were
1 Secretary*s Annual Report.Jan. 1927, Minutes. United Trades & Labor 
Council of S.A., 11/3/1927. After this experience, the Government in 
1928 sent its request on the same matter to the trades and labour coun­
cils instead of the newly-established A.C.T.U. This time, the councils 
asked it to deal with the central body.
2 See Chapter 10.
3 Amalgamated Engineering Union, Souvenir. 25th Anniversary, 1945, 253.
strengthened by the objections of the unaffilia ted  Western Australian 
central union organization to the predominant position given A.C.T.U. 
representatives in the prpposed Panel.
The A.C.T.U.*s inab ility  to control i ts  major member-unions was 
underlined when, against i t s  opposition, five a ff ilia ted  organisations 
accepted the Governments invitation to take part in the Trade Union Ad­
visory Panel as fina lly  constituted. Again, despite the condemnation 
levelled by the 1940 A.C.T.U. Congress against the A.E.U. for negotiating 
a dilution agreement on i t s  own in itia tiv e , and the Congress1 s warning to 
a l l  other unions against sim ilar action,^ a number of other a ff ilia ted  
unions la te r  followed the A.E.U.1 s eatample.
The Leader of the Federal Labor Opposition summed up the position 
when he pointed out tha t the d ifficu lties  surrounding the formation of 
the Trade Union Advisory Panel were d ifficu lties  which !any Prime Minister 
would experience in Australia* because of the lack of a national union 
organization.5 Because of th is , he thought that the Panel, although withr- 
out A.C.T.U. representation, was *quite competent adequately to represent 
the Trade Union movement*; and he recommended the A.C.T.U., *as a sort
of greater en tity  of unionism in Australia*, to accept membership of the
£
Panel on the terms offered by the Government.
Despite Curtin*s advice the A.C.T.U., as of i t s  nature i t  had to , 
continued to in s is t on i t s  righ t to government recognition as the author­
ita tiv e  spokesman for the trade union movement. I ts  leaders were no 
more prepared to forgo th is  principle for the sake of membership of the 
Trade Union Advisory Panel in 1940 than they had been for the privilege
4 Ib id ., 252.
5 Quoted by Hasluck, The Government and the People. 1939-41. 235.
6 Ibid.
of taking part in a conference with a Federal government in the f i r s t
year of the A.C.T.U.*s l i f e ,  when they demanded, and were refused, the
exclusive right to represent the union movement a t the industrial peace
7conference proposed by the Bruce-Page Government in 1927. As soon as
the Curtin Labor Government took office in October 1941> the A.C.T.U. pressed
i t s  claims for recognition as the *direct source of contact* between the
unions and the Government on a l l  Federal matters. At the conference of
Federal unions convened by the Minister for Labour and National Service
in February 1942, the A.C.T.U. leaders secured the adoption of a resolution
re-asserting th is c l a i m B u t  in June the same year, the Prime Minister
found i t  necessary to point out again that *the A.C.T.U, as a Body did not
represent the Trades Union Mgvement as a whole *, and to appeal for * some
definite and authoritative machine* that could speak for the unions -  *a
real Trades Union Panel with definite authority to cover the whole Trades
Union Movement; a Body which represented a ll  elements of the Movement;
10a Body whose decisions would be final.*
The continuing in ab ility  of the A.C.T.U,, despite i t s  claims, to 
function in th is capacity resulted in the Labor -Governments policy of 
consulting directly  with the Federal unions and the State central union 
organizations by means of annual large-scale conferences throughout the 
war period. Recognition of th is inab ility  was also evident in  the compo-
7 See Greenwood (ed .), Australia: A Social and P o litical History. 325*
8 Statement, P .J. Clarev. The Labor Call (Melbourne). 5/2/1942.
9 Report. Conference of Federal Unions, Feb. 1942, 11#
10 Report. Convention of Federal Unions, June 1942» 16.
sition of the short-lived Industrial Relations Council, on which the
union representation consisted of four A.C.T.U. officials and one official
directly appointed from each of four major unions, three of which were
11affiliated with the A.C.T.U. When the Government did attempt to con­
fine its negotiations to the A.C.T.U., it met strong opposition from major
12A.C.T.U. member-unions.
The change that has taken place in the stature of the A.C.T.U. within 
the trade union movement since the war has already been discussed at 
length.13 in the present context, the change was indicated by the fact
that in 1954 all the union representatives on the Ministry of Labour Advis­
ory Council were, by contrast with the wartime Industrial Relations Council, 
wholly appointed, in fact if not technically, on the nomination of the 
A.C.T.U. But the most arresting indication of the new role of the A.C.T.U. 
in dealings with Federal governments was given in September 1956 by an ex­
change of letters between A.E. Monk, President of the A.C.T.U., and H.E. 
Holt, Minister for Labour and National Service in the Menzies Government.
In a letter to the Minister, the President protested against the 
Acting Prime Minister^ action in receiving a deputation from the Victor­
ian branches of a number of A.C.T.U.-affiliated unions shortly after he 
had refused to see an A.C.T.U. deputation on the ground of pressure of 
business. Monk also noted that that the Clerks and Ironworkers unions, 
both affiliated with the A.C.T.U., were each pressing the Government to 
receive a deputation on matters which had already been the subject of
11 A.E.U., Souvenir, op* cit., 269.
12 See, e.g., ibid., 272.
13 See Chapter 3.
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A.C.T.U. policy decisions -  one of the unions1 proposals had in fact 
been rejected three months ea rlie r by a special A.C.T.U. Congress. Monk 
urged the Government to take account only of representations that «pressed 
’the declared policy of the Trade Union Movement* rather than minority 
views.
To his reply the Minister attached a copy of a le t te r  he had sent to
a l l  members of the Ministry, other than the Prime Minister and Acting
Prime Minister, following the A.C.T.U. President’s approach. This le t te r
set out Holt’3 own practice and his reasons for i t ,  and indicated the
intended practice of members of the Government as a whole.
I t  has been my own p rac tice .. .to refer a l l  such requests for depu­
tations and representations of other than a minor character, to the 
A.C.T.U. indicating that I would consider any requests or views put 
to me from that source. This procedure has a number of obvious ad­
vantages. By channelling these matters through the A.C.T.U. the 
number of items eventually reaching the Government is considerably 
reduced.
Many relatively  tr iv ia l  matters and others of only temporary con­
cern become sieved out in the process. I t  is  helpful towards forming 
a soundly based judgement to know that the views put forward have 
f i r s t  been considered by the A.C.T.U. and have i t s  endorsement. Subse­
quent discussion of any points that may require clarification  or el­
aboration is  fac ilita ted . I t  is  of advantage to know the people we 
are dealing with and we can ascertain more accurately the background 
of any proposition put to us. The A.C.T.U. is  the o ffic ia l organiz­
ation of i t s  a ff ilia te d  trade unions and can speak with more author­
i ty  than anyone else for the trade union movement.
I t  appears that Mr Monk’s recent communication to me is  the con­
sequence of what he alleges to be a departure from th is procedure by 
some M inisters.,.1  have discussed Mr Monk’s le t te r  with our colleagues 
of the Cabinet and i t  has been decided that as a matter of general 
practice, members of individual Trade Unions a ff ilia ted  with the A.C. 
T.U. should be asked, whether making requests for deputations or 
forwarding written representations, to submit these to the Govern­
ment through the A.C.T.U.
The rise  of the A.C.T.U. as the authoritative union spokesman a t the 
Federal level appears to have been reflected in  the corresponding role
14 This correspondence is  reproduced in the A.C.T.U. Bulletin. Sept. 
1956, 12-13.
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of the metropolitan trades and labour councils at the St$te level.
The councils have shown a noticeable tendency in recent years to empha­
size that they are acting as State branches of the A.C.T.U. in their 
dealings with State governments.
------0 O 0 --------
The question of organization has also been important on the side of 
the Federal government. There is little doubt that consultation with 
the unions has been facilitated since 1940 by the establishment of the 
Department of Labour and National Service which provides centralizing 
machinery complementary to that provided on the trade union side by the 
A.C.T.U. The centralizing role of the Department is illustrated by .. 
the policy now followed of requiring that all industrial agreements cover­
ing employees of Federal departments and instrumentalities must be approv­
ed by the Department of Labour and National Service before their conclusion. 
This policy, dearly designed to introduce some uniformity into the terms 
of such agreements, is disliked by union leaders who contend that it has 
prevented favourable settlements1 in many cases. Nevertheless, in the 
same way that the Minister for Labour and National Service, in the corres­
pondence cited above, was emphatic that the union movement was most eff­
ectively dealt with through the A.C.T.U., the A.C.T.U. President, in the 
same exchaige, referred to *what we have both recognized as being the 
proper approach to economic and social questions* - that they should be
15 As one official put it: *The day is gone when 80 per cent, of the Pub­
lic Service Arbitrator*s determinations were the result of agreement'. 
A.C.T.U. leaders were also convinced that a settlement of the postal work­
ers* regulation strike of 1957 would have been reached much earlier with 
the Post-Master General*s Department if it had not been for the attitude 
of the Department of Labour and National Service: Minutes, A.C.T.U. 
Interstate Executive, 1957, 11.
16 A.C.T.U. Bulletin. Sept., 1956, 12.
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1 AC h an n e lle d  through you, as th e  M in is te r  f o r  L a b o r '.
At the S ta te  l e v e l ,  departm ents o f lab o u r o p e ra te  in  each c a se .
But t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  a c t  as c e n tr a l iz in g  bod ies d i f f e r s  w ith  th e  e x te n t 
o f t h e i r  fu n c tio n s . The departm ents in  South A u s tra lia  and W estern Aus­
t r a l i a ,  f o r  in s ta n c e , a re  r e s t r i c t e d  to  m a tte rs  concerning S ta te  govern­
ment em ployees, and the v a rio u s  in d u s t r i a l  m a tte rs  which u s u a lly  come under 
the  departm ent o f lab o u r in  o th e r  S ta te s  a re  d isp e rse d  among o th e r  d e p a r t­
m ents. The F ed e ra l Department o f Labour and N atio n a l S e rv ic e , l ik e  the  
A.C.T.U. in  r e l a t io n  to  the S ta te  tra d e s  and la b o u r c o u n c ils , has s in ce  
the  war tak en  s tep s  to  secure  g re a te r  cohesion  of a c t io n  between i t s e l f  
and i t s  S ta te  c o u n te rp a r ts . Such co o rd in a tio n  as th e re  i s  has been ach­
iev ed  m ainly through the  r e la t io n s  e s ta b lis h e d  between the S ta te  d e p a rt­
ments and th e  re g io n a l o f f ic e s  o f th e  F ed e ra l Department in  each S ta te  
c a p i t a l .  But a developm ent t h a t  has a lre a d y  borne some f r u i t  and i s  l ik e ­
ly  to  be im p o rtan t in  the  fu tu re  i s  the  e s ta b lish m e n t o f th e  Departments 
of Labour Advisory Committee, c o n s is t in g  o f th e  perm anent heads o f th e
F ed era l and a l l  S ta te  departm ents o f la b o u r , which meets a t  six -m onth ly  
17
in te r v a l s .  The F ed e ra l Department has a ls o  p layed  a le a d in g  p a r t  in  
a ttem p ts  to  secu re  a uniform  approach to  a p p re n tic e sh ip  m a tte rs  w hich, in  
term s o f g e n e ra l l e g i s l a t i v e  pow ers, a re  e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith in  th e  competence 
o f th e  S ta te s .
The c e n tr a l iz in g  fu n c tio n s  o f th e  F ed e ra l Department o f Labour and 
N atio n al S erv ice  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  both  th e  Commonwealth and S ta te  adm in is-
16 A.C.T.U, B u l le t in . S e p t. 1956, 12.
17 The Committee was s e t  up in  1947, b u t la p se d  two y ears  l a t e r  u n t i l  i t s
1C r e v iv a l  in  1955 on the  su g g es tio n  o f the  M in is try  o f Labour A dvisory Coun­
c i l .  The Committee r e c e n t ly  sponsored a scheme to  a llow  in te rch an g e  of 
th e  powers o f F e d e ra l and S ta te  I n d u s t r ia l  In s p e c to r s .
18 A j o i n t  F e d e ra l-S ta te  Committee o f In q u iry  in v e s t ig a te d  a p p re n tic e sh ip  
problem s during  1952-4; and in  1955 a s tan d in g  j o i n t  body, th e  (P .T .O .)
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trative structures is significant in the light of the post-war extension 
of Federal activities in the economic field* It is also important in view 
of the parallel rise of the A.C.T.Ü. as the authoritative organ of the 
trade union movement and the growing tendency of the unions to approach 
their problems on a national basis*
2. Consultation with the Unions
Consultation between unions and governments usually takes place in 
one of two ways* In the first place, it may be the result of approaches 
made by either side whenever matters of common concern happen to arise*
In the second place, it may take place through joint bodies established 
for the express purpose of enabling regular discussions on a given range 
of matters*
Ad hoc consultation may be conducted in a v ariety of ways and at a 
number of levels. The degree of formality tends to rise with the level 
in the governmental structure at which consultation takes place. It is 
therefore likely to be conducted on a more formal plane at the ministerial 
than at the departmental level* The frequent variations from the rule 
are primarily a function of personal factors, which are of first importance 
in this context. Political factors are of major importance in determining 
the results of consultation, but are usually of secondary importance in 
determining the nature of the consultative process.
Ad hoc consultation is frequent and informal between the top officials 
of the Federal Department of Labour and National Service and the A.C.T.U* 
officials, both being based in Melbourne. The telephone and office
Apprenticeship Advisory Committee, was formed.
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d is c u s s io n , r a th e r  th an  th e  l e t t e r  and form al con ference , a re  th e  p re ­
f e r r e d  and m ost-used in s tru m en ts  o f c o n s u lta t io n . Easy p e rso n a l r e l a ­
t io n s  between departm en tal and un ion  le a d e rs  a t  t h i s  le v e l  a re  encouraged 
n o t on ly  by f re q u e n t c o n ta c t b u t a lso  by j o in t  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  d e le g a tio n s  
to  conferences o f th e  In te rn a t io n a l  Labour O rg an iza tio n . On t h i s  b a s is  
exchanges of views and in fo rm atio n  a re  r e a d i ly  c a r r ie d  th rough . Never­
th e le s s ,  r e s t r a i n t s  imposed by the  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  o f the  men in v o lv ed  
a re  p robab ly  in e v i ta b le  a t  t h i s  l e v e l .  T h is , to g e th e r  w ith  th e  n a tu re  o f 
the  union  movement which g iv es  i t s  le a d e rs  a g re a t  bu t n o t dom inating 
in flu en c e  on i t s  d e c is io n s , means t h a t  th e re  i s  co n sid e rab le  value  in  such 
exchanges a t  le v e ls  below th a t  o f the  n a t io n a l  le a d e rsh ip  on each s id e .
The re g io n a l o f f ic e s  e s ta b l is h e d  by the  F ed e ra l Department o f  Labour 
and N a tio n a l S erv ice  in  each S ta te  c a p i t a l  p la y  an im p o rtan t p a r t  in  th e  
c o n su lta tiv e  p ro c e ss . The re g io n a l d i r e c to r s  a re  u s u a lly  in  touch  w ith  
tra d e  union  le a d e rs ,  in  some cases  on a f ir s t-n a m e  b a s is .  In  th e  case o f 
one re g io n a l d i r e c to r  th i s  i s  re in fo rc e d  by p rev io u s  a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  th e  
union movement as a f u l l - t im e  o f f i c i a l  o f one o f the  b ig g e s t u n io n s . 
Normally th e re  i s  a f a i r  amount o f u s e fu l  communication between th e  D epart­
ment and un ion  le a d e rs  a t  t h i s  l e v e l .  But re g io n a l d ir e c to r s  a re  necess­
a r i l y  concerned w ith  a  wide range o f m a tte rs , and concerned w ith  them i n  a 
su p e rv iso ry  r a th e r  th an  an ex ecu tiv e  c a p a c ity . The o f f ic e r s  w ith
the  un ions on a d ay -to -d ay  b a s is  a re  the  re g io n a ljin d u s tr ia l  o fficers ,**  who
1 The t i t l e  o f Regional I n d u s t r ia l  O ff ic e r  i s  n o t used  in  N.S.W. and Vic­
t o r i a  where the  D ep artm en ts  re g io n a l o f f ic e  e s ta b lish m e n ts  a re  l a r g e r  
th an  in  th e  o th e r  S ta te s ;  th e  c o u n te rp a r t o f th e  R .I .O . in  th e se  S ta te s  
i s  g iven  th e  t i t l e  o f A ss is ta n t D ire c to r  ( I n d u s t r ia l  R e la t io n s ) , though 
c a rry in g  ou t b a s ic a l ly  th e  same fu n c tio n s . In  th e  t e x t ,  th e  l a t t e r  o f f i ­
c e rs  a re  in c lu d ed  in  the  d is c u ss io n  on re g io n a l i n d u s t r i a l  o f f ic e rs *  
fu n c t io n s •
provide the main channel of communication between the Department and 
the unions in relation to the continual flow of matters involving the 
two. It is at this level that the most informal, and in many ways the 
most fruitful, form of consultation usually takes place.
The regional industrial officer (R.I.O.) is the chief source of 
routine information sought by the unions on awards and industrial 
matters generally. This is a function of particular importance in the 
smaller States where many of the State branches of Federal unions are 
run by part-time officials who place a great deal of reliance on the 
Department for information and advice. The contacts made in this way 
are valuable as a means of obtaining information from the unions. But 
the exchange of official information is something which can, of course, 
take place at any level and in a variety of ways. It is, for example, 
a function of the employment officers operating in centres scattered 
throughout each State as well as in the capitals.
The peculiar value of the R.I.O. results, in the first place, from 
his training and interest in the wide sweep of industrial affairs, neither 
of which, naturally, are as pronounced in the case of his colleagues con­
cerned primarily with the Department's activities in the employment field. 
In the second place, there is his greater mobility. A regional director, 
responsible for both the industrial and employment activities of his office 
is usually hindered by lack of time and by his official status from keeping 
up a regular and close contact with union leaders in general. On the
other hand, most R.I.O.’s can and do constantly seek to promote closer
2relations with union leaders. Frequent communication by telephone is
2 In the case of the metal trades unions especially, this aim is 
promoted by frequent association with union officials on local 
tradesmen's rights committees, of which the R.I.O. is usually 
chairman.
important. But a readiness to visit union officials in their offices, 
to strike up a casual conversation in Trades Hall corridors, or to dis­
cuss matters out of working hours over a glass of beer is usually of 
greater importance in establishing the easy personal relationship on a 
first-name basis which is often an essential prerequisite to afrank exch­
ange of views and information in this fiel«!* The R.I.O.'s, and some of 
their superiors, work along these lines at least to some degree. Vari­
ations in the procedures preferred reflect differing personal qualities of 
the officers involved; and their success depends largely, of course, on 
the personalities of the union leaders concerned.
As it was viewed by one R.I.O. who has followed the policy of persona}, 
contact most completely (and, as union leaders testified, with considerable 
success), the aim of this policy is that the officer should be 'accepted 
as part of the scenery'. It is in these circumstances that the 'off-the- 
record' technique can be most frequently and usefully employed, leading 
to complete frankness in discussion. At its best, the technique has res­
ulted in the disclosure of confidential information by union leaders, in 
the knowledge that although the information itself or in its original form 
will go no further, it will influence reports and recommendations made 
within the Department, The departmental heads are well aware that in 
many cases their regional officers have access to confidential information 
in this way: they have shown a far-sighted appreciation of the factors
involved by accepting reports made in the light of such information, with­
out requesting specific details or, where these are not disclosed, the 
sources of any specific information which is given.
Summing up, it is clear that ad hoc consultation with the unions is 
frequent and usually informal at all levels in the Department of Labour 
and National Service, Gn the union side, most officials (including many 
acting for State unions) have contacts within the Department and are usu­
ally quick to seek information or to put their views on specific issues.
On the departmental side, responsible officers are accustomed to getting 
in touch with union leaders for information on a wide range of other matters 
and to 1 sounding out* union leaders on matters of major importance, such 
as the amendment of legislation. A.C.T.U, officials are as a matter of 
course normally informed officially about the contents of BJlls origin­
ating in the Department before these are made public. In the case of 
major policy matters in particular, the informal approach may be combined 
with the more formal procedure of a conference between union and depart­
mental representatives, the degree of formality usually rising, as is 
natural, with the numbers involved or with the variety of interests repre­
sented.
Ad hoc consultation between the unions and State de pa rtments primarily 
concerned with industrial matters is also frequent and often ccnducted on 
an informal basis. The same initial points of contact operate in relation 
to the State departments as the case of the Federal Department - the ex­
change of official information, the handling of union complaints connected 
with the enforcement of awards and general industrial legislation. The 
extent to which personal relationships are formed and provide a basis for 
informal discussions and friendly cooperation appears to bear some relation 
to the size of the State: the likelihood of casual contact between public
servants &nd union officials outside, as well as inside, office hours is
greater In the smaller States, Departmental preparation of documents 
for the use of union advocates in cases where the State government is 
opposing union claims before a State industrial tribunal, and departmental 
advice to a union to claim higher wage rates for its members employed by 
the State government: these are impressive examples of cooperation with
the unions and have occurred in two of the smaller States, Departmental 
heads and their subordinates, with inevitable variations resulting from 
the personalities involved, normally have easy relations with at least the 
leaders of the State central union organization and usually with officials 
of individual unions as well. Again, the telephone rather than the letter 
is more often used. Generally speaking, however, there appears to be 
rather more emphasis in the States than in the Federal sphere on formality 
at the upper departmental levels. There are also other varying features 
between the States and the Commonwealth which affect the union-depart- 
mental relationship.
In the first place, there is in the States less evidence of a delib­
erate intention to create a harmonious relationship with the unions in 
the sense of taking the initiative in making and maintaining personal con­
tacts with union leaders. The action of the Federal regional director, 
who addressed a meeting of the Statefs main central union organization on 
certain aspects of Commonwealth industrial policy, has no parallel among 
State departmental officers. But more important, the Federal regional 
industrial officer has no counterpart in the State administrations. The 
State officers handling industrial matters in relation to particular public 
enterprises or to government employees in general are concerned mainly with
the mechanics of industrial bargaining in this area rather than broader 
industrial questions, and therefore cover only a part of the field with 
which the Federal officers are concerned.
In the second place, the range of matters dealt with at the departmental 
level in the States is almost invariably limited by a ban on the discussion 
of ’policy1, usually meaning legislation, which is less evident in the Fed­
eral sphere. Combined with the lack of an intention to create a basis for 
consultation, this limitation is likely to affect the frequency, and perhaps 
the informality, of consultation between State labour departments and the 
unions.
The differences between Federal and State departmental practice are 
probably the product of a number of factors. Among these is the dominant 
role of the Commonwealth in economic and industrial affairs: the assumption 
of this role has not only brought the Federal administration into close and 
constant touch with the unions since the war, but seems in many ways to have 
relieved the States of responsibilities in this field that they might other­
wise have shouldered. The fact that in some States general industrial act­
ivities are carried out by more than one department is also likely to have 
some effect. But perhaps of greatest importance is the role of the State 
cabinet minister by comparison with his Fgderal counterpart.
At the State level, access to ministers responsible for industrial 
matters is easier and consultation more frequent than at the Federal. Where
the Federal Minister for Labour spends a large part of his time in Canberra 
and the rest mainly in Melbourne, State ministers are located permanently 
in the State capitals. The geographical factor hinders easy access to 
the Federal Minister on the part of Federal unions with their headquarters
in Sydneyjand, when the Minister is in Canberra, those based in Melbourne, 
together with the A.C.T.U., are affected in the same way. On the other 
hand, there is no similar hindrance in the case of the main unions at the 
State level, whose headquarters are almost invariably in the State capitals. 
Coupled with this is the effect of the larger legislative competence of 
State governments in the industrial field and the tendency of ministers 
themselves to handle even comparatively trivial matters connected with it* 
Thus in 1956, while the permanent head of the Department of Labour and 
National Service informed the A*C*T,U, of impending changes to the main 
Federal industrial measure, the Labor Council of New South Wales learnt of 
proposed amendments to the corresponding State legislation direct from the 
State Premier, This is a result partly of the more intimate character of 
State politics and partly of the sweeping nature of the State industrial 
power, which elevates many questions of detail to the legislative level. 
Such questions are therefore likely to be more numerous at this level than 
is the case in the Federal sphere, and if union representations on them 
are considered at all they are almost invariably dealt with by the minister 
in person - though the practice is not confined to questions of this sort. 
Moreover, union leaders are moreoften and more closely acquainted with 
State than with Federal ministers, particularly in the compact political 
communities of the smaller States,
The factors encouraging union consultation direct with State ministers 
inevitably tend to lessen the importance of consultation with the officers 
of State departments. On the other hand, the absence or smaller influence 
of the same factors in the Federal sphere gives comparatively greater 
importance to consultation with officers of the Department of Labour and
National Service, This does not mean that the Federal Minister is el­
iminated from the consultative process where policy matters are concerned; 
what it means is that he is frecently spared the preliminary skirmishing.
The procedures of ad hoc consultation at tht ministerial level are 
basically the same in both Federal and State spheres, though their use is 
probably more frequent in the States and there is also likely to be more 
emphasis on informality - depending largely on the personalities involved. 
At its most formal, the communication of union views to ministers is ach­
ieved by letter. But if the matter is sufficiently important, or it is 
considered that it cannot be adequately dealt with in this way, the minis­
ter may be asked to receive a deputation on the subject. The deputation 
is the procedure commonly resorted to in the case of matters the unions 
wi3h to press at the ministerial level. For their part, ministers may 
initiate consultation in the same ways and in the same forms though, as 
distinct from union leaders, they are normally likely for reasons of con­
venience to prefer communication by letter rather than by conference. But 
it is they, rather than the unions, who favour tripartite conferences 
including representatives of employers as well a3 unions. Less formal 
approaches often result from long association in these ways, a develop­
ment which is encouraged by the growing tendency for negotiations at the 
ministeriell level to be handled almost exclusively by the leaders of cen­
tral union organizations.
----- O Ö O ------
Ad hoc consultation constitutes the most widespread form of commun­
ication between unions and governments. There are, however, a number of 
formal government bodies on which unions are represented that provide a
regular channel of consultation on a varying range of matters and are 
concerned solely with giving advice to the government concerned. Some 
of these bodies, chiefly of a minor character, were set up before 1939*
But most have been established since the war.^ None are solely union- 
government bodies: they also include representatives of other interests,
principally employers. On the government side, almost all of them include 
departmental rather than ministerial representatives, but their recommen­
dations, if any, are usually made to the relevant minister. Unionist- 
members are usually appointed as direct union or employee representatives; 
but in some cases, particularly Federal bodies, they are formally regarded 
as being appointed in a personal equity, though their appointment is clear­
ly a consequence of their association with union affairs.
Advisory bodies are formal in the sense that they have been set up, 
either by statute or by administrative decision, as standing bodies with 
regular rules of procedure. But apart from any advice they may give, their 
principal value lies in the fact that they tend to generate informality by 
the opportunities they provide for the regular association of those involved. 
The operation of bodies of this kind can therefore be expected to assist 
the formation of personal relationships between union and government repre­
sentatives which will in turn encourage informality in the field of ad 
hoc consultation.
A list of the various Federal and State advisory bodies with unionist- 
members operating at the end of 1957 is given in Table 9« The list is not 
claimed to be exhaustive, though it is as full as has been found possible 
to make it. It deals only with advisory bodies in existence in 1957* Thus
3 See Table 9
temporary bodies with a specific task, like the Commonwealth-State 
Apprenticeship Inquiry of 1952-54 (with two unionists in its membership of 
nine) and the 1955-56 Committee of Inquiry into the stevedoring industry 
(with one of its three members a unionist), are not ire luded; nor is the 
National Security Resources Board (with one union representative in its 
membership of twelve), which was set up as a standing body in 1950 but 
has not met since 1953*
As Table 9 shows, the greatest development in the use of advisory bodies 
with union representation has taken place in the Federal sphere. In most 
States, if the various apprenticeship committees are included, there were 
numerically more bodies of this sort operating in 1957. But in no State 
were there bodies to match the stature of the major Federal advisory bodies 
or the range of matters with which they were concerned* In the second 
place, only in the Federal sphere were there advisory bodies of which cab­
inet ministers were members.^ Finally, the great majority of the Federal 
advisory bodies were set up by a non-Labor government*
3* The Onions1 Role in Administration
There are three ways in which unions take part, or may take part, in 
the actual administration of government: throughl&eir ability to help ad­
minister industrial legislation, through the appointment of unionists to 
government administrative bodies, and, finally, through the appointment of 
unionists to positions in the professional public service.
The unions* role in the administration of industrial arbitration leg-
4 These were the Ministry of Labour Advisory Council (from which the A.C.T.U 
has since withdraw^)and the Coal Industry Committee; in each case the 
appropriate minister acted as chairman* The now-moribund National Sec­
urity Resources Board was presided over by the Prime Minister*
islation, and the way in which they have been equipped by law to carry it
1out, have been discussed in detail in an earlier chapter. It is there­
fore sufficient merely to recall that in all jurisdictions, with some 
variations, unions are charged with the initiation of the statutory proced­
ures for settling industrial disputes, with the responsibility for ensuring 
that their members comply with awards and agreements, and with -the function 
of policing and enforcing awards and agreements against employers. It is 
in this field that the unions are most extensively and most closely involved 
in the administrative framework of government in Australia.
There is, in addition to arbitration legislation, a number of measures 
dealing with matters of direct union concern. In the main these are State 
measures regulating such matters as industrial safety, shop and factory 
working hours and standards of sanitation. The Federal Parliament has no 
general consitutional power to regulate industrial conditions directly by 
legislation, though Federal industrial tribunals may of course do so, their 
awards almost invariably dealing with matters otherwise covered by general 
State legislation. In certain areas, however, the Commonwealth has found 
power to legislate in this way, and has exercised its power to bring unions 
into the administration of legislation. Thus, under the Tradesmens Rights 
Regulation Act 1946-55, the unions concerned are given a voice on the bodies 
that determine the qualifications of tradesmen in certain industries; and 
under the Stevedoring Industry Act 195V56, the Waterside Workers Federation 
has the sole right to recruit waterfront labour in all major ports, a stat­
utory grant which gives the union an important share in the Act*s adminis­
tration.
1 See Chapter 5
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Most State measures directly regulating industrial matters do not 
expressly give unions a share in their administration. Nevertheless, 
unions frequently play an important part in policing and enforcing legi­
slation of this sort. They usually operate in this field by bringing 
cases of non-compliance to the notice of government officers who have power 
to take legal action. But in many cases the union first takes up the 
matter with the employer concerned, and, occasionally, may even call a 
strike in order to secure his compliance - a tactic which is most frequent­
ly adopted as a means of enforcing safety measures. Sometimes the unions 
may take legal action themselves; this course is open in New South Wales 
to union officials acting formally as individuals, but rarely in other 
States where legal enforcement is almost invariably in the hands of 
government officers alone.
The extent to which unions take an active part in policing general 
industrial legislation varies greatly. Generally speaking, they pay more 
attention to the bread-and-butter provisions of awards and agreements.
Many, of course, are not greatly affected by general legislation of this 
kind. Of those that are, most seem to do little more in this field than 
refer complaints from members to departmental inspectors. To some unions, 
on the other hpud, direct industrial regulation by legislation is of great 
importance, and they are correspondingly active in securing its enforce­
ment. The Furnishing Trades Society of New South Wales, for example, has 
obtained extensive statutory regulation of the State furnishing trade, and
the legislations effectiveness is largely a result of the union!s energetic
and continual policing of its provisions.^ Shop assistants and baking 
2 See Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, espec. 43, 4&~9> 61.
trades unions are especially active in policing regulations prescribing
b a k i n g  q
shop-trading and^hours:^ in Western Australia, for instance, the local 
baking union follows a consistent policy of imposing heavy fines on its 
own members for working after-hours.^ Mining unions are invariably 
sensitive on the question of compliance with safety regulations, and the 
same attitude is apparent on the part of building trades unions:** in 
both cases strike action rather than legal action is the preferred means 
of enforcement.
------0O0------
Unionists have been appointed to many bodies administering govern­
ment enterprises or other activities of government concern. A list of 
both Federal and State administrative bodies with unionist-members is 
given in Table 9j which indicates the variety of such bodies and the nat­
ure and conditions of the unionist-appointees1 membership.
As shown in the Table, the composition of administrative bodies oper­
ating in 1957 gave unionist-members a dominant voting power in only one 
case, the New South Wales Milk Board, and usually . ..vtfagjf ’ were 
in a decided minority. Nevertheless, the presence of unionist-members 
does enable the expression of union views within bodies whose decisions, 
in most cases, are of direct interest to the unions. Apart from this, 
even a single unionist-member*s vote may be of importance on occasions.
3 N.S.W. baking union officials carry out this function at the request 
of the State Minister for Labour: Sydney Morning Herald. 1o /i/1956.
4 In N.S.W. unions have prosecuted members who have taken temporary em­
ployment contrary to the Annual Holidays Act: ibid., 30/3/1955; 15/6/1955«
5 Building unions recently sponsored the formation of * safety committees* 
on job sites to police the N.S.W. Lifts and Scaffoldings Act: ibid.,13/2/1957.
No doubt a partial explanation of the growing practice of appoint­
ing trade unioh officials to administrative bodies is the opportunities 
it gives to reward faithful or powerful unionist supporters with the pay­
ments which, as the Table shows, often accompany such appointments. The 
payments are not usually large, and therefore probably play a more import­
ant part in the spoils-distribution of Labor than of non-Labor governments. 
On the other hand, the practice can also be justified by sound adminis­
trative reasons which may influence non-Labor governments - though even 
in the case of 2 $u£.H governments, there h^ve on occasion been alleg­
ations circulating in union circles that paid appointments have been given 
to certain union officials as 1 rewards for faithful service1• However 
this may be, the background of a unionist-appointee may enable him to 
contribute materially to an administrative body’s discussions, particu­
larly in the field of labour matters or related questions. Whether this 
actually occurs is, as experience with the Federal primary produce market­
ing boards has shown, largely dependent on the calibre of the appointee.
In addition, a unionist-member may enhance the prospects of union cooper­
ation. The mere fact of his membership and the share, even if little 
more than nominal, that it gives unions in the making and administration 
of policy may achieve this. But more important, the member’s access to 
information and to fresh views of problems may facilitite, and has in 
fact done so, the resolution of misunderstandings and union acceptance 
of policies which would have been opposed if the union representative had 
not advocated their support.
These considerations appear to have some bearing on the increasing 
number of union officials appointed to South Australian administrative
bodies since the war by the noxt-Labor Playford Government* The Menzies 
Federal Government has shown re la tiv e ly  less  energy in th is f ie ld  by com­
parison with i t s  a c tiv ity  in the formation of consultative bodies* I t  
has contented i t s e l f  largely with the maintencance of the status quo 
established by i t s  Labor predecessors, aware that, despite i t s  many inade­
quacies from the administrative standpoint, any attempt to change i t  would 
antagonize the unions and probably raise more serious problems*
The contrast between the practice of Labor and non-Labor governments, 
and thereby the importance placed on the 'sp o ils ' motive, should not be 
carried too far* By comparison with the performance of the South Aust­
ralian non-Labor Government, for example, Queensland Labor governments
have shown far le ss  inclination  to appoint union o ff ic ia ls  to administrat-
6ive bodies. Moreover, even under strong union pressure, Labor Federal 
governments were not prepared to enact special leg is la tio n  to allow the 
appointment of unionists to three important primary produce boards set up 
by nor -^Labor governments before the war: provision for appointments on
these lin es wees not made u n til a fter  Labor had been in power several 
years* Indeed, the Labor enactment of 194& constituting another Federal 
board, the Australian Wheat Board, made no provision for a union repre­
sentative, an amendment to th is  e ffec t not being passed u n til two years 
later* A union leader in 1942 indicated the resistance met by the unions 
in th is  connection when he complained that i t  had taken 'no le s s  than
6 To a suggestion that a unionist should be appointed as consumers* repre­
sentative (a practice followed by other governments, including the non- 
Labor government of S*A.) on administrative bodies dealing with price 
control, a Labor Premier of Qd* replied that the most suitable person for  
such a position was 'an elected representative of the people, i . e* ,  a 
Minister of Parliament'll Minutes* Trades & Labor Council of Qd* 7/7/194#.
7 These were the Meat, Dairy Produce, and the Apple & Pear boards.
eight months to convince the Labor government' that leather trades unions
gshould be represented on the wartime Hides and Leather Industries Board.
------0 O 0 -------
The third way in which the unions may take part in government adminis­
tration, though more indirectly and with less certainty than in the ways 
already discussed, is through the appointment of unionists to positions in 
the professional public service. This category is restricted here to 
appointees from the ranks of unions whose membership is drawn from occupa­
tions outside the professionell public service. These appointments are 
invariably full-time, and involve the severance of the appointee's official 
connections with the union movement. They are made on a personal basis; and 
although they eire usually made in the light of the appointees’ industrial 
experience and the relevant union or central union organization is frequently 
consulted beforehand, it is seldom seriously argued that such appointees are 
acting as union representatives.
Almost invariably appointments of this sort have been to positions 
below the decision-making level of government departments and instrumental­
ities. This feature distinguishes them from the personal, full-time 
appointments of unionists to administrative bodies, because all these 
represent the top administrative level in their respective fields. The 
more general distinction, however, is based on the fact that while the major 
functions with which a unionist-member of an administrative body is concerned 
are attached to the body itself and not to the member as an individual, the 
main functions with which the appointee in the category discussed here is 
concerned are within his competence as an individual.
8 Report, Convention of Federal Unions called by the Federal Government, 
June, 1942, 18.
In the past, the practice of appointing unionists to public 
service positions was given impetus by two developments. One of these 
was the establishment, first at the State and then at the Federal level, 
of inspectorates to police awards and general legislation directly regu­
lating industrial matters. This created a need for government officers 
with industrial experience, and, initially, industrial inspectors were 
largely recruited from the ranks of union officials. But the practice 
is a dying one. Reliance on it has decreased as a result of the accept­
ance by the departments concerned of the responsibility for training their 
own men to fill these positions. The practice is also often regarded as 
undesirable. It is argued that in some fields at least industrial exper­
ience gained through union activity is not adequate training for the polic­
ing of highly technical regulations covering a wide variety of industries; 
nor, in the eyes of some departmental heads does it provide the best back­
ground for Celling* rather than merely enforcing indiÄtrial legislation. 
Most inspectorates still include a leavening of ex-union officials, and 
others are occasionally appointed. But the tendency now is to appoint 
inspectors by promotion within the department concerned.
The second development occurred during the second world war when the 
vital importance of labour relations encouraged the appointment of union 
officials to positions in Federal departments and instrumentalities con­
cerned with industrial matters. The practice was particularly evident 
after the Curtin Labor Government took office in 1941• The Amalgamated 
Engineering Union alone lost at least five of its full-time officials in 
this way, together with a larger number of lesser officials. Other
2PH
unions were similarly affected. Many of the wartime appointees re­
mained after the war to make their careers in the public service, one of 
them havihg risen to the position of Regional Director in the Department 
of Labour and National Service. But here again, while union officials 
are still occasionally appointed as industrial officers in Federal depart­
ments and instrumentalities, appointments of this sort are now more often 
made from within the public service. The same situation applies in the 
case of State departments and instrumentalities. On the other hand, the 
need for obtaining union cooperation, which influenced wartime practice 
in this connection, has been evident in relatioh to the migration programme. 
Almost all the Federal officers charged with the selection of skilled mi­
grant labour in Europe are ex-union officials, who were appointed after
9consultation with the A.C.T.U. and the unions primarily concerned. For 
the same reason, all the Investigators appointed to police the application 
of the Federal Tradesmens Rights Regulations Act are ex-unionists.
It is in the systems of industrial arbitration, however, that union­
ist-appointees have continued to be most strongly and consistently repre­
sented in positions which do not require legal qualifications.^ Thus of 
the nine Commissioners (including the Senior Commissioner) who operate in 
the Federal arbitration system, five are ex-union officials. Two of the 
three one-man local coal authorities, constituting part of the special 
arbitration machinery covering the coal industry in New South Wales, are 
former officials of mining unions. All four conciliation commissioners
9 These appointments, as union leaders have testified, have contributed 
materially to union acceptance of migrants in the skilled trades: Minutes« 
A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive, Feb. 1957, 18.
10 These appointments are additional to those, listed in Table 9, of union­
ists to the various arbitration bodies operating in all States with 
unionist-members•
appointed under the New South Wales Arbitration Act, and the single 
conciliation commissioner appointed under the corresponding Western 
Australian measure, are former union officials, as is the single chairman 
of all Tasmanian wages boards. In the case of appointments in this 
field it is usual for the appropriate central union organization to be 
sounded out beforehand by the government concerned.
Unionists appointed to government positions of the kind considered 
here cannot;, generally speaking, be expected to press union views and to 
act in accordance with them in the way that their counterparts on admin­
istrative bodies may be expected to do so. Nevertheless, the unions 
favour such appointments. For, even though the performance of unionist- 
appointees in the arbitration field, for example, is frequently criticized 
it is felt that they at least, as one union official put it, *have an 
understanding of trade union problems outside the forms of the arguments 
presented to them.*
PART IV
n
O
THE PASTY-POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
The Labour Party having grown out of the Trade Union Move­
ment and, being financed from the beginning by fees paid by 
affiliated Trade Unions, the relationship between the Labour 
Party and the Trade Uni<p Movement is and always must be a 
close and intimate one.
There is...a very much closer link between the industrial 
wing and the political wing of the labour movement in Aust-
and 
a
These two statements, one by a leading Labor politician and the other 
by a leading Liberal politician, illustrate the extent to which the trade 
union movement in Australia is identified with the Australian Labor Party 
(A.L.P.). The present discussion of the party-political framework is 
concerned with an assessment of the contemporary relationship between what 
are loosely termed the industrial and political wings of the Australian 
labour movement. Such an assessment involves an examination of the for­
mal links between trade unions and Party as set down in constitutions and 
rules. It also involves an inquiry into what has been called the power 
structure of the Party,^ which for present purposes means the ways in 
which and the extent to which trade unions are, or may be, in a position 
to influence or control Party policies and activities at each of three 
levels - the Party machines outside parliament, the parliamentary Labor 
parties, and Labor governments.
ralia than there is in those countries [U.K., U.S.A. 
CanadaJ , which tends to make every industrial issue 
political issue also.^
1 A.A.Galwell, ’The Australian Labour Party', in The Australia^ Political 
Party System. 77.
2 H.E.Holt, 1956 C*wealth Pari. Debs, (first period), 1988,
3 Overacker, The Australian Party System, 112
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THE A.L.P. MACHINE
1 • Membership
The Federal organization of the A.L.P, has no membership or affili­
ation structure distinct from its St^te branches. Thus Federal trade 
unions, as such, cannot affiliate with the Party, but can do so only through 
their branches operating at the State level.
The basic units of A.L.P. organization in all States are political 
branches and affiliated unions. The overwhelming majority of Australian 
unionists are members of unions affiliated with the A.L.P. In most States 
only individual unions, including State branches of Federal unions, are so
I
affiliated. The practice of affiliating unions on a district as well as 
on a State basis is the exception rather than the rule, though some unions 
in most States are affiliated in this way. In Western Australia, how­
ever, unions are customarily affiliated on a district basis and each unit 
is given the status of a branch of the State Party: the A.E.U., for ex­
ample, is affiliated through its twenty-eight branches within the State 
instead of as a single State-wide organization as it is in other States.
No trades and labour council is affiliated with any State branch of the 
1Party, but no Victorian union is eligible for affiliation unless it is
2first affiliated with a *recognized! trades and labour council. More­
over, it appears that trades and labour councils are ineligible under the 
garty rules operating in all States except South Australia, where provision
1 But in W.A. the Trade Unions Industrial Council is a constituent part 
of the Party structure.
2 A.L.P. (State of Victoria), Constitution and Platform. 1956, r.33* This 
title is referred to below as *A.L.P., Vic. Rules1 2. The same form is 
used for all references, after the first, to the constitutions and rules 
of the other State branches of the Party.
Ais made for the affiliation of 1 other organizations*; the United Trades 
and lAbor Council was in fact affiliated, on a nominal membership, for a 
time during the 1920*s.^
In some States (New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia) 
the rules in each case state that the membership of the Party consists of 
the members of affiliated unions and of political braiches.^ But this 
formal statement, or lack of it, does not necessarily reflect the true 
status of affiliated union members in relation to political branch members. 
Thus in New South Wales, despite the formal statement, affiliated union 
members as such are not eligible to exercise the most signal privilege of 
Party membership, the right to vote in selection ballots for parliamentary 
candidates; they can do so only a s full members of a political branch.^
In South Australia, again despite the formal statement, members of affili­
ated unions can take part in Electorate Committee meetings only if they
£
are attached to a political btfanch. Only in Queensland does the formal
statement reflect the true position: members of affiliated unions are as
7such entitled to vote in selection ballots. In the States where the 
Party rules embody no formal statement of this kind, the status of affili­
ated unionists is closer than in New South Wales and South Australia to 
that of political branch members. Members of unions affiliated with the 
Victorian Party are entitled to vote in selection ballots after fulfilling
3 See Minutes. United T. & L.C. of S.A., 5/ll/l926.
4 A.L.P. (N.S.W. Branch), Rules and Constitution. 1954^56, as amended t© 
1957, r.2; A.L.P. (State of Queensland). Constitution and General Rules. 
1957, r.2; A.L.P. (South Australian Branch). Rules and Standing OrdersT 
1955, as amended to 1957, r.3 (a).
5 A.L.P., N.S.W. Rules, r. 146
6 A*L.P,, S.A..Rules, r.5 (a). The test of eligibility to vote in select­
ion ballots is not available in this case because selections are made by 
the annual Convention.
7 A.L.P., Qd. Rules, rr. 41-43*
c e r ta in  minor f o r m a l i t i e s . 8  In  W estern A u s tra l ia  th ey  a re  e x p re ss ly
given  a l l  th e  r ig h ts  and p r iv i le g e s  o f p o l i t i c a l  branch members. And
in  Tasmania an a f f i l i a t e d  union  member, a f t e r  s ig n in g  th e  P a rty  P ledge,
may enjoy  a l l  the  r ig h t s  accompanying f u l l  membership o f  th e  P a rty  w ithou t
10jo in in g  a p o l i t i c a l  b ranch .
On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  P a r ty  ru le s  in  fo u r  S ta te s  d e c la re  th a t  a 
person who f a i l s  to  jo in  a tra d e  union f o r  which he i s  e l ig ib le  i s  au to ­
m a tic a lly  in e l ig ib le  fo r  membership o f a p o l i t i c a l  b ranch . In  South 
A u s tra lia  and W estern A u s tra l ia  th e  requ irem en t i s  l im ite d  to  unions a f f i l i ­
a te d  w ith  th e  P a r ty , in  V ic to r ia  to  unions a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  a t ra d e s  and
11
labou r c o u n c il , and in  New South Wales the  requ irem en t i s  g e n e ra l. These 
r u le s ,  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  n a tu r a l  tendency o f A .L .P . members to  jo in  an 
a p p ro p ria te  un ion  even where no form al requ irem en t to  t h i s  e f f e c t  i s  l a id  
down, r e s u l t  in  a g re a t  d ea l o f d u p lic a tio n  between the  membership o f p o l­
i t i c a l  branches and a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n s . This should  be borne in  mind in  
r e la t io n  to  the  a n a ly s is  o f the  com position of A .L .P . S ta te  branch member­
sh ips which i s  g iven  in  Table 10, a lthough  i t  does n o t m a te r ia l ly  a f f e c t  
the  p o s i t io n  re v ea led  by th e  T ab le . The im p o rtsn t f a c t o r , i n  view o f the  
overwhelming num erical dominance o f a f f i l i a t e d  un ion  members in  a l l  S ta te s ,  
i s  the  s ta tu s  and r ig h ts  h e ld  w ith in  th e  P a rty  machine by a f f i l i a t e d  union­
i s t s  as such . This f a c to r  has been touched on above, and i s  d iscu ssed  
in  more d e t a i l  in  the  pages ahead .
8 A.L.P., Vic. r . 65.
9 A .L .P . (W.A. D ivision), State Constitution. Standing Orders. Platform 
and General Governing Rules. 1953* as amended to 1956, r . 4 (c) •
10 A .L .P . (Tasmanian S e c tio n ) ,  P la tfo rm . C o n s ti tu tio n  and R u les1. 1953> as
amended to  1956, r .  5 (b )• . N
11 A.L.P. , Rules: N.S.W ., r . 48 (a) 5 V ic .,  r . 85 (h); S .A ., r . 3 (<*) 5
W.A., r . 19 (h).
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2. Conferencesand Executives
Affiliated unions are not directly represented on the A.L.P.*s 
Federal bodies, the Federal Conference and the Federal Executive. The 
members of these bodies formally represent State braiches of the Party.
As their method of selection varies from State to State, it is proposed 
to deal first with the part played by unionists in the main Party bodies 
at the State level in order that their role at the Federal level may be 
seen in perspective.
The Party Conference - also referred to as the Convention (Queensland 
and South Australia) and the General Council (Western Australia) - is the 
‘supreme ruling authority* in each State branch of the A.L.P. Its decis­
ions are final and binding on all Party members, including parliament­
arians, within the State. Conference meets annually in all States except 
Queensland and Western Australia, where its meetings are held at three-
yearly intervals because of the distances many delegates must travel in 
1these two States.
Conference in all States is composed of delegates from affiliated 
unions and from the political membership of the Party. The basis of 
representation of political delegates varies from State to State. In 
New South Wales and South Australia they are drawn direct from individual 
political branches as well as from the Party organization at the level of 
the State electorate. In Western Australia they are sent by individual 
branches and by each of the nine District Councils. Political delegates 
in Victoria and Queensland are selected at the level of the State elect­
orate only; but in Tasmania only individual political branches are so
1 Provision is made in these, and in all other States, for the convening 
of special conferences, though this is rarely used.
represented.
The allocation of Conference delegates in accordance with the number 
of members represented is the system most commonly used in assessing the 
delegates to which both affiliated unions and political branch memberships 
are entitled. The system is not, however, used in all cases, and where 
it is used the scales of membership, on which the assessment is made, 
are different. In Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, where this 
system applies, delegates allocated to both affiliated unions and the 
pplitical membership are assessed on the same scale.^ The same system
is used in New South Wales in relation to both union and political dele­
gates, but the scales applicable to the two categories are different, and 
are weighted so as to redress to some extent the numerical inferiority of 
the political membership. Delegates from affiliated unions in Queensland
are allocated on a membership scale that is particularly favourable to 
the bigger unions, while delegates representing the political membership
2
2 A.L.P., Rules: N.S.W., r. 19$ Vic., r.5$ Qd., r.13; S.Ä., rr.13,14; W.A., 
r.11 (a); Tas., r.24* In S.A. and W.A. the Federal and State parliament­
ary Labor parties are each entitled to one delegate.
3 The seales used are as f ollows. Vic.: 1 delegate for up to 500 members; 2 
for 501-1000; 1 for each additional 1000 members or part thereof. S.A..:
1 delegate for 25-150 members: 2 for 151-250; 3 for 251*350; 4 for 351-500 
5 for 501-750; and a maximum of 6 delegates for more than 750 members.
Tas♦:1 delegate for 10-50 members; 2 for 51-100; 3 for 101-200; 4 for 201- 
500; a further delegate for every additional 500 up to 3000; and 1 dele­
gate for every 1000 members, or part thereof, above 3000.
4 The scales used are as follows: Affiliated unions: 1 delegate for up to 
500 members; 2 for 501-1000; and a further delegate for each additional 
1000 members or part thereof. State Electorate Councils:2 delegates for 
up to 250 members; and a further delegate for each additional 500 members 
or part thereof.
5 The scale used is as follows: 1 delegate for 1000-3000 members; 1 further 
delegate for each additional 3000 members, with a maatimum of 12 delegates 
in the case of any one union. Affiliated unions with individual member­
ships of less than 1000 jointly elect a number of delegates assessed on 
the basis of their collective membership in accordance with the above 
scale.
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are fixed at one for each State electorate. This method of allocating 
delegates gives the political membership considerably greater repre­
sentation than is the case in other States, The membership of affili­
ated unions in Western Australia is irrelevant to the allocation of 
delegates: each affiliated union, and each political branch and District 
Council is entitled to one delegate irrespective of its membership,^
This method does not reduce union representation, as it would in other 
States, since unions in Western Australia are affiliated on a district 
basis and are therefore allocated delegates on the same basis. The A.E.U, 
for example, with twenty-eight affiliated district branches is entitled 
to a delegate for each branch.
An analysis of the number and proportions of union delegates at 
recent State Conferences is given in Table It* The striking feature 
of these figures is the fact that delegates representing affiliated un­
ions were in a minority at the 1956 Queensland Convention, while in all 
other States union delegates formed a majority, in most cases an over­
whelming majority. The Queensland reversal of the pattern found in 
other States is, however, more apparent than real as a consequence of 
the rule which expressly allows members of affiliated unions, as well 
as political branch members, to vote in elections for the delegate repre­
senting the State electorate in which they reside,^ This provision 
is especially favourable to a union like the A,W,U,, which, with a 
membership of 82,000 scattered throughout the State, is not only the 
largest union in the State but is larger than any Federal union apart
6 A.L.P., W.A, Rules, r.11 (a)
7 A,L.P., Qd, Rules, r*24
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from its own parent body. As a result, the delegates from the ten 
electorates in the Western Zone of the State are almost invariably asso­
ciated with the A.W.U.; the same union is also entitled to the maximum 
of twelve delegates as an affiliated union. This pattern is repeated 
in many other of the seventy-five electorates and, in some cases, in 
relation to other large unions.
The Queensland provision permitting affiliated unionists, as such, 
to take part in the selection of political delegates is not repeated in 
the rules of any other State branch of the A.L.P. But in New South 
Wales, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania it appears, in 
the absence of any express prohibition, that a member of an affiliated 
union, as a member of a political branch, can take part in ballots for 
the selection of political delegates as well as exercising a vote in 
the selection of the delegates from his union. Only in Victoria is it 
specified that an affiliated unionist who is also a political branch
omember may vote for his union or political delegate, but not for both.
On the other hand, union delegates in some States need not, and on
A
occasion are not, members of the union they represent. Only in New
South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania is it stipulated that union 
delegates must be members of the union they represent.9 The Victorian
rules require only that all delegates shall be members of the
8 A.L.P., Via.Rules, r. 25 (e)
9 A.L.P., Rules: N.S.W., r. 33 (c); S.A., r.14 (c); Tas., r*33« Union 
delegates in N.S.W. and Tas., but not in S.A., are also required to 
be members of political branches.
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Party; and in Queensland, delegates must be either members of the Party
or of an affiliated union, though even this requirement may be waived by 
11Conference. The Western Australian requirement that all delegates shall 
be members of the Party has the same effect as the Queensland rule, since 
an affiliated union in that State has the formal status of a political
12branch and an affiliated unionist is therefore a full member of the Party.
The Queensland and Western Australian rules do not restrict the choice of 
delegates from among a union*s members to the extent that the Victorian 
provision does. But in each of these three States the way is open for 
the attendance at Conference of union delegates who are not members of the 
union they represent, and may, indeed, not be unionists at all. Confer­
ences in these States have in the past been attended by such delegates, 
usually parliamentarians or other prominent members of the political wing
who for some reason have been unable to secure election as political dele- 
13gates. This practice is probably facilitated by the fact that, with the 
exceptions of South Australia and Tasmania, ^  Party rules do not recjiire 
that union delegates should be elected by the members of the union concerned, 
though,even in the case of the two exceptions, the mere existence of such 
rules is no guarantee that unions oomply with them. It has been claimed 
that in Victoria at least delegates are usually appointed by union executives,
10 A.L.P., Vic. Rules, r.24. This rule, inserted in 1939 as a safeguard 
against Communist-influenced unions, was unpopular with union executives 
because it restricted the unions* right to appoint delegates: A. Davies, 
Chapter on Victoria in the forthcoming State Government in Australia (ed., 
Davis), (MS.) 62-3* The rule was waived in 1955 when 15 of the union dele­
gates at the Victorian special Conference, convened by the Federal Exec­
utive as a result of the dispute in the Party, were not members of the 
A.L.P.: see Official Reportf A.L.P., 21st. C’wealth Conference, 1955* 20*
11 A.L.P., Qd. Rules , r.18 (f)
12 A.L.P., W.A. Rules, r.11 (f)
13 For details of this practice in Vic. during the 1930*s, see Rawson, The 
Organization of the Australian Labor Party. 1916-19A1 (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis), 238; and more recently, see Rawson, The Organization of the 
A.L.P. (unpublished A.N.U. seminar paper). 5*
14. A.L.P., Rules: S.A.. r. 14 (b); Tas., r.3i.
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and only a minority of unions give their members a voice in the selection  
15of delegates. The same i s  probably true of other.State5.
The numerical dominance of delegates representing a ff ilia te d  unions 
at most State conferences, as shown in Table 11, is  important in relation  
to the voting power of such delegates. In a l l  States the customary system 
of one—delegate—one-vote i s  applied, but in South Australia and Western
r>
Australia provision i s  a lso  made for the use in special circumstances of
a d ifferent system, which works to the advantage of the unions in general,
and to the advantage of the larger unions in particular. In South Australia
any matter before Conference may, on the ca ll of the delegates from five
a ff ilia te d  organizations, be decided by a card vote in which the voting
power of each delegate or group of delegates i s  given a numerical value
16
equivalent to the number of a ff ilia te d  members represented. Under the
card vote system, the numerical dominance of a ff ilia te d  unions1 memberships
can be brought to bear d irectly  on the decidon of important issues • The
effec t i s  particularly sign ifican t in relation to large unions because of
the lim it se t to the number of delegates that may represent a single union:
thus the A.W.U. with the maximum six  delegates exercising s ix  normal votes,
and representing only three per cent, of the to ta l normal vote at the 1957
Conference, increases i t s  voting strength to 12,000 under the card vote
system and i t s  share of the possible to ta l vote to more than f if te e n  per
cent. In Western Australia a modified form of the South Australian card
17vote may be used i f  one-tenth of the Conference delegates c a ll  for i t .
Voting strength (except in the case of D istr ict Council delegates who are
15 Rawson, The Organization of the A.L.P. .  op. c i t . ,  5.
16 A.L.P., S.Ä. Rules, r.19 (a^
17 A.L.P., W.A. Rules, r.11 ( i ) . The sane system, with some variation in  
d e ta il, i s  available also in relation to each of the W.A. d is tr ic t  councils 
ib id , r.15 (a).
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r e s t r i c t e d  to  a s in g le  vote each) i s  a sse ssed  on th e  b a s is  o f one vo te
f o r  each hundred, o r  p a r t  o f a hundred, members re p re se n te d . Under t h i s
system  on ly  th e  v o tes  a v a ila b le  to  union d e leg a te s  a re  a f fe c te d  s in c e ,
in  1956 a t  l e a s t ,  no p o l i t i c a l  branch had a membership o f more th a n  a
hundred. As in  South A u s tra l ia ,  i t  i s  p r im a r i ly  the  b ig  unions t h a t
reap  th e  b e n e f i t .  Thus, in  one card  vo te  h e ld  a t  th e  1956 C onference,
th e  e lev en  A.W.U, d e le g a te s ,w i th  e leven  normal v o te s  re p re se n tin g  s ix
p e r c e n t ,  o f th e  t o t a l  normal v o te , in c re ase d  th e i r  v o tin g  s tre n g th  to
e ig h ty -sev e n  v o te s  o r  f i f t e e n  p e r c e n t, o f the  t o t a l  575 card  v o te s  t h a t
were c a s t ;  and the  n ine  normal v o te s  ( f iv e  p e r c e n t .)  o f th e  n ine d e le g a te s
from the  Amalgamated S o c ie ty  o f Railway Employees were in c re a se d  to  s ix ty -
18one (e lev en  p e r c e n t . ) •
The number and p ro p o rtio n  o f union re p re s e n ta t iv e s  a tte n d in g  re c e n t 
S ta te  C onferences i s  shown in  Table 11.
-----------0O 0---------------
The a d m in is tra tiv e  s t ru c tu re s  adopted by A .L .P . S ta te  b ranches f a l l  
in to  two c a te g o r ie s :  those w ith  a s in g le  ex ecu tiv e  body and th o se  w hich,
e i t h e r  as a m a tte r  o f  p ra c t ic e  o r in  conform ity  w ith  form al r u l e s ,  c o n s is t  
o f a tw o - t ie r  system of execu tiv e  b o d ie s .
In  th e  f i r s t  ca teg o ry  a re  New South W ales, V ic to r ia  and Tasm ania.
In  each case a r e l a t i v e ly  sm all C en tra l Executive (G eneral E xecu tive in  
Tasmania) ad m in is te rs  th e  a f f a i r s  o f th e  P a rty  between s i t t i n g s  o f  Con­
fe re n c e . N e ith e r th e  number o f members on the  v a rio u s  e x ec u tiv e s  no r
19th e  method o f t h e i r  s e le c t io n  i s  un ifo rm .
18 These f ig u r e s  a re  c a lc u la te d  from a v o tin g  card  used  a t  the  1956 
C onference.
19 A .L .P ., N.S.W. R u les, r . 4 ;  V ic . ,  r .2 8 ;  T a s .,  r r .5 1 ,  52, 64.
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The New South Wales Central Executive consists of forty-two members, 
including five executive officers; all but five are elected by Conference - 
the exceptions being two members elected by the Labor caucus in the State 
legislative Assembly , two by the Federal Labor caucus and one by the 
State Legislative Council Labor caucus. In Victoria the Central Execut­
ive has a membership of twenty-five, including six executive officers; 
except for the State Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Woman Organizer, 
who are appointed by the Executive and are ex officio members, members of 
the Executive are elected by Conference. The Tasmanian General Executive 
consists of eleven members, including three executive officers; they are 
elected by Conference with the exception of the Leader of the State Parl­
iamentary Labor Party who is an ex officio member. In Tasmania, unlike 
other States, the State Secretary of the Party is not a full voting member 
although he attends Executive meetings.
In Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia two-tier systems 
of administrative control operate. Supreme executive authority is vested 
in a numerically large body. A smaller body supervices the day-to-day 
administration and forms an important centre of influence despite its sub­
ordinate constitutional powers. Only in South Australia is the two-tier 
system formally established under Party rules,
A Central Executive and a Central Council are the two South Australian 
executive bodies, the Council being ’the governing body between Convent­
ions’. The Central Executive is the smaller body; it consists of twenty 
members, including five executive officers, of whom all but three are 
elected by card vote at the Convention - the three exceptions being the
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Immediate Past President, the Secretary, and the Leader of the State
2q
Parliamentary Labor Party who are ex officio members. All members of the
Central Executive are ex officio members of the Central Council, whose
membership otherwise comprises delegates from affiliated unions and political
branches, allocated in accordance with the size of the membership represen- 
21ted, together with one delegate each fron the State and Federal parliamen­
tary Labor parties. There is thus no set limit to the size of the Council.
In 1957 its membership, including the Central Executive members, numbered 220.
In Queensland and Western Australia a single body, the Queensland 
Central Executive (Q.C.E.) and the State Executive, respectively, is 
formally established as the administrative authority of the Party. Both 
these bodies have a very large membership as a result of the way in which 
they are constituted. The membership of the Q.C.E. is made up of eleven 
members elected by Convention, one member each from the State and Federal 
parliamentary Labor parties, and an unspecified number of members
appointed directly by affiliated unions in accordance with their member- 
22ship. In March 1957 its total membership was sixty-six. None of the 
members of the Western Australian State Executive are elected by Con­
ference (General Council). The bulk of them are elected by the nine dis­
trict councils, each of which is allocated a number of delegates on the
20 A.L.P., S.A. Rules, r.26.
21 Ibid., r.21. The scale used is as follows: 1 delegate for 25-249
members; 2 for 250^499; 3 for 500-1499; 4 for 1500-2499; 5 for 2500- 
3499; 6 for 3500-4999; with a maximum of 7 delegates for a membership 
of more than 5000. All delegates must be elected at ’properly consti­
tuted’ meetings and must be ’bona fide* members of the organization 
they represent.
22 A.L.P., Qd. Rules, r.28. The scale used for allocating members is: 1
delegate for 2000-4999 members; a further delegate for each additional 
5000 members, or part thereof, with a maximum of 5 delegates for more 
than 20,000 members. Affiliated unions with individual memberships of 
less than 2000 jointly elect a number of delegates assessed on the basis 
of their collective membership in accordance with the above scale.
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23basis of its affiliated membership,' In addition, the Executive com­
prises the eight officers of the Party, elected by the combined members 
of the district councils; delegates from unions affiliated direct with
the State Executive and allocated in accordance with the scale operating
24in relation to district council delegates; two delegates from the Trade 
Unions Industrial Council; and one delegate each from the State and Federal 
parliamentary labor parties, the Labor Women*s Central Executive and the 
Young Labor League, The total membership of the State Executive in 1957 
was eighty-two.
The size of the Queensland and Western Australian Executives has 
naturally led to the detailed supervision of the Party13 activities in 
these States being carried out by a more manageable group, the Executive 
in each case acting as an endorsing rather than an administrative body.
The role of the small administering group is of particular importance in 
Queensland, where the Q.C.E, is obliged to meet only at three-monthly inter­
vals; the Western Australian State Executive must meet at least once a 
25month. In both States the administering group is composed of the offi­
cers of the Party, though in neither case is their constitution as a 
separate body acknowledged by the rules. In Western Australia the rules 
provide for the election of eight officers by the combined vote of district
A.L.P., W.A. Rules. r,12 (a). The district councils are in every case 
predominantly composed of union delegates allocated on a scale related 
to membership. The scale used in assessing the number of State Executive 
delegates to which a Council is entitled is as follows: 1 delegate for 
up to 500 members, and one further delegate for each additional 1000 mem­
bers or part thereof.
The provision enabling affiliation directly with the State Executive is 
for the benfit of unions operating in areas, chiefly in the north-west 
of the State, where no District Council exists.
A.L.P., Rules: Qd,, r, 32 (a); W.A., r,13* /*** !praf?y
♦^fV'ERSV'
31r?
c o u n c il members* In  Q ueensland, on th e  o th e r  hand, the  a d m in is tra t­
ive  group i s  a t  once more pow erfu l than  in  W estern A u s tra lia  and a lm ost 
com pletely  overlooked by th e  S ta te  P arty*s r u le s .  The ex ecu tiv e  o f f ic e r s
o f th e  P a rty  a re  n o t fo rm ally  d e fin ed ; the  Q.C.E. i s  m erely empowered to
27
e l e c t  * i ts  own O ff ic e rs * . The group formed by th e  o f f ic e r s  i s  custom­
a r i l y  known as the  In n er E x ecu tiv e , though the  on ly  re fe re n ce  to  such a
body in  the  ru le s  i s  a p ro v is io n  d e fin in g  a fu n c tio n  th a t  the  'E x ecu tiv e
28Committee o f th e  Queensland C en tra l Executive* may n o t u n d e rta k e . In  
March 1957 th e  In n e r Executive c o n s is te d  o f seven members.
The number o f union  o f f i c i a l s  on th e  main ex ecu tiv e  bodies o f S ta te  
branches o f th d  A .L .P . in  1957, and t h e i r  p ro p o r tio n  o f  the  t o t a l  member­
sh ip  in  each c a se , i s  shown in  Table 11.
------  oOo -  -  -
The b ie n n ia l  F ed e ra l Conference o f th e  A .L .P ., th e  * supreme govern­
in g  a u th o r i ty  and policy-m aking body* o f the P a r ty , c o n s is ts  o f s ix  d e le -
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g a te s  from each S ta te  branch o f the  P a r ty , a t o t a l  o f t h i r t y - s i x  d e le g a te s .
The F ed e ra l r u le s  la y  down no uniform  method f o r  th e  s e le c t io n  o f d e le g a te s ,
and th e  method v a r ie s  frara S ta te  to  S ta te .  In  V ic to r ia  and Tasmania a l l
s ix  d e le g a te s  a re  e le c te d  by th e  S ta te  C o n fe re n c e ,^  and th e  same p ra c t ic e
i s  fo llow ed  in  South A u s tra l ia  (th e  card  vote being  used) a lthough  th e
ru le s  a re  s i l e n t  on the  p o in t .  Conference d i r e c t l y  e le c t s  fo u r  o f th e
New South Wales d e le g a te s  and a ls o  e le c ts  th e  S ta te  P re s id e n t and G eneral
31S e c re ta ry  who a re  ex  o f f ic io  d e le g a te s .  One o f the d e le g a te s  from 
W estern A u s tra l ia  i s  e le c te d  by the  S ta te  E xecutive and th e  rem ain ing  f iv e
26 A .L .P ., W.A. R ules, r .9 *  29 A .L .P ., F e d e ra l Conference R u le s .1957
27 A .L .P ., Qd. R u les , r .3 2  (m).  ^ 2 .
28 I b i d . ,  r .  32 (yy) 3 0  A .L .P .) R ules; Vic»,App. 1 , r . 2 ; T a s . r . 54*
31 A .L .P ., N .ä .W. R u les , r .2 7 .
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by th e  d i s t r i c t  c o u n c ils , the Executive being  empowered to  f i l l  any
32v acan c ies  i f  in s u f f i c i e n t  appointm ents a re  made by th e  c o u n c i ls .  The 
Q ueensland ru le s  make no p ro v is io n  f o r  th e  appointm ent o f d e le g a te s  to  
F ed e ra l C onference, b u t in  p ra c t ic e  th ey  a re  e le c te d  by th e  t r i e n n i a l  
Convention o r ,  i f  Convention does n o t d e a l w ith  th e  m a tte r , by the  Q.C.E.
The F ed e ra l a d m in is tra tiv e  body o f th e  A .L .P ., th e  F e d e ra l E x ecu tiv e , 
i s  composed o f two d e le g a te s  from each S ta te  b ranch , a t o t a l  o f  tw elve 
d e l e g a t e s . B o t h  d e le g a te s  a re  e le c te d  by th e  S ta te  Conference in  Vic­
t o r i a  and T a sm an ia ;^  and a lso  in  South A u s tra l ia  on a c a rd  v o te , though 
the r u le s  do n o t r e f e r  to  t h e i r  s e le c t io n .  In  New South Wales th e  S ta te
P re s id e n t and G eneral S e c re ta ry , both  e le c te d  by C onference, a re  ex o f f i -  
35c io  d e le g a te s .  The W estern A u s tra lian  d e leg a te s  a re  e le c te d  on th e
36
combined vo te  o f a l l  members o f the d i s t r i c t  c o u n c ils . The Queensland 
Convention, in  th e  absence o f any d i r e c t io n  from the  P a r ty  ru le s  on the 
p o in t ,  e le c ts  th e  two d e leg a te s  from th a t  S ta te .
The number and p ro p o rtio n  of tra d e  un ion  o f f i c i a l s  who were members 
of the  two F ed e ra l bodies in  1957 a re  d e ta i le d  in  T«ble 11. I t  must be 
remembered th a t  th e se  o f f i c i a l s  were a c tin g  in  th e  c a p a c ity  o f re p re se n t­
a t iv e s  o f S ta te  branches o f th e  A .L .P ., and th ey  v o ted , where in s t ru c t io n s  
had been g iv en , on th e  in s t r u c t io n s  o f t h e i r  A .L .P . S ta te  branches and 
n o t o f t h e i r  u n io n s . On th e  o th e r  hand, as the  Table a ls o  shows, most 
o f th e  s ig n i f ic a n t  bod ies in  the S ta te  branches which s e le c te d  them and 
in s t r u c te d  them were composed m ainly o f un ion  re p re s e n ta t iv e s .
32 A .L .P . . /R u les , r .2 2  (b)
33 A .L .P ., F ed e ra l E xecutive R u les, 1957, r . 3 .
34 A .L .P ., R ules: V ic . ,  App. 1 , r . 2 ;  T a s .,  r .53*
35 A .L .P ., N .S.W ., R u le s , r .2 7
36 A .L .P ., W.A. , R u les , r .2 3 .
314
3* A .L .P . E xecu tives and C en tra l Union Bodies
The l in k s  between ex ecu tiv e  bodies o f the  A .L.P. and co rrespond ing  
c e n tr a l  un ion  o rg a n iz a tio n s  a re  of in c re a s in g  im portance w ith  th e  expand­
ing  ro le  o f th e se  o rg a n iz a tio n s  as co o rd in a to rs  o f union  p o l ic ie s  and 
a c t i v i t i e s .  The n a tu re  o f th e  l in k s  c o n s t i tu te s  a s ig n i f ic a n t  elem ent 
in  th e  r e la t io n s  between th e  in d u s t r i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  wings o f th e  lab o u r 
movement; th e y  a f f e c t  th e  way and e x te n t to  which id e a s  a re  exchanged, 
d if f e re n c e s  composed and co o p era tio n  ach ieved .
C asual, p e rso n a l c o n ta c t on the  p r iv a te  o r  o f f i c i a l  p lane i s  o f  f i r s t
im portance. At th e  S ta te  l e v e l ,  in d iv id u a l ex ecu tiv e  members o f c e n tr a l
un ion  bodies and t h e i r  c o u n te rp a r ts  in  th e  A .L .P . m achine, p a r t i c u l a r ly
where the  l a t t e r  a re  un ion  o f f i c i a l s  a ls o ,  a re  norm ally  on f a m i l ia r  term s
even where t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  p a th s  do n o t c ro s s . The c o n c e n tra tio n  o f tra d e
union  o f f ic e s  in  th e  Trades H a ll found in  each S ta te  c a p i t a l  (and in  many
p ro v in c ia l  c e n tre s )  i s  enough to  ensure t h i s .  Moreover, f a m i l i a r i t y  w ith
those  on the  s t r i c t l y  p o l i t i c a l  s id e  i s  encouraged by the lo c a t io n  o f th e
S ta te  Labor P a r ty ’s head o f f ic e  in  the  re le v a n t Trades H a ll in  a l l  S ta te s
excep t Q ueensland, where the  A .L.P. o f f ic e  i s  in  the  A.W.U.-owned Dunstan 
1
House. P erso n a l c o n ta c t i s  le s s  in  evidence a t  the  F ed e ra l l e v e l .
Members o f th e  A .L.P. F ed e ra l Executive come from a l l  S ta te s .  The Föd­
e r a l  E x e c u tiv e ’s head o f f ic e  i s  in  B risbane, w hile  th e  A.C.T.U. i s  based 
in  M elbourne. The ex ecu tiv e  bodies o f the A .L .P . and the  A.C.T.U. meet 
a t  d i f f e r e n t  tim es and d i f f e r e n t  p la c e s . Members o f each body from the  
same S ta te  a r e ,  o f co u rse , l i k e ly  to  have e s ta b lis h e d  p e rso n a l r e la t io n s h ip ^
1 In  W.A., o f  co u rse , th e  head o f f ic e  o f the  A .L .P . S ta te  Branch and of 
th e  Trade Unions I n d u s t r ia l  Council a re  one and th e  same.
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but general contact of this sort is inevitably much rarer than at the 
State level.
On the official plane, the most important form of liaison occurs 
through the duplication of membership between the respective executive 
bodies, and through joint membership of standing committees set up with 
the aim of facilitating regular consultation between the two bodies 
concerned.
Duplication of membership between A.L.P. executive bodies and those 
of the corresponding central union organizations varies greatly as is 
shown in Table 12. The importance of such duplication lies in its func­
tion as a channel of communication, and therefore, even where it is relat­
ively slight, it may still be of considerable value to both bodies. The 
degree of duplication is usually higher between the executives of central
2
union organizations and the larger Labor Party bodies, such as Conferences. 
But for the purpose of continuing liaison, duplicatioh at the executive 
level is by far the most important.
Standing bodies with the specific task of facilitating regular con­
sultation between the A.L.P. machine and corresponding central union org­
anizations operate only in New South Wales, although in Victoria and South 
Australia consultative bodies including also representatives of the res­
pective State parliamentary Labor parties to some extent carry out the
3same function."" In New South Wales, an Industrial Committee composed 
of the top officials of the State Labor Party and the Labor Council is
2 The practice of the Victorian Branch of the A.L.P., mentioned by Crisp
in 1954> of »always* including the President and Secretary of the A.C.T.U 
in its delegation to the A.L.P. Federal Conference, was not continued in 
1955 or 1957, although the A.C.T.U. President was a member of the Vic­
torian Central Executive in those years. See Crisp, The Australian Fed­
eral Labour Party, 1901-1951 > 31*1 •
3 See Chapter 13*
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very  a c t iv e .  A S o c ia l S e rv ice s  Committee c o n s t i tu te d  on the  same l in e s  
o p e ra te s  s p o ra d ic a l ly . A H olidays, Shops and Hours A cts Committee was 
a c t iv e  in  th e  p a s t ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  connection  w ith  th e  fo r ty -h o u r  week 
campaign, b u t has s in ce  f a l l e n  in to  d is u se . In  S ta te s  where committees 
of th i s  n a tu re  have n o t been s e t  up , ad hoc d iscu ss io n s  a re  n o t in fre q u e n t-  
ly  conducted between le a d e rs  o f th e  P a rty  machine and the  tra d e s  and lab o u r 
co u n c il on m a tte rs  o f j o i n t  concern . At th e  F ed e ra l l e v e l ,  c o n su lta tio n  
between th e  A.C.T.U. and the  A .L .P . F ed e ra l E xecutive i s  g e n e ra lly  conduct­
ed through th e  members o f the  E xecu tive who a re  a ls o  on th e  A.C.T.U. I n te r ­
s t a t e  E x ecu tiv e .
The id e a l  (as  exp ressed  by a union  o f f i c i a l  w ith  a prom inent p a r t  to  
p la y  as a l in k  between c e n tr a l  union bodies and th e  A .L .P . m achine), th a t  
the  r e la t io n s h ip  between the  in d u s t r i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  wings should  be ’ so 
f r e e  and un d ers tan d in g  th a t  form al m eetings s h o u ld n 't  be n e c e ssa ry ’ , i s  
f a r  enough from r e a l iz a t io n  to  make the  ex is ten c e  o f th e  form al and sem i- 
form al means o f l i a i s o n  o u tlin e d  above o f co n tin u in g  im portance and 
p o s s ib le  v a lu e .
4 . F inance
The f in a n c ia l  requ irem en ts of a p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  f a l l  in to  two c a te ­
g o r ie s :  funds needed to  pay expenses invo lved  in  th e  ro u tin e  a d m in is tra t­
io n  o f th e  p a r ty  m achine, and funds n ecessa ry  to  su p p o rt p e r io d ic  e l ­
e c t io n  cam paigns.
The fin an ce  f o r  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f the A .L .P . machine i s  o b ta in ed  
from annual a f f i l i a t i o n  fe e s  le v ie d  on a f f i l i a t e d  unions and from sub­
s c r ip t io n s  payable by the  members o f p o l i t i c a l  b ranches. The r a te s  a t  
which such fe e s  and s u b sc r ip tio n s  a re  payable to  S ta te  ex ecu tiv e s  o f the
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A.L.P., together with the total amounts paid or payable in both cases in 
recent years, are shown in Table 13. The Federal Executive is not within 
the terms of the Table because its operating expenses are met by annual 
payments from the State branches assessed in relation to their total 
affiliated and direct membership. It is to be emphasized that Table 13 
refers only to fees and subscriptions which are handled by State executives. 
This means that while the full amount of union affiliation fees is included 
in the Table, since all union affiliation fees are payable direct to the 
central Party body, only a part of the full amount derived from the sub­
scriptions of political branch members is so included. In all States 
the subscription payable by members of political branches is fixed (either 
by the Party rules,3 or at the discretion of each political branch^-,) at 
a rate in excess of that laid down as payable to the State Executive, the 
branch retaining the difference for its own administrative expenses or,
in some States, paying part of it to intermediate bodies in the Party struc- 
5ture. But this consideration, while noteworthy, does not materially 
affect the dominant part played by affiliated unions in all States in 
supplying the Party*s administrative expenses.
--- - 0O0 ------
The affiliated unions1 2345 share of contributions to A.I.P. election 
campaign funds is very much more difficult to assess. The only available 
estimates of their share in relation to recent elections are set out in
1 A.L.P., Federal Executive Rules. 1957, finances’, r.1.
2 The exceptions are minor. In N.S.W. and Tas. there are intermediate bodies 
(district assemblies and divisional councils, respectively) with which 
unions can be directly affiliated; if so affiliated, they pay an addit­
ional affiliation fee direct to the body concerned, usually at a nominal
r a - f 0
3 As in N.S.W. and Vic.
4 As xn Qd*, S.A., V.A. and Tas*
5 A.L.P., Rules: N.S.W., r*41; Vic., r.34> Qd., r.112; S.A., r*4 (a);
W.A., r.19(b); Tas., r*9.
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Table 14 . However, th e se  e s tim a te s  a re  o f l im ite d  value f o r  tw o 
re a so n s .
In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e , the  e s tim a te s  do no allow  f o r  campaign funds 
c a r r ie d  over from prev ious e le c t io n s ;  nor do th ey  tak e  account o f funds 
o th e r  th an  those  i n i t i a l l y  earm arked f o r  use in  e le c t io n s .  They th e re ­
fo re  exclude campaign f in a n c es  drawn from su rp lu se s  l e f t  a f t e r  normal 
a d m in is tra tiv e  expenses have been met ou t o f r e g u la r  a f f i l i a tL o h  fe e s  
and s u b s c r ip t io n s .  This may be an im portan t source o f campaign fu n d s .
Indeed , in  W estern A u s tra lia  un ion  a f f i l i a t i o n  fe e s  were in c re a se d  by
6
f i f t y  p e r c e n t ,  in  1949 ff o r  the  purpose o f f in a n c in g  e l e c t i o n s . ’
In  the  second p la c e , and more im p o rtan t, th e  e s tim a te s  a re  r e s t r i c t ­
ed to  funds which passed  through the  hands o f the  c e n t r a l  ex ecu tiv e  b o d ie s . 
Since th e se  bodies a re  n o t th e  on ly  p o in ts  a t  which campaign funds a re  
c o lle c te d  and expended, the  f ig u re s  given in  th e  Table a re  s u b je c t  to  two 
m ajor q u a l i f i c a t io n s .  On the one hand, donations from so u rces  o th e r 
than  unions a re  re ce iv ed  and expended by A .L.P . bod ies a p a r t  from P a rty  
e x e c u tiv e s . On the  o th e r  hand, the  un ions them selves do n o t confine  
t h e i r  donations to  the campaign funds of P a rty  e x e c u tiv e s . These two 
q u a l i f ic a t io n s  opera te  in  c o n tra ry  d ire c t io n s  in  r e l a t io n  to  th e  e s tim a te s  
g iven  in  Table 14. The f i r s t  tends to  d im in ish  the  f ig u re s  g iv en , th e  
second to  in c re a se  them. To what e x te n t th ey  can ce l each o th e r  o u t i t  
i s  im possib le  to  j a y  s in ce  the  re le v a n t  f ig u re s  a re  n o t a v a i la b le .  The 
most t h a t  can be done, th e re fo re ,  i s  to  give some id ea  of th e  ways in
6 O f f ic ia l  R ep o rt. 20 th  G eneral C ouncil, Ju ly  1956, 28. The move was
u n su c c e ss fu l, unions adop ting  v a rio u s  ex p ed ien ts  to  avo id  paying 
h ig h e r t o t a l  a f f i l i a t i o n  f e e s ,  and th e  r a te  was dropped ag a in  in  1953> 
though n o t to  i t s  o r ig in a l  l e v e l .
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which A .L .P . campaign funds may be c o lle c te d  and expended o th e r  than
through the  c e n t r a l  ex ecu tiv e  b o d ie s .
In  a l l  S ta te s  th e  A .L .P . machine in c lu d e s  bodies e s ta b lis h e d  on th e
b a s is  o f bo th  F ed e ra l and S ta te  e le c to r a te s  w ith  th e  main fu n c tio n  o f con-
7
d u c tin g  e le c t io n  cam paigns. In  most cases th e  F e d e ra l e le c to ra te  bodies
g
have no o th e r  fu n c tio n s ; b u t those  o p e ra tin g  in  r e la t io n  to  S ta te  e l e c t ­
o ra te s  a re  s tan d in g  bodies w ith  a v a r ie ty  o f fu n c tio n s . In  a l l  S ta te s  
th e  l a t t e r  bodies a r e  e n t i t l e d  to  a  rd g u la r  income f o r  a d m in is tra tio n
expenses, and those  in  New South W ales, V ic to r ia  and Queensland a re  a lso
9
empowered to  impose le v ie s  on t h e i r  c o n s t i tu e n t  p o l i t i c a l  b ranches. In  
th e  V ic to r ia n  S ta te  e le c t io n s  o f 1955» accord ing  to  a prom inent P a rty  o f f ­
i c i a l ,  th e  S ta te  e le c to ra te  c o u n c ils  each sp en t up to  £100 in  su pport o f 
c an d id a te s  f o r  th e  L e g is la tiv e  Assembly and up to  £200 (th e  e le c to r a te s  in  
such cases  being  la rg e r )  in  su p p o rt o f L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil c a n d id a te s . In  
most cases  th e  bulk  o f th i s  money came from p o l i t i c a l  branches and sources
o th e r  th an  u n io n s , b u t a number o f donations were made d i r e c t  to  the  coun-
10
c i l s  by a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n s . This p ra c t ic e  i s  u s u a lly  d iscouraged  by S ta te  
e x e c u tiv e s , b u t v a rio u s  unions in  most S ta te s  fo llo w  i t  from tim e to  time 
where th e  Labor cand ida te  i s  favoured  f o r  some re a so n .
For F e d e ra l e le c t io n s ,  un ion  donations to  th e  A .L .P . F ed era l Executive 
come from F e d e ra l unions whose S ta te  b ran ch es , to g e th e r  w ith  S ta te  u n io n s ,
7 A .L .P ., R ules# N.S.W ., r r .9 2 ,  94; V ic .,  r r .4 1 ,  49; Q d., r r .1 5 2 ,  157; S .A . 
r r . 6 ( c ) ,9 ;  W.A., r .1 6 ;  T a s .,  E igh th  Schedule, r .3 »
S In  W.A. and T a s .,  u n lik e  o th e r  S ta te s ,  the  same bodies conduct bo th  S ta te  
and F ed e ra l e le c t io n  campaigns and cover more th an  one e le c to r a te .
9 A .L .P ., R u les : N.S.W. ,  r .8 4 ;  V ic . ,  r r .4 5 ,4 6 ;  Q d., P a r t  Three, r .1 9 ;  S .A ., 
r . 4  ( e ) ; W.A., r . 6  (b ) , ( e ) ;  T a s .,  r . 8 .
10 Even on th e  assum ption th a t  the  maximum amount was sp en t in  each e le c to r ­
a te  and th a t  in  each case i t  was d e riv ed  com pletely  from sources o th e r  
th a n  u n io n s , th e  t o t a l  amount, a p o s s ib le  £6,600 (th e  A .L .P . c o n te s te d  44 
L e g is la tiv e  Assembly and 11 L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil s e a t s ) ,  s t i l l  f a l l s  w e ll
(P .T .O .)
320
usually make their own contributions to the Federal campaign fund of the
11
appropriate State Executive. During the 1955 Federal elections, for 
example, Victorian unions donated £7,757 to the State Executive as compared 
with corresponding contributions of £29 from political branches and £318
1Pfrom 1 other sources*. ~ On the other hand, Party bodies concerned with 
the campaign at the electorate level were said to have spent about £150 in 
each of thirty-three Victorian Federal electorates, most of the money being 
drawn from political branches and 1other sources*.
Campaign funds are also held by the various parliamentary Labor parties. 
These funds are alleged to be substantial in cases where the Party’s parlia­
mentary representatives have a record or prospects of electoral success, 
and, for obvious reasons, they are probably the most frequent destination 
of donations from ’other sources*• Although in some cases money from 
them has been transferred to the relevant A.L.P. Executive, the existence 
of such funds is on the whole regarded without favour by union officials 
and leaders of the Party machine. It is argued that their disbursement 
is too often at the discretion of the parliamentary leaders who can use 
them to bolster their own position or group. But closer to the bone, 
especially where a Labor Government is concerned, is the belief that funds 
of this sort are likely to be large enough to lessen materially the
10 short of the total contributed to the State Executive by affiliated un­
ions ; c  ^ I 11 V  .
11 Fpr a rough estimate of the total campaign funds collected by State exec­
utives for the 1946 Federal elections, see Overacker, The Australian 
Party System. 284* Her comment that the Federal Executive takes no part in 
raising or expending campaign funds is no longer correct.
12 A.L.P., Victorian Central Executive Report. 1955-56, 26*
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financial dependence of the parliamentarians on the Party machine and the 
unions. Moreover, in many Party quarters it is suspected, and resented, 
that these funds attract contributions from interests that are incompatible 
with those of the bulk of Labor supporters. Such contributions, it is 
felt, compromise the parliamentarians and blunt their Lajx>r principles - 
as well as possibly lessening their responsiveness to the Party machine.
The strength of this attitude was indicated by the inclusion among the 
charges made against V.C.Gair, Premier of Queensland, at the time of his 
expulsion from the A.L.P., of the charge of Soliciting and obtaining fin­
ancial support from non-Labor sources and sources definitely unsympathetic
to Labor..without accounting to any individuals or any body such as the 
13Q.C.E.1 The Queensland Central Executive apparently considered the matter 
of sufficient importance, as a means of gaining support, to continue attack­
ing Gair on this point after his expulsion.^
Notwithstanding the prevailing attitude, it appears that in the Feder­
al sphere at least some unions have in the past contributed to the fund 
controlled by the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party.^ But the general
union view of the practice is illustrated by discussions that took place in
1954 on the question of the way in which unions should contribute to Federal
"16election campaigns. The matter was raised by the A.C.T.U. with the Fed­
eral Secretary of the A.L.P. and the Leader of the Federal Parliamentary 
Labor Party. The Federal Leader, H.V. Evatt, argued that unions should be 
free to make donations direct to the ’Federal Parliamentary Fund’. The
13 Labor News (A.L.P., Queensland Central Executive), May 1957*
14 See, e.g., Sydney Morning Herald. 29/4/1957.
15 Regarding the foundation of this fund, see Overacker, op. cit., 284^ -5.
16 President’s report, Minutes. A.C.T.U. Emergency Committee, 26/5/1954*
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A.C.T.Ü. officials, on the other hand, pressed for a more fregular proced­
ure1. Thqysuggested that contributions from Federal unions should be sent 
to the A.L.P. Federal Executive, and those from the State branches of such 
unions should be made in accordance with the ’normal practice* to the appro­
priate State branches of the Party, the disposal of the funds by the bodies 
concerned being ’a matter for their own decision’. These suggestions were 
finally agreed upon.
The custom of giving financial assistance direct to individual labor
candidates is long-established and fairly prevalent among certain unions.
It is not, however, officially recognized by the A.L.P. nor as extensively
practised as it is in the United Kingdom, where many of the large unions
not only assume financial responsibility for, but actually select, parlia- 
17raentary candidates. The practice is in general frowned on by A.L.P. 
executives, and occasional attempts by unions to specify the electorates in 
which their contributions to the central campaign fund are to be spent have 
usually been rebuffed. In Tasmaiia, however, the State Executive does 
accept funds which the contributing union wishes to earmark for a particular 
State electoral division: under the State’s proportional representation 
system, this does not mean that the contribution will be used to support a 
single candidate, and its acceptance is conditional on its being used in 
support of all the Labor candidates within the specified division. But 
unions wishing to help a particular Labor candidate normally do so directly. 
Many unions make a point of contributing to the campaign expenses of their 
own officials or ex-officials^ and some, on occasion, give such support to 
other favoured candidates. The A.W.U. appears to have followed this policy
17 See B.C.Roberts, Trade Union Government and Administration in Great 
Britain. 376-9•
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most c o n s is te n t ly  and most e x te n s iv e ly  o f a l l ;  i t  has a ls o ,  p a r t i c u la r ly
in  Queensland, o f te n  p laced  th e  s e rv ic e s  o f i t s  o f f i c i a l s ,  i t s  o f f ic e  eq u ip -
19
ment and v e h ic le s  a t  the  d isp o sa l o f Labor can d id a te s  in  g e n e ra l.
A part from th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f in d iv id u a l u n io n s , most c e n tr a l  tra d e  
union o rg a n iz a tio n s  c o n tr ib u te  in  v a rio u s  ways and to  a vary ing  e x te n t to  
A .L.P . e le c t io n  cam paigns. Up to  the  1954 F ed e ra l e le c t io n s ,  the  A.C.T.U. 
cu sto m arily  sp en t about £1,500 on n a tio n a l b ro a d c a s ts , on ly  p a r t  o f which 
was refunded by i t s  a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n s . This was d isco n tin u ed  in  view of 
the  burden i t  p laced  on th e  o rg a n iz a tio n ’ s l im ite d  f in a n c ia l  re so u rc e s , bu t 
the  A.C.T.U. has con tinued  i t s  p rev ious p o lic y  of appea ling  to  i t s  a f f i l i ­
a te d  unions f o r  c o n tr ib u tio n s  to  A .L.P . F ed e ra l e le c t io n  fu n d s . S ta te  
t ra d e s  and la b o u r c o u n c ils , to o , u s u a lly  make ap p ea ls  fo r  F ed era l e le c t io n  
fu n d s , and sometimes fin an ce  advertisem en ts  and m eetings. The Trades and 
Labor Council o f Queensland was p a r t i c u la r ly  a c tiv e  in  t h i s  re s p e c t du ring  
th e  1955 F ed e ra l e le c t io n s ,  when i t  sponsored more th an  th re e  hundred meet­
in g s , a number o f S ta te  b ro ad csts  by F ed e ra l Labor le a d e rs ,  and  su p p lie s  of
20
l e a f l e t s ,  p o s te rs  and ’s t i c k e r s ' .
In  a l l  S ta te s ,  o th e r  than  W estern A u s tra l ia ,  where th e  Trade Unions 
In d u s t r ia l  C ouncil i s  p a r t  o f th e  A .L .P . s t ru c tu re  and has no sep a ra te  funds 
o f i t s  own, th e  main tra d e s  and lab o u r co u n cils  tak e  some p a r t  in  S ta te  
e le c t io n  cam paigns. W ith th e  o ccas io n a l ex cep tio n  o f the  Labor Council 
o f New South W ales, th ey  do n o t make d i r e c t  f in a n c ia l  c o n tr ib u tio n s  to  A .L.P. 
campaign fu n d s . But th e y  u s u a l ly  make appeals to  t h e i r  a f f i l i a t e d  unions 
f o r  such c o n tr ib u tio n s , and du rin g  the 1956 Tasmanian e le c t io n  th e  Hobart
18 See, e . g . ,  Rawson, The O rgan iza tion  o f th e  A u s tra lia n  Labor P a r ty , 1916- 
1941. 20 -1 .
19 See C ourie r-M ail (B risb a n e ) , 2 4 / l / l9 5 7 .
20 M inutes. Trades and Labor C ouncil o f Q d., 30/11/1 955*
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Trades Hall Council took the exceptional step of actually collecting
funds and forwarding them to the A.L.P. State Executive. The various
councils have given help in other ways. The United Trades and Labor
Council of South Australia frequently sponsors newspaper advertisements;
the New South Wales Labor Council makes available additional free time over
its radio station for A.L.P, speakers; the Melbourne Trades Hall Council
finances the publication of election leaflets, and spent £248 in this way
22during the 1955 State election campaign. But only in Queensland and 
Tasmania have councils, in recent years at least, played an active role in 
coordinating union election activities. Before the Tasmanian State elect­
ions of 1955, the Hobart Trades Hall Council took the lead in formulating 
a programme of electioneering work to be carried out by the unions to ob- 
tain campaign funds and support for Labor candidates. In the post-war 
years up to 1957 the Trades and Labor Council of Queensland appears to 
have taken little part in State election campaigns by contrast with that 
of trades and labour councils in other States - and with its own activity 
in relation to Federal elections. But in the State elections that follow­
ed the 1957 crisis in the State Branch of the A.L.P., the Council organized 
and financed an 1independent Trade Union campaign* in support of the A.L.P., 
and carried it through with vigour.^
-- -- oOo----
The many points at which A.L.P. campaign funds may be, and are, 
collected and expended make it impossible for even Party officials to fix
21 Minutes, Hobart Trades Hall Council, 22/11/1956. In 1956 the Council also 
made a special appeal on behalf of the State Labor Government*s Chief 
Secretary, A.J. White, at the time a Council member and its immediate 
past President: circular to affiliates, 26/9/1956.
22 Melbourne Trades Hall Council, Statement of Accounts, Year ended 30/9/1955
23 Minutes. Hobart Trades Hall Council, 13/1/1955*
24 Minutes. Trades and Labor Council of Qd., 26/6/1957.
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with any accuracy the total amount spent during an election campaign or 
the sources from which the money is derived. For this reason, the esti­
mates given in Table 14 of the union share of election donations handled 
by A.L.P. central executive bodies are of strictly limited value. Never­
theless, the estimates do suggest a conclusion which is perhaps worth out­
lining on the assumption that the central executives probably represent, in 
most cases, the main point at which campaign funds are collected. It is 
that a Labor Party out of power, or likely to lose power, is more depend­
ent on the unions for election finance than a Labor Party in office, or 
likely to gain office.
As shown in the Table, the union share of campaign funds collected by
A.L.P. central executives in relation to the elections indicated was markedly
less in New South Wales and Tasmania than in all other cases. Labor had
held office for many years in these two States, and had reasonable prospects
of retaining its position. In Western Australia, where the union share
was somewhat higher, a Labor Government was also in power but the likeli-
25hood of its return seemed rather more doubtful. In all other cases the 
union share was significantly large in circumstances which gave Labor small 
prospect of success. In Victoria and Queensland, the elections had been 
forced on Labor governments by dissension in their own ranks, and the A.L.P. 
faced the electorate harried by vote-splitting ex-Labor candidates. The 
1955 Federal elections were fought by a Labor Opposition at a time delib­
erately chosen by the Government in order to take advantage of the current 
unpopularity and disunity of the A.L.P. And in South Australia, where
25 See 1Political Chronicle* (1956), 2 Australian Journal of Politics and 
History. 115.
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union contributions represented almost the sole source of the State Brec­
on
utive’s campaign funds, the Party formed a near-permanent Opposition.
The conclusion suggested here was most dramatically illustrated, how­
ever, by the variation in the union share of the campaign funds accumulated 
by the Queensland Central Executive for the 1956 and 1957 State elections.
As Table 14 shows, this share represented about 80 per cent, of the total 
in 1957 when the A.L.P. had its back to the electoral wall. On the other 
hand, in 1956, when Labor was entering its twenty-fifth consecutive year in 
office, the union shareaccording to a responsible Party official, was a 
mere 20 per cent. The difference in these proportion resulted partly from 
a fall in the 1957 contributions received from *other sources1, whose purses 
were open to a united Party assured of success but not to a divided one 
facing probable electoral defeat. But primarily it resulted from an in­
crease in the amounts of money extracted from the unions by the circumstances 
of the 1957 elections, during which, incidentally, the State Party collect­
ed and expended nearly twice the total amount it had in the course of the 
1956 campaign. To this extent, the low union share of 1956 was a function 
of union parsimony, which was in turn largely the product of Queensland 
Labor’s unparalleled electoral record,since its first major success in 
1915* With labor entrenched in government by the mechanics of the State 
electoral system, unions were understandably reluctant to dip into their 
funds to the extent they would have had the result been less readily
26 Perhaps an indication of the 3.A. Party’s financial straits was given by 
the recent rules amendment to impose a 2§$ salary levy on State and Feder­
al parliamentarians from the State for election purposes: A.L.P., S.A. 
Rules, r.4* (a)
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predictable; and their reluctance was reinforced by the knowledge that 
considerable funds were already available, chiefly to the Parliamentary 
Party, from sources outside the Party and the unioni? The tendency was, 
therefore, either to make token donations or to withhold them altogether, 
or - and this practice appears to have be en followed on g wide scale in 
Queensland - to make them direct to favoured candidates from whom special 
consideration might be expected. A leading member of the Gair Cabinet, 
at the time of the split in the Party, acknowledged this last avenue of 
union contributions before he went on to claim that *as to the central 
organization, less than £1,000 was contributed directly to the political 
canpaign by the whole of the trade union structure of Queensland* during
tiie 1956 elections.
5. Union Control of the Party Machine
The A.L.P. machine, as the term is used here, is the Party structure 
outside parliament, which has been described in preceding sections of this 
chapter* Control of the machine means, briefly, the continuing ability 
in practice to exercise a determining influence on its decision-making 
process. The key to control of the machine, at the Federal level and in 
each of the States, is found, first, in the supreme body in each case which 
makes final decisions binding on all members of the Party and on all units 
of the Party structure within its area; and, second, in the central exec­
utive body which administers the Party*s affairs between meetings of the 
supreme body. These bodies, Conference and Central Executive (the latter
27 The reverse is also likely to apply. Even as the most reliable source of 
election funds, the unions* enthusiasm, as has been evident in S.A., is 
naturally dampened where the Party has been repeatedly defeated: see 
Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia , 99
28 The amount gathered in the *Premier*s Fund* for the 1956 State elections 
was alleged to be at least £12,000: Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 24/l/l957*
29 E.J. Walsh, 1957. Qd. Pari* Debs. (2nd Session), 34th Pari.), 42.
27
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term  in c lu d in g  those  S ta te  ex ecu tiv e  bodies w ith  a tw o - t ie r  s tru c tu re )  , 
a re  a t  the  c en tre  o f the  power s t ru c tu re  of the A .L .P . m achine. C on tro l 
of th e  machine in  g en e ra l n e c e s s a r i ly  in v o lv es  c o n tro l o f th e  re le v a n t 
gonference and C en tra l E x ecu tiv e .
In  term s o f form al o rg a n iz a tio n , as has been shown, th e  unions a re  in  
a p o s i t io n  to  c o n tro l th e  A .L .P , machine in  a l l  S ta te s ,  and th e reb y  th e  
F ed e ra l m achine. In  every  S ta te  th e  membership o f a f f i l i a t e d  unions f a r  
o u ts t r ip s  the  P arty*s p o l i t i c a l  branch membership. As a r e s u l t ,  t h e i r  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  c o n s t i tu te  ( in  f a c t  i f  n o t always on p ap er, as in  Queens­
land) the  m a jo r ity  o f d e le g a te s  a t  S ta te  C onferences; and in  most S ta te s  
th ey  a lso  'have the  numbers* on th e  c e n tr a l  ex ecu tiv e  b o d ie s . In  every  
S ta te ,  to o , th ey  provide the  bulk  o f th e  P a r ty 's  running  expenses th rough 
t h e i r  a f f i l i a t i o n  f e e s ,  and they  a re  the  most r e l i a b l e ,  i f  n o t always th e  
most generous, source o f e le c t io n  campaign fu n d s. But to  a s s e r t  t h a t  *the 
unions could r e t a in  c o n tro l o f th e  p a r ty  f o r  t h e i r  own purposes because o f 
the  r e l a t iv e  la ck  o f s tro n g  in te re s t-g ro u p s  th a t  had to  be compromised’ 1i s  
to  imply th a t  union  le a d e rs  in v a r ia b ly  a c t  to g e th e r ,  and th a t  th e re fo re  
the  fo rm al d e s c r ip t io n  given  above com pletely  d e sc r ib e s  th e  power s t ru c tu re  
o f th e  A .L.P . In  p ra c t ic e  th e  p o s i t io n  i s  le s s  c le a r - c u t .  The form al 
d e s c r ip t io n  i s  m eaningful in  p o te n t ia l  b u t r a r e ly  in  a c tu a l  te rm s, because 
union le a d e rs  do n o t in v a r ia b ly  a c t  to g e th e r . The h is to r y  o f th e  A .L.P . 
in  a l l  S ta te s  i s  s tu d ie d  w ith  s tru g g le s  between competing groups o f un ion  
le a d e rs  f o r  c o n tro l o f th e  P a r ty  machine. Changes in  the  membership and 
s tre n g th s  o f  such groups have been fre q u e n t because th e  f a c to r s  t h a t  d iv id e
1 Kuhn, *Why Pressure-G roup A ction by A u s tra lia n  Trade U n io n s? ', (S e p t . ,  
1952) 24 A u s tra lia n  Q u a rte rly  66.
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union leaders on different issues and at different times run the gamut
2from principle to expediency. For this fceason their classification as 
nothing more than factions, intent merely on the achievement of the power 
that control of the Party machine can bring, is tempting. It is not, 
however, completely accurate; it overlooks the genuine disagreements on 
policy which are normally of undeniable, if indeterminate, importance in 
struggles within the machine. Disagreements of this kind are reflected 
in the the existence of certain more or less stable core groups of unions.
In distinguishing these groups and discussing the unions outside them, it 
should be kept in mind that the attitudes discussed are essentially atti­
tudes held by union leaders. The independence of attitude of union leaders 
in relation to their members varies considerably from union to union, from 
place to place, and from time to time. But, however conditioned, that 
attitude is of determining importance in the present context.
Three core groups are generally distinguishable in the Australian 
trade union movement. In the first place, it has always been possible to
describe the trade union movement in terns of a left-wing and a right-wing,
*
and it is in this connection that the division on principle most consist­
ently arises. A complex of attitudes is involved on each side but, broadly 
speaking, the distinction between the left-wing and right-wing core groups 
can be described in terms of two major issues. Industrially, the general 
distinction is between unions favouring strike action and unions clinging 
firmly to the procedures of industrial arbitration. Politically, the 
general distinction is between Communist-controlled unions or, within the
2 For a summary of the fluctuating character of the controlling groups in 
the N.S.W. Party machine up to 1941> see Rawson, The Organization of the 
Australian Labor Party, 1916-41» 11*
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A .L .P .! s frame o f re fe re n c e , unions th a t  reg a rd  th e  s o c ia l i z a t io n  
o b je c tiv e  as som ething more th a n  a m isty  id e a l  and a re  wedded to  i t s  
r e a l i z a t io n  by c o n s t i tu t io n a l  means, and, on the  o th e r  hand, un ions to  
whom th e  s o c ia l iz a t io n  o b je c tiv e  i s ,  i f  n o t anathem a, a t  l e a s t  h ig h ly  em­
b a rra s s in g  and u n re a l iz a b le .  These in d u s t r i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  a t t i tu d e s  on 
each s id e  ten d  to  go to g e th e r ; and unions th a t  re g a rd  th e  two is su e s  o f 
the  s t r ik e  and s o c ia l iz a t io n  from the same extreme a ls o  te n d  to  tak e  up 
the  same a t t i tu d e s  over a w ider range o f i s s u e s .  These two core groups 
e x h ib i t  a c o n s is te n t  concern w ith  aims a p a r t  from , o r  a t  l e a s t  a d d i t io n a l  
t o ,  p e rso n a l aggrandizem ent, a concern in v o lv in g  fundam ental b e l ie f s  th a t  
u s u a lly  p rev en t them f in d in g  common ground on a l l  b u t th e  most n e u tr a l  
i s s u e s .  The com position o f th e se  two core groups i s  com p arativ e ly  s ta b le  
over a p e rio d  o f tim e , b u t may vary  from tim e to  tim e and from p lace  to  
p la c e . D iffe ren ces  in  th e  a t t i tu d e s  o f t h e i r  o f f i c i a l s  may le a d  to  th e  
v a rio u s  S ta te  o rg a n iz a tio n s  o f a F ed e ra l union being  a t ta c h e d  to  a d i f f e r ­
e n t core group, o r a tta c h e d  to  n e i th e r .  A change o f  o f f i c i a l s ,  o r le s s  
commonly th e  t h r e a t  of a change heard  in  the  rum bling o f th e  rank  and f i l e ,  
may swing a union  from one group to  an o th er o r in to  th e  la r g e r  poo l o f 
uncommitted u n io n s .
The uncommitted u n io n s , as th e  a d je c tiv e  im p lie s , range in  a t t i tu d e  
acro ss  the  spectrum  on which the  le f t-w in g  and r ig h t-w in g  core groups a re  
the  ex trem es. The uncommitted unions a re  n o t f i rm ly  id e n t i f i e d  w ith  e i th e r  
o f th ese  two core g roups, and t h e i r  in d u s t r ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  a re  
le s s  r i g i d .  The t i g h t  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f r ig h t-w in g  and le f t -w in g  co re  groups 
( r e a d i ly  observab le  a t  in te r -u n io n  conferences) i s  l e s s  f r e q u e n t ,  and c e r­
t a in ly  le s s  l a s t i n g ,  among th e  uncommitted u n io n s . They t  ake s id e s  on 
p a r t i c u la r  is su e s  and may f o r  a time c o n s is te n t ly  a cc e p t th e  le a d e rsh ip
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of one or the other of the two core groups: as the price of attracting 
their support they may oblige the left-wing or right-wing group to com­
promise its principles but rarely to abandon them. It is primarily within 
the pool of uncommitted unions that the strictly factional division occurs - 
whether as a product of personal ambition, personal antipathies or of con­
flict between the industrial interests of particular unions - and cuts 
across divisions of principle separating the left-wing and right-wihg core 
groups. This is far from saying, however, that all divisions occurring 
within this pool are based on factional advantage.
The large pool of uncommitted unions is not a group as such. It lacks 
the unity of purpose and of organization that characterizes the groups at 
its extremes. It does, however, enclose the third and most readily dist­
inguishable core group in the shape of the Australian Workers Union (A.W.U.) 
- use of the term ‘group* being continued in this connection for the sake
of simplicity. The independent role of the A.W.U. in the trade union
3movement in general has been discussed elsewhere. This role as a sympton 
of the A.W.U.*s power is, however, of greatest significance within the 
structure of the A.L.P. machine, in which are reflected the diviaons out­
lined above in relation to the trade union movement in general.
The role of the A.W.U. as the third core group within the structure of 
the A.L.P. machine is derived not from the rigidity of its leader*s beliefs, 
as in the case of the right-wing and left-wing core groups, but from certain 
qualities that give it, as a single union, a peculiar importance within 
the machine. These qualities are the size and distribution of its member­
ship and its officials’ close and constant preoccupation with political
activities, combined with its ability as an uncommitted union to shift its 
3 See Chapters 3 and 4«
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posit-ion in a way that is not normally open to either of the other two 
core groups. Although its leadership is traditionally conservative in 
attitude, the A.W.U. has shown a marked ability in its alliances to swing 
from one end to the other of the area between the left-wing and right-wing 
groups - a characteristic it shares, of course, with many other uncommitted 
unions whose individual weight is less significant. By far the largest of 
all Australian unions, with a huge membership scattered through all States, 
the A.W.U. has the distinction of being the only union that was represented 
on every State Executive of the A.L.P. in 1957. Its strength and influence 
within the machine varies from State to State. The weight of its State 
memberships, consisting chiefly of rural and metal mining workers, is import­
ant but counts for less in the Party councils of the heavily industrialized 
States of Victoria and New South Wales, On the other hand it is dominant 
in Queensland, where the Party rules as well as its enormous membership 
enhance its position; and it is of first importance in the other three 
States where its membership outstrips any other union. Moreover, in two 
of these States, South Australia and Western Australia, it is able to exert 
its full strength in important Party ballots owing to the existence of the 
card vote.^
The widespread strength of the A.W.U. at the State level, together with 
the fact that all States are equally represented on Federal bodies ofthe
atiA.L.P., usually gives its officials a membership on these bodies andAinfluence 
as a group at the Federal level that is out of all proportion to their union’s 
strength in the union movement as a whole. Among the members of the A.L.P.
4 Thus the S.A. State Secretary of the A.W.U.® ’The thing that does aid us... 
is that...we have a card-system, and when we vote...we cast a vote for 
every member of the organisation*: Official Report. A.W.U., 69th Annual 
Convention, Jan. 1955, 176.
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F ed e ra l E xecutive in  1957, f o r  example, two of th e  s ix  un ion  o f f i c i a l s  
were S ta te  s e c r e ta r ie s  o f the  A.W.U., and a t  l e a s t  one o th e r  member, a 
p a r lia m e n ta r ia n , was a form er A.W.U. o rg a n iz e r . S im ila r ly ,  o f the  s ix ­
te e n  union  o f f i c i a l s  a tte n d in g  th e  1957 F ed e ra l C onference, f iv e  were o f f ­
i c i a l s  o f th e  A.W.U. and a t  l e a s t  two o th e r  d e le g a te s ,  bo th  p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s ,
were c lo s e ly  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  union  -  one as a fo rm er o rg a n iz e r  and the
5
o th e r  as a c u r re n t  member o f a S ta te  Executive o f th e  u n io n . The p o s s ib le  
s tre n g th  o f the  A.W.U. a t  the  F ed e ra l l e v e l  o f th e  P a r ty  was s t r i k in g ly  
dem onstrated  in  an im portan t vo te  tak en  a t  the  1951 F e d e ra l C onference.
The is su e  was an a p p lic a t io n  by th e  union  f o r  membership o f th e  F e d e ra l 
Labor Advisor;/- Committee^ which c o n s is te d  a t  the  tim e o f r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  
from the  F e d e ra l P a rliam en ta ry  Labor P a r ty , th e  F e d e ra l E xecu tive  and th e  
A.C.T.U. D esp ite  s tro n g  o p p o s itio n  from th e  P re s id e n t ,  S e c re ta ry  and 
o th e r  o f f ic e -h o ld e r s  o f th e  A .C .T .U ., a l l  o f whom were d e le g a te s ,  th e  a p p l i -  
c a tio n  was approved by a vo te  o f e ig h te en  to  sev en teen ; Of d e c is iv e  im port­
ance was th e  f a c t  th a t  s ix te e n  o f the  e ig h teen  fav o u rab le  v o te s  came from
7
A.W.U. members d i s t r ib u te d  among th e  v a rio u s  S ta te  d e le g a tio n s .
The th re e  core groups o u tlin e d  above c o n s t i tu te  the  p rim ary  d iv is io n s  
w ith in  th e  power s t ru c tu re  o f th e  A .L .P . In  la rg e  measure i t  i s  th e  i n t e r ­
p la y  o f th e se  th re e  groups t h a t  determ ines c o n tro l o f th e  P a r ty  m achine, 
a t  l e a s t  one o f them u s u a lly  form ing the nucleus o f each o f th e  l a r g e r
5 In  a d d it io n , i t  i s  p o ss ib le  t h a t  some o f the  o th e r  p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  were 
members of the  A.W.U. in  view o f the  p r a c t ic e ,  p re v a le n t  in  some S ta te s ,  
o f Labor p o l i t i c i a n s  ta k in g  o u t membership t i c k e t s  -  a p r a c t ic e  made p o s s i­
b le  by the  g e n e ra l term s o f th e  A.W.U.*s c o n s t i tu t io n ,  and d e s ir a b le  by 
th a t  union*s g e n e ro s ity  to  th e  campaign funds o f  fav o u red  c an d id a te s  and 
by the  g e n e ra l p o l i t i c a l  advantage t o  be gained from being  ab le  to  speak 
as a u n io n is t .
6 The m issing  vo te  was t h a t  o f A .A .G alw ell, who was a b se n t from th e  con­
fe ren ce  room a t  the  tim e .
7 C risp , The A u s tra lia n  F ed e ra l Labor P a r ty , 1901-1951» 203.
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groups that from time to time struggle for control of the Party machine.
For, normally, no single core group is in a position where it can achieve
decisive power in the machine without allies. It may draw allies from
three sources. In the first place, a core group may form an alliance
with another core group. The crucial limitation on this process is the
rarity with which the left-wing and righi>-wing union groups find a common
cause to bring them together; and the divergence between them has been
sharpened since the second world war by the tendency of prosperity and full
8employment to shift the right-wing further to the right. This limitation 
enhances the position of the third core group, the A.W.U., since it alone 
is free to join forces with either of the other two.
In the second place, even for a combination of two core groups it is 
usually necessary to attract the support of a significant section of those 
unions which are committed wholeheartedly to no particular group and, like 
the floating voter of parliamentary concern, feel free to shift their alleg­
iance in accordance with the demands of the moment. Moreover, the fact 
that such divisions exist among the unions and that, by itself, no core 
group can normally expect to muster the absolute majority necessary in the 
main Party bodies, frequently gives the political branches of the Party an 
importance that the comparative smallness of their membership would not 
otherwise have. Indeed, the creation of political branches composed of 
their own supporters, and the ’stacking* of existing branches, is a tactic 
that has not been neglected by groups controlling the Party machine (and 
thus controlling the grant of branch charters) and anxious to entrench 
themselves in this position. It */as used to good effect by the J.T. Lang
8 See Rawson,’The A.L.P. Industrial Groups - An Assessment*,(Dec., 1954)
26 Australian Quarterly 40-43»
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group in  the  s t ru g g le s  w ith in  th e  New South Wales Braaich^ST^the A .L .P .
during  the  ' t h i r t i e s .  More re c e n t ly ,  i t  has been a l le g e d  th a t  th e  same
p o lic y  was fo llow ed  on a grand s c a le  by I n d u s t r ia l  G ro u p -co n tro lled  exec­
u t iv e s  in  New South Wales and V ic to r ia :
I  sug g est t h a t  the A .L.P . members should  look back from th e  end o f 
1951, and th in k  o f the  amazing in c re a se  in  A.L.P* membership in  th e  
B ranches. . . I  guaran tee t h a t  th e  whole membership has doubled in  th e  
l a s t  two y ea rs  in  V ic to r ia  and New South W ales...W hy th i s  sudden rush 
in  thousands to  jo in  th e  A.L.P? O bviously, i t  i s  a su rg ing  forw ard  
o f th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  of th e  M ovem ent.^
11In  Queensland, to o , as shown above, the S ta te  P a r ty 's  ru le s  a re  fram ed in
a way th a t  en ab les  the  A.W.U., in  p a r t i c u la r ,  to  in flu en c e  th e  s e le c t io n  
of many p o l i t i c a l  branch d e le g a te s  to  the t r i e n n i a l  L a b o r - in -P o li t ic s  Con­
v e n tio n . A part from d e l ib e ra te  t a c t i c s  o f th is  s o r t ,  however, d iv is io n s  
w ith in  and among p o l i t i c a l  branches can be expected  to  conform to  som ething 
l ik e  the  p a t te r n  e x is t in g  among a f f i l i a t e d  un ions; and in  d is p u te s  over •
the  c o n tro l o f the  A .L .P . m achine, ' i t  i s  u su a l to  f in d  two r i v a l  un ion
12
groups competing f o r  power, each supported  by a number o f le a g u e s . '
In  th e  t h i r d  p la c e , th e  P a r ty 's  p a rlia m e n ta r ia n s  a re  u s u a l ly  an im port­
a n t f a c to r  in  any s tru g g le  f o r  c o n tro l o f th e  m achine. In  th e o ry , th e  
p a rlia m e n ta r ia n s  as a group a re  subo rd ina te  to  th e  P a rty  m achine, t h a t  i s ,  
to  whichever group c o n tro ls  the  m achine. But in  p r a c t ic e ,  p a rlia m e n ta ry  
g roups, p a r t i c u la r ly  when Labor holds the  re in s  o f government, a re  o f te n  
in  a p o s i t io n  where th ey  a re  n o t only  la rg e ly  s e lf -d e te rm in in g  b u t may 
a c tu a l ly  have a hand in  c o n tro l l in g  the machine t h a t  p u rp o r ts  to  c o n tro l 
them. The q u e s tio n  of th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  P a rty  machine and 
Labor p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  and governments i s  d iscu ssed  f u l l y  in  th e  two
9 O veracker, The A u s tra lia n  P a rty  System . 159«
10 T .D ougherty, F ed e ra l S e c re ta ry , A.W.U., O f f ic ia l  R ep o rt, 69th  Annual 
C onvention, Ja n . 1955, 201.
11 See S e c tio n  2 o f th i s  c h a p te r .
12 Rawson, The O rgan ization  o f the A .L.P . (Seminar p ap er, A .N .U ., 1953,)3*
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succeeding chapters. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that 
parliamentary Labor parties, and especially the members of Labor govern­
ments, form a group with views and interests which are a product of their 
official status, and frequently with an influence in the Party machine out­
side parliament that makes their opposition or support a matter of crucial 
importance to the groups of unions, centred on the core groups, seeking to 
control the machine.
Union core groups may find it necessary to draw support from Labor 
parliamentary groups and from the political branches if they are to exercise 
a determining influence on the Party machine. But, owing to the numerical 
weight of affiliated unions and the importace placed on dieer numbers by the 
Party's structure, they are ultimately dependent on the support of at least 
a significant section of the uncommitted unions and usually also on the 
support of one other core group.
---  - 0O0 - - -
The role of the core groups in the power structure of the A.L.P. is 
perhaps best demonstrated by an examination of the interests involved in 
the recent struggle for control of the Queensland Party machine, a struggle 
that in 1957 finally led to the election of the State's first non-Labor 
government in twenty-five years. A single illustration does not , of course 
constitute conclusive proof of the validity of an analysis made in the gen­
eral terms of that outlined above. The examination of the Queensland dis­
pute is intended as no more than an illustration. It is contended, however 
that it does exemplify a pattern which is usually discernible in previous 
and contemporary struggles for control of the A.L.P. machine in other States 
as well as Queensland. - The same pattern is evident, for example, in the
337
split in the Victorian Party in 1955, and in the uneasy balance of forces 
that overlays the continuing struggle since 1955 in the New South Wales 
Party machine.
All three core groups are clearly distinguishable in the Queensland 
case: a left-wing centred among the unions affiliated with the Trades and 
Labor Council of Queensland; a right-wing consisting of a number of unions 
controlled by Industrial Group supporters; and, finally, the A.W.U. In 
addition, there is a Parliamentary group dominated by a strong Labor Cab­
inet with strong influence in the Party machine. A combination of the 
last two core groups working closely with the Parliamentary group was in 
complete control of the Party machine until 1955, but from early in that 
year open signs of the combination’s ultimate break-up appeared.
Before the ruling combination began to disintegrate, the most import­
ant of its constituent groups was the -Queensland Branch of the A.W.U.,
whose enormous numerical superiority was enhanced by the terms of the Party 
13rules. This role is one that the A.W.U. has traditionally filled in 
Queensland Labor politics. In the past, it has not only provided many of 
the State Labor parliamentarians from its officials, but has provided over 
nearly forty years of Labor rule the solid support which has enabled the 
Parliamentary leaders, with rare exceptions, to stamp the Party machine 
in their own image. The strength of the A.W.U. was not exaggerated by the 
Queensland delegate to the union’s Federal Convention who, unaware of his 
own prescience, voiced the opinion that ’if this Union were forced into 
the position of opposing our Labor Government, we would lose the Labor 
Government in Queensland/^ The A.W.U.’s influence was of major importance
13 See Section 2 of this chapter. In Queensland before 1955 the nearest rival 
to the A.W.U.*s affiliated membership of 82,000 was the Federated Clerks 
Union with 20,000, an Industrial Group-controlled union. Between them these two covered half the total number of unionists affiliated with the State Party.
14 Official Report. A.W.U., op. cit., 195*
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in securing official A.L.P. recognition in Queensland of the Industrial
Groups. One of its leading officials, R.J.J. Bukowski, was an original
member of the committee set up by the 1947 Labor-in-Politics Convention to
15organize the Groups, and he continued to act as one of the three State
1Aorganizers for several years; In its adoption of this policy, the A.W.U.
was in sympathy with the officials of other unions supporting the Groups
and also, after 1952, with the Parliamentary group led by the Premier,
V.C. Gair, and the Treasurer, E.J. Walsh, whose rise to dominant positions
in both Caucus and the Queensland Central Executive (Q.C.E.) of the Party
17was in large measure the product of A.W.U. support. This combination 
centred on the A.W.U. was able to command a regular four-fifths majority 
on the Q.C.E.
There were, however, aspects of the relationship between the A.W.U. and 
the Parliamentary group - in effect, the Government - which reflected a 
decline in the uniorfe influence and were a potential source of dispute. Gair 
and his predecessor, E.M. Hanlon, had broken the line of ex-A.W.U. Labor 
Premiers in Queensland. Unlike their forerunners in office they were some­
what less sanguine about the traditional dependence on the A.W.U. for financ­
ial and organizational support. While C.G. Fallon was State Secretary of 
the union, however, these undercurrents were largely submerged beneath the 
harmonious personal relationship that existed between him and the Premier, 
Hanlon. With Fallon’s death in 1950 the situation changed. The new State 
Secretary of the A.W.U. was H. Boland, while R.J.J. Bukowski became State 
President. The new leaders continued the alliance with the Parliamentary
15 Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 21/9/1953-
16 See Official Report. A.W.U., op. cit., 149.
17 ’Political Chronicle’ (1955), 1 Australian Journal of Politics and History 
113.
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group in the Party machine. At the same time, and particularly after 
Gair*s succession to the Premiership in 1952, they sought to tighten the 
union*s hold on the Government leaders by using its financial support as 
a bargaining counter - a tactic that caused the Government increasingly to 
look elsewhere for such support. Nevertheless, despite the strains evi­
dent in such a situation, there was sufficient cooperation between the two 
to rule out the possibility of the A.W.U. leaders seeking new allies out­
side the Parliamentary group and the Industrial Group unions, since this 
could only mean the left-wing unions centred on the Trades and Labor Council* 
The Trades and Labor Council was under strong Communist and militant 
lef tawing influence, some of its leading officials being avowed Communists.
It was inflexibly opposed to the Industrial Groups. Many of its member- 
unions were also affiliated with the .A.L.P., but were mainly outside the 
ruling groups within the Party. It was to be expected, therefore, that
the Council*s general attitude towards the *Tory Labor Government* and its
18supporters in the Party machine was usually highly critical.
Relations between the leaders of the Party machine and the Trades and 
Labor Council were, to put it mildly, strained during the post-war years 
up to 1955* The Party leaders* attitude is reflected in the terms of a 
recommendation issued in relation to a conference of all unions that had 
been called by the Trades and Labor Council. The Party*s Inner Executive 
stated that ’it considers the conference to be sponsored and inspired by 
Communist influences. All trade unionists and ALP members are, therefore, 
advised to take no part in this so-called conference But the depths to
which relations between the two bodies had sunk is perhaps best illustrated
18 The attitude of the Meat Industry Employees Union may be taken as typical: 
see Kenneth F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, 187-8.
19 Courier-Mail. 21/4/19547 “ “
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in  th e  co n tro v e rsy  over the  com paratively  minor m a tte r  o f Labor Day 
c e le b ra t io n s .
The orgai iz a t io n  o f the Labor Day p ro cess io n  th rough  B risbane, and 
the  sp o r ts  m eeting th a t  fo llo w ed , had cu sto m arily  been handled by the  
Trades and Labor C ouncil. A fte r  the  Labor Day o f 1947, the  y ear when 
I n d u s t r ia l  Groups were o f f i c i a l l y  recogn ized  in  Q ueensland, most unions 
a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  th e  A .L .P . re fu se d  to  p a r t i c ip a te ,  a l le g in g  th a t  th e  pro­
ceedings were C om m unist-con tro lled .20 In  1949 the Q.C.E. stepped in  and 
o b ta in ed  th e  n ecessa ry  p o lic e  p e rm it f o r  th e  1950 p ro cess io n  and a lso  
th e  booking o f th e  E x h ib itio n  Grounds f o r  th e  s p o r ts  m eeting . At a meet­
ing  o f fo u r te e n  a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n s , in c lu d in g  the A.W.U., an A u s tra lia n  
Labor Day C e leb ra tio n s  Committee (A.L.D.C. Committee) was formed to  org­
an ize  p ro ceed in g s , th e  Trades and Labor Council announcing a t  the  same time 
th a t  i t  would comduct i t s  own p ro c e ss io n  d e sp ite  i t s  la ck  o f a p e rm it?1 
The d isp u te  reached  such p ro p o rtio n s  t h a t  th e  P re s id e n t o f the  A.C.T.U. 
took up th e  m a tte r  w ith  Hanlon, th e  P rem ier, on b e h a lf  o f th e  Trades and 
Labor Council which was the  A.C.T.U.>s S ta te  Branch. As re p o rte d  to  the  
C ouncil, th e  Prem ier though t t h a t  agreem ent on a u n ite d  p ro cess io n  could  be
reach ed , and he undertook th a t  the  p ro cess io n  p erm it would be given to  the
ZZ
Council in  th e  f u tu r e .  However, when the  A.C.T.U. P re s id e n t saw the  th re e
o f f ic e r s  of th e  A.L.D.C. Committee, in c lu d in g  Bukowski of the  A.W.U. and
two union  o f f i c i a l s  c lo s e ly  connected  w ith  the  I n d u s t r ia l  Groups, he was
to ld  t h a t  th e y  would n o t agree to  a  j o in t  p ro cess io n  and th a t  *as f a r  as
23
th ey  were concerned th ey  would have the perm it f o r  the  n ex t y ear a l s o . ’
20 I b i d . ,  2 /5 /1 9 5 0 .
21 M inutes. T. & L.C. o f Q d., 9 / l l / l 9 4 9 .
22 I b i d . ,  29 /3 /1950 .
23 I b id . ,
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A rig h t-w in g  union*s re s o lu t io n  su g g es tin g  th a t  a l l  u n io n is ts  should
inarch in  th e  A .L.P . unions* p ro cess io n  was no t accep ted  by the chairm an a t
2 L
a Trades and Labor Council m e e tin g ." '1' But in  th e  e v e n t, Hanlon’s comprom-
25is in g  in flu en c e  p re v a ile d  and a j o in t  p ro c e ss io n  was h e ld . In  1951,
on th e  o th e r  hand, no compromise was fo rthcom ing . The A.L.D.C. Committee
o f f i c e r s ,  accompanied by the  Prem ier and Deputy P rem ier, le d  the  Labor Day
p ro c e ss io n  w hile  th e  Trades and Labor C ouncil, a f t e r  "threatening to  march
d e sp ite  i t s  la c k  of a  p e rm it, h e ld  a ’d isp lay*  o u ts id e  the  Trades H all
26surrounded by a r in g  of policem en. In  1952 th e  C ouncil re -a ff irm e d  i t s
r i g h t  to  conduct th e  Labor Day c e le b ra t io n s ,  b u t a f t e r  an u n su cc e ss fu l
a ttem p t to  o b ta in  the  c o o p e ra tio n  o f A .L .P . - a f f i l i a t e d  unions in  o rd e r to
a llow  i t  to  e x e rc is e  the  r i g h t ,  i t s  le a d e rs  took p a r t  in  th e  A .L.P . p ro -
28cess io n  as in d iv id u a l union members. For Labour Day, 1953, the  Council 
dropped i t s  claim  to  conduct th e  p ro cess io n  and sough t, again  w ith o u t suc­
c e s s , to  co n fe r w ith  the A.L.D.C. Committee, w ith  a view to  the formation
of a ’u n ite d  com m ittee’ t h a t  would b rin g  about a ’u n ite d  Labor Day’ . 9
30In  1954 the  p ro cess  was re p e a te d , and th e  Prem ier c o n g ra tu la ted  the  A.L.D.C.
31Committee ’f o r  having taken  c o n tro l o f the  c e le b ra tio n s  from Communists’ .
The Trades and Labor C ouncil’ s view of the  r e la t io n s  between the  Gov­
ernment and i t s  su p p o rte rs  in  th e  A .L.P . m achine, p a r t i c u la r ly  th e  A.W.U., 
was summed up by a member o f th e  C ouncil’ s Executive in  1953 when he comm­
en ted  on th e  S ta te  T re a su re r’ s rep ea ted  r e f u s a l  to  d iscu ss  w orkers’ compen­
s a t io n  w ith  th e  C ouncil: ’the  reaso n  Mr. Walsh was dodging the  unions
24 Ib id .
25 C o u rie r-M ail, 2 /5 /1950 .
26 I b i d . ,  1 /5 /1951 .
27 M inutes. T. & L.C. o f  Q d., 2 4 /l0 / l9 5 1 .
28 C o u rie r-M ail. 6 /5 /1 9 5 2 . , ,
29 M inutes. T. & L.C. o f Q d., 5 / n / l 9 5 2 ,  22 /4 /1953 .
30 i b i d . ,  24 / 3/ 1954 , 7 /4 /1 9 5 4 .
31 C o u r ie r -M a il . 4 /? /l9 5 4 »
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apparently was that he was endeavouring to give the Australian Workers*
32Union all the credit for any improvements achieved in the Compensation Act.* 
The first public sign of the change that was to take place after 1954 
in the relationships discussed above was when, in November 1954» the two 
Queensland delegates to the A.L.P. Federal Executive voted on opposite sides 
on the crucial decision to dismiss from office the elected members of the 
Industrial Group-dominated Victorian Central Executive. While Gair, the 
State Premier, opposed the motion, his fellow-delegate, J.M. Schmella, State 
Secretary Of the A.L.P., supported it and ensured the narrowest possible 
majority necessary for its passag^ This vote followed H.V. Evatt’s attack 
on the Industrial Groups. More importantly, from the point of view of the 
Party in Queensland, it also followed a similar attack launched the previous 
month in The Australian Worker, the Federal journal of the A.W.U. - an attack 
that was publicly supported by Bukowski, Queensland State President of the 
union, with the reservation that the Industrial Groups in Queensland were 
*noi>-sectarian* and ’apparently worked differently from those in New South 
Wales and Victoria*
Further signs of the impending change soon appeared. At the subse­
quent meeting of the Queensland Inner Executive, a motion was carried dis­
associating the Queensland Party from Schmella’s action; but Boland, State 
Secretary of the A.W.U., abstained from voting, and Bukowski was absent 
from the meeting. When the issue was raised before the Q.C.E. a few days 
later, however, Bukowski led the opposition to a motion moved by M.T. Brosnan 
his former colleague on the A.L.P. Industrial Groups Committee, instructing
32 Ibid., 13/11/1953.
33 'Political Chronicle*, (1955) 1 Australian Journal of PoliticsAHisbry. 113
34 Courier-Mail, 13/11/1954
35 Ibid., 24/ W 1954.
the State delegates to the Federal Executive on the course they should 
take at the Executive^ next meeting. Faced with this opposition, thd 
Industrial Group supporters were forced to substitute.a successful comprom­
ise motion which, in effect, left the delegates free to act at their own 
36discretion. Atrthe annual State delegate meeting of the A.W.U. later the
same month, Bukowski echoed the attacks made on the Industrial Groups by
37A.W.U. leaders in the southern States; and the Federal Convention of the 
union shortly afterwards provided the setting for a full-scale assault on 
the same lines by the A.W.U. leadership, with the complete concurrence of 
the Queensland delegation.
The rift that this sequence of events indicated, between the A.W.U. and 
the other members of the combination controlling the Queensland Party machine, 
was fully confirmed at the Federal Conference of the A.L.P. held in Hobart 
in March 1955. The Conference met after the Federal Executive had decided 
to accept the credentials of the anti-Industrial Group delegation from Vic­
toria in preference to those of the Industrial Group-supported delegation. 
Seventeen of the delegates entitled to attend boycotted the Conference in 
protest against the Executive^ decision. Among them were five of the six 
Queensland delegates, including the Premier and the Treasurer, Gair and 
Walsh, and three Industrial Group union officials. The one Queensland 
delegate who attended the Conference wqs Boland, State Secretary of the 
A.W.U? The Q.C.E. subsequently rejected a censure motion against the 
five abstaining delegates by thirty-one votes to twenty-three. But the
vote had a significance apart from its result. Not only was the minority
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36 Ibid., 7/1/1955
37 Ibid., 18/1/1955
38 See Official Report, A.L.P., 21st. C'wealth Conference, March, 1955, 3-4«
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vote substantial by previous standards, but it included the A.W.U. block, 
the unsuccessful resolution having been moved by Bukowsk??
The breach opened in this way was not to be healed by the later unan­
imous acceptance of the Federal Conference decisions by both the State
Labor Caucus and the Q.C.E., the relevant motion in the latter case having
40again been proposed by Bukowski. The dispute had, among other things, 
clearly exposed the inability of the A.W.U. leadership to bring its part­
ners in the Party machine into line behind it. From this time on the 
efforts of the A.W.U.'s leaders were directed toward bringing the Parlia­
mentary group ahd its Industrial Group union supporters to heel, and the 
only way this could be done was by cementing the newly-founded alliabce 
with the left-wing unions.
The changing attitude of the A.W.U. and those A.L.P.-affiliated unions
which followed its lead is illustrated by further reference to the conduct
of Labor Day processions. In January 1955 the Trades and Labor Council
again sought a meeting with the A.L.D.C. Committee of the A.L.P., with a
view to obtaining a united processio&l In reply, the A.L.D.C. Committee
merely reiterated its resolution of 1952 that only delegates of unions
/2affiliated with the A.L.P. could attend its meetings. The Trades and 
Labor Council was prepared to continue negotiations on this basis^ but 
soon had reason to complain about the 'lack of co-operation' shown by the 
Committee's officer^" Shortly after this, however, the full Committee 
forced a change of policy, and for the first time in five years a joint 
Labor Day procession was held in Brisbane - a number of placards being
39 Courier-Mail. 26/3/1955
40 Ibid., 16/4/1955
41 Minutes, T.. & L.C. of Qd., 26/l/l955.42 Ibid., 23/2/1955
43 Ibid., 9/3/195544 Ibid., 23/3/1955.
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carried expressing sentiments which had been banned by the A.L.D.C. Comra-
45
ittee the previous year on the ground that they were * Communistic’.
The following year the initial approach for a united procession came from
46 _the A.L.DaC. Committee instead of the Trades and Labor Council, By
1957 cooperation between the two bodies had reached a pitch where the
Council was referring interstate correspondence on Labor Day activities to
the A.L.D.C, Committee^ and seeking the Committee’s permission to enter
48a float in that year’s procession. The course of the Labor Day question 
reflects the changed relationship between the A.W.U. and the left-wing 
unions. The benediction on the new relationship was pronounced by the 
President of the Trades and Labor Council, an avowed Communist, when he 
asked delegates to the 1955 State Trade Union Congress to ’pay tribute 
and respect to that tremendously powerful organisation of workers, the 
great Australian Workers’ Union’^  The importance of this alliance was 
soon evident.
During 1955 the A.W.U. and its new allies concentrated their efforts
on securing a majority on the Q.C.E. and, more important in the long-run,
a majority at the Party’s triennial Labor-in-Politics Convention which
was to be held early in 1956. A number of left-wing unions re-affiliated
with the Party, including the 10,000-strong Building Workers Industrial
Union; other unions, previously affiliated on only a number of their
branches, affiliated on their State-wide membership in order to increase
50their representation on the Q.C.E. A number of affiliated unions follow­
ed the lead of the A.W.U. and dropped their association with the Industrial
45 Courier-Mall. 3/5/1955.
46 Minutes. T. & L.C. of Qd., 21/3/1956.
47 Ibid., 6/3/1957
48 Ibid., 17/4/1957.
49 Courier-Mail. 20/l0/l955.
50 Ibid., 19/10/1955.
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Groups, and with it their support within the Party machine for the Parl­
iamentary leaders - many union officials, indeed, had previously affiliated, 
or other^found it wiser to be counted as Group supporters, in order to 
avoid being opposed by Group candidates in union elections*
By l$te in 1955> on the industrial issue of three weeks annual leave, 
this combination was able to obtain a large majority on the Q.C.E. against 
the opposition of the Parliamentary group and one major Industrial Group 
unionf** but its strength on other issues was less sure. However, the 
main struggle centred on the selection of political branch delegates to 
the triennial Convention, since under the system of representation provided
in the Party* s rules control of Convention by any combination of unions
52is impossible without the support of a number of branch delegates.
The conclusive test of strength at the Convention was the voting for 
the eleven delegates elected by Convention to the Q.C.E. At the Rock­
hampton Convention in 1953 the political ticket (the term 1political*, 
like ’industrial*, is used here for the sake of simplicity rather than 
accuracy) had swept the board: it had included five parliamentarians, one 
A.W.U. official, four officials of strong Industrial Group unions, and one 
from an uncommitted union whose name was also on the industrial ticket.
At Mackay in 1956, however, the political ticket, this time without A.W.tT. 
representation, was soundly defeated. Only one of the men on it, the
Premier, was elected. He owed his election to the inclusion of his name
£/also on the industrial ticket, which was completely successful. Three 
parliamentarians were elected to the Q.C.E. at the 1956 Convention by
51 Ibid., 12/11/1955, 22/12/1955
52 See Section 2 of this chapter.
53 Courier-Mail. 25/3/1953
54 Telegraph (Brisbane), 27/2/1956
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com parison w ith  the f iv e  e le c te d  in  1953* The two e le c te d  in  a d d itio n  
to  th e  Prem ier were J.E.Duggan and F .C .S . D ittm er, n e i th e r  of whom had 
been on the  p o l i t i c a l  t i c k e t  in  e i th e r  1953 o r  1956. In  the  e le c t io n s  
as  in  o th e r  i s s u e s ,  the  p a t te rn  was s e t  by the  b lock  v o tes  o f e ig h ty  ’in -
55d u s t r i a l ’ and f i f t y  ’p o l i t i c a l*  c a s t  in  the  f i r s t  vo te  o f th e  Convention:
The n a tu re  o f th e  a l l ia n c e  t h a t  had made the  m a jo rity  vote p o s s ib le , and
th e  change i t  re p re se n te d , was s h o r t ly  s ta t e d  by an o b serv er who p laced
G. W hiteside , S ta te  S e c re ta ry  o f the  Federated  Engine D rivers  and Firem ans
A sso c ia tio n , a lon g sid e  th e  A.W.U. and uncommitted un ion  o f f i c i a l s  regarded
as le a d e rs  o f th e  ’in d u s tr ia l*  b lo ck , and r e c a l le d  W h ite s id e ’s s tan d  a t
the  1953 Convention as  ’ the  le a d e r  o f a t in y  band o f seven d e leg a te s  who
s tre n u o u sly  r e s i s t e d  adop tion  of a r e p o r t  on A .L .P . in d u s t r i a l  g roups?^ '
The dominance o f the  new com bination was confirm ed a t  the  subsequent
m eeting o f th e  Q.C.E. a t  w hich, a lthough  c a l le d  on s h o r t  n o tic e , the  number
57
o f union d e le g a te s  p re s e n t was th e  g re a te s t  on re c o rd . The seven-member 
Inner Executive e le c te d  a t  t h i s  m eeting in c luded  Boland and Bukowski o f 
the A.W.U. as P re s id e n t and V ic e -P re s id e n t, re s p e c t iv e ly ,  W hiteside and 
J .  E gerton  (bo th  members o f th e  Trades and Labor Council E xecu tiv e , the  
l a t t e r  being  V ic e -P re s id e n t) , J.M . Schmella (S ta te  and F ed e ra l S e c re ta ry  
o f th e  A .L .P .) , and two p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s , the Prem ier and the  Deputy P rem ier, 
Duggan. The p rev io u s  In n er Executive e le c te d  in  1953 had a lso  in c lu d ed  
Boland, Bukowski and G a ir . But th e  o th e r  fo u r members had c o n s is te d  of 
two p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s , Walsh and T. Rasey -  both  members o f the  A .L .P . comm­
i t t e e  s e t  up in  1947 to  o rgan ize the  I n d u s t r ia l  Groups -  and two I n d u s t r ia l
55 C o u rie r-M ail. 28/2/1956
56 I b id . ,  23/2/1956
57 I b i d . ,  31/3/1956
58 Ib id .
348
Group union leaders, C.R. Muhldorff of the State Service Union and
59A, Co}.e of the Railway Maintenance Employees Union.
In the succeeding months up to April 1957, when the crisis point was
wasreached and a Labor PremierAexpelled from the A.L.P. for the first time
in Queensland1s history, many issues arose - or were raised - to drive
deeper the wedge between Government and A.W.U. leaders. At the same time
these issues also served to emphasize the A.W.U.*s dependence on the left-
wing union group for its position in the Party machine, a dependence that
received implicit and final recognition in July 1956, when the A.W.U. re-
affiliated with the Trades and Labor Council after an absence of nearly 
60twenty years. Because of its enormous membership and the terms of the 
Party rules, the A.W.U., as a core group, was more strongly placed in the 
Queensland Party machine than any of the other core groups. Indeed, its 
position was probably stronger than that of any core group in any of the 
other A.L.P. State machines. But even with the backing of faithful uncom­
mitted unions, it was still not strong enough to retain control of the Party 
machine without the support of at least one of the other core groups. Onee 
it had broken with the right-wing union core group and with a strong parl­
iamentary group similarly inclined, the A.W.U. was inevitably forced, 
unless its leaders were prepared to abdicate, to come to terms with the 
left-wing union core group. And in this case, the left-wing group, though 
weak while the previous alliance lasted, could gather further strength 
from the fresh affiliation of other left-wing unions (by April 1957 even 
the Australian Railways Union was affiliated after being outside the Party
59 Ibid., 17/7/1953
60 Minutes. T. & L.C. of Qd., 25/7/1956
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for more than th irty  years), and from the e ffe c t  that the withdrawal of 
the A.L.P. imprimatur from the Industrial Groups had had on elections in 
other a ff ilia te d  unions. But u n til after April 1957, when the d is a f f i l i ­
ation of the three strongest right-wing unions removed the backbone of
61the rightr-wing group on the Q.C.E., even the new alliance with the block 
votes of the A.W.U. and the left-w ing union group combined found i t  wise 
to marshal i t s  issues with care in order to hold su ffic ien t of the uncomm­
itted  unions1 votes. When the campaign against the Premier was at i t s  
height in 1957, the seriousness of the position clearly  persuaded many 
uncommitted unions to incline to caution in their voting performance on 
the Q.C.E. Thus a watered-down version of a motion, originally  accepted 
by the Inner Executive, that cr itic ized  the contentious Petrol B ill then
before the State Parliament was accepted in the Q.C.E. by only thirty-two
62
to twenty-seven votes. Nevertheless, when the supreme te s t  came in the 
two votes resulting in the Premier’s expulsion, the voting figures were 
th irty -five  to twenty-seven on the motion asking him to show cause why
63he should not be expelled, and th irty -five  to th irty  on the subsequent 
expulsion resolution^* The narrowness of these majorities demonstrated 
that the alliance with the left-w ing group Has imperative i f  the A.W.U. 
was to continue to hold i t s  traditional position in  the Party machine.
The lesson was underlined by the action of two o f f ic ia ls  of the A.W.U. who
65cast their votes against their colleagues on the two expulsion motions.
-----------0O 0-------------
61 These were the Federated Ironworkers Association, the Federated Clerks 
Union and the State Service Union.
62 Sydney Morning Herald. 12/4/1957
63 Ib id ., 19/ 4/1957
64 Ib id ., 25/4/1957
65 1 P o lit ica l Chronicle’ , (1957) 3 Australian Journal of P o lit ic s  and 
History. 106-7
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The preceding discussion has been concerned chiefly with the
divisions which produce disparities between the formal power structure
of the A.L.P. and the actual situation. The notion of union control
predicates the agreement of the great majority of the unions, or rather
their leaders, on the ends to which the Party machine should be used.
66
While it may be broadly true, as Miller implies, that union leaders will 
normally tend to share common views on general industrial questions, 
trade union unity on such questions can easily be over-emphasized. 
Particularly in recent years the right-wing of the union movement, org­
anized around the A.L.P. Industrial Groups, introduced attitudes on ind­
ustrial matters which have sharply divided union leaders - the right-wing 
advocacy of court-controlled union elections and of a basic wage tied to 
a productivity index have proved the most contentious. But Miller's 
generalization does hold in the sense that the common interest of union­
ists in industrial questions which affect them immediately will often 
result in united action cutting across otherwise strong lines of division. 
The unifying effect of such an issue was shown in the case of one of the 
narrowest votes recorded in the Queensland Central Executive in the days 
before the tight combination of the A.W.U., the Parliamentary group and 
the right-wing unions was broken. The motion, urging the Government to 
grant an extra day's holiday over the Christmas peril od was, with the 
combined weight of the A.W.U., the parliamentarians and only some of the
right-wing unions thrown against it, defeated by a bare twenty-two votes 
67to twenty. Two years later, when the A.W.U. no longer flew
66 J.D.B. Miller, 'The Development of Party Discipline in Australia'
(II), (1953) 5 Political Science 29
67 Courier-Mail. 23/11/1953
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automatically to the defence of the Government, and Industrial Group
officials were no longer so sure of their union positions, a solid union
vote on the Q.C.E. directing the passage of three weeks annual leave
legislation was broken by only a single right-wing union* On the same
issue a year later, when the implied threat to the Government was far
greater, a vote of fifty-one to eleven was recorded, the minority includ-
69ing only three right-wing unions. Even on non-Indus trial matters the
union movement has on occasion shown almost complete unity, the most
striking example being the unanimity with which the unions opposed con-
70scription for overseas military service in 1916 and I9I7.
However, as far as control of the A.L.P, machine is concerned, it 
can rarely be said that over a period of time the unions as a whole, or 
even the great bulk of them, act in concert to bend the machine in a 
direction on which they are all agreed. Some unions, in the shape of 
their officials, are at most times in a position to control the machine 
or at least to exercise considerable influence within it. The compara­
tively rare occasions when the great bulk of the unions have tended to 
act together have usually been in response to some pressing threat to 
their broad industrial aims or gains, or to their independence. Such 
occasions usually arise in relation to the actions of parliamentary Labor 
parties and Labor governments, the control of whose activities is,
68 Ibid., 12/11/1953» Although most supported the Q.C.S. motion, the right- 
wing unions did, however, attempt to relieve the resultant pressure on 
the Government by calling a meeting of A.L.P.-affiliated unions to plan 
a combined approach to the State Industrial Court. The move failed after 
it had been attacked by both the T. & L.C. (Minutes, 30/5/1956) and the 
State President of the A.W.U. (Courier-Mail,24/5/1956)•
69 Courier-Mail. 1/3/1957
70 See Childe, How Labour Governs' , 45
o
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after all, one of the main incentives for seeking control of the Party- 
machine. It is only on such occasions, and even then the categories 
are rarely water-tight, that the struggle for control of the machine 
can be more or less accurately described as a struggle between the 
industrial and political wings of the Party.
CHAPTER 13
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LABOR PARLIAMENTARIANS
There are, broadly speaking, two ways in which trade unions can 
hope to influence the actions of Labor parliamentarians and thereby the 
policies adopted by parliamentary Labor parties (P.L.P!s). In the 
first place, the unions, individually or collectively, may exert influence 
directly on parliamentarians. In the second place, they may bring 
influence to bear through the medium of the A.L.P. machine. These two 
questions are discussed here in relation to P.L.P.’s generally, regard­
less of whether they constitute government parties. The special questions 
arising in relation to Labor governments are dealt with in the next 
chapter.
1. Direct Influence
Personal relationships are of considerable importance in this conn­
ection. But their precise significance, either generally or in a partic­
ular case, can be a matter only for conjecture. The following discussion 
of the ways in which trade union influence can be exerted directly on 
Labor parliamentarians is, therefore, confined mainly to what may be 
called the institutional aspect of the question. In a sense, of course, 
the institutional aspect is the context within which the personal factor 
operates as a most important element, and to this extent its examination 
may help to throw some light on the working and importance of the personal 
factor.
The direct institutional relationship is go nsidered below in terms 
of three categories: briefly, consultation, duplicated membership, and
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direct pressure on individual members of P.L.P.’s.
Consultation:
Ad hoc consultation is commonplace between P.L.P. represent­
atives and central trade union organizations. Formal standing bodies 
facilitating consultation between central union organizations and P.L.P.’ 
have been resorted to in two of the States. In Victoria a Bt^iamentary 
Advijoty Committee has functioned, though somewhat spasmodically, since 
the ’thirties: it is composed of two leading members each of the Melb­
ourne Trades Hall Council, the A.L.P. State Executive and the State P.L.P 
and meets when the occasion demands. A similar body, identically named, 
has operated in South Australia since the second world war: its composit­
ion is the sane (the United Trades and Labor Council of South Australia 
being the relevant union organization) and it meets regularly to consider 
State legislation. But the question of formal bodies of this kind has 
been of greatest concern at the Federal rather than the State level, a 
natural consequence of the less intimate personal relationships possible 
between trade union leaders and Federal parliamentarians in general.
The fact that the Federal Parliament sitis in Canberra while Federal trade 
union headquarters, including those of the A.C.T.U., are situated mainly 
in Melbourne or Sydney clearly adds to the attractions of a formal stand­
ing body acting as a channel for regular consultation.
Before the establishment of the A.C.T.U. in 1927, the difficulty 
faced by the Federal P.L.P. in detaining trade union views was the lack of 
a corresponding union body. If P.L.P. leaders wished to consult with 
more than the officials of a few big unions, they had to convene a 
national conference of Federal unions. This was done, for example, in
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June 1921 when the A.L.P. Federal Executive called a Trade Union Congress 
because, as stated by E.J. Holloway, Federal President of the Party and
Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, ’the Party leaders felt
1that in that time of rapid transition they might have lost touch’. The 
disadvantages of this procedure were, from the P.L.P. point of view, that 
it was extremely cumbersome and, from the trade union viewpoint, that it 
was irregular and left the initiative largely in the hands of the parlia­
mentary and Party machine leaders. Shortly after the creation of the 
A.C.T.U., moves were made on both sides in an effort to develop adequate 
channels of communication between the new central union organization and 
the Federal P.L.P. The practice of ad hoc consultation between the two 
bodies was early established, and was from the first a two-way affair.
In 1928, for example, the Federal P.L.P. initiated this sort of consult­
ation on one occasion by appointing two of its members with the task of 
discussing a specific matter with the A.C.T.U. Executive; on another occa­
sion, the initiative was taken by the A.C.T.U. which asked that represent­
atives of the P.L.P. should be appoihted to take part in discussions on 
2certain questions. This pattern continued into the ’thirties, though 
while the P.L.P. tended to restrict the topics on which it sought dis­
cussion to industrial issues before the Federal Parliament, the A.C.T.U.’s
3approaches were made on an appreciably wider range of matters.
For ten years after the formation of the A.C.T.U. no formal consul­
tative body existed. The nearest thing to one was the standing committee 
set up by the P.L.P. in December 1930 to act as a liaison with the union
1 Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
90-912 Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party. 1901-1951. 190
3 Ibid., 193-4
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movement, b u t i t s  main ta s k  in  t h i s  re s p e c t was r e s t r i c t e d  to  d isc u ss io n
on th e  S c u ll in  Labor Government’s p ro p o sa ls  to  amend the  C o n c ilia t io n  and
A rb i t r a t io n  Act^- In  1938, however, a F ed e ra l Labor A dvisory Committee
was s e t  up as  th e  r e s u l t  o f a su g g es tio n  by the P re s id e n t o f the  A.C.T.U.
f o r  a s tan d in g  c o n su lta tiv e  body to  p rov ide f o r  ’c lo s e r  c o llab o ra tio n *
between the  A .C .T .U ., th e  F ed e ra l P .L .P . and the  A .L .P . F ed era l E x ecu tiv e .
The Committee, m odelled on th e  V ic to rian  P a rliam en ta ry  Advisory Committee,
c o n s is te d  o f two re p re s e n ta t iv e s  from each o rg a n iz a tio n . I t s  c o n s t i tu t io n
was endorsed , in  th e  face  o f c r i t ic i s m  from A.W.U. d e le g a te s , by th e  1939
A .L .P . F ed e ra l Conference. While Labor formed th e  F ed e ra l O pposition ,
the  Committee a p p a re n tly  fu n c tio n ed  e f f e c t iv e ly  i f  i r r e g u la r ly ,  and,
e s p e c ia l ly  during  1941> was f re q u e n tly  convened. But a f t e r  Labor took
o f f ic e  in  O ctober 1941, the  Committee was convened on only  th re e  occasions
5
during  the  rem aining y ears  o f the  war and d id  n o t meet a f t e r  1945. I n 
194S an A.C.T.U. p ro p o sa l t h a t  the  Committee should  be rev iv ed  was endors­
ed by the  A .L .P . F ed e ra l C onference. ✓  The com position o f the r e - e s ta b l i s h ­
ed Committee was as b e fo re , b u t i t s  o p e ra tio n  was p u t on a r e g u la r  fo o tin g  
by p ro v id in g  th a t  i t  shou ld  meet a t  q u a r te r ly  i n te r v a l s .  During i t s  b r ie f
s e c o n d -life  th e  Committee was claim ed to  have been s u c c e ss fu l in  ’secu rin g
6common a c tio n  over a la rg e  range o f s u b je c ts ’ . In  1951, however, the  
Committee ag a in  went in to  e c lip se  a f t e r  the  A .L.P . F ed era l Conference of 
th a t  y e a r approved an a p p lic a t io n  from th e  A.W.U. f o r  f u l l  and eq u a l re p re ­
s e n ta t io n  w ith  th e  A.C.T.U. on th e  Committee. The A.C.T.U. I n te r s t a t e  
Executive re fu se d  to  con tinue i t s  r e p re s e n ta t io n  on th e se  term s, and a t
T  I b i d . ,  ’ 192
5 I b i d . ,  194-7
6 A.A. C alw ell, The A .L .P .’ , in  The A u s tra lia n  P o l i t i c a l  P a r ty  System ,78; 
see a ls o ,  C risp , The A ustra lian" F ed e ra l Labour P a r ty , 1901-1931» 199-200
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the Committee * s next meeting the A.C.T.U. members withdrew when the A.W.U. 
representatives appeared. The A.L.P. Federal Executive upheld the later 
ruling of its President that the Committee should be disbanded on the
nground that all its member-bodies were no longer taking part.
So long as the division between the A.C.T.U, and the A.W.U. continues, 
and the A.W.U. remains a power in the A.L.P. machine, it is likely that 
formal consultative machinery on the lines of the Federal Labor Advise ry 
Committee will, as Crisp has phrased it, 'be conspicuous by its absence,
gor at least tortuous in its operation'. Up to 1956 Crisp's first alter­
native applied. At the dame time^fit decided to withdraw from the Comm­
ittee, the A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive directed its officers to confer
9with leaders of the Federal P.L.P. 'whenever warranted by the circumstances’ 
Consultation between the two bodies thus continued, but on an ad hoc basis - 
and sometimes, as in the case of discussions held in 1954 on the industrial 
matters to be included in the Federal Leader's election policy speech, in 
conjunction with Federal officials of the A.W.uP 1956 saw the develop­
ment of more formal machinery which, though somewhat more 'tortuous in its 
operatioA'than the Federal Labor Advisory Committee, achieves substantially 
the same end.
In April 1956 the Federal P.L.P. set up an Industrial Committee under 
the chairmanship of P.J. Clarey, former President of the A.C.T.U., with 
the 1unction of formulating the Opposition's attitude towards the major 
amendments that the Menzies Government proposed to make to the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act and the Stevedoring Industry Act. On the Committeefe
7 Crisp, ibid., 203-4
8 Ibid., 204
9 Report on decisions, Minutes. Melbourne Trades Hall Council, 12/4/1951
10 Minutes, A.C.T.U. Emergency Committee, 1 /6/1954
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su g g es tio n , A.C.T.U. officipJLs had p re lim in a ry  d isc u ss io n s  w ith  i t  which
were con tinued  when the  Government f i n a l l y  in tro d u ced  the  l e g i s l a t i o n  in  
11P arliam en t. The Committee rem ained in  ex is ten c e  a f t e r  th e  enactm ent o f
th e se  m easures, and was ag a in  used as a means of co n su ltin g  w ith  the A.C.T.U.
12l a t e r  in  th e  y e a r when o th e r  in d u s t r i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  was befo re  P a rliam en t.
The I n d u s t r ia l  Committee has s in ce  th en  e s ta b lis h e d  i t s e l f  as a permanent 
channel of communication w ith  the  A.C.T.U. D iscussions between the  two 
b o d ies , which a re  u s u a lly  a tte n d ed  by th e  O pposition  le a d e rs  in  both  Houses, 
a re  f a i r l y  r e g u la r ly  h e ld . In  e f f e c t ,  th e  on ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  d if fe re n c e  
between t h i s  m achinery and the  F ed e ra l Labor Advisory Committee i s  t h a t  i t  
i s  n o t a form al body e s ta b lis h e d  by th e  P a r ty  machine and th e  A .L.P. Fed­
e r a l  Executive does n o t d i r e c t ly  take  p a r t  in  th e  d is c u s s io n s . The p re se n t 
m achinery i s  fav o u rab ly  regarded  by A.C.T.U. le a d e rs ,  who c o n sid e r i t  ade­
quate in  the  c ircum stances a lthough  th ey  would p re fe r  a body c o n s t i tu te d  on 
the more form al l in e s  of the F ed e ra l Labor Advisory Committee. I t  does 
a t  l e a s t  s a t i s f y  t h e i r  w ish to  co n fe r r e g u la r ly  w ith  the  F ed era l P .L .P . 
on in d u s t r ia l  m a tte rs .
-  -  -  oöo -  ----
Ad hoc c o n su lta tio n  w ith  P .L .P . le a d e rs  i s  f r e q u e n tly  i n i t i a t e d  by 
in d iv id u a l unions as w e ll as c e n tr a l  union o rg a n iz a tio n s . P reference  i s  
given to  un ions a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  th e  A .L .P .; u n a f f i l i a t e d  unions a re  norm ally  
re q u ire d  to  make approaches th rough a recogn ized  c e n tr a l  un ion o rg a n iz a tio n .
W ritten  re p re s e n ta t io n s  to  P .L .P . caucuses from th e  same sources a re  
a lso  f re q u e n t and u s u a lly  s u b je c t to  the  same c o n d itio n s . But p ra c t ic e
11 Ib id ., 16/4/1956; 27/4/1956
12 Ib id ., 31/10/1956
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may vary according to the circumstances. On at least one occasion
relations between the Trades and Labor Council of Queensland and the State
P.L.P. reached a stage where the P.L.P. was refusing officially to receive
in Caucus correspondence from the Council, on the ground that the Council
13was not a ‘constituent body* of the A.L.P. The same description is appli­
cable to every other central union organization in the country, but this 
has not prevented their making representations in this way.
The right to make oral representations to P.L.P. caucuses has been 
rarely granted to either individual unions or central union organizations.
Occasional attempts have been made at both the Federal and State levels to
1/4secure such a right, but almost invariably without success. On the other 
hand, following the defeat of the Queensland Labor Government in 1957 the 
Trades and Labor Council has pressed, apparently with some prospect of success; 
for the right to make oral representations to the Labor Opposition Caucus. 
Duplication of Membership:
Labor parliamentarians who are, or have been, trade unionists are 
likely to provide one of the most important channels of communication bet­
ween the trade union movement and P.L.P.’s. It does not follow, however, 
that because a parliamentarian is an existing or former unionist, he has 
first-hand experience of the workings of union politics, or first-hand know­
ledge of union policies or of the background and strength of union attitudes. 
He may have been merely an inactive ticket-holder who rose to prominence in 
Labor circles solely through activity within the Party machine. To allow 
for such cases, the anafersis of double membership given in Table 15 includes 
only those parliamentarians who were at the time existing or former union
13 Minutes, Trades & Labor Council of Qd., 26/ll/l947
14 See Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 1901-1951 . 125, in­
relation to the Federal sphere.
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o f f i c i a l s  r a th e r  th an  m erely  union  members. No d i s t in c t io n  i s  made 
between p a id  and honorary  o f f i c i a l s .  I t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  p re s e n t purp­
oses t h a t  the  b e s t  p ra c t ic a b le  in d ic a to r  o f a c tiv e  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  union 
a f f a i r s  i s  e le c t io n  o r appointm ent to  an o f f i c i a l  union p o s i t io n ,  w hether 
th i s  be shopstew ard o r g e n e ra l s e c re ta ry .  Use o f t h i s  c r i t e r io n  means 
t h a t  w hile  the  m a jo rity  o f Labor p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  a re  u s u a l ly  form er o r 
c u r re n t un ion  members,and may o r  may n o t have been a c t iv e  in  un ion  a f f a i r s ,  
the f ig u r e s  g iven  in  the  Table cover th e  sm a lle r p ro p o r tio n  who c le a r ly  
have been a c tiv e  u n io n is t s .  For example, ou t o f the  t o t a l  o f e ig h ty -sev en  
Labor members in  both  Houses o f the F ed e ra l P arliam en t covered in  th e  su r­
vey, s ix ty - f iv e ,  o r n e a r ly  sev e n ty -f iv e  p e r  c e n t . ,  were members o f unions
a t  some s tag e  in  t h e i r  c a re e rs ;  bu t on ly  f o r ty - th r e e ,  le s s  th an  f i f t y  p e r
15c e n t . ,  had been union o f f i c i a l s .
Most union o f f i c i a l s  who e n te r  p a rliam en t do no t r e ta in  t h e i r  union 
p o s i t io n s ,  and t h e i r  t i e s  w ith  the union  movement a re  co rresp o n d in g ly  weak­
ened. Those th a t  do r e t a in  t h e i r  p o s i t io n s ,  o r s h i f t  from a p a id  to  an 
honorary  p o s i t io n  on e le c t io n ,  can be expected  to  be r a th e r  more s e n s i t iv e  
to  s h i f t s  in  un ion  a t t i tu d e s  and p o l i c i e s .  In  th i s  group, those  who re ­
t a in  p o s i t io n s  n o t m erely  in  in d iv id u a l un ions b u t in  the  ex ecu tiv e  bod ies 
o f c e n tr a l  un ion  o rg a n iz a tio n s  a re  l i k e ly  to  be espe d a i l y  im portan t as 
channels o f communication. There a re  n o t many in  th i s  c a te g o ry , as i s  
shown in  Table 16, b u t t h e i r  e x is ten c e  i s  n o ta b le .
The e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f u n io n is t-p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  as channels o f commun­
ic a t io n  from the  tra d e  un ion  movement to  P .L .P .’s should n o t be o v e r -e s t -
15 C a lcu la ted  from d a ta  co n ta in ed  in  A u s tra lia n  Labor P a rty : F ed era l
P ersonnel 1901-195A (mimeograph), com piled by L .F . C risp  and S .P . B ennett.
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im ated . Communication i s  two-way. Because o f t h i s ,  the  p o l ic ie s  th a t
th e  p a r lia m e n ta r ia n  su p ports  in  un i$n  c i r c le s  a re  a s  l i k e ly  to  r e f l e c t  h is
P .L .P 's  views (and, where th e  P a rty  i s  in  power, the  mellowing in flu en ce
o f p o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty )  as the  p o l ic ie s  the  union  o f f i c i a l  supports
in  p a rlia m e n ta ry  c i r c le s  a re  l i k e ly  to  r e f l e c t  h is  tra d e  un ion  background.
In  o th e r  w ords, i t  i s  q u e s tio n ab le  w hether th e  p o l i t i c i a n  w i l l  ten d  to  th in k
as a u n io n is t  o r  th e  u n io n is t  as a p o l i t i c i a n ,  w ith  th e  odds p robab ly  on
th e  l a t t e r  when p o l i t i c a l  o f f ic e  i s  ach ieved  o r  in  s ig h t .
The tra d e -u n io n  l e a d e r . . .em phasises the  improvement o f wages and 
c o n d itio n s ; as a p o l i t i c i a n  he f in d s  i t  n ecessa ry  to  c o n s id e r care ­
f u l l y  th e  views o f those  who a re  n e i th e r  tra d e  u n io n is ts  nor members 
o f the  P a rty ; as a C abinet M in is te r  he f in d s  i t  o b lig a to ry  to  take 
in to  account th e  sti!}.l w ider n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t .
The a l t e r n a t iv e s  a re  n o t ,  o f co u rse , m u tu a lly  ex c lu s iv e  a t  a l l  p o in ts ,  
and t h e i r  b lend ing  v a r ie s  accord ing  to  p e r s o n a l i ty  and c ircu m stan ces . At 
one extreme a re  to  be found such n o tab le  union  o f f ic ia l s - tu r n e d - p o l i t i c i a n s  
as W.M. Hughes, Prime M in is te r  and fo r  long the le a d e r  o f the  W aterside 
Workers F e d e ra tio n , and W.G. Spence, member of Hughes1 C abinet and p io n eer 
and le a d e r  o f the  A u s tra lia n  Workers Union. T heir le a d e rsh ip  o f the f i g h t  
fo r  o v erseas c o n sc r ip tio n  in  1916, in  th e  t e e th  o f f ie r c e  o p p o s itio n  o f a 
tra d e  union  movement -  in c lu d in g  t h e i r  own un ions -  which has r a r e ly  shown 
such u n i ty  of pu rpose , i s  perhaps th e  c la s s ic  example of the  p a rlia m e n ta r­
ia n  su b o rd in a tin g  th e  u n io n is t .  Of co u rse , th e  c o n f l i c t  does n o t usuall.y  
a r i s e  in  term s as d ram atic  as th e s e . U n til  th e  e le c t io n  o f H.V. E v a tt as 
Leader of th e  F e d e ra l P .L .P . in  1951 a l l  F e d e ra l le a d e rs  o f the  P a rty  had 
been drawn from th e  ranks o f th e  u n io n s , though n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  from the
ranks of un ion  o ff ic ia ld o m . But no F ed era l Government under such le a d e r­
sh ip  has ev e r been p rep a red  to  go to  th e  le n g th s  n ecessa ry  to  f u l f i l  un ion
16 Lloyd Ross, ’The Role o f Labour’ , in  A u s tra l ia  ( e d . ,  G ra tta n ! , 251
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aspirations, and has therefore never satisfied the unions - with the 
possible exception of the first Federal Labor Ministry of 1904, whose 
term of office was too short for much to be expected from it, and whose 
performance was in any case regarded less than its achievement. On the 
other hand, the failure of Labor governments to satisfy union aspirations 
fully should not obscure the likelihood that where such governments include 
a significant unionist element they will go further to give effect to at 
least the industrial demands of the union movement than Labor governments 
in which this element is less significant. For example, referring to the 
early Queensland Labor government’s record of industrial legislation and 
administrative policies favourable to the unions, Childe ascribes the con­
trast this provides with the record of the early Labor governments in New
South Wales to the fact that in Queensland there was a higher proportion of
17unionists in both the P.L.P. and Cabinet.
The almost inevitable clash between an individual’s role as a parlia­
mentarian and as a union official, which arises most forcefully when the 
P.L.P. is in office and the official is a cabinet member, has been admirably 
illustrated in the case of A.J. White, a member of the Cosgrove Labor Gov­
ernment in Tasmania. White was President of the Hobart Trades Hall Council 
from September 1949 until his resignation in August 1956; over the same 
period he was also, as Chief Secretary, the Minister primarily concerned
13
with industrial matters- He took his presidential position as seriously
17 Childe, How Labour Governs. 72
18 There was a precedent, though not an exact one. P.J. Clarey was Minister 
for Labour in the Victorian Labor Government of 1945-47; over the same 
period he was also President of the A.C.T.U.
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as  h is  m in is te r ia l  d u t ie s .  He re p o rte d  f re q u e n tly  and a t  le n g th  to
the  C ouncil on the  p ro g ress  o f l e g i s l a t i o n  under h is  c a re , the p roceed ings
o f r e le v a n t  P a rliam en ta ry  committees and th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  p o l ic ie s  o f
the  Government which were of concern to  the  u n io n s . In  th e  eyes o f some
of h is  co lleag u es  on th e  Council he was r a th e r  more 'th in -sk inned*  about
un ion  c r i t ic i s m  of the  Government*s in d u s t r i a l  p o l ic ie s  th an  he need have
been. On numerous occasions he l e f t  th e  c h a ir  to  re p ly  to  d e leg a te* s
c r i t ic i s m  of th o se  p o l i c i e s .  Because o f th e  g e n e ra lly  adm itted  s in c e r i t y
o f h is  d e s ire  to  s a t i s f y  as f u l l y  as p o ss ib le  the  demands o f bo th  p o s i t io n s ,
members o f the C ouncil, as one o f f i c i a l  p u t i t ,  found i t  *em barrassing  a t
tim es when we had to  a t ta c k  th e  Government*. As a r e s u l t ,  th e  C ouncil f e l t
o b lig ed  to  c a r ry  by acclam ation  fre q u e n t re s o lu t io n s  commending the  e f f o r t s
made by the  C hief S e c re ta ry  to  s a t i s f y  union  demands,and t r u s t in g  th a t  he
would long con tinue  in  t h a t  o f f ic e .  I t  was a ls o  accep ted  as an u n w ritte n
ru le  th a t  c r i t ic i s m  of th e  Government*s in d u s t r ia l  p o lic y  was to  be d ire c te d
a t  th e  Government as a whole and never s p e c i f ic a l ly  a g a in s t  the C hief Sec-
19r e ta r y  who was p r im a r i ly  concerned w ith  t h a t  p o lic y . Only a f t e r  seven
y ears  in  bo th  p o s i t io n s  d id  White f i n a l l y  abandon th e  a ttem p t to  re c o n c ile
them. The is su e  on which he re s ig n ed  was m inor compared w ith  many o f th o se
p rev io u s ly  r a is e d  and decided  by the  Council in  o p p o s itio n  to  h is  v iew s.
He t r e a te d  a m otion c r i t i c a l  o f the  Government*s d e lay  in  fo rm u la tin g  i t s
p o lic y  f o r  the  1956 P rem ie r 's  Conference as a vo te  o f confidence in  h im se lf
as P re s id e n t ,  and re s ig n e d  a f t e r  i t  was c a r r ie d  d e sp ite  the  f a c t  t h a t  the
19 For example, a t  one Council m eeting from which White was ab se n t a m otion 
proposing  th a t  an a c tio n  o f the  C hief S e c re ta ry , r e la t in g  to  th e  f re e z in g  
o f the  S ta te  b a s ic  wage, should  be condemned was soundly d e fe a te d  on a 
coun ter-m otion  'g ra n t in g  perm ission  to  withdraw* the  o r ig in a l  m otion; th e  
m eeting l a t e r  c a r r ie d  re s o lu t io n s  condemning th e  Government as a whole 
f o r  the p o lic y  to  which o b je c tio n  was taken ; M inutes, H obart T .H .C ., 
19/ 11/1953
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majority was a small one and that the Council at the same meeting gave him 
a unanimous vote of confidences The really surprising feature of his 
resignation, however, was not that he should have resigned on this particu­
lar issue, but that he should have persevered for so long as both President 
and Chief Secretary, a double function that was neither easy nor, it appears, 
congenial to him since it was generally considered that as far as the pres- 
dential office was concerned he had * carried his resignation in his pocket1 
fora considerable time. Clearly a less earnest trade unionist would have 
abandoned the venture much earlier or, more likely, never even attempted it.
- - - 0 O 0 --- --
Up to this point the discussion has been concerned with the duplication 
of membership between unions and P.L.P.’s in the strict sense. There is, 
however, a looser form of duplication which is relevant in this context.
This occurs in cases where parliamentarians, either as individuals or as 
P.L.P. representatives, sit in on union meetings or those of central union 
organizations, and may in this way act as a channel of communication.
In the case of a few unions, parliamentarians who were formerly assoc­
iated with them as officials sometimes pay visits to union meetings and 
conferences. Occasionally, as in the case of the 1957 delegate conference 
of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, a prominent Labor parliamentarian may 
be invited to open proceedings without actually sitting in on them. In 
recent years, Labor parliamentarians, other than those who may happen to 
be present as union officials or delegates, have rarely, if ever, attended 
meetings of the main central union organizations in Queensland, South Aus­
tralia or Tasmania, or, in the Federal sphere, the biennial Congresses of
20 Minutes. Hobart T.H.C., 9/8/1956. He continued, however, to act as a dele­
gate to the Council from the Federated Clerks Union.
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the  A .C.T.U. In  New South W ales, one o r two S ta te  p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  who
were fo rm erly  d e leg a te s  have con tinued  to  p u t in  o ccasio n a l appearances as
v i s i t o r s  a t  Labor Council m eetings. The ru le s  o f th e  Melbourne Trades
H a ll C ouncil provide t h a t  members o f both F ed era l and S ta te  P .L .P .’s are
e n t i t l e d  to  a s e a t  on th e  C ouncil w ith  th e  r ig h t  to  speak on a l l  m a tte rs ,
bu t w ith o u t th e  r ig h t  to  vo te  o r nominate f o r  Council o f f ic e  u n le s s  c red -
21
e n t i a l l e d  d e le g a te s . From tim e to  time advantage has been tak en  o f t h i s  
p ro v is io n , b u t the  p ra c t ic e  has d e c lin ed  in  re c e n t y e a rs . C u rio u sly  enough, 
the  q u e s tio n  o f l i a i s o n  in  th i s  form has aroused  g r e a te s t  concern in  West­
e rn  A u s t r a l ia ,  w here, as th e  Deputy Leader o f th e  F ed e ra l P .L .P . claim ed, 
th e  u n if ie d  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f the  in d u s t r ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  wings has o b v ia ted
the ’need f o r  e x tra  c o n su lta tiv e  o rg a n iz a tio n s  such as A dvisory Committees’
22to  l in k  th e  un ions and the  S ta te  P .L .P .
In  1952 a ’H e-o rg an iza tio n  Committee’ re p o r tin g  to  the G eneral Council 
o f the  W estern A u s tra lia n  Branch o f the A .L.P. suggested  th a t  *a c lo se  l in k  
should e x i s t  between th e  p o l i t i c a l  and in d u s t r i a l  s e c tio n s  o f th e  Movement’ , 
and recommended th a t  the  Leader and Deputy Leader o f the S ta te  P .L .P . and 
’o th e r s e le c te d  P a r lia m e n ta r ia n s ’ should  be a sk e d  to  a tte n d  m eetings of f u l l ­
tim e union  o f f i c i a l s ,  ex ecu tiv e s  and g en e ra l m eetings and to  ad d ress  job
23m eetings o f u n io n is t s .  L i t t l e  has flowed from t h i s  p ro p o sa l. Most p a r l ­
iam en tarian s  r a r e ly  a ttem p t to  c a r ry  i t  ou t ex cep t when th ey  a re  invo lved  in  
p re - s e le c t io n  b a l lo t s  o r ,  in  the case o f a few, where th ey  have k e p t up 
t h e i r  a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  the  un ion  of which th ey  were fo rm erly  members. As 
f o r  th e  u n io n s , in v i ta t io n s  to  p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  to  a t te n d  m eetings have a lso  
been ra re :  many un ion  o f f i c i a l s  a re  in c l in e d  to  view the  p ro p o sa l w ith
21 Laws of the  Trades H a ll C ouncil, M elbourne, 194&, r .3  (d)
22 C alw ell, op. c i t . ,  78-9
23 O f f ic ia l  R ep o rt. A .L .P ., W. A. G eneral C ouncil, Dec. 1952, 44
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reserve, regarding its application as possibly driving a wedge between
themselves and their members. On the other hand, full advantage has been
taken of an invitation extended in 1954 to members of the State P.L.P. to
24attend meetings of the Trade Unions Industrial Council. A representative 
of the P.L.P. has since then regularly attended Council meetings while 
Parliament is not sitting, and often when it is in session.
Direct Pressure on Individuals;
The ability of unions directly to influence individual Labor parl­
iamentarians can be expected, saving the factor of personality, to vary in 
accordance with three factors: the closeness of the ties between the parl­
iamentarian and the union concerned; the financial or other help which the 
union may make available at election time; and the ability of the union to 
’deliver’ a significant proportion of votes either for or against a parlia­
mentary candidate.
Attempts by unions to influence particular parliamentarians, usually 
on industrial matters of immediate concern, are not uncommon and occur 
especially at the State level. Normally reliance is placed on enlisting 
the sympathy of parliamentarians rather than on threatening possible re­
prisals. A union wishing to put its views before a P.L.P. caucus through 
a caucus member attempts, where possible, to work through parliamentarians 
who are former or existing members and whose association with, and personal 
contacts within, the union can be expected to incline them favourably to­
wards its demands. The existence of this sort of connection with P.L.P.’s 
is generally considered to be of some value in union circles, though its 
limitations are fully realized. The view of the militant union official,
24 Minutes. T.U.I.C., 10/8/1954
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faced with a lack of such connections, is probably typical: ’At times,
as Secretary of the Branch, he felt severely handicapped through being
unable to go down to Parliament House, and round up say half a dozen mem-
25bers who had come from our ranks, and tell them what we wanted done.1
This attitude is reflected in the direct financial support given by
a number of unions to the election campaigns of their ex-officials or
26members standing as parliamentary candidates.~ The withdrawal of such
support may be a potent threat in some cases, but it is a threat than can 
be used only in extreme circumstances and has, therefore, a limited use as 
a means of exerting pressure. Use of this sanction was implicit in the 
threat made by the Queensland Branch of the A.W.U. in 1955 to expel from 
the union a number of parliamentarians - a measure that an A.W.U. official 
pointed out would involve the withdrawal of the union’s ’political support’ 
and the parliamentarians' ‘virtual end.’2^ The charge of ’having failed to 
carry out union policy’ was levelled against five members of the State Labor 
Cabinet and one Federal parliamentarian, and followed a ’talk for politic­
ians on industrial groups' to which the union had summoned the twelve State,
and one Federal,parliamentarians who were members of the A.W.U. Five of
28those summoned, including four State Ministers, had sent apologies; and
one Minister who did attend the ’talk’ had later, as an A.W.U. delegate on
the Queensland Central Executive of the A.L.P., voted against the A.W.U.-
sponsored motion censuring the State delegates who had boycotted the Federal
29Conference of that year. The threat, which was later carried out in 
relation to the Ministers, failed completely to bring them into line.
25 Quoted by Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia. 188
26 See Chapter 12
27 Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 1/4/1955
28 Ibid., 26/2/1955
29 Ibid., 1/4/1955
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I t s  presence  in  the  background, however, was s u f f i c i e n t  to  induoe the  
seven p r iv a te  S ta te  members to  a c t  in  accordance w ith  A.W.U. p o lic y .
The a b i l i t y  o f any s in g le  union o r  any group o f unions to  swing a 
s ig n i f ic a n t  p ro p o rtio n  o f v o te s  a g a in s t  an endorsed  Labor cand ida te  i s  
q u e s tio n a b le . Few unions a re  in  a p o s i t io n  to  claim  such an a b i l i t y  as 
a means o f e x e r tin g  p re ssu re  on p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s . The s tro n g e s t  c la im an ts  
a re  p robab ly  the  co a l m ining unions o f New South W ales. The q u e s tio n  has 
a r i s e n ,  b u t has a p p a re n tly  never been te s t e d ,  in  r e la t io n  to  ’c o a lf iä d s  
p o l i t i c i a n s 1 from th e  N ew castle, South Coast and Lithgow d i s t r i c t s  o f New 
South W ales, where the  miners* vote i s  o f co n sid e rab le  im portance and t h e i r  
rem arkable cohesion as u n io n is ts  g ives a prom ise th a t  the  Miners* Feder­
a t io n  and o th e r  m ining unions can * d e liv e r*  t h e i r  v o te . The F ed e ra tio n  has 
been accustomed to  p re s s in g  S ta te  p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  in  p a r t i c u la r  to  espouse
i t s  causes in  the  Labor Caucus. I t s  le a d e rs  have on occasion  spoken openly
30of ’d ire c tin g *  the  c o a lf ie ld s  p o l i t i c i a n s  to  take  c e r ta in  a c t io n .  These
d ire c t io n s  a p p a ren tly  persuaded two New South Wales M .’s .L .A . to  th re a te n
to  re s ig n  from the  P .L .P . in  1957 i f  the  S ta te  Labor Government d id  n o t f a l l
in  w ith  th e  F e d e ra tio n ’s p ro p o sa ls  concern ing  th e  c u rre n t employment c r i s i s
31
in  the  co a l in d u s try . The Government’ s subsequen t a c tio n  in  d iv e r t in g  
a co a l o rd e r from th e  W estern to  the N orthern  f i e l d  w asdascribed  by a West­
e rn  union  le a d e r  as a r e s u l t  o f th e  f a c t  th a t  f iv e  Labor p a rlia m e n ta r ian s
32were from the  N orthern  a re a  a g a in s t  one from the  W estern. P rev io u s ly , 
in  1933, the  M iners F e d e ra tio n  a ttem p ted  to  in s t r u c t  a number o f p a rliam en t­
a r ia n s ,  n o t o f f i c i a l s  of the  un io n , on the a t t i tu d e  th e y  should take  to  the 
s p l i t  which had o ccu rred  in  th e  A .L .P . in  New South W ales. One o f the
30 See, e . g . ,  Sydney Morning H era ld . 7 /3 /1957
31 D aily  T eleg raph , (Sydney). 28/6/1957
32 I b i d . ,  27/7/1957
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four Federal members and seven of the nine State members summoned by the
Federation to a meeting on the question actually attended; but most who
did so managed to avoid falling in with the Federation’s wishes despite con- 
33siderable pressure. However, in this case, unlike the more recent case
cited above involving the A.W.U., it was significant that even in relation
to a non-industrial matter of this sort, as Rawson points out, none
of the parliamentarians concerned apparently felt strong enough to dispute
34the Federation’s right to instruct them,
Apart from the coal miners’ unions, the A.W.U., which covers metal 
miners in many States, has been thought to be in a position to influence vot­
ing behaviour materially in a number of areas, particularly in some of the 
electorates in western Queensland. This supposition, however, seemed to 
have been falsified by the voting pattern of these electorates in the State
elections of 1957, when A.L.P. candidates were opposed by candidates put up
♦
by the breakaway Queensland labor Party.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to assess with any accuracy the 
importance of direct pressure as a means by which unions may influence indi­
vidual parliamentarians to act against their own inclinations. But it does 
appear that in general it is not very great. On the other hand, as a means 
of informing parliamentarians, and through them P.L.P.’s, of union views, 
particularly on industrial matters, the direct approach made on a consult­
ative rather than a directive basis may prove of value to the union concerned 
and of importance in reinforcing representations usually made by central 
union organizations.
33 See Rawson, The Organization of the Australian Labor Party. 1916-1941T 
287-290
34 Ibid., 290
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2 . C on tro l Through th e  A .L .P . Machine
Union a ttem p ts  to  c o n tro l the  members o f the  P .L .P .* s  have usually- 
been made through the  A .L .P . m achine. The p ro sp e c t o f th e  t a c t i c  being 
s u c c e ss fu l i s ,  in  the  f i r s t  p la c e , a fu n c tio n  of the  u n io n s1 a b i l i t y  to  
c o n tro l the  machine i t s e l f .  That q u e s tio n  has been d iscu ssed  in  th e  p rev­
io u s  c h a p te r . In  the second p la c e , g iven  an a b i l i t y  to  c o n tro l the m achine, 
th e  q u e s tio n  th en  becomes one o f the  a b i l i t y  o f the  machine to  c o n tro l P .L .P . 
members. This q u e s tio n  in v o lv es  some exam ination  of the channels of comm­
u n ic a t io n  between the machine and the  r e le v a n t  P .L .P . More im p o rtan t, i t  
a lso  in v o lv es  exam ination o f th e  san c tio n s  a v a ila b le  to  the machine f o r  
use  a g a in s t  r e c a l c i t r a n t  members o f the P .L .P .,  and o f th e  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  
o f those s a n c tio n s .
Cornmunicat ion ;
The form al tra n sm iss io n  to  P .L .P ,* s  o f m otions c a r r ie d  by the  bodies 
th a t  c o n s t i tu te  the  A .L.P . machine i s  on ly  one, and perhaps th e  l e a s t  im­
p o r ta n t ,  o f th e  ways in  which Labor p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  a re  k ep t inform ed o f 
the  views o f dominant groupings in  the m achine. Of g re a te r  im portance a re  
in f ormal c o n ta c ts  and d is c u ss io n s  betwden le a d e rs  o f the  machine and members 
o f the a p p ro p ria te  P .L .P . There a r e , i n  a d d i t io n ,  o th e r  means o f communic­
a t io n  between th e  tuo  bod ies which a re  l i k e ly  to  have s p e c ia l  s ig n if ic a n  ce 
when a Labor government i s  in  power and le ad in g  members o f the  P .L .P . a re  
le s s  r e a d i ly  a c c e ss ib le  owing to  th e  p re ssu re  o f t h e i r  m in is te r ia l  d u t ie s .
The p a rlia m e n ta ry  ad v iso ry  committees o f V ic to r ia  and South A u s tra lia , 
d e sc rib ed  in  the  p rev io u s  s e c t io n , in c lu d e  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f th e  S ta te  Ex­
e c u tiv e  o f th e  A .L .P . in  each ca se , and thus f a c i l i t a t e  communication of 
th e  type d iscu ssed  h e re . But th e  more Im portan t and more w idespread  way 
o f en su rin g  re g u la r  communication between P .L .P .* s  and th e  P a rty  machine i s
through the participation of parliamentarians in the proceedings of major 
bodies within the machine, particularly the executives. The number of 
parliamentarians on the various A.L.P. executives, and the proportion they 
form of the executive membership, is set out in Table 17. In each case, 
apart from the Victorian and Federal organizations, Party rules expressly
-iprovide for P.L.P. representation on the Executive concerned. As indi­
cated in the Table, the South Australian and Tasmanian provisions relaxte 
only to the State P.L.P., while those of New South Wales, Queensland and 
Western Australia af]?ect both State and Federal P.L.P.'s. In practice, 
however, it almost invariably happens that both Federal and State parlia­
mentarians are found on every executive, with the weight of number usually 
favouring the State P.L.P.'s on the State executives and often on the Fed­
eral Executive also.
Parliamentarians are invariably found among the delegates attending
Party Conferences. In South Australia and Western Australia provision is
made for the attendance of a voting delegate from both the State and Federal 
2P.L.P.'s; and in Queensland, as in South Australia, the rules provide that 
all parliamentarians are entitled to attend and speak, but not to vote unless 
they are credentialled delegates.1 23
The existence of these links between P.L.P.'s and the Party machine is, 
of course, no guarantee of control of the former by the latter - indeed, 
they may facilitate quite the reverse. But they do provide a regular means 
by which a P.L.P. may be aware not only of specific criticisms of its per­
formance, but more importantly of the degree of dissatisfaction existing 
among machine leaders. This places P.L.P. leaders in a better position to
1 See notes to Table 17.
2 A.L.P., Rules: S.A., rrl4 (a}*W.A., r.11 (a)
3 A.L.P., fiules: Qd., r.22; S.A., r . U  (e)
9 r 1 oo i ^
judge how far they should go, where necessary, to placate such dissatis­
faction. To this extent, the existence of these links is likely to be a 
factor of some significance in the relationship between the Party machine 
and P.L.P.'s.
Sanctions:
Behind the recommendations or instructions of the A.L.P. machine 
to P.L.P.’s stand two formal sanctions that constitute the machine*s power
to discipline Labor parliamentarians. The first, applicable to all Party
\
members, is expulsion, which, in the case of a parliamentarian, automatic­
ally involves exclusion from the P.L.P. of vrhich he is a member. As with 
other voluntary associations, expulsion is the Party’s ultimate sanction; 
and it is one against which, by a decision of the High Court concerning the 
A.L.P., members have no redress through the courts.^
The rules of each A.L.P. State branch, with the exception of those of 
the South Australian Branch which contain an implied power to this effect, 
expressly provide powers to expel for ’disruptive tactics or disloyal or
unworthy conduct’, or ’violation of Party discipline*, or for similar reas-
5ons which are defined with varying precision. Although the political 
branches of each State Party can expel members, subject to review by higher 
Party organs, the most important body in this respect is, in all States 
except South Australia, the Central Executive. In South Australia the 
Central Executive has the power only to investigate charges against members 
and to recommend expulsion, or other penalties, in its report to the Central 
Council which has the decisive voice. In New South Vales the original
4 Cameron v. Hogan (1934), 51 C.L.R. 358
5 A.L.P., Rules: N.S.W. r.5l(a); Vic., rr.29,86; Qd., rr.32(n), (u), 105;
S.A., r.40; W.A., rr!l3(o), 17(e); Tas., rr.8,75(v)
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expulsion power of the Central Executive is implicit in its general powers^*
but in the other four States it is expressly placed in the hands of each
Central Executive. All Executive expulsion decisions are subject to an
appeal to the relevant State Conference. The rules of the A.L.P* Federal
Executive do not refer specifically to expulsion but it is covered by the
general rule giving the Executive plenary powers to deal with and decide
any matter which, in the opinion of at least seven members of the Executive,
affects the general welfare of the Labor Movement1, subject to appeal to
7the Federal Conference.
The second sanction is applicable solely to parliamentarians: it is
the withdrawal of the A.L.P. endorsement of a parliamentarian’s candidature 
for re-election. Withdrawal may be effected in one of two ways: through
a selection ballot or by the decision of a Central Executive.
The selection of parliamentary candidates for both Federal and State 
elections is conducted by each of the A.L.P. State branches. The methods 
of selection are not uniform. For present purposes the significant vari­
ations of method are those which affect the ability of affiliated unions 
to bring their weight of numbers to bear on the selection process.
In New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia select­
ions are made by ballot of individuals qualified to vote as individuals.
Only in New South Wales do the rules restrict those so qualified to the 
members of political branches, thus excluding, as such, the members of affil-g
iated unions. In the other three States affiliated unionists, as well 
as political branch members, are entitled to vote in selection ballots.^
6 A.L.P., N.S.W., Rules, r.3 (b)
7 A.L.P., Federal Executive Rules, 1957, r.9 (i)
8 A.L.P., N.S.W. Rules, rr•146-8
9 A.L.P., Rules: Vic., rr.63,65; Qd., rr.41-3,56; W.A., r.2Q(n)
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A u n io n is t  i s  q u a l i f ie d  to  vo te  in  a  V ic to r ia n  s e le c t io n  b a l l o t  
r e l a t in g  to  the  e le c to ra te  in  which he r e s id e s  i f ,  f o r  a t  l e a s t  th re e  months 
p reced in g  the c lo s in g  o f nom inations, he has been a f in a n c ia l  member o f a 
un ion  which has been a f f i l i a t e d  fo r  a t  l e a s t  tw elve months. S im ila r  q u a l­
i f i c a t i o n s  a re  l a id  down in  Queensland, excep t th a t  the  p e rio d  in  each  case 
i s  s ix  m onths. In  W estern A u s tra l ia  only  the  re q u ire d  p e rio d  o f f in a n c ia l  
membership ( th re e  months) o f an a f f i l i a t e d  un ion  i s  s p e c if ie d .  U nlike 
those  o f the  o th e r  two S ta te s ,  however, th e  V ic to r ia n  ru le s  add th e  f u r th e r  
co n d itio n s  t h a t ,  a t  the  time o f v o tin g , an a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n is t  must s ig n  the 
A .L .P . Pledge and produce signed  union  membership t i c k e t s ,  o r a ’v o tin g  au th ­
o r iz a t io n  form* is su e d  by th e  u n io n , in  o rd e r to  enable a com parison o f s ig ­
n a tu re s .  The o p p o rtu n ity  f o r  a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n is ts  to  vote in  Q ueensland 
s e le c t io n  b a l lo ts  ( p l e b i s c i t e s ’) i s  enhanced by a p ro v is io n  a llo w in g  members 
in  co un try  d i s t r i c t s  to  c a s t  a p o s ta l  v o t e . ^
In  South A u s tra lia  s e le c t io n s  o f can d id a te s  are  made by card  vo te  a t
the annual C onvention, excep t in  th e  case o f coun try  e le c to r a te s  where an
11
E lectorate Council operates. This system, as we have seen , operates in
favou r o f the  u n io n s . In  Tasmania the  P a r ty  r u le s ,  as amended in  1956,
s t ip u la te  t h a t  can d id a te s  a re  to  be s e le c te d  e i th e r  by b a l lo t  a t  th e  annual
Conference o r by g en e ra l m eetings o f p o l i t i c a l  b ra ic h es  and a f f i l i a t e d  unions
in  the e le c to r a te  concerned; v o tin g  power in  each case i s  a s se sse d  on th e
b a s is  o f one vo te  f o r  each Conference d e leg a te  o r f o r  each such d e leg a te  to
12
whom a branch o r un ion  i s  e n t i t l e d .
10 A .L .P ., Qd., R ules, r r .6 6 -9
11 A .L .P ., S .A ., R u les , r .4 4  (f)
12 A .L .P ., T as. R u les, r .7 9 .  Up to  1956 the s e le c t io n  and endorsem ent o f 
c an d id a te s  was s o le ly  in  the  hands of th e  G eneral E x ecu tiv e . The d ra f t in g  
o f th e  new ru le s  le av e s  much to  be d e s ire d  and co m p lex itie s  in  the
p re s e n t s e le c t io n  system a re  ap p aren t.
The main S ta te  ex ecu tiv e  bodies have e x ten s iv e  powers in  connec tion
w ith  th e  s e le c t io n  o f p a rlia m e n ta ry  c a n d id a te s . In  a l l  S ta te s  excep t
W estern A u s tra l ia  and Tasmania, the C en tra l Executive ( in  South A u s tra lia
th e  C en tra l Counci]) may withdraw the  nom ination o f any person  c o n te s tin g  a
13s e le c t io n  b a l lo t  on grounds o th e r  than  form al e l i g i b i l i t y .  M oreover, in  
a l l  S ta te s  excep t New South Wales and South A u s tra l ia ,  the E xecu tive may 
withdraw  the endorsem ent o f a person  who has won a s e le c t io n  b a l lo t  f o r  
reasons o th e r  th an  breach  o f the  ru le s  governing such b a l l o t s . ^  A part 
from th e se  g en e ra l pow ers, th e re  a re  lo c a l  v a r ia t io n s  which f u r th e r  ex tend  
th e  E x ecu tiv e ’s power to  in flu en c e  the  s e le c t io n  of p a rlia m e n ta ry  c a n d id a te s . 
The New South Wales Executive i t s e l f  s e le c ts  the  cand ida tes  f o r  th e  S ta te
15
L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil; and, l ik e  th e  South A u s tra lia n  C en tra l Council* and
th e  Queensland C en tra l E x ecu tiv e , i t  i s  empowered to  s e le c t  c an d id a te s  in  
16an emergency. The Queensland C en tra l Executive may a ls o ,  f o r  any reaso n ,
17d e c la re  a s e le c t io n  b a l lo t  n u l l  and v o id . The normal powers g iven  S ta te  
ex ecu tiv e s  a re  o c c a s io n a lly  ex tended . For example, the Q ueensland C en tra l 
Executive suspended a l l  s e le c t io n  b a l lo ts  h e ld  in  connection  w ith  th e  1950 
S ta te  e le c t io n s  and made the s e le c t io n s  i t s e l f ,  w ith  the  subsequen t approval 
of the t r i e n n i a l  Convention. The Tasmanian G eneral E xecutive in  1957 took
13 A .L .P ., R ules: N.S.W ., r .1 4 3 ; -V ic., r.55> Q d., r .3 2 ( b ) ; S .A ., r .4 4 (d )  .
The Q .C .E ., fo r  example, e x e rc ise d  t h i s  power on two o ccasio n s  in  1953•
14 A .L .P ., R ules: V ic .,  r .8 5 ( a ) ;  Q d., r .3 2 ( c ) ; W.A., r r .1 3 ( n ) , 1 7 (g ) ; T a s .r .8 a
15 A .L .P ., N.S.W. R u les . r.133* The f iv e  P .L .P . re p re s e n ta t iv e s  on the  Cen­
t r a l  Executive are  n o t e n t i t l e d  to  take  p a r t  in  s e le c t io n  and endorsement 
p roceed ings befo re  the  E xecu tive : i b i d . ,  r .4 ( e )
16 A .L .P ., R ules: N.B.W., r .1 3 2 ; Q d., r .3 2 ( d ) ; S.A , r . 4 4 ( e ) . In  South Aus­
t r a l i a ,  t h i s  power was e x e rc ise d  by the  C en tra l 'E x ecu tiv e  up to  1955.
17 A .L .P ., Qd. R u les , r . 3 2 ( e ) . In  such c a se s , the  Q.C.E. i t s e l f  s e le c ts  the 
c a n d id a te . This was done in  the case o f th re e  d isp u ted  p le b i s c i t e s  in  
1952.
18 C ourier-M ail (B risb an e ) , 28/12/1952
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upon i t s e l f  to  s e le c t  th e  P a r ty 1s Senate c a n d id a te s , a move th a t  was b i t t e r ­
l y  opposed by many union  le a d e rs  who p re ssed  f o r  use o f the  s e le c t io n  p ro -
19
cedure l a i d  down in  the r u le s .  In  V ic to r ia ,  fo llo w in g  the s p l i t  in  th e
State Branch, the Central Executive was empowered by Conference to  make the
s e le c t io n s  f o r  the  F ed e ra l and S ta te  e le c t io n s  o f 1955, and th i s  power was
✓  20renewed f o r  a f u r th e r  y ea r in  1956 and ag^in  in  1957.
The methods by which p a rlia m e n ta ry  can d id a te s  a re  s e le c te d  give a f f i l i ­
a te d  u n io n is t s ,  in  most S ta te s ,  a w eight corresponding  to  t h e i r  numbers. On 
occasio n  the  vo tes o f a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n is ts  have been Im portant le s s  f o r  t h e i r  
number th an  f o r  the  d i f f i c u l t y  experienced  in  en su rin g  th a t  they  are  v a l id ly  
c a s t :  1 n e a r ly  a l l  th e  c o rru p t p r a c t ic e s  which in  th e  p a s t  have d is f ig u re d
21
Labor s e le c t io n  b a l lo ts  have invo lved  the misuse o f u n io n is t s ’ v o tin g  r i g h t s ' .
The co n d itio n s  and q u a l i f ic a t io n s  l a id  down f o r  v o te rs  in  s e le c t io n  b a l lo ts
in  New South W ales, V ic to r ia  and South A u s tra l ia ,  in  p a r t i c u la r ,  r e f l e c t
22
experience o f th i s  s o r t .  But undoubtedly  the most im p o rtan t sources of 
c o n tro l over th e  s e le c t io n  o f p a rliam en ta ry  c an d id a te s , a s  over th e  use of
•Hve.
the ex p u ls io n  weapon, a r e Ad i i e f  ex ecu tiv e  bodies w ith in  the S ta te  m achines.
The F ed era l bodies o f the  A .L.P. p lay  l i t t l e  o r no p a r t  in  the  s e le c t ­
ion  of F ed e ra l p a rlia m e n ta ry  c a n d id a te s . The F ed e ra l Executive has a l im i t ­
ed power -  which has n o t y e t  been used -  to  h ea r and decide an appeal from 
a cand ida te  f o r  a F ed e ra l s e a t  whose endorsem ent has been ’w ith h e ld  o r unduly 
delayed f o r  any cause which, in  th e  op in ion  o f th e  F ed era l E xecu tive , a f f e c t s  
the F ed e ra l Labor P la tfo rm  o r F ed e ra l P o lic y , o r th e ‘ a t t i tu d e  o f any member
19 A d v e rtis e r  (A d e la id e ), 19/8/1957
20 See Mote in  V ic. R u lesr 34; a lso  D ec is io n s . Annual C onference, June 1957, 
No. 11. To meet c r i t ic i s m s  o f t h i s  p o lic y  the  Executive in  1957, when i t  
s e le c t in g  i t s  can d id a te  f o r  the  b y -e le c tio n  consequent on th e  d eath  o f the  
S ta te  P .L .P . Leader, in v i te d  two re p re s e n ta t iv e s  from each b ra ic h  in  the  
e le c to ra te  concerned to  observe the  s e le c t io n  p ro ceed in g s .
21 Rawson, The O rg an iza tio n  o f th e  A .L .P .(A .N .U .Sem inar P aper, 1953), 5
22 See O veracker, The A u s tra lia n  P a r ty  System, 107
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oi the A .L .P• t h e r e t o '.  s im i la r ly ,  a lthough  the  F ed era l Executive has
in  re c e n t y ears  in c re ase d  i t s  s ta tu r e  w ith in  the A .L.P. machine as a whole
24
and in  r e l a t io n  to  the  F ed e ra l P .L .P .,  i t  has never used i t s  power o f ex­
p u ls io n  a g a in s t  F ed e ra l p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s , p r e f e r r in g  to  leave  d is c ip l in a r y  
a c tio n  o f th i s  kind to  the competent S ta te  b o d ie s . But in  a 1957 case in ­
vo lv ing  two F ed era l p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s , the  F ed e ra l E x e c u tiv e 's  re s o lu t io n  • 
r e f e r r in g  th e  d is c ip l in in g  of the  members to  th e  S ta te  bod ies concerned, was 
couched in  term s amounting to  a d i r e c t io n  to  ex p e l, and was accompanied by 
the F ed e ra l P r e s id e n t 's  comment th a t  the  F ed e ra l body would tak e  f u r th e r
a c tio n  i f  the  punishment ad m in is te red  a t  the S ta te  le v e l  was considered  in -
25
s u f f i c i e n t .  This a c t io n  fo llow ed  th e  narrow d e fe a t o f a p ro p o sa l th a t  the  
F ed e ra l Executive should e x e rc ise  i t s  ex p u lsio n  powers.
The Q uestion o f C o n tro l:
C on tro l o f the  A .L .P . machine c a r r ie s  w ith  i t ,  as we have seen , the 
form al a b i l i t y  to  e x e rc ise  o r  to  th re a te n  severe  d is c ip l in a r y  a c tio n  a g a in s t  
Labor p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s . For th e  p a r lia m e n ta r ia n , w ithdraw al o f endorsement 
has s u b s ta n t ia l ly  the  same r e s u l t  as  ex p u ls io n . Both san c tio n s  a lso  have 
the same flaw  -  t h e i r  s e v e r i ty .  W ithin the framework o f the  A .L .P ., expul­
s io n  and non-endorsem ent correspond to  th e  supreme p e n a l t ie s  o f p u b lic  law.
But the  P a rty  law , u n lik e  p u b lic  law , has no e f f e c t iv e  in te rm ed ia te  s a n c tio n s . 
And because the  very  s e v e r i ty  of the  P a r ty 's  san c tio n s  means t h a t  norm ally 
they  w i l l  be ap n lied  on ly  in  extreme c a se s , p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  have a margin 
of s a f e ty  w ith in  which th ey  can a f fo rd  to  d is re g a rd  the  P a rty  machine w ith o u t 
a ro u sin g  o p p o s itio n  in te n se  enough to  b rin g  down e ith e r* th e  supreme p e n a l t ie s  
on t h e i r  h ead s . The m argin can be expected  to  vary  accord ing  to  two m ajor
377
23 A .L .P ., F ed e ra l E xecutive R u les . 1957, r . 9  (h)
24 See Rawson, The O rg an iza tio n  of the  A u s tra lia n  Labor P a r ty . 1916-1941. 
Sydney Morning H e ra ld . 29/8/1957
fac uors• On the one hand, there is the stature of the parliamentarian
concerned, that is, the extent of his personal following both within the 
and in the Party outside parliament» On the other hand, there is 
the effect his expulsion or non-endorsement may have on the P.L.P.'s posit­
ion in parliament or on the Party*s unity when it faces the electors* To 
a great degree, ox course, these factors intertwine. Their importance, 
and thereby the margin of safety they provide, is most märked in relation 
to the leaders of a Labor government, a question which is considered in 
the next chapter. Of present concern, however, is the question of the eff­
ectiveness of these sanctions in relation to ordinary members of the P.L.P's.
The significance of the backbencher in this oontext lies in the extent 
to which leaders of tne Party machine may be able to influence the way he 
votes in caucus by threatening disciplinary measures. His margin of safety 
will usually depend less on any personal following he may have than on the 
surength and position in parliament of the P.L.P* concerned. Thus where 
Labor is in opposition or is in power with a safe majority, the machine will 
be in the strongest position to employ such tacticsj correspondingly, the 
parliamentarian is likely to be most susceptible to them.
Queensland Labor politics provide two cases where these tactics were 
fully employed by unions controlling the Party machine. On both occasions 
a labor government was in office with a strong parliamentary majority. In
the first case the issue chosen was the statutory enactment of the forty-
_ 26tour hour working week. The State Labor-in-Politics Convention of 1923 
adopted a resolution advocating the immediate introduction of legislation 
on these lines. State Government leaders declined to carry out the proposal 
on the ground that existing economic circumstances were unfavourable. The
d®Jailed account, see Morrison, 'Militant Labour in Q'land, 1912-27» 
\ 752; 38 Journalf Royal Australian Historical Society. 21.3-.223.
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leaders of the Party machine thereupon directed their efforts towards 
inducing a sufficient number of parliamentarians to support the Convention 
resolution in order to obtain a majority in Caucus and so reverse the Gov­
ernments policy. The threat of withdrawal of endorsement was levelled 
against backbenchers, many of whom were already uneasy about their pros­
pects in future selection ballots in the light of the publicity their per- 
i ormance in Caucus a.nd Convention votes on this and other controversial 
issues had received in union journals. These tactics were completely succ­
essful. The desired majority was obtained in Caucus, and the Government 
leaders, after an abortive walk-out, were forced to capitulate.
In the second case, the struggle for control of the Queensland P.L.P. 
Caucus extended over a longer period and ended less successfully for the 
Party machine leaders. A resolution carried by the Labor-in-Politics 
Convention of 1953 advocated legislate on increasing the amount of annual 
leave to which employees were entitled. The matter was taken up by the 
Queensland Central Executive (Q.C.E) late in 1955 when it urged the Govern­
ment to put this proposal into effect. At its first vote on the matter, 
Caucus unanimously endorsed the Governments contention that the economic 
situation was not suitable for the introduction of such a measure?^ The 
Q.C.E. responded with a direction to the P.L.P. to bring down immediate 
legislation. A union member of the Q.E.E. made it clear that if any parl­
iamentarian opposed the direction, the Q.C.E. ’would have to take steps to
withdraw his endorsement and call fresh nominations for his seat before 
. _ 28the next State election*. Caucus nevertheless reaffirmed its earlier 
decision; but in place of the previous unanimous support for the Government’s
27 ’Political Chronicle’, (1956) 1 Australian Journal of Politics and Hist­
ory, 258 ~ '
28 Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 12/11/1955
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s ta n d , tw enty of the  f o r ty - e ig h t  members p re s e n t c a s t  t h e i r  v o tes  a g a in s t  
29
the  Government. R e -co n s id e ra tio n  o f the  q u e s tio n  e a r ly  in  1956? on the  
re q u e s t o f the  Q .C .E ., r e s u l te d  in  a Caucus vo te  of t h i r t y  to  n in e te en  in  
su pport o f the G overnm ent The m a tte r  was th en  r e fe r re d  to  th e  L abor-in - 
P o l i t i c s  Convention which c a r r ie d  a r e s o lu t io n  c o n s t i tu t in g  endorsem ent o f 
the  Q .C .E .’s p o lic y . Although i t  was c le a r  th a t  the union  le a d e rs  expect­
ed the  Government to  bow to  th i s  d e c is io n , no re fe re n ce  was made to  annual 
leav e  in  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  programme announced f o r  the  p a rliam en ta ry  se ss io n  
th a t  opened l a t e r  in  1956.
A fta r  t h i s ,  th e  campaign to  swing the  few v o te s  t h a t  the Q.C.E. le a d e rs  
needed f o r  c o n tro l o f Caucus began in  e a r n e s t .  AnInner Executive d e c is ­
io n , in  September 1956, to  w rite  to  a l l  p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  ask ing  them w hether 
th ey  were p repared  to  su p p o rt th e  in tro d u c tio n  of annual leave le g i s l a t i o n
before  the  end o f th e  y ear was fo llow ed  by a  Caucus vote of tw e n ty -e ig h t to
31
n in e te en  in  su p p o rt o f the  Government, This was fo llow ed a few days
l a t e r  by an id e n t ic a l  vote on the Government’s r e f u s a l  to  in te rv e n e  in  the
p a s to r a l  s t r ik e  w hich, w hile o s te n s ib ly  a sep a ra te  i s s u e ,  d iv id ed  the  P a rty
on the  same l in e s  as the  annual leav e  is s u e ,  th e  vote in  t h i s  case demon-
32
s t r a t in g  the  harden ing  l in e s  of t h a t  d iv is io n .  The p re ssu re  on in d iv id ­
u a l p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  was m a in ta in ed . A ll members o f the  P .L .P . were summ­
oned d u ring  October befo re  a s p e c ia l  committee s e t  up by the Q.C.E. Ex­
p u ls io n  and non-endorsem ent were th re a te n e d . A C abinet M in is te r  was ex­
p e l le d , o s te n s ib ly  f o r  c o rru p t p r a c t ic e s  d is c lo se d  by the Royal Commission
th a t  had in v e s t ig a te d  the a d m in is tra tio n  o f lan d  le a s e s ,  though th e  Comm-
33i s s io n ’s r e p o r t  had been made p u b lic  more than  fo u r  months e a r l i e r .
29 ’P o l i t i c a l  C h ro n ic le ’ , (1956) 1 A u s tra lia n  Jo u rn a l of P o l i t i c s  and 
H is to ry , 258
30 Ib id .
31 C o u rie r-M ail. 27/9/1956
32 I b i d . ,  4 /10/1956 33 I b i d . ,  2 6 /l0 /l9 5 6
A p r iv a te  member was suspended f o r  a s ta tem en t c r i t i c i z i n g  the  Q .C .E . ,^
th e  r e a l  reason , i t  was claim ed, being to  enab le  the Q.C.E. to  'g e t  the
rem ainder o f those  [p a rlia m e n ta ria n s]  who were th e re  to  accep t the  d ire c -  
35
t io n * . In  th i s  way, th e  Government l o s t  two Caucus v o tes  and the Q .C .E .1* 
d e te rm in a tio n  was made c le a r .  A new su p p o rte r of the Q.C.E. was re tu rn e d  
a t  a b y -e le c t io n . A ttem pts were made to  re s c in d  the  P .L .P . ru le  o f Cab­
in e t  unan im ity  in  Caucus, in  th e  knowledge th a t  th i s  would re le a s e  a t  l e a s t  
one C abinet member. In  March 1957, the Q.C.E. re -a ff irm e d  i t s  s tan d  on 
the annual leav e  is s u e .  P a rliam e n ta ria n s  were ag a in  warned th a t  those
p e r s i s t i n g  in  t h e i r  o p p o s itio n  would be 'd e a l t  w ith ' under the P a r ty 's
36
r u le s ;  and j u s t  before  the subsequent Caucus m eeting l e t t e r s  were s e n t
to  a l l  P .L .P . members th re a te n in g  to  w ithdraw t h e i r  endorsem ent?7 The
l a s t  Caucus vote on the m a tte r  supported  th e  Government by a m a jo r ity  of
33
tw e n ty -s ix  to  tw enty-one. The R a d e rs  o f the machine th en  p layed  t h e i r  
trump card  and e x p e lled  the  P rem ier. The s tre n g th  o f th e  d iv is io n  w ith in  
the  P a rty  and th e  i n a b i l i t y  of the Q.C.E. to  g a in  c o n tro l o f Caucus was 
dem onstrated  when tw enty-tw o Labor members fo llow ed  the  Prem ier w hile 
tw en ty -fo u r rem ained w ith  th e  P a r ty . ^
The second Queensland episode i l l u s t r a t e s  the  shortcom ings o f the 
san c tio n s  a v a ila b le  to  th e  P a r ty  machine as  a means o f ga in in g  c o n tro l of 
P .L .P . 's  in  c ircu m stan ces  vliere p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  a re  re so lv ed  to  tak e  a 
firm  s ta n d . The Q.C.E. could  make examples o f two members in  th e  hope
34 I b id .
35 1957 Qd. P a r i .  Debs. (Second S essio n , 34 th  P a rliam e n t) , 83, 95.
36 C o u rie r-M ail. 1/371957
37 I b i d . ,  23/ 3/1957
38 I b i d . ,  28/3/1957
39 See 'P o l i t i c a l  C h ro n ic le ',  (1957) 3 A u s tra lia n  Journa l  o f P o l i t i c s  and 
H is to ry , 107. One o f th e  24 was a M in is te r  whose vo te  on th e  leave  issu e  
had been h e ld  cap tiv e  by the ru le  re q u ir in g  C abinet unan im ity  in  Caucus. 
Thus no more than  two pro-Government members changed s id e s  on ly  when the  
q u e s tio n  o f le av in g  the A .L.P. became a m a tte r  f o r  p e rso n a l d e c is io n .
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t h a t  th e se  would b rin g  o th e rs  in to  l i n e .  But, even in  Queensland where 
Labor was so s tro n g ly  en trenched  as to  have been in  alm ost continuous con­
t r o l  o f P a rliam sn t f o r  over f o r ty  y e a rs , the Q.C.E. d id  no t dare  embark on
th e  mass ex p u lsions which in  the  end were c le a r ly  necessa ry  i f  Caucus v o t-
40
ing  s tre n g th s  were to  be re v e rse d . In s te a d , i t  chose as a l a s t  r e s o r t  
to  expel th e  key man in  th e  P .L .P .,  the  P rem ier, gambling on the  chance 
th a t  the m a jo rity  of h is  su p p o rte rs  would be u n w illin g  v o lu n ta r i ly  to  fo llo w  
him ou t o f th e  P a rty  and would be cowed in to  obedience by such a s t r ik in g  
i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f the m achine’s d e te rm in a tio n  and power.
The c ircum stances o f the two Queensland cases a ls o  in d ic a te  a f u r th e r  
s ig n i f ic a n t  l im i ta t io n  on the  power o f th e  P a r ty  machine to  c o n tro l a P .L .P , 
by means o f the  san c tio n s  a t  i t s  d is p o s a l .  The is su e  in v o lv ed , o r  in t r o ­
duced, was in  each case o f a c h a ra c te r  th a t  ensured  i t  would a t t r a c t  s tro n g  
su p p o rt to  the  machine le a d e rs  from the ranks o f the unions and th e  P a r ty .
In  bo th  cases c r i s i s  p o in t was reached and the  p a rlia m e n ta r ia n s  were made 
a c u te ly  aware th a t  t h e i r  m argin o f s a fe ty  had reduced to  v an ish in g  p o in t .
But c r i s i s  c o n d itio n s  cannot be su s ta in e d  once the  c r i s i s  has e v en tu a ted  o r  
been a v e r te d . When th i s  p o in t has p assed , th e  extreme n a tu re  o f the  sanc­
t io n s  a v a ila b le  to  the  P a r ty  machine once ag a in  re s to re s  p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n s ’ 
margin of s a f e ty .  Thus any e f fe c t iv e n e s s  t h a t  the san c tio n s  may have as 
a c o n tro l mechanism i s  n o t con tinu ing  bu t i s  l im ite d  to  a p a r t i c u la r  s e t  
o f c ircu m stan ces . M oreover, as we have seen , even in  a c r i s i s  th e  mech­
anism may n o t ensure  c o n tro l of Caucus.
D e lib e ra te  a ttem p ts  to  so lve the problem of co n tin u in g  c o n tro l have
le d  to  the  form ats on o f an a l l ia n c e  between the le a d e rs  o f th e  P a r ty  machine
40 When th e  Q.C.E. c a r r ie d  the  m otion summoning the Prem ier to  show cause 
why he should n o t be e x p e lle d , a move was made to  summon a ls o  a l l  those 
who had supported  him on th e  leav e  issu e  in  Caucus: the  move was re je c ­
te d  by the  Q.C.E. I b id . ,  106.
and a f a c t io n  w ith in  the P .L .P .,  an a l l ia n c e  which i s  based, in  the  f i r s t  
in s ta n c e , on the  f a c t i o n s  need to  s tre n g th en  i t s  p o s i t io n  r a th e r  than  on 
i t s  e s ta b lis h e d  a b i l i t y  to  dominate the P .L .P . The most c le a r - c u t  and
in s t r u c t iv e  example o f t h i s  t a c t i c  i s  the  J .T . Lang episode in  New South
, &W ales.
In  1926 the  New South Wales P a rty  machine endowed Lang, and l a t e r  re ­
in fo rce d  th e  g ra n t, w ith  powers over h is  p a rliam en ta ry  co lleag u es  g re a te r  
than  any th a t  have been w ielded  by a Labor p o l i t i c a l  le a d e r ,  on the  under­
s tan d in g  th a t  he would c o n tro l the P .L .P . in  accordance w ith  the d i r e c t io n  
o f the  machine lead e rs*  But Lang! s power, and th e  p re s t ig e  t h a t  accom­
panied  i t ,  became such th a t  by 1936  when h is  support w ith in  the  machine 
began to  fade he dominated n o t only  the  p o l i t i c i a n s  b u t a lso  the  machine. 
The a ttem p t to  achieve e f f e c t iv e  co n tin u in g  c o n tro l o f the  P .L .P . by in ­
d i r e c t  means had rebounded, and the  union  le a d e rs  who had ra is e d  Lang to  
h is  p in n ac le  tu rn ed  to  the  long  and b i t t e r  s tru g g le  n ecessa ry  to  p u l l  him 
down a g a in .
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41 For a d e ta i le d  account and in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th i s  ep iso d e , see Rawson, 
The O rg an iza tio n  o f the  A u s tra lia n  Labor P a r ty . 1916-1941. c h ap te rs  
V I, V II, X.
CHAPTER 14 #4
LABOR GOVERNMENTS
The extent to which the trade unions can influence the policies of Labor 
governments varies according to time and place. Labor government leaders 
probably start from the assumption that the benefit of the doubt should be 
given to union claims. Beyond this, however, the weight they give such 
claims is likely to be less a matter of instinct than the product of a num­
ber of variables: the nature of the claims made; the regions they evoke 
from other sections of the community; the strength astt unity of the unions 
both inside and outside the A.L.P. machine; the strength of the dominant 
union group within the machine; the strength of the government in the el­
ectorate, in parliament and in caucus; and the personalities of the union 
and government leaders concerned - to mention only the most prominent.
The actual and potential character and combinations of these factors 
are endless. In 1942 the Labor Prime Minister, John Curtin, bluntly told
union leaders that if they ‘thought they were going to have a political fix-
1ation of wages whilst Labor was in office, then they were mistaken*; and 
he was as good as his word. Curtin clearly faced a combination of factors 
very different from that facing E.G. Theodore, Labor Premier of Queensland 
in 1924. Theodore bitterly opposed a union demand for legislation intro­
ducing the forty-four hour working week; but after being forced to the brink 
of resignation as the result of union pressure on members of his parliament- 
ary party, he was obliged to satisfy the unions’ wishes in full. Both 
these combinations were different again from that involved in the case of 
another Queensland Premier, V.C. Gair, who refused to accede to a union
. demand for legislation increasing employees’ annual leave, even at the point
1 Report, Convention of Federal Unions called by the Federal Government, 
J u n e 1942, 5.
2 This episode is discussed further in section 3 below.
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where h is  ex p u lsio n  from the A .L .P . was c e r ta in  i f  he f a i l e d  to  do s o . ''
These examples in d ic a te  the  p o ss ib le  range o f union in flu en c e  on 
Labor governm ents. In  th e  f i r s t  c a se , C u rtin  took h is  s tand  and th a t  
was th e  end o f the  m a tte r . In  the  second c a se , Theodore took h is  s tan d  
bu t was fo rce d  to  c a p i tu la te  befo re  th e  p re ssu re  th e  unions b rought to  b e a r . 
Ahd in  the  th i r d  c a se , G air took  h is  s tan d  and d id  n o t d e p a r t from i t  des­
p i te  the  unions* a b i l i t y  and d e te rm in a tio n  to  use a g a in s t  him the  most 
extreme m easures w ith in  t h e i r  power. But to  c i t e  examples i s  one th in g ; 
to  give a g en e ra l ex p lan a tio n  o f the  e x te n t and e ffe c t iv e n e s s  o f union in ­
flu en ce  in  th i s  co n tex t i s  a n o th e r , and more d i f f i c u l t  ta s k .  N ev e rth e le ss , 
some l i g h t  may be thrown on th ese  q u e s tio n s  by an exam ination of un ion  
a t t i tu d e s  to  Labor governm ents, o f th e  ways in  which union  views may be 
brought to  b ear on them, and o f the e x te n t to  which such governments have 
r e a l iz e d  un ion  ans in  r e l a t io n  to  c e r ta in  m a tte rs  of c lo se  concern to  
u n io n is t s .
1• Union Hopes and Union E xpec ta tio n s
Trade union  le a d e rs  no lo n g e r -  as th ey  were in c lin e d  to  f i f t y  years  
ago -  equate  t h e i r  hopes of what a Labor government may do to  r e a l iz e  union 
p o l ic ie s  w ith  t h e i r  e x p ec ta tio n s  of what i t  w i l l  do. T heir fundam ental 
e x p e c ta tio n  i s  th a t  a Labor government w i l l  seek and s e r io u s ly  c o n s id e r
4
th e i r  adv ice on in d u s t r ia l  m a tte rs  a t  l e a s t ;  t h e i r  hope i s  th a t  th e  gov­
ernment w i l l  a c t  on th a t  a d v ice . These a re  the  b a s ic  elem ents in  the  
g en era l union  a t t i tu d e  to  Lahor governm ents.
In  r e tu rn  f o r  the  fu lf i lm e n t  of t h e i r  e x p ec ta tio n s  and the p o ss ib le  
fu lf i lm e n t  o f t h e i r  hopes, th e  unions have u s u a lly  shown a g re a te r  re ad in ess
3 This ep isode i s  d iscu ssed  a lso  in  C hapter 12, and i s  con sid ered  f u r th e r  
in  S ec tio n  3 below.
4 For what i s  meant by * in d u s t r i a l  m a tte r s ’ in  t h i s  c o n te x t, see C hapter 2,
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to smooth the path of a Labor than a non-Labor government, by cooperating in
the application of government policy and by refraining from industrial action
that might embarrass the government. But their cooperation and restraint are
less assured to the extent that their expectations are flouted or their hopes
dashed too often, or in relation to issues on which they are committed too far
to compromise. For example, in 1941 the accession to office of the Federal
Labor Government led by Curtin was accompanied by a noticeable change in the
readiness of unions to submit to the greater wartime regulation which previous
non-Labor governments had regarded as necessary, but which was largely put in-
to effect by the Curtin Government. On the other hand, it was not long before
union leaders were pointing out that even a Labor government should not take
the support of the trade union movement for granted. P.J. Clarey, speaking
for the A.C.T.U., expressed the unions’ primary expectation on this score.
The Trades Union Movement wished to consult with the Government on 
all matters affecting the rights of Trade Unionists...Unfortunately 
there has been a tendency on the part of the Government that because 
the Trades Union Movement supports the political labour party, that 
such movement can be ignored particularly when big questions of prin­
ciple are being decided. Of late principles for which the Trades 
Union Movement has fought for and established have been curtailed and 
the movement has not been consulted. He thought at this stage they 
should tell the Government they were not prepared to continue that 
co-operation unless they were consulted...on all matters [by] which 
they were directly affected, such as the pegging of wages and so on.
The Government continued to do these things despite their protest and 
he would say that they must accept the responsibility of their actions 
if they persisted in ignoring the Movement as any Government acting in 
this way was running a grave risk of losing the support of the Movement.
This rebuke, administered at a conference called on the initiative of the 
Minister for Labour and National Service, apparently struck home. Four months 
later the Prime Minister, flanked by an imposing array of his Ministers, pre­
sided over a conference of Federal unions convened for the purpose of
5 See E. Ronald Walker, The Australian Economy in War and Reconstruction.
289; Butlin, War Economy 1939-42. 486; Hasluck, The Government and the 
People 1939-41. 604.
6 Report. Conference of Federal Unions convened by Minister for Labour ana National Service, February 1942, 12.
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e x p la in in g  th e  Government's p o lic y  to  the  u n io n s .
2. C o n su lta tio n
A good Labor government, as one union o f f i c i a l  p u t i t ,  should know 
union views 'a lm o s t i n s t i n c t iv e ly ’ . But s in ce  experience  has shown th a t  
th i s  id e a l  i s  r a r e ly  r e a l iz e d ,  c o n su lta tio n  i s  an im portan t elem ent in  the  
r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  tra d e  union movement and Labor governments. The 
in fo rm al l in k s  between unions and p a rliam en ta ry  Labor p a r t i e s ,  d iscu ssed  in  
th e  p reced in g  c h a p te r , a re  u su a lly  considered  of l e s s  im portance as channels 
of communication when a Labor government i s  in  power. In  such c ircu m stan ces , 
a S ta te  union le a d e r  m ain ta ined , 'Caucus means n o th ing  to  u s ; we d ea l 
d i r e c t  w ith  m in i s t e r s '.
Views d i f f e r  on th e  m achinery d e s ir a b le  fo r  such c o n su lta tio n , p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  between th e  F e d e ra l and S ta te  sp h e res . A.C.T.U. le a d e rs  tend to  favour 
r a th e r  more form al m achinery in  t h e i r  d ea lin g s  w ith  F ed e ra l Labor governments 
th an  do tra d e s  and lab o u r co u n c il o f f i c i a l s  in  r e la t io n  to  S ta te  Labor govern­
m ents. The d if fe re n c e  i s  n a tu ra l  s in ce  inform al m eetings w ith S ta te  govern­
ment m in is te rs  can be more f re q u e n t, and major union le a d e rs  a re  u s u a lly  more 
c lo s e ly  involved in  a S ta te  Labor a d m in is tra tio n  than  in  i t s  F ed e ra l 
c o u n te rp a r t .
The p o st-w ar exp erien ce  of F ed e ra l tra d e  union le a d e rs  has been th a t ,  
w ith  a s in g le  s ig n i f i c a n t  ex cep tio n , i t  has proved ' f a r  e a s i e r ’ to  co n fer 
w ith  th e  m in is te rs  in  a non-Labor than  in  a Labor government. G enerally  
speak ing , non-Labor m in is te rs  have shown a g re a te r  re a d in ess  to  meet union 
r e p re s e n ta t iv e s .  The n o ta b le  excep tion  to  th i s  ru le  was th e  Labor Prime 
M in is te r , J .B . C h if le y , whose approach a b i l i t y  was one o f the  main reasons 
why he i s  perhaps th e  only F e d e ra l le a d e r  o f a m a jo rity  Labor government 
to  emerge from o f f ic e  w ith  an enhanced re p u ta t io n  among union le a d e rs .
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Nevertheless, even with Chifley the A.C.T.U. found it necessary in 1947,
before the revival of the Federal Labor Advisory Committee, to assert its
claim to be associated with dismissions on industrial matters between the
Prime Minister and the A.L.P. Federal Executive, which appears for a time
1to have superseded the A.C.T.U, in this respect. When the Federal Labor
Advisory Committee was re-established in 1948, however, not only were the
2two regular representatives of the Federal P.L.P. Cabinet members, but
TJhifley himself frequently attended the Committee's meetings and always kept
3in close touch with its activities.
The Government's readiness to by-pass the A.C.T.U. towards the end of 
the war and in the immediate post-war period was partly the result of in­
creased Communist influence within the A.C.T.U. which led to some friction 
with the Federal P.L.P.^" But to a large extent it also reflected an atti­
tude common to both Labor and non-Labor governments. Ministers tend to 
assume that because of their own experience and social contacts they are 
sufficiently conversant with views of their steady supporters, and that 
the refore it is necessary to ascertain directly only the views of other 
significant sections of the community with which they are less familiar. 
Moreover, governments are often more energetic in conciliating these sections 
in the hope of obtaining cooperation from them, than those whose support can 
be relied on.
Acting on this assumption, Labor ministers have tended to find it more 
necessary to consult with employers' organizations than with the unions, 
while non-Labor ministers have inclined to the reverse policy. The steps
1 Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 1901-1951, 198
2 (1949) 203 C'wealth Pari. Debs. 1399
3 Crisp, op. cit., 200; and see, generally, Chapter 13 above.
4 Calwell, 'The Australian Labour Party', in The Australian Political Party 
System. 79
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taken by the Menzies Government to resume regulat? meetings between minis­
ters and the Federal Executive of the Liberal Party were prompted by mount­
ing criticism of the Government for its failure to consult its followers 
outside Parliament; and it was trenchantly argued by a political observer 
that this was also the main reason behind the Government’s establishment
in 1956 and 1957 of the Economic Advisory Committee, on which businessmen
5were strongly represented. On the other hand, the Menzies Government 
had earlier done much more than its Labor predecessors, for example, to 
enlist the active cooperation and assistance of the union movement in 
carrying out the migration programme. Similarly, although employers’ org­
anizations as well as the union movement were represented on the Ministry 
of Labour Advisory Council set up in 1954, the Council’s main immediate 
value to the Menzies Government was clearly that it provided a regular and 
established channel of communication with the unions.
The prevailing attitude of Federal Labor ministers in the post-war 
period is illustrated by E.J. Holloway’s reaction to a suggestion from 
the A.C.T.U. that permanent machinery should be set up to facilitate reg­
ular consultation with him. Holloway was Minister for Labour and National 
Service in the Chifley Government and a former Secretary of the Melbourne
Trades Hall Council. He expressed strong indignation at the suggestion 
that formal arrangements were necessary for dealing with a man who had 
such an intimate knowledge of the union movement. The existence of this 
attitude did not, of course, mean that all consultation between the trade 
union movement and the Labor Government was channelled through the Federal 
Labor Advisory Committee once that body had been set up. Consultations
of various degrees of formality with ministers were frequent.
*5 Sydney Morning Herald. 1/3/1957
But the comparison outlined above is of some significance
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The difficulties experienced in the matter of consultation with Fed­
eral Labor ministers have been evident, in varying degree, in the five 
States (the exception being South Australia) that have had Labor govern­
ments since 1945.
In only two cases did a Labor government initiate moves, in both cases 
abortive, to set up a standing consultative body with union representation. 
In 1953 the Victorian Labor Government made statutory provision for the 
establishment of a Labour and Industry Advisory Board, which was to con­
sist of three representatives each of employers and employees, the latter
6to be appointed on the nomination of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council. 
Although Labor remained in power until 1955, the Board was never set up.
In 1954 the Tasmanian Labor Government extended to the Hobart Trades 
Hall Council what the Council described as a 'belated invitation' to app­
oint a representative to an Economic Advisory Committee, which included
employers' representatives and had been set up mainly to advise the Gov-
7ernment on cost of living problems. The Trades Hall Council accepted 
the invitation but soon expressed doubt about the Committee's effective­
ness. Partly in response to the Council's criticism, an Industrial Ad­
visory Committee was set up later the same year on the Premier's suggestion. 
The new body, composed solely of union representatives, was to consider 
proposals for industrial legislation submitted to it by the Government.
It was not long-lived. After a few months the Trades Hall Council was 
complaining about the Government's failure to consult the Committee 'priorg
to any action being taken with regard to amendments to legislation', and 
still later found it necessary to pass a resolution asking the Government
6 Labour and Industry Act 1953, s.19
7 Minutes. Hobart Trades Hall Council, 28/l/l954 8 Ibid.,23/'6/1955
to  ’ submit* to  the  Committee th e  d r a f t  of a proposed amendment to  the
9F a c to r ie s  and Shops Act ’befo re  same i s  p re sen te d  to  P a rliam e n t’ .
Experience in  r e la t io n  to  ad hoc c o n su lta tio n  v a r ie s  from S ta te  to  
S ta te .  Inform al d isc u ss io n s  based on p e rso n a l c o n tac t between Labor min­
i s t e r s  and union le a d e rs  a re  im portan t in  many c a se s . This fbrm of con­
s u l ta t io n  i s  l ik e ly  to  be o f p a r t i c u la r  im portance in  New South Wales where 
many o f the  le ad in g  union  o f f i c i a l s  co n cu rren tly  occupy s e a ts  in  the S ta te  
L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil; the  M in is te r  f o r  Labour and In d u s try , f o r  example, 
i s  a lso  a member o f th is  body. Formal d e p u ta tio n s  from the  New South 
Wales Labor Council have ready  access to  S ta te  m in is te rs  from th e  Prem ier
down, though in d iv id u a l u n io n s , n o t always w ihout blame to  them selves,
10
o c c a s io n a lly  s t r ik e  tro u b le  in  t h e i r  d ea lin g s  w ith  m in is te rs .
In  V ic to r ia  ad hoc c o n su lta tio n  w ith  th e  m in o rity  Labor Government 
o f 1945-47 was .easy and f re q u e n t, the  Government, in  which th e  M in is te r  
fo r  Labour and In d u s try  was a lso  P re s id e n t o f the  A .C .T.U ., a ccep tin g  le g ­
i s l a t i o n  d ra f te d  by the Melbourne Trades H a ll C ouncil. During the  term 
o f o f f ic e  o f the l a s t  Labor Government (1952-55), however, d i f f i c u l t y  was 
experienced  by n o n - In d u s tr ia l  Group union o f f i c i a l s  in  ga in in g  access to  
some C abinet members who were c lo se ly  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  the G roups. But 
access to  m in is te rs  was o therw ise  easy  f o r  the c e n tr a l  un ion  o rg a n iz a tio n s  
and A .L .P . - a f f i l i a te d  u n io n s .
C o n su lta tio n  between th e  Hawke Labor Government o f W estern A u s tra lia  
and the  I n d u s t r ia l  Committee o f th e  Trade Unions In d u s t r ia l  C ouncil, which 
c o n s is ts  o f the  C ouncil’ s ex ecu tiv e  o f f ic e r s  and th e  P re s id e n t and
9 I b id . ,  8 /12/1955
10 See, e . g . ,  STdnev Morning H era ld . 26 /8 /1955; D gilv Telegraph (Sydney),
3/7/1957
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and S e c re ta ry  o f the  S ta te  A .L .P ., i s  p a r t i c u la r ly  f r e e ;  and C abinet 
members have shown a c o n s ta n t re ad in ess  to  co n fe r w ith  the I n d u s t r ia l  
Committee, w hether in  t h e i r  own o f f ic e s  o r in  the  Trades H a ll. In  a d d it­
io n , m in is te rs  have o f te n  accep ted  in v i ta t io n s  to  a t te n d  f u l l  m eetings of 
th e  Trade Unions* I n d u s t r ia l  Council in  o rd e r to  ex p la in  Government p o lic y  
and h ear d e le g a te s ’ comments. On m a tte rs  o th e r  th an  those  a f f e c t in g  more 
than  one u n io n , which th e  Government u s u a lly  p re fe rs  to  d ea l w ith  through 
th e  C ouncil, d e p u ta tio n s  from in d iv id u a l un ions a re  r e a d i ly  re c e iv e d  by 
m in is te r s .
In  Tasmania, the C hief S e c re ta ry  in  th e  Cosgrove Labor Government, as 
p a s t  P re s id e n t and subsequen tly  an ex ecu tiv e  member o f the main un ion  org­
a n iz a t io n , the  H obart Trades H a ll C ouncil, has been a most im p o rtan t chann­
e l  o f communication between th e  unions and th e  Government. But in  any 
ev en t, un ion  o f f i c i a l s ,  and p a r t i c u la r ly  le a d e rs  o f the Trades H a ll Council 
norm ally  have ready access  by d e p u ta tio n  to  m in is te r s ,  and to  th e  Prem ier 
where m in is te rs  have f a i l e d  to  g ive s a t i s f a c t io n .  The e x p e c ta tio n s  o f 
S ta te  union le a d e rs  a re  p itc h e d  r a th e r  h ig h e r than  t h i s ,  however, and th e i r  
d isappo in tm en t i s  r e f le c te d  in  in s t ru c t io n s  which the Trades H a ll Council 
gave to  i t s  re p re s e n ta t iv e  on the newly-formed S ta te  Economic A dvisory 
Committee in  1954*
1 . To p lace  b e fo re  M in is te rs  and the Prem ier the  re a c tio n s  o f the 
Trades Union Movement.. . i n  re s p e c t to  in d u s t r ia l  l e g i s l a t i o n  n o t 
being  subm itted  to  the Trades Union Movement f o r  c o n s id e ra tio n  
b efo reb e in g  subm itted  to  P a rliam en t.
2 . The tre a tm e n t o f the  Trades Union Movement by the Government 
in  re s p e c t  t o . . . t h e  GovernnE n t . . .e x te n d in g  b e la te d  in v i ta t io n s  to  
th e  Trades Union Movement to  be re p re se n te d  on the  Conferences and 
Committees s e t  up by the  Government to  d ea l w ith  t h i s  [c o s t o f 
l iv in g ] m a t te r .12
Ti The p o s i t io n s  of P re s id e n t and S e c re ta ry  on bo th  the  T .U .I .C . and the 
A .L.P . have cu sto m arily  been occupied by the same men.
12 M inutes, H obart Trades H a ll C ouncil, 28/1/1954-
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R ela tio n s  between Queensland Labor governments up to  1957 and the 
main tra d e  union body ,As tro n g ly  le f t-w in g  Trades and Labor Council of Queens­
la n d , were r a th e r  le s s  im tim ate than  in  o th e r  S ta te s ,  This was p a r t i c u l ­
a r ly  so during  the  G air G overnm ents term  of o f f ic e  from 1952, though s ig n s
o f s t r a i n  had been e v id en t from the  tim e the  A .L .P . I n d u s t r ia l  Groups were
13
e s ta b lis h e d  in  the  S ta te ,  As l a t e  as 1948, s h o r t ly  a f t e r  the b i t t e r l y -  
fought Queensland ra ilw ay  s t r i k e ,  the Labor Prem ier of th e  day, E.M. Hanlon, 
a tte n d ed  a m eeting o f the  Trades and Labor Council to  ex p la in  the Govern- 
m ent’s views on p r ic e  c o n tro l .  This p o lic y , which dem onstrated  (e sp ec ia lly  
in  the e x is t in g  c ircum stances) a co n sid e rab le  re a d in ess  on th e  p a r t  o f the 
Government to  exchange views w ith  th e  C ouncil, was n o t rep ea ted  in  l a t e r  
y e a r s . The G overnm ents changed a t t i tu d e  was r e f le c te d  in  the f a c t  th a t  
from 1950 u n t i l  19559 when the  Trades and Labor Council began to  assume a 
new im portance w ith  th e  s tru g g le  in  the  A .L .P . machine, no member of Cabin­
e t  addressed  the annual S ta te  Trade Union Congress h e ld  under the au sp ices
15
of the C ouncil, a lthough  t h i s  had p re v io u s ly  been common p r a c t ic e .  In­
deed, i t  was claim ed in  1955 t h a t  no m in is te r  had so much as s e t  fo o t  in
16the Trades H a ll f o r  an even lo n g e r p e r io d . G en era lly  speak ing , the Gov­
ernment p re fe r re d  to  work where i t  could th rough bodies o th e r  th an  the Coun­
c i l  in  i t s  d e a lin g s  w ith  the  tra d e  union  movement. The m ajor un ions re p re ­
sen ted  on th e  Queensland C en tra l E xecu tive o f the  A .L .P . o f te n  took  the  
p lace  o f th e  Trades and Labor Council in  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  and the C en tra l Ex­
e cu tiv e  s e t  up an I n d u s t r ia l  Committee formed f o r  the purpose . However, 
in  most c ases  Government le a d e rs  could  n o t a f fo rd  to  ignore the  Trades and
13 The backgroundto th is  s itu a t io n  i s  d iscussed  in  d e ta il  above in  Chapter12
14 M inutes, Trades and Labor Council o f Q ueensland, 7/7/1948
15 C ourier-M ail. 21/10/1955
16 I b i d . ,  6 /5 /1955
■J*Labor Council completely. Consultation by deputation to minister^,on the
Council’s initiative, was fairly frequent, but was marked by difficulties
which indicated Government reluctance. Much more often than seems to have
occurred in other States, ministers declined to meet deputations from the
Council, often on matters of considerable importance. Not all ministers
practised this policy, which was most prevalent anong the large section of
Cabinet with strong Industrial Group sympathies. In 1953 the Trades and
Labor Council protested against the ’continued refusal by certain Ministers
to discuss by deputation matters of vital importance which have been raised 
17by Council’. Two years later it again complained that ’for some time now
responsible political representatives...have refused to meet recognised
Trade Union Bodies such as the Trades and Labor Council...and we call on
the Premier to meet deputations from the T. & L.C. and that he instruct his
13ministers to do likewise.’ ~ A subsequent interview with the Premier 
evoked an optimistic report on the matter from the Council's President, 7 
but within a few days three ministers had reaffirmed their previous refusals
20
to see Council deputations. The Treasurer, E.J. Walsh, powerful in Cab­
inet and an original member of the A.L.P. committee set up in 1947 to org­
anize Industrial Groups in Queensland, was the worst offender. A further
Council resolution referred to 'very strong feeling among Unions about Mr.
21Walsh’s persistent refusal to meet Council deputations'. The Treasurer 
was apparently determined to have nothing whatever to do with the Council: 
repeated attempts by the Council over a period of years to discuss the 
Workers Compensation Acts withhirn were invariably rebuffed. A number of
17 Minutes, Trades and Labor Council of Qd., 2/12/1953
18 Ibid., 4/5/1955
19 Ibid., 1/6/1955
20 Ibid., 15/6/1955
21 Ibid., 2/11/1955
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deputations discussed these difficulties with the Premier without improve-
22raent, until he himself refused to discuss the matter any further,
3. The Question of Control
The question of the unions’ ability to control Labor parliamentarians 
was discussed in general terms in the preceding chapter. Normally, how­
ever, the question assumes major proportions only when Labor is in power.
It is less important at other times because, on the one hand, P.L.P. lead­
ers are usually more agreeable to union wishes when their function is to 
oppose and not to operate the government, and, on the other hand, the unions 
do not expect from a P.L.P. in opposition the results that can only accom­
pany occupancy of the government benches. Conversely, when Labor is in 
power, its parliamentary leaders incline to caution while the unions seek 
the translation of promises into action. Moreover, as we have seen, in 
these circumstances the unions look less to the P.L.P. as a whole than to 
its leaders in cabinet. Control of caucus, in the wa.ys discussed earlier, 
thus becomes merely one means of reinforcing attempts to control government 
policy by methods aimed directly at cabinet, which may involve independent 
action by the unions or action through the Party machine. The ability of 
unions to exercise some form of direct control on the policies adopted by 
a Labor government varies according to the means chosen and the strength of 
the union or unions concerned in exploiting them.
The threat of large-scale industrial trouble by a militant union or 
group of unions represents a greater political danger to a Labor than to a 
non-Labor government because, as a general rule, the electorate closely 
identifies Labor governments with the trade union movement. For this
22 Ibid., 19/^1956
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reason, a Labor government may be inclined to yield to threats of direct 
action in order to avoid a major strike which is likely to antagonize marg­
inal voters, and so to have unfavourable electoral repercussions for the 
government. On the other hand, a Labor government may not only refuse to 
yield to threats of this nature but may take drastic steps to avert or break 
a strike precisely in order to demonstrate to the marginal voter that it 
does not in fact ’take order®* from the unions. The latter tactic is like­
ly to be used only in relation to serious strikes, especially in cases where 
the strikers are not whole-heartedly supported by the remainder of the trade 
union movement - as in the case of the coal miners’ strike of 1949> involv­
ing a Federal Labor administration.
A Labor government will probably be more prepared to resist union de­
mands, and to take strong action against striking unions, when it has little 
need to fear those of its normal supporters whom it may antagonize by such 
action. Thus in the case of the Queensland railway strike of 1948 the 
State Labor government employed extreme measures to break the strike, secure 
in the knowledge that it was so firmly entrenched in office,by the mechanics 
of the electoral system,and also in the Party machine that its position 
could not be affected by the unions concerned. Yet even in these circum­
stances, strong measures can occasionally react against a Labor government. 
Despite the electoral strength of the McCormack State Government and the 
fact that its methods of breaking the Queensland railway strike of 1927 
were supported by Caucus, the State A.L.P. machine and a majority of the 
unions, the Government’s defeat in the 1927 elections was in large measure 
caused by embittered railwaymen and other militant unionists withdrawing
their support**. Nevertheless, threats by unions to withdraw electoral
1 See Morrison, ’Militant Labour in Queensland, 1912-r1927’, (1952) 38 Journal» 
Royal Aus’n. Historical Society,232-4* ■ * ’ ' > L.
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support, whether numerical or financial, are normally unlikely to be con­
sidered as seriously jeopardizing the position of Labor governments.
2Labor in power, as we have seen, is probably less dependent than Labor 
out of power on union election contributions; and the general ability of 
unions - even their willingness when the moment for action comes - to 
change the ingrained voting behaviour of most of their members is doubtful.
The threat of disaffiliation from the A.L.P. because of a Labor gov­
ernment’s policies is also a weapon of dubious force. Disaffiliation 
directly affects the Party machine, chiefly by depriving it of affiliation 
fees, rather than the government or P.L.P. concerned. Thus the threat of 
disaffiliation is usually a tacit admission of weakness rather than a show 
of strength. If a union threatening such action can enlist the Party 
machine’s support for its attitude, then disaffiliation is not only super­
fluous but damaging to its cause. A Labor government is usually prepared 
to pay more attention to the views of unions prominent in the Party machine 
than to those of a union that has shown itself to be out of step with maj«r 
Party opinion. However, if the disaffiliation threat is carried out, it 
may indicate to government leaders the intensity of feeling aroused, for a 
decision to disaffiliate is a serious matter which must usually overcome a 
tradition of allegiance to the Party, especially where rank and file re­
presentatives have a voice in the decision.“"
As was shown in the preceding chapter, control of caucus as a means of 
controlling a Labor government is more likely to be achieved through the 
Party machine than through direct union pressure on parliamentarians. But
2 See Chapter 12
3 Thus in 1957 when officials of the W.A. Society of Railway Employees, a 
union long associated with the State A.L.P. and having an affiliated memb­
ership second in size only to the A.W.U., threatened disaffiliation from
the Party in protest against the Labor Government’s policy on closures of 
railway lines, it was because they could not carry the State Executive wit1.
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here  a g a in , as was a lso  shown, the  d is c ip l in a r y  measures a v a ila b le  to  
le a d e rs  o f the  P a rty  machine by no means guaran tee c o n tro l of caucus.
Indeed , t h e i r  potency  can be expected  u s u a lly  to  be weaker when Labor i s  
in  power, because the  p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n s  m argin o f s a f e ty  i s  in c re a se d  by 
the  n a tu r a l  h e s ita n c y  o f P a rty  le a d e rs  to  jeo p ard ize  th e  governm ents p a r l ­
iam entary  m a jo r ity . Moreover, even i f  the  m achine’ s a ttem p t to  dominate 
caucus i s  s u c c e s s fu l, i t s  a b i l i t y  th e reb y  to  fo rce  a Labor government to  
fo llo w  a p a r t i c u la r  p o lic y  a g a in s t  i t s  w il l  i s  on ly  as g re a t as the  a b i l i t y  
o f caucus to  c o n tro l c a b in e t. T h e o re tic a l ly , th e  Labor caucus does c o n tro l 
c a b in e t , u l t im a te ly  through i t s  fu n c tio n  o f e le c t in g  i t s  le a d e r  and th e  mem­
b e rs  o f a Labor m in is try . In  p r a c t ic e ,  h o w e v e r , the  dominance of caucus 
i s  more o f te n  ap p aren t than  r e a l .  In d iv id u a lly  and a s  a group, m in is te rs  
are  norm ally  ab le  to  e x e r t  s tro n g  in flu en c e  on caucus members and even, in  
some c a se s , to  r e ly  on the  lo y a l ty  o f in d iv id u a l  fo llo w e rs  f o r  su p p o rt. 
As a l a s t  r e s o r t ,  the  p o te n t th r e a t  o f d is s o lu t io n  i s  in  t h e i r  hands.
Labor governments have in  f a c t  shown a marked a b i l i t y  to  rev e rse  th e  th eo ry  
o f caucus c o n tro l and, o c c a s io n a lly , a re a d in ess  to  by-p&ss caucus a l to ­
g e th e r , o r even to  a c t  in  the  te e th  o f i t s  known views^
E ffe c t iv e  union  c o n tro l o f Labor governments through caucus i s ,  th e re ?  
f o r e ,  l i k e ly  to  be ra re  on q u e s tio n s  about which union and government le ad ­
e rs  ho ld  s tro n g  and c o n f l ic t in g  o p in io n s . On sm alle r m a tte rs  th e  is su e  
does n o t a r is e  in  th e se  te rm s. The t a c t i c  h a s , however, been used  success­
f u l l y  in  a t  l e a s t  one im p o rtan t c a se . In  1924 unions o p e ra tin g  c h ie f ly  
through the  A .L.P. machine were su c c e ss fu l in  fo rc in g  a m a jo rity  o f the
them in  th e  m a tte r . N e v e rth e le ss , the  p ro p o sa l was r e je c te d  a t  a subse­
quen t d e leg a te  conference o f the  un ion .
4 See J .D .B . M il le r ,  ’The Development o f P a rty  D isc ip lin e  in  A u stra lia*  ( I I )  
(1953) 5 P o l i t i c a l  Science 23-6; C risp , The P a rliam en ta ry  Government of 
the  Commonwealth o f A u s t r a l ia , 207; C h ilde , Hoi/ Labour G overns, 17^21
Queensland Labor Caucus to support their claim for immediate legislation 
to introduce the forty-four hour working week, the methods used being des­
cribed in the preceding chapter. Cabinet members, led by the Premier,
E.G. Theodore, bitterly opposed the proposal in Caucus. When it was clear 
that their combined influence was insufficient to retain their previous 
majority, they played their trump card and tendered their resignations. 
Contrary to expectations, these were accepted by Caucus, The ministers 
and their followers immediately left the room, but the impending split was 
averted when they returned a few minutes later after holding a brief meet­
ing and deciding to accept the inevitable. The resignations were withdrawn,
and the legislation was put through Parliament during the following session
5in accordance with union wishes. The fact that this tactic may get results 
is enough to ensure that it will not be neglected - indeed, it was used to 
the hilt, falling just short of success, between 1955 and 1957 in the course 
of the Queensland dispute Qn the annual leave question?
The nature of the formal disciplinary sanctions which the Party machine 
can use against Labor parliamentarians was ©xamined in the preceding chapt­
er. The question of control, whether by these or other means, not only 
arises most frequently in relation to the members of Labor governments, but 
the problem of enforcing control through the sanctions of expulsion and 
non-endorsement becomes much more difficult. For it is in this context 
that the two main factors determining the parliamentarian’s margin of safety 
- his personal stature and the Party’s parliamentary position - are almost 
certain to be at their peak.
Government leaders are likely to have, at least initially, a substantial
5 Morrison, op. cit., 223
6 See Chapter 13
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p e rso n a l fo llow ing  w ith in  th e  F a rty  machine, and a re  c e r ta in  to  have such 
a fo llo w in g  w ith in  the  P .L .P . i t s e l f .  In  a d d it io n , the  p re s t ig e  a t ta c h in g  
to  t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  p o s i t io n  may extend th e  a rea  of t h e i r  in flu en ce  in  th e  
P a r ty  o u ts id e  p a rlia m e n t. Thus an a ttem p t to  take  d is c ip l in a r y  a c tio n  
a g a in s t  a government le a d e r  i s ,  in  the  f i r s t  p la c e , l i a b l e  to  s p l i t  th e  
P a r ty  o u ts id e  p a rliam en t u n le ss  he has deep ly  an tagonized  a l l  major e lem en ts. 
A s p l i t  on th e se  l in e s  was, fo r  example, one r e s u l t  of the  expu lsion  the  
Labor Prem ier of Queensland, V.C. G a ir, in  1957. On th e  o th er hand, th e  
ex p u lsio n  of a  number o f L abor’s p a rlia m e n ta ry  le a d e rs  who supported  th e  
c o n sc r ip tio n  referendum  in  1916 and the  P rem ier’s P lan  in  1932 was achieved 
w ithou t d r a s t i c a l l y  s p l i t t i n g  th e  P a r ty  because th e  unions were alm ost 
unanim ously opposed to  th e se  p ro p o sa ls  and th e  p o l i t i c a l  branches were only 
a l i t t l e  le s s  u n ite d . B ut, as th e  h is to ry  of th e  A .L.P . shows, even i f  th e  
P a rty  o u ts id e  p a rliam en t p asses  through such a c r i s i s  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  in ta c t ,  
th e  P .L .P . concerned does n o t .  As an immediate r e s u l t ,  expelled  le a d e rs  have 
in v a r ia b ly  been follow ed out of th e  P a r ty  by a number of p a r lia m e n ta r ia n s  
s u f f i c i e n t  to  dep riv e  i t  of i t s  p a rlia m e n ta ry  m a jo r ity . Where an e le c tio n  
has fo llow ed , th i s  lo s s  has been confirm ed by an e le c to ra te  con fron ted  w ith 
th e  charges and co u n te r-ch a rg es  of em b itte red  form er co lle ag u e s , and o ften  
w ith  v o t e - s p l i t t i n g  ex-Labor can d id a te s  as w e ll.
Where d is c ip l in a r y  a c tio n  i s  contem plated a g a in s t  Labor government 
le a d e r s ,  th e re fo re ,  th o se  who c o n tro l th e  P a rty  machine, even though su re  
of t h e i r  own s tr e n g th  in  the  machine, a re  faced  w ith  a se r io u s  dilemma.
They must decide  whether to  acc e p t th e  alm ost c e r ta in  succession  o f a non- 
Labor government w ith  which they  can hope to  have l i t t l e  in f lu e n c e , and 
which may re v e rse  fav o u rab le  p o l ic ie s  e s ta b lis h e d  by i t s  Labor p re d e ce sso rs ; 
or to  r e t a in  a Labor government which, w hile h ig h ly  u n s a t is fa c to ry  in
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certain important respects, is at least certain to continue established 
Labor policies and in most cases to be sympathetic, if not always respons­
ive, towards Party and union wishes. This dilemma is inevitable, and it 
is the key determinant of the extent to which Labor government leaders can 
disregard the opinions of powerful sections of the Party without rousing 
them to the point where they prefer Labor out of power to Labor in power 
with its existing parliamentary leaders. On almost all of the few but 
critical occasions when the Party’s sanctions have been directed against 
Labor government leaders, the crisis point was reached because the leaders 
had misjudged their margin of safety in these terms. The point is well 
illustrated by Childe’s comment on the attitude of W.A. Holman, Labor Prem­
ier of New South Wales* whose endorsement was withdrawn in 1916 by the A.L.P, 
State Executive owing to his stand on the oonscription issue: 'He could
not imagine that the unionists should not prefer a Labour Government of
7
whatever kind to a Tory one’.
But the margin of safety is normally wide, and within it Labor govern­
ment leaders can count on considerable freedom of action. The action ag­
ainst Holman, for example, represented more the culmination of union discon­
tent with the policies followed by his and the previous McGowen Labor gov­
ernments than a sudden difference of opinion on the specific issue of con­
scription. Their industrial policies had been a bitter disappointment to 
unionists who had expected so much from the first Labor administrations. 
During the referenda campaigns of and 1913, in which the Federal labor
Government sought to extend the Commonwealth’s power over industrial and 
commercial matters, the leading members of the State Labor Government had 
ostentatiously avoided giving public support to the proposals submitted,
7 Childe, op. cit., 39
despite the instructions of Party conferences that they should give posi-
8tive support to the Federal Government in the matter. No action was taken 
against them. Again, in 1916, when most of the unions combined to form 
an ’industrial section1 and captured the A.L.P. State Conference and the 
Central Executive, Conference censured Holman for failing to honour his 
undertaking to the 1915 Conference to reform the Legislative Council and 
place it under Labor control. Holman thereupon obtained the agreement of 
Caucus to the resignation of his Ministry - though he delayed handing in 
its formal resignation to the Governor. Faced with the prospect of losing 
its most able parliamentarians for the forthcoming election campaign, and 
with an unwilling and doubtful new P.L.P. Leader elected by Caucus, Con­
ference finally backed down on its demand that reform of the Legislative
Council should be the Government’s central election policy and accepted
9Holman’s undertaking not to oppose a referendum on the question. The 
Holman episode demonstrates the wide margin of safety available to Labor 
government leaders. It also shows how a strong parliamentary leader can 
turn the tables on the Party machine by threatening resignation if it fails 
to fall in with his wishes, or at least to moderate its demands.
It is in the face of these obstacles that the Party machine has used 
its powers of expulsion and non-endorsement against the leaders of Labor 
governments. They remain its most effective, if imperfect, sanctions.
Their inadequacy as a means of control lies in the fact that they have been, 
and can be, used only at crisis-points in the Party’s history. Thus the
threat implied by their presence is unlikely to oblige strong Labor govern­
ment leaders, aware of their wide margin of safety (and usually, it appears, 
over-estimating its width), to follow slavishly the line laid down by the
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8 Ibid., 28-32
9 Evatt, Australian Labour Leader. 383-7
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P a rty  machine o r t-he unions dominant w ith in  i t*  Labor governments a re  
le s s  l i k e l y  to  comply w ith  th e  » in s tru c t io n s ’ o f the P a rty  machine ou t of 
f e a r  oi i t s  form al san c tio n s  than  because th ey  reg a rd  the  m achine’ s propos­
a l s  as having p o l i t i c a l  m e rit  in  t h e i r  own r ig h t .  A part from t h i s ,  the  
b a s ic  sympathy of Labor government le a d e rs  w ith  g en e ra l union  aims has 
some p a r t  to  p la y , and in d u s tr ia l  m a tte rs  c lo se  to  th e  h e a r t  of th ese  aims 
can be expected  u s u a lly  to  re c e iv e  more fav o u rab le  a t te n t io n  th an  in  the 
case o f a non-Labor government.
I f  the  san c tio n s  a v a ila b le  to  the  P a rty  machine d id  in  f a c t  enable the
c lo se  and c o n sta n t c o n tro l o f Labor governm ents’ p o l ic ie s  th a t  i s  o f te n
a lle g e d  to  e x i s t ,  th e n , as P ark er p o in ts  o u t, *a g re a t d ea l more o f th e
Labor P la tfo rm  m ight be on the  S ta tu t»  Book, and Conferences and u n io n is ts
would have to  spend f a r  le s s  tim e w orrying over how to  b rin g  the  p o l i t i c i a n s  
10
in to  l i n e ’ . Confronted w ith  determ ined government le a d e rs ,  the  P a rty  
machine i s  a lm ost in v a r ia b ly  ob lig ed  to  compromise because in  a l l  b u t the 
most e x ce p tio n a l c ircum stances i t s  ohly  e f f e c t iv e  san c tio n s  a re  u n u sab le . 
Moreover, experience  has shown th a t  they  a re  l e s s  a means o f c o n tro l than  a 
means o f r e p r i s a l  -  ’when i t  comes to  a q u e s tio n  o f fo rc in g  a Labour Govern­
ment to  give e f f e c t  to  t h e i r  p la tfo rm  o r r e a l iz e  th e  id e a ls  th ey  have been
11s e n t in to  P arliam en t to  accom plish the o rg a n iz a tio n  has broken down’ •
Even as a  means o f r e p r i s a l ,  use of the san c tio n s  has no t always prov ided
12the  exem plary le sso n  in ten d ed .
In  co n c lu s io n , i t  i s  ap p aren t t h a t ,  w hether d i r e c t ly  o r through the
10 R .S• P a rk e r, c h ap te r on N.S.W. in  S ta te  Government in  A u s t r a l ia ,  fed.
D av is), (MS) 59 ---------- -------  9
11 C h ild e , op. c i t . ,  53
12 For exam ple, the  ex p u lsio n  o f W.M. Hughes, F ed e ra l Prime M in is te r , and the 
w ithdraw al o f endorsem ent from W.A. Holman, N.S.W. P rem ier, in  1916 d id  
n o t a u to m a tic a lly  rob them of o f f ic e ,  which th ey  each re ta in e d  Sopr some 
time  ^a fte rw ard s  — though most of t h e i r  fo llo w e rs  su ffe re d  a somewhat 
e a r l i e r  p o l i t i c a l  demise*
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Party machine, the unions have little ability to exercise a continuing 
control over Labor government leaders in the sense of forcing their accep­
tance at all points of policies pushed by union leaders. On the other 
hand, it is also clear that in the long-run the unions can make or break 
such leaders. Labor*s political leaders cannot afford consistently to 
antagonize the major union groups on large issues. Ultimately, efforts 
to control are re-directed to secure the leaders’ punishment rather than 
their reform - even at the cost of converting a Lqbor government into an 
opposition. The conclusion drawn by Miller from the J.T. Lang episode, 
though he implies a unanimity of action among union leaders that is rarely 
found, is equally supported by the other cases where Labor leaders have 
been broken by the Party machine:
No Labour leader can retain his position without the support of the 
trade union movement. If he loses it, his parliamentary supporters 
drift away from him. If he retains it, however, as Curtin and Chifley
can marsha-l ’solidarity* behind him in Parliament and out of it.
Recognition by Labor government leaders of this ultimate determinant of 
their position ensures, in varying degree, that the policies of their gov­
ernments will reflect union influence if not union control.
4. The Measure of Union Influence
Trade unions are more often united in their approach and more deeply 
committed on industrial matters than on any others. It is, therefore, in 
the area oi their industrial competence that Labor governments are normally 
likely to be subjected to greatest union pressure to exercise their power 
in a given direction.
Of all the policies which may receive union support, it is in relation 
13 Miller, op. cit., 27
1 For a definition of »industrial matters’ in this context, see Chapter 2
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to those concerning industrial matters that^margin of safety of Labor 
government leaders is usually least certain in so far as the unions are 
in a position to embark on disciplinary action* It follows that labor 
governments tend to place a corresponding emphasis on their functions in 
the industrial field, and the minister chiefly concerned with industrial 
matters in Labor cabinets is almost invariably a former (in some cases an 
existing)trade union official. As a rule, Labor governments can also be 
expected to adopt, or at least to go some way towards meeting, union views 
on industrial policy with somewhat greater readiness than in the case of 
more general matters. It is noteworthy, for example, that while the ‘char­
acterless and dispiriting respectability’ developed by the Victorian P.L.P. 
after many years in opposition or minority governments produced a 1955 
election platform that was barely distinguishable from its opponents*, only
the Labor policy included a specifically industrial plank in the shape of
2proposed amendments to the Factory and Workers Compensation Acts. More 
important, however, was the same P.L.P.*s record during the term of its 
first majority government in the history of Victoria. In the Parliament 
preceding the 1955 elections, the Cain Labor Government had passed long- 
service leave legislation that was more favourable to unionists than any of 
the corresponding measures enacted by other Labor governments up to that 
time. In addition, it had also been the first Labor Government to enact 
legislatidn compelling State industrial tribunals to provide for automatic 
quarterly adjustments to the basic wage following the Federal Arbitration 
Court’s decision to abandon this system.
The Victorian example is a significant one. The Cain Government did 
not have a large parliamentary majority; nor was it entrenched in office in
2 Alan Davies, chapter on Victoria in State Government in Australia, (ed., 
Davis), (MS.) 58
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the way that the Queensland and South Australian governments were at that 
time. In these circumstances it might be expected that the Government 
would have hesitated to take action of this sort, which was clearly detri­
mental to the interests or opposed to the views of many in those sections 
of the electorate whose support the Government needed to retain or gain if 
it was to survive the hext election. The principle involved in terms of 
electoral support has been enunciated in this way:
To make extreme concessions to one interest at the expense of the 
others is likely to be fatal to the alignment of interests that 
make up the constituency of a major party. The process moderates 
the course of party action...^
In Australia, as in the United States to which this statement was pri­
marily related, the union movement is only one interest group in the elect­
orate at large and by no means exercises a dominating influence despite its 
large membership. But the importance of the Australian trade unions in 
party-politics is less a matter of their strength in the electorate than of 
their actual or potential strength within the framework of a single party. 
Whatever the position of the unions in the electorate, the nature of the 
A.L.P. machine means that the unions constitute, or can constitute, the 
dominant interest group within that Party. Ultimately, therefore, they 
are in a position to decide the fate of Labor*s political leaders in a way 
that has nothing to do with the electoral support the A.L.P. has among union­
ists. Moreover, while rejection of these leaders by the electorate entails 
their exclusion from government, there are prospects that the exclusion is 
only temporary. On the other hand, the nature of the party system usually 
means that exclusion from the Party itself, or from its list of endorsed
candidates, involves exclusion from political office of a decidedly more
3 For an explanation of the situation in these two States, see below in 
this section.
4 E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government. 85
permanent nature - it normally involves exclusion from parliament also.
The force of this consideration as an influence on Labor government
policies in any particular case varies in accordance with the factors al-
£
ready enumerated in this connection.^ But its force is almost invariably 
greatest in relation to the unions’ industrial aims. The extent to which 
governments have applied or supported industrial policies advocated by the 
unions is, therefore, likely to be the most significant and readily discern­
ible indicator of union influence on them.
In the first place, union influence as reflected in industrial policies 
normally varies in accordance with whether the government concerned is 
Labor or non-Labor. The provisions of the main industrial legislation of 
Queensland and South Australia provide the most marked contrast between 
the enacted industrial policies of Labor and non-Labor governments. The 
legislative contrast is shown in Table 18. These two States are the ex­
treme examples. Between 1915 und 1956, the year when the legislation 
analysed in the Table was in force, Labor had dominated State politics in 
Queensland for all but three years and non-Labor governments had held office 
in South Australia for all but a total of eight years - and even during 
those years South Australian Labor governments were invariably confronted 
with a hostile Legislative Council, an institution which a Queensland Labor 
Government was able to abolish in 1922. In each of these States the dom­
inant party had been continuously in office for more than twenty yeans up 
to 1956, the A.L.P. since June 1932 in Queensland and the Liberal Country 
League since April 1933 in South Australia. Moreover, by virtue of the 
perpetuation of electoral boundaries and voting systems favourable to the 
government party, each was normally assured of re-election and could regard
407
5 See the introductory remarks to this chapter.
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themselves as firmly entrenched - saving a split in their own ranks, as 
occurred in Queensland in 1957.
In 1956, therefore, the governments of Queensland and South Australia 
were in a position which differentiated them from their counterparts in 
all other States and in the Commonwealth sphere. For even where, as in 
New South Wales and Tasmania, one party - in both cases the A.L.P. - had 
retained office for more than fifteen years, the electoral mechanism was 
not so blatantly favourable to the government of the day. By comparison 
with Queensland and South Australia, the character of industrial legis­
lation in all other cases falls between the extremes represented by these 
two States. To a large extent this may be attributed to the element of 
electoral uncertainty, which persuades Labor governments to apply union 
demands in moderation and non-Labor governments to hesitate before tamper- 
ing with legislation favourable to the unions. In addition, labor govern­
ments in Victoria (where majority Labor governments have been almost as rare 
as in South Australia), Western Australia and Tasmania chronically suffer 
upper houses in which they do not command a majority. A situation of this 
nature has persisted in Tasmania over more than twenty years of continuous 
Labor rule. Even in New South Wales, where it prefers control to abolition 
of the Legislative Council, Labor was in office seven years before it fin­
ally secured a Council majority in 1948.
The Queensland and South Australian comparison, set out in Table 18,
ä
thus illustrates union influence in the present context at its highest and 
its lowest. In no other State, or in the Commonwealth sphere where the 
parliamentary industrial power is more limited, is the corresponding indus­
trial legislation quite as favourable to the unions as in Queensland, or
quite as ungenerous to them as in South Australia. The variations between 
these two extremes occur among Labor governments as well as between Labor 
and non-Labor governments. They can perhaps be best appreciated in a 
brief space by an examination of the attitudes and performance of different 
governments in relation to a number of industrial isscaes to which the unions 
attach a great deal of importance. The issues considered below from this 
viewpoint are: government ^influence on industrial tribunals; wages policy; 
preference in employment for unionists; long-service leave; anti-strike 
legislation; and court-controlled union ballots. Aspects of all of these 
issues have been the subject of recent controversy. Discussion of them, 
however, will not in all cases be confined to their immediate background.
Industrial Tribunals and Governments:
In 1926 statutory provision was made to enable the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General to intervene, ’in the public interest*, in Federal Arb­
itration Court proceedings relating to the basic wage or standard hours.
In the same year, the non-Labor government that had enacted the amendment 
intervened in a case involving a union application for a forty-four hour 
week: it neither supported nor opposed the application, maintaining that 
it was intervening merely to allow, in accordance with the terms of the Act, 
other interdsted parties to give evidence on the matter? Earlier, in
1920, a Federal non-Labor government had declined an invitation from Judge
7Higgins to give its views on a similar union claim then before the Court.
In 1930 the Commonwealth again exercised its intervening power when the 
Attorney-General in the Scullin Labor Government actively supported the 
union case and opposed an application for a reduction in the basic wage.
6 24 C.A.R., at 793
7 14 C.A.R., at 846
8 30 C.A.R., at 29-30
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The Attorney-General later applied unsuccessfully for the Court's order
granting a reduction to be suspended for three months on the ground
that immediate enforcement would 'embarrass the Government in completing
9its proposals for economic rehabilitation'. Again, it was a Federal 
Labor Government that intervened in the Court's Standard Hours Inquiry of 
1947 to support the unions' claim for a forty hour working week. By con­
trast, the Liberal-Country Party Government 'adopted...an attitude of what
may be described as neutrality' when it intervened in the 1950 and 1953
10
Basic Wage Inquiries; and in the 1956 and 1957 Inquiries it directly 
opposed the unions' claim for the restoration of automatic quarterly ad­
justments of the basic wage.
A similar pattern is evident in the case of State governments on the 
occasions when they have appeared before the Federal Arbitration Court.
In general, State governments, whatever their political colour, have been 
content merely to give evidence of the effect any proposed change would 
have on government instrumentalities and State finances. There have, 
however, been some significant variations in this practice. Thus in the 
1947 Standard Hours Inquiry the Labor governments of New South Wales, Vic­
toria, Queensland and Tasmania (and also that of Western Australia before 
its defeat at elections held during the hearing) urged the Court to give 
immediate force to the unions' claim for a forty hour week. On the other 
hand, the non-Labor Government of South Australia expressed support for 
the forty hour principle but opposed its immediate application, the newly- 
elected non-Labor Government of Western Australia taking substantially the 
same view. Only State non-Labor governments troubled to intervene in the
9 Ibid., at 74
10 77 C.A.R., at 486
1950 B asic Wage In q u iry , and e i th e r  opposed o r exp ressed  no o p in ion  on 
the u n io n s1 claim  f o r  an in c re a s e . However, a new f a c to r  was im ported 
in to  succeeding b a sic  wage cases  in  the  shape o f th e  f a te  o f au tom atic  
q u a r te r ly  ad justm ents o f th e  b a s ic  wage in  accordance w ith  changes in  th e  
c o s t~ o f - l iv in g  index . So f a r  as the  union claim  f o r  an in c re a se  in  the  
b a s ic  wage was concerned, a l l  S ta te  governments in  the  1953 and 1956 cases 
n e i th e r  supported  no r opposed the  c laim ; b u t the  im portance o f the  p o l i t i c ­
a l  c h a ra c te r  o f the  d i f f e r e n t  governments was ap p aren t in  r e l a t io n  to  the  
■question o f q u a r te r ly  ad ju stm en ts . In  the  1953 case th e  Labor governments 
o f New South W ales, V ic to r ia ,  Q ueensland, W estern A u s tra lia  and Tasmania 
a l l  opposed the  em ployers’ a p p lic a t io n  fo r  the abandonment o f q u a r te r ly  
ad ju stm en ts , w hile the  non-Labor Government of South A u s t r a l ia ,  l ik e  t h a t  
o f the  Commonwealth, adopted a n e u tra l  a t t i t u d e .  Again in  the  1956 case 
the  Labor governments o f New South W ales, Queensland, W estern A ustralaand  
Tasmania supported  the u n io n s ’ claim  f o r  r e s to r a t io n  of q u a r te r ly  a d ju s t­
m ents, w hile the  norvLabor Government o f South A u s tra lia  opposed i t  and
11th a t  o f V ic to r ia  s tood  n e u t r a l .
The form al in te rv e n tio n  o f S ta te  governments in  p roceed ings before  the  
F ed e ra l a r b i t r a l  t r i b u n a l  i s  based on th e i r  ro le  as r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f the  
p u b lic  i n t e r e s t  in  t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  sp h e res . In  t h i s  c a p a c ity , th a t  i s  
as o th e r  th an  employers p a r ty  to  a d is p u te , ’S ta te  governments seldom ex­
p re ss  firm  op in ions on m a tte rs  to  be decided  by the  c o u r t ’ -  ’ the  excep­
t io n s  re p re se n t the use o f a means o f ex p re ss io n  of union  o r employer views
11 No S ta te  Labor government in te rv e n ed  in  the  1957 b a s ic  wage ca se , app­
a r e n t ly  on th e  assum ption , which proved c o r r e c t ,  th a t  the C ourt’ s a t t i ­
tude on the  q u e s tio n  o f q u a r te r ly  ad justm en ts was s e t t l e d .  The non-Lab­
o r Government o f S.A. in te rv e n ed  to  oppose bo th  the  claim  f o r  re s to ra tio n  
o f ad justm en ts and f o r  an in c re a se  in  th e  b a s ic  wage, w hile th a t  of 
V ic to r ia  p ro fe sse d  n e u t r a l i t y .
412
12
supplem entary to  the  advocates a lre ad y  appearing  befo re  th e  c o u r t ' •
The excep tio n s  from the  ru le  have become more f re q u e n t s in ce  t h i s  passage 
was w r i t t e n ,  bu t the assessm ent of t h e i r  c h a ra c te r  and m o tiv a tio n  s t i l l  
h o ld s .
S ta te  governments r a r e ly  appear b e fo re  S ta te  in d u s t r ia l  t r ib u n a ls  
o th e r  th an  in  t h e i r  c a p a c ity  as  em ployers. There i s ,  g e n e ra lly  speak­
in g , le s s  need f o r  Labor governments to  take such a c tio n  because in d u s t­
r i a l  t r ib u n a ls  a t  the  S ta te  le v e l  have n o t th e  same c o n s t i tu t io n a l  in s u l­
a t io n  from government as have t h e i r  F ed e ra l c o u n te rp a r ts , and th ey  can be 
g iven  s p e c if ic  l e g i s l a t i v e  d i r e c t io n  on the  p o l ic ie s  th ey  a re  to  fo llo w . 
N ev erth e le ss , in te rv e n tio n  on th ese  l in e s  may be re s o r te d  to  in  ex cep tio n a l 
c ircu m stan ces . The W estern A u s tra lian  Labor Government, f o r  example, 
accep ted  an in v i ta t io n  from the  S ta te  A rb itra tL  on Court to  make subraissi ons 
on the q u e s tio n  o f the resum ption o f q u a r te r ly  ad justm en ts to  the  b asic  
wage fo llo w in g  the  Government's u n su cc e ss fu l a ttem p ts  to  g e t l e g i s l a t i o n  
to  th i s  e f f e c t  through a h o s t i l e  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil. The Government's
advocate came down s o l id ly  on th e  union  s id e , su b m ittin g  th a t  'th e  time
13has a r r iv e d  f o r  the  Court to  once ag a in  allow  q u a r te r ly  a d ju s tm e n ts '.
-  -  -  oOo -------
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  a sse ss  the  e x te n t to  which the ex p ress io n  o f gov­
ernment views a f f e c t s  th e  d e c is io n s  o f i n d u s t r i a l  t r ib u n a ls .  Perhaps the 
c le a r e s t  in d ic a t io n  o f the  w eight one t r ib u n a l  on a p a r t i c u la r  occasion  
has a tta c h e d  to  government subm issions was g iven  in  the judgement handed
down by th e  F ed e ra l A rb itr a t io n  Court in  th e  S tandard  Hours In q u iry  of 
1947 , when the Court g ran ted  the  u n io n s ' claim  f o r  a f o r ty  hour working
12 R .J . Cameron, The Role of th e  A rb i t r a t io n  C o u r t ',  (1953) 6 H is to r ic a l  
S tu d ie s : A u s tra lia  and New Zealand, 214
13 T ra n s c r ip t  o f B asic Wage, q u a r te r ly  D e c la ra tio n  fo r  th e  June Q uarter 
c a se . W.A. A rb i t r a t io n  C ourt, August 1955, 28
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14week. In  the  course o f the  In q u iry , the  Court had d ec la red  i t s  approval 
in  p r in c ip le  o f the  u n io n s ’ c la im , le av in g  th e  q u es tio n  to  be decided  
w hether th e  e x is t in g  economic circum stances j u s t i f i e d  immediate in tro d u c t­
io n  o f th e  f o r ty  hour week.
The C ourt, which showed an acu te  aw areness o f the  l e g i s l a t i v e  fu n c tio n
involved  in  d ec id ing  the  c a se , was c le a r  t h a t  ’ the  p o pu lar w i l l  i f  i t  could
be a sc e r ta in e d  i s ,  in  a fundam ental q u e s tio n  of th i s  k in d , a m a tte r  which
1 5th i s  C ourt should no t ig n o re ’ . On th i s  ground i t  reg arded  as s ig n i f i c ­
a n t th e  f a c t  th a t  no government had opposed th e  p r in c ip le  of a f o r ty  hour
16
week and, of ’f i r s t  im portance’ , th e  f a c t  t h a t  fo u r  S ta te s  ( ’which inclnab 
the g r e a te s t  both in  p o p u la tio n  and economic a c t i v i t y ’ and th e  Common­
w ealth  had favoured  th e  p r in c ip le ’s immediate a p p l ic a t io n . But a lthough  
in  t h i s  case the  Court could  a t ta c h  ’v e ry  s u b s ta n t ia l  weight* to  the  views 
o f the Commonwealth and th e  fo u r  S ta te  governm ents/ i t  d id  n o t fo llow  
th a t  a  c o n s is te n t  w eight could  in  a l l  c ircum stances be given to  government 
view s.
The m a tte r  was co n sid ered  by the  F ed e ra l A rb itr a t io n  Court in  the 
b asic  wage case o f 1956, a f t e r  counsel f o r  the  Tasmanian Labor Government 
had c i te d  the  d ic ta  o f the 1947 s tan d a rd  hours case as  g iv in g  ’ s p e c if ic  
weight* to  government v iew s. The C ourt r e p l ie d  th a t  in  th e  circum stances 
i t  was im possib le  to  a t ta c h  w eight to  the  ’mere e x p re ss io n ’ o f government
views when, in  r e l a t io n  to  th e  q u e s tio n  of q u a r te r ly  ad justm en ts to  the 
b asic  wage, th e  views exp ressed  were so d iv e rse  and, in  some c a se s ,in c o n -
14 Of the  th re e  judges who handed down the  C ourt’ s unanimous d e c is io n , 
Drake-Brockman, C . J . ,  and F o s te r , J . ,  had fo rm erly  been a s s o c ia te d  w ith  
emplojrers and u n io n s , re s p e c t iv e ly ,  befo re  t h e i r  e le v a tio n  to  th e  bench 
20 y ears  e a r l i e r ,  w hile Sugerman, J . ,  had no such co n n ec tio n s .
15 59 C.A.R. ,  a t  533
16 I b i d . ,  a t  591
17 I b i d . ,  a t  539 
13 I b i d . ,  a t  592
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s i s t e n t  w ith  p o l ic ie s  fo llow ed  by the  governments concerned.
With th e  no tab le  ex cep tio n s  of th e  F edera l t r i b u n a l s  d e c is io n s  in  
the  two cases  r e fe r re d  to  above, in d u s t r ia l  t r ib u n a ls ,  w hether S ta te  o r 
F e d e ra l, have n o t been in  th e  h a b it  o f p u b lic ly  acknowledging the  w eight 
they  have a tta c h e d  o r may be p repared  to  a t ta c h  to  government v iew s. Thus 
i t  i s  u s u a lly  im possib le  to  e s ta b l i s h  w ith  any p re c is io n  the  e x te n t to  
v/hich the members of a given t r ib u n a l  r e a c t  o r have re a c te d  to  such views -  
w hether th e  views have been fo rm ally  subm itted  o r a re  p u b lic  knowledge, 
and w hether a p o lic y  c o in c id in g  w ith  them has been ap p lie d  so ldy  on the 
t r i b u n a l ’s i n i t i a t i v e  o r as the  r e s u l t  o f in fo rm al government p re s su re . 
However, to  deny government views some im portance in  th i s  connection  i s  to  
reg a rd  in d u s t r ia l  t r ib u n a ls  as im personal i n s t i t u t i o n s  concerned w ith  prob­
lems to  which th e re  i s  on ly  one c o r re c t  s o lu t io n , when in  r e a l i t y  th e y  are  
in s t i t u t i o n s  composed o f men who have th e i r  own p e rso n a l b e l ie f s  and a t t i ­
tudes and d e a l w ith  complex s o c ia l  and economic problems which a re  no t 
s u sc e p tib le  to  s t r i c t  le g a l  d e f in i t io n s  of r i g h t  and wrong.
W hatever may be the  p re c is e  e f f e c t  o f government viev/s on the  d e c is ­
ions o f in d u s t r ia l  t r ib u n a ls ,  th e  tra d e  union movement a t  l e a s t  does no t 
u n d e r-e s tim a te  t h e i r  p o s s ib le  in flu en c e  -  i f  an y th in g , union  le a d e rs  are 
convinced th a t  th e re  i s  o f te n  a c lo se  r e la t io n s h ip  between the  two. The 
A.C.T.U. S e c re ta ry  made t h i s  p o in t in  r e l a t io n  to  F ed e ra l in d u s t r i a l  t r i b ­
u n a ls : ’The o v e rrid in g  f a c to r  has -  g e n e ra lly  speaking -  been the  c lo se
20
re la tio n sh ip  o f a r b i t r a l  d e c i s io n s . . .w ith  Government p o l ic y ’ . One r e s u l t  
o f th i s  view i s  th a t  m ajor cases before  the  F ed e ra l a r b i t r a l  a u th o r i t ie s  
in  p a r t i c u la r  a re  o f te n  accompanied by s tro n g  union p re ssu re  on Labor
19 Reasons f o r  Judgment, 11 I . I . B . ,  a t  397
20 H .J .S o u te r , The P rocess o f M ediation and A rb i t r a t io n  in  A u s t r a l ia .  (Un­
p u b lish ed  paper d e liv e re d  a t  Seminar on I n d u s t r ia l  R e la tio n s  R esearch, 
S o c ia l Science R esearch Council o f A u s tra l ia ,  January , 1957), 17
governments to  in te rv en e  in  su p p o rt o f the  un ion  ad v o ca tes. Although 
Labor governments have responded on a number o f occasions to  the re q u e s t 
to  in te rv e n e , the  un ions have been r a th e r  le s s  su c c e ss fu l in  o b ta in in g  
from them firm  support f o r  the union  case . In  F ed e ra l b a s ic  wage h ear­
in g s  Labor governments have u s u a lly  adopted the  ‘n e i th e r  su p p o rtin g  nor 
opposing1 form ula in  r e l a t io n  to  claim s f o r  b a s ic  wage in c re a s e s , which 
in d ic a te  t h a t  th ey  a re  in te rv e n in g  m erely to  supply  any f a c tu a l  inform­
a t io n  th e  tr ib u n a l  may r e q u ir e .  On th e  o th e r  hand, long term  p o l ic ie s  
on which hopes a re  most s tro n g ly  co n ce n tra te d , such as the f o r ty  hour week 
and the  r e te n t io n  o r r e s to r a t io n  o f au tom atic  q u a r te r ly  ad justm en ts to  the 
b a s ic  wage, have rece iv ed  the  a c tiv e  support o f in te rv e n in g  Labor governnarts
21
-  -  -  0 O 0  -  -  -
The ex p ress io n  o f views i s  n o t the  only  way in  which a government 
may in flu en c e  the  d e c is io n s  of an  in d u s t r i a l  t r i b u n a l .  I t  may do so more 
d i r e c t l y  by g iv in g  s p e c if ic  and d e ta i le d  le g i s l a t i v e  d ir e c t io n s  as to  
co n d itio n s  of employment and o th e r  in d u s t r i a l  m a tte rs . F ed e ra l govern­
ments a re  su b je c t to  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  l im i ta t io n s  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  b u t the 
techn ique has been used  e x te n s iv e ly  by S ta te  Labor governm ents, the  indus­
t r i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  of New South Wales and Q ueensland, in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  being
22
studded w ith  examples o f i t s  u se . In  i t s  extreme form , l e g i s l a t i v e  d ir e ­
c t io n  in v o lv es  tak in g  d e c is io n s  ou t o f the  hands of the  t r ib u n a l  concerned, 
though fo rm al ex ecu tio n  o f the p o lic y  l a id  down i s  u s u a lly  l e f t  to  the  
t r i b u n a l .  Labor governments have re s o r te d  to  l e g i s l a t i v e  d i r e c t io n s  as a
21 In  the  case of S ta te  t r ib u n a ls ,  f o r  example, the  W.A. Trade Unions In­
d u s t r i a l  Council has p re sse d  th e  S ta te  Labor Government to  in te rv en e  
b efo re  th e  S ta te  A rb itr a t io n  Court in  su pport o f a l l  a p p lic a t io n s  by 
A .L .P .- a f f i l i a te d  un ions f o r  p re fe ren ce  o r compulsory unionism :
M inutes, T .U .I .C ., 8 /5 /1956
22 For' Q ueensland, see Table 18,
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23means of reversing the established policies of tribunals. On at least
one occasion, a Labor government has by-passed a tribunal altogether in 
the course of reversing its policy and giving effect to union claims.
The President of the Western Australian Arbitration Court had refused
to alter the State basic wage after each of the first two quarterly re­
views conducted by the Court in 1942, despite rises in the cost-of-living 
index. Shortly after the second review, the Federal Labor Government, 
at the suggestion of the Western Australian Labor Premier, exercised its
wartime powers to authorize the Premier to adjust the basic wage in accord-
24ance with the cost-of-living index if the Court failed to do so. Two
days before the Court conducted the third quarterly review of the year,
the Federal Government gazetted a further regulation empowering the Premier
to adjust the basic wage to the level it would have been had the Court
25adjusted it after the two previous reviews. The Court adjourned its third 
quarterly review on the first day of the proceedings, after the President
had indicated he was against increasing the basic wage even though the
26cost-of-living index had again risen. The following day, the Premier
exercised his power under the Federal regulations to increase the basic
27wage by varying all State awards to this effect.
Except under wartime emergency powers, Federal governments are unable
to control directly the content of arbitral awards in the manner open to
State governments. But they may, up to a point, achieve the same end by
23 For example, in 1945 the N.S.W. Labor Government passed legislation re­
versing the State Industrial Commissions policy of not granting annual 
leave and sick leave in the same award: see K.F. Walker, ’Australia*, in 
Comparative Labor Movements (ed., Galenson), 228
24 National Security (Economic Organization) Regulations, reg. 17A, 1942 
S.R., No. 257
25 Ibid., 1942 S.R., No. 344
26 22 W.A.I.G.,at 227
27 Ibid., at 230
statutory extension or limitation of the matters with which Federal tri­
bunals are competent to deal. This technique is most effective in its 
negative aspect, for while a tribunal cannot deal with a matter which ia 
removed from its jurisdiction, the mere inclusion of a matter is no guar­
antee that the tribunal will decide it in the desired way. Use of the 
technique is illustrated below in connection with preference to unionists, 
anti-strike measures and court-controlled union ballots.
Apart from legislation directly relating to the powers of industrial 
tribunals or the way in whih they are exercised, a government may influence 
a tribunal’s decisions by the nature of its general policies. The Federal 
Arbitration Court in its 1956 basic wage decision, while disclaiming that 
it could place any weight on government views formally submitted to it, was
on the other hand clearly disposed to place considerable weight on the Fed-
28eral Government’s announced economic policies. A similar connection was 
even moreapparent when a judge of the sane Court, acting on the assumption 
that the existing Federal Labor Government intended to assist employers 
affected by any added costs arising from his award, made an award increas­
ing wage rates and suspended its operation until the Government had taken
29the appropriate action. Influence exerted in this way has not been con­
fined to tribunals within the constitutional jurisdiction of the government 
concerned. This was clearly demonstrated in the Federal Arbitration Courtfe 
Standard Hours Inquiry of 1947.
While the hearing in this case was in progress, the New South Wales 
Labor Government enacted legislation prescribing a forty hour working week 
(the claim the unions were making to the Federal Court) for all workers
under State awards. At the same time, the Queensland Labor Government
28 See Reasons for Judgment (roneoed), 1956, 37, 76, 83
29 See Foenander, Industrial Regulation in Australia, 15-16
418
announced i t s  in te n t io n  o f b rin g in g  down an id e n t ic a l  m easure, re g a rd le ss
30
ol th e  C ourt’s d e c is io n  in  r e la t io n  to  F ed e ra l award workers* The New 
South Wales Act came in to  o p e ra tio n  on 1 J u ly  1947, and by Septem ber, 
when th e  F ed era l Court handed down i t s  d e c is io n , the  e f f e c t s  o f the mea­
su re  in  th e  most h e a v i ly - in d u s t r ia l iz e d  o f th e  S ta te s  were becoming p la in .  
N early  f i f t y  p e r c e n t, o f employees in  th e  S ta te  were working under S ta te  
aw ards. In  many c a se s , S ta te  and F ed e ra l awards covered d i f f e r e n t  em­
p loyees in  the  same e s ta b lish m e n t. Employers faced  w ith  t h i s  s i tu a t io n  
had e i th e r  to  o p era te  t h e i r  p la n t  f o r  fo r ty - f o u r  hours a week ih  accordance 
w ith  F ed e ra l aw ards, and pay t h e i r  S ta te  award employees f o r  fo u r  h o u rs ’ 
o vertim e, o r to  give t h e i r  F ed e ra l award employees a f o r ty  hour week. 
According to  a union e s tim a te s , most employers p re fe r re d  the  second so lu ­
t io n .  When i t  gave judgement in  Septem ber, the  F ed e ra l Court showed 
awareness t h a t  i t  alone was in  a p o s i t io n  to  ensure the  uniform  a p p lic a tio n  
o f the f o r ty  hour week, a u n ifo rm ity  beyond th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  competence
of any one government and ’ so e s s e n t ia l  f o r  o rdered  business and harmon-
31
lous in d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s ’ . The s i tu a t io n  in  New South Wales m eant, in  
e f f e c t ,  t h a t  i f  u n ifo rm ity  was the  aim , then  th e re  was on ly  one course 
open to  th e  Court:
. . . i t  i s  of course very  obvious th a t  the  New South Wales Act d id  a l t e r  
v e ry  m a te r ia l  economic and p o l i t i c a l  f a c to r s  and d id , du rin g  the  h ear­
ing  o f the  case , p re s e n t th i s  Court w ith  a f a i t  accom pli in  r e la t io n  
to  a s u b s ta n t ia l  s e c tio n  o f i t s  in d u s try  and to  th a t  e x te n t d id  a f f e c t  
the  freedom w ith  which the Court m ight o therw ise  have a c te d .32
--------oO o----------
F in a l ly ,  among the ways in  which governments may in flu en c e  the dec­
is io n s  o f in d u s t r i a l  t r i b u n a ls ,  th e re  i s  the  q u e s tio n  o f the men who
30 This measure was en ac ted  in  O ctober and came in to  fo rce  a t  th e  same time 
as d id  the  C ourt’ s d e c is io n , on 1 January  1948*
31 59 C .A .R ., a t  5S9
32 Ib id .
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compose the  t r ib u n a ls .  Both Labor and non-Labor governments f re q u e n tly  
make appointm ents from th e  ranks o f t h e i r  su p p o rte rs . Labor appo in tees 
have no t always come up to  e x p e c ta tio n s , and union c r i t ic i s m  of them i s  
common. On the  o th e r  hand, some non-Labor ap p o in tees  have been h ig h ly  
regarded  by the  u n io n s . But w hile few appointm ents made in  the  hope th a t  
they  w i l l  in flu en ce  an in d u s t r i a l  t r i b u n a l ’s p o l ic ie s  can be expec ted  to  
s a t i s f y  the  in te r e s t s  invo lved  on a l l  p o in ts  and a t  a l l  tim es , the n a tu re  
of such appointm ents i s  r ig h t ly  regarded  as being o f co n sid e rab le  im portance, 
In  p a r t i c u la r  cases th e y  do n o t u s u a lly  r e s u l t  in  a d ram atic  change in  the
33
t r i b u n a l 's  p o lic y , though th i s  has occurred  on o ccasio n . But th e re  i s  
reason  to  b e lie v e  th a t  th ey  have in c lin e d  t r ib u n a ls  to  favour one s id e .
The im portance o f th e  appointm ent f a c to r  was ev id en t in  th e  fo rm ation  
o f the Queensland I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt’s p o lic y  on th e  q u estio n  o f p re fe ren ce  
to  u n io n is ts  and compulsory unionism . This p o lic y  and some o f the  f a c to r s  
c o n tr ib u tin g  to  the  h igh  in c id en ce  o f  p re fe ren ce  c lau ses  in  Queensland 
awards have been d e sc rib ed  abovJ'J' A f u r th e r ,  and perhaps the  most im port­
a n t ,  f a c to r  in  th i s  s i tu a t io n  appears to  have been the n a tu re  o f the  app­
ointm ents made to  the  award-making t r ib u n a l .
The overwhelming p ro p o rtio n  o f Queensland awards which inc lu d e  p re f -
35erence o r compulsory unionism  c lau se s  i s  n o t o f re c e n t o r ig in .  At the
end of 1929> e ig h ty  p e r c e n t ,  o f a l l  S ta te  awards con tained  p re fe ren ce
c lau ses  o f one s o r t  o r an o th e r; by the  end o f 1954 the  p ro p o r tio n  had r is e n
36
by only nine p e r c e n t. The p ro p o rtio n  of th ese  c lau se s  th a t  p re sc r ib e d  
compulsory unionism  ro se  in  the  same p e rio d  from s ix ty -se v e n  to  e ig h ty -n in e
33 E .g . ,  see the W.A. A rb itr a t io n  C ourt’ s change in  a t t i tu d e  to  the  q u es tio n  
of q u a r te r ly  c o s t - o f - l iv in g  ad justm en ts to  th e  b a s ic  wage, d e sc rib ed  be­
low under ’V/ages P o lic y ’ .
34 See C hapter 7
35 See Table 8
36 In  a b so lu te  f ig u r e s ,  a s  Table 8 shows, the  r i s e  i s  much g re a te r .
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p er c e n t. Thus i t  can be sa id  t h a t  th e  p re fe ren ce  c la u se , and compulsory- 
unionism  in  p a r t i c u la r ,  had become f irm ly  en trenched  as a fe a tu re  o f Queens­
land  awards by th e  end o f 1929. But perhaps th e  most s t r ik in g  in c re a se  in  
th ese  p ro p o rtio n s  occu rred  in  th e  space of l i t t l e  more than  fo u r  y e a rs  p re­
ceding the  end o f 1929: between 1925 and 1929 p re fe ren ce  c lau se s  o f a l l  k inds 
in c re ase d  by h a l f ,  from f i f t y - t h r e e  to  e ig h ty  p e r c e n t . ,  and the p ro p o rtio n
of th ese  c lau se s  th a t  p re sc r ib e d  compulsory unionism  more than  doubled , from
37
th ir ty -o n e  to  s ix ty -se v e n  p e r  c e n t. The base e s ta b lis h e d  by the  C ourt of 
I n d u s t r ia l  A rb itr a t io n  during  i t s  e ig h t  y ears  o f o p e ra tio n  up to  1925 was 
s u b s ta n t ia l  by s tan d a rd s  in  o th e r  ju r i s d ic t io n s ;  b u t th e re  was c le a r ly  an 
in te n s i f i e d  d riv e  during  the  fo u r  y ears  a f t e r  1925 to  in c re a se  the  number o f 
p re fe ren ce  c lau se s  and, p a r t i c u la r ly ,  to  in c re ase  the  number p re s c r ib in g  
compulsory unionism  -  the  in c re a se  in  the  t o t a l  number of awards over th i s  
p e rio d  being r e la t iv e ly  s l i g h t .
W ith t h i s  in  mind, the  a l t e r a t io n s  made to  the  s tru c tu re  o f the  award­
in g  t r ib u n a l  in  1925 a re  s ig n i f i c a n t .  In  th a t  y ea r the  S ta te  Labor Govern­
ment ab o lish ed  the  Court o f I n d u s t r ia l  A rb itr a t io n  and s e t  up in  i t s  p lace  
a Board o f Trade and A rb i t r a t io n .  Whereas the  Court had c o n s is te d  of two 
ju d g es, the  new Board was composed o f one judge and two la y  members. The 
p o in t o f the new body was shown in  the  G overnm ents ju d ic io u s  cho ice o f the  
la y  members. One was W .J. Dunstan, S ta te  S e c re ta ry  o f th e  A.W.U.; the  other 
was W.N. G i l l i e s ,  who stepped  down from the  o f f ic e  o f Prem ier to  tak e  the  
appointm ent -  a f t e r  he had seen  the  amending B i l l  s a fe ly  through P a rliam e n t. 
The appointm ent of th ese  tw o, as we have seen , was fo llow ed  by a s u b s ta n t ia l  
r i s e  in  th e  number o f p re fe ren ce  c lau se s  in  Queensland awards and a  sharp  
in c re a se  in  the p ro p o rtio n  o f th e se  c lau se s  which prov ided  f o r  compulsory
37 See Table 8
unionism . The in flu en c e  o f the  new members was a lso  ev id en t in  th e  Board*s 
ex ten s iv e  use of p re fe ren ce  c lau se s  app ly ing  to  e x is t in g  as w e ll as new 
em ployees. The form er Court o f In d u s t r ia l  A rb itr a t io n  had norm ally  exclud­
ed e x is t in g  employees from th e  o p e ra tio n  o f i t s  p re fe ren ce  c la u se s ; the
Board re v e rsed  th i s  p o lic y , * fo llo w in g  the  p ra c t ic e  of th e  Board in  favou r
38of w e ll d is c ip l in e d  unions o f long s tan d in g * .
When Labor was d e fe a te d  in  1929, the N ational-C oun try  P a rty  Government 
re p laced  the Board w ith  an I n d u s t r ia l  Court composed of two ju d g es , and re ­
duced th e  two form er la y  members to  the  p o s i t io n  o f c o n c i l ia t io n  commiss­
io n e rs  w ith  very  l im ite d  powers th a t  d id  n o t inc lu d e  the  a b i l i t y  to  g ra n t 
p re fe ren ce  c la u s e s . On Labor*s r e tu rn  to  power in  1932, the I n d u s t r ia l  
Court was r e - c o n s t i tu te d  on the l in e s  of the  o ld  Board of Trade and A rb it-
w e r e .
r a t io n .  The two la y  membersJW.J. R iordan, S ta te  S e c re ta ry  o f the  A.W.U.,
and T.A. F e r ry , a form er U nder-S ecre tary  o f the  C hief S e c re ta ry ’ s Department
39who had o r ig in a l ly  been appo in ted  to  the Board by th e  S ta te  Labor Caucus
e a r ly  in  1928 a f t e r  G illie s*  d e a th . R epairing  the  damage caused  by the
Moore Government’ s p ro h ib i t io n  on p re fe ren ce  c lau se s  in  1930 was one o f the
main ta sk s  assumed by the  r e - c o n s t i tu te d  Court: ’ In  r e s to r in g  p re fe ren ce
c lau se s  th a t  were so d e le te d , th e  Court has adhered as n e a r ly  as  p o ss ib le
40
to  the  form o f p re fe ren ce  p re v io u s ly  con tained  in  aw ards’ .
Wages P o licy :
Wages p o lic y  i s  d iscu ssed  here in  th e  l i g h t  of the co n tro v e rsy  in  
r e c e n t  y ears  over the  q u e s tio n  o f q u a r te r ly  ad justm ents to  the  b a s ic  wage in  
accordance w ith  changes in  the  c n s t - o f - l iv in g  index . The system  o f au to­
m atic  ad ju stm en ts  made on th i s  b a s is  was adopted by the  Commonwealth
38 (1926) 11 Q .I .G ., a t  937
39 B risbane T eleg rap h . 3 /3 /1928
40 TT933) 18 Q . I . G . , a t  211
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A rb itr a t io n  C ourt in  1921; and p ro v is io n s  on th e se  l in e s  were soon 
in co rp o ra ted  in  most F e d e ra l a w a rd s .^  Over t h i r t y  years  l a t e r ,  th e  
A rb itra tio n  C ourt ab o lish ed  th e  system and, in  e f f e c t ,  pegged the  F e d e ra l 
b a s ic  wage a t  the  l e v e l  o b ta in in g  when i t  handed down i t s  judgem ent, sub­
j e c t  to  l a t e r  changes made d i r e c t ly  by th e  C ourt in  response  to  a p p lic a tio n s  
from th e  p a r t i e s  concerned . At th e  tim e th e  Court gave i t s  d e c is io n , 
September 1953, the system  of q u a r te r ly  ad ju stm en ts , u s u a lly  on an a u to ­
m atic b a s is ,  was fo llow ed in  r e l a t io n  to  th e  b a sic  wages determ ined in  a l l  
S ta te  in d u s t r ia l  j u r i s d i c t i o n s .  So f a r  a s  th e  S ta te s  were concerned, th e  
C o u rt’s a c tio n  p laced  wages p o lic y  sq u a re ly  in  the  p o l i t i c a l  arena  because 
S ta te  governments, u n lik e  t h e i r  F e d e ra l c o u n te rp a r t ,  a re  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  
com petent to  d i r e c t  t h e i r  in d u s t r ia l  t r ib u n a ls  to  fo llow  s p e c if ie d  p o l i c i e s .
One of the main f a c to r s  in  th e  F e d e ra l C o u rt’s d e c is io n  was i t s  co n v ic ­
t io n  th a t  th e  system had c o n s t i tu te d  an ‘a c c e le r a t in g  fa c to r  in  th e  ra p id
42in c re a se  in  p r i c e s ’ , and th a t  i t s  a b o l i t io n  would th e re fo re  give 'good 
ground fo r  an e x p ec ta tio n  th a t  th e  p r ic e s  of com m odities, p a r t i c u la r ly  con -
43sumer com m odities, w il l  tend  a t  l e a s t  to  be s t a b i l i z e d ' .  I r re s p e c tiv e  of
whether th e se  c o n s id e ra tio n s  in  f a c t  dom inated th e  C o u rt 's  th in k in g , as has 
44been su ggested , i t  i s  n e v e r th e le s s  c le a r  th a t  the  d e c is io n  was w idely
accepted  as an a ttem p t to  s t a b i l i z e  th e  economic s i tu a t io n .  Regarded in
th i s  way, th e  d e c is io n  in e v ita b ly  ra is e d  th e  qu estio n  of whether th e  same
p o lic y  should be fo llow ed a t  th e  S ta te  le v e l  -  indeed, the  F e d e ra l C ourt
based i t s  ex p ec ta tio n  th a t  i t s  d e c is io n  would encourage economic s t a b i l i t y
45p a r t ly  on th e  assum ption, ' i f  g en era l e f f e c t  be given to  th e  d e c is io n ’ .
41 R .J .  Hawke, 'The Commonwealth A rb i t r a t io n  C ourt -  Legal T rib u n a l or 
Economic L e g is la tu r e ? ',  (1956 ) 3 Annual Law Review (W.A.), 460.
42 77 C .A .R ., a t  49S.
43 I b id . ,  a t  532.
44 Hawke, op. c i t . ,  471.
45 77 C .A .R ., a t  532.
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The New South Wales I n d u s t r ia l  Commission, which had p re v io u s ly  ap p lied
the  au tom atic  q u a r te r ly  ad ju stm en t system to  a l l  S ta te  aw ards, abandoned the
system in  1953 in  compliance w ith  the  s ta tu to r y  d i r e c t io n  th a t  i t  should
46
fo llow  F ed e ra l Court d e c is io n s  in  the  m a tte r . The Labor Prem ier re fu se d  to  
re v e rse  the  d e c is io n  by l e g i s l a t i o n ,  on the ground th a t  th i s  would on ly  le ad  
to  a p r ic e  r i s e ,  le s s  than  two y ears  l a t e r ,  in  August 1955, th e  same Gov­
ernment announced i t s  in te n t io n  to  b rin g  down l e g i s l a t i o n  r e s to r in g  au to­
m atic  q u a r te r ly  ad justm en ts in  S ta te  awards and r a is in g  the  S ta te  b a s ic  wage 
to  the  l e v e l  i t  would have r  eached had i t  n o t been fro zen  a t  the  September
1953 le v e l ;  th e  d e c is io n  was a lso  to  be a p p lie d  by ex ecu tiv e  a c t io n  to  a l l
47
S ta te  Government employees working under F ed era l aw ards. The consequent 
A ct came in to  fo rce  in  December 1955. The G overnm ents change o f p o lic y , 
p a r t i c u la r ly  in  so f a r  as i t  a p p lie d  to  th e  G overnm ents F ed e ra l award em­
p lo y ees , was regarded  by the  unions as r e s u l t in g  la r g e ly  from th e  p re ssu re  
th ey  had brought to  b e a r . I t  i s  notew orthy in  t h i s  connection  t h a t  the  wave 
o f in d u s t r i a l  u n re s t  which c h a ra c te r iz e d  the f i r s t  h a l f  o f 195$ in  New South 
Wales was in  p a r t  a p roduct o f the  union campaign f o r  r e s to r a t io n  o f  au to­
m atic  q u a r te r ly  ad ju stm en ts .
V ic to r ia n  wages boards in  September 1953 were empowered, a t  t h e i r  own 
d is c r e t io n ,  to  provide f o r  au tom atic  q u a r te r ly  ad ju stm en ts . Very n e a r ly  a l l  
t h e i r  d e te rm in a tio n s  in c lu d ed  p ro v is io n s  on th e se  l i n e s .  Im m ediately f o l l ­
owing the  F ed e ra l C ourt’ s d e c is io n , a number of wages boards d e le te d  the  pro­
v is io n s . However, in  November, before  the  p ro cess  could become w idespread , 
th e  S ta te  Labor Government en ac ted  le g i s l a t i o n  re q u ir in g  the  in c lu s io n  of 
such p ro v is io n s  in  a l l  d e te rm in a tio n s ; i t  a lso  a p p lie d  the  same p o lic y  by 
ex ecu tiv e  a c t io n  to  i t s  own employees working under F ed era l aw ards. Labor’ s
46 111 I .G .(N .S .W .), a t  41
47 Sydney Morning H era ld , 10/8/1955
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defeat in the elections of May 1955 brought no immediate change. But a 
year later the new Liberal Government reversed the executive decision and 
repealed the legislative direction to wages boards, leaving them free to 
decide whether or not to continue the .systemj the relevant provisions were 
subsequently deleted from all State determinations.
Up to 1953 the Queensland Industrial Court had carried out quarterly
reviews of the State basic wage and adjusted it in accordance with changes
in the cost-of-living index. It did not depart from this practice aftefc
48
the Federal Court1s decision. The State Labor Government, however, took 
no steps to give those of its employees working under Federal awards the bene­
fit of quarterly adjustments. But the number of employees concerned was, 
in any event, extremely small.
Before September 1953, the State * living wage1 of South Australia had 
followed the Federal basic wage (both in amount and in the method of comput­
ation) , the quarterly adjustments to it being made by the President of the 
Board of Industry. No adjustments were made by the President after the 
Federal Court’s decisioä? The Liberal Country League Government has taken 
no steps to alter the position in relation to its own employees.
The Western Australian Arbitration Court follows the Queensland practice 
of conducting quarterly reviews of the State basic wage. Up to September 
1953 it had usually made adjustments in accordance with changes in the cost- 
of-living index. In the first quarterly review held after the Federal Ccuzt% 
decision, the President of the State Court ruled that because the Federal tri­
bunal’s basic wage policy had normally been followed in the past, 'consistency 
alone' demanded that the Court should refuse to increase the basic wage in 
accordance with changes in the cost-of-living - though he also considered the
48 See (1953) 38 Q.I.G. (Supp.) 551
49 See (1953) 25 S.A.I.R. 293
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F ed era l C o u rt1s d e c is io n  to  be * p la in ly  r i g h t ’ . The q u a r te r ly  review s were 
continued  w ith o u t any change in  the  S ta te  C ourt’ s a t t i tu d e  u n t i l  A p ril 1955, 
when the new P re s id e n t, appo in ted  by the  S ta te  Labor Government, expressed  
doubts about the e f f ic a c y  o f the  b a s ic  wage ’f r e e z e ’ as a means of s t a b i l ­
iz in g  th e  c o s t - o f - l iv in g ,  bu t f o r  the  time being fo llow ed  h is  p re d e c e ss o r 's
51
p o lic y . However, in  August 1955> a f t e r  h earin g  su b m issiin s  made by employer^
unions and th e  Labor Government, the  l a t t e r  su p p o rtin g  the  union  ca se , the
President decided in favour of a return to the practice of adjusting the bas-
52
ic  wage on the  l in e s  of the  C o u rt 's  p o lic y  befo re  1953. The Court has since
C o u r t”’
continued  to  make q u a r te r ly  ad ju stm en ts . Before th e ^ re v e rte d  to  t h i s  p o lic y ,
the  S ta te  Labor Government had a ttem p ted  to  take  the i n i t i a t i v e  in  the  m a tte r .
But i t s  th re e  a ttem p ts  to  en ac t l e g i s l a t i o n  re s to r in g  q u a r te r ly  ad justm en ts
were each d e fe a te d  in  the L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil. C abinet co n sid e red , b u t
decided  a g a in s t ,  app ly ing  the  p r in c ip le  to  government employees by ex ecu tiv e
a c tio n . I t s  s ta te d  reasons f o r  doing so in c luded  the  u n c e r ta in ty  o f the
fu tu re  f in a n c ia l  burden invo lved  and the  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f u n re s t  among p r iv a te
employees; b u t c h ie f  emphasis was la id  on the  argument t h a t  the  Government
would r*Lncur the wrath of the Grants Commission, which would undoubtedly ref-
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use to  meet any p o r tio n  o f the S t a t e 's  d e f ic i t*  a r i s in g  from such a p o lic y . 
Since the  S ta te  A rb itr a t io n  C o u rt 's  d e c is io n  to  r e s to re  q u a r te r ly  ad justm en ts 
in  r e l a t io n  to  S ta te  award em ployees, th e  Government has made no move to  ex­
ten d  the p r in c ip le  to  th o se  of i t s  amployees covered by F ed era l aw ards, though,
as in  Q ueensland, very  few a re  a f fe c te d  in  t h i s  way.
50 (1953) 33 W .A .I.G ., a t  502
51 (1955) 35 W .A.I.G. 177. This was the  second q u a r te r ly  review  in  which the 
new P re s id e n t had tak en  p a r t ;  in  th e  f i r s t  he had re fu sed  to  low er the  bas­
ic  wage in  response to  a f a l l  in  th e  c o s t - o f - l iv in g  index; i b i d . ,  38«
52 I b i d . ,  431.
53 Report g iven  by A .L.P. G eneral S e c re ta ry  on b e h a lf  o f the  P rem ier, K in u te s , 
Trade Unions I n d u s t r ia l  C ouncil, 13/4/1954*
Policy on the question of automatic quarterly adjustments has been more 
erratic under the Tasmanian Labor Government than in any other State. At 
September 1953 all State determinations contained automatic adjustment clausea 
Shortly after the Federal Court*s decision, the State Labor Government called 
a compulsory conference presided over by the Chairman of all wages boards, 
who heard the views of employers* and unions’ representatives, then gave his 
opinion that the State basic wage should be frozen for a * reasonable trial
54
period*. This meant that, as chairman of each board, hb would exercise his 
casting vote in favour of the suspension of quarterly adjustments. By early 
December his decision had been applied to all State determinations. Union 
agitation for restoration of the adjustment system increased in 1955 when 
the cost-of-living index began to rise after a period of stability. In an 
attempt to relieve the pressure the Government announced in July that it 
would convene the wages boards after the Federal Court had given a decision 
on a union application for restoration in relation to Federal awards. But 
the next day it expressed the 'hope* that the wages boards would be convened 
not later than September. As the prospect of an early Federal decision reced­
ed, the Government finally called a second compulsory conference on the 1953 
pattern in November, at which the Chairman of wages boards stated that he was 
in favour of restoration, provided it did not take effect until February 1956
in order to allow a ’serious attempt* to be made to reduce prices so that the
r m 55’impact of the increase Lin the basic wagej will not be so great’. The
Chairman*s view was speedily embodied in all State determinations. Late in
June 1956, after the Commonwealth Court’s refusal to restore automatic quart-
er]yadjustments, a third compulsory conference was called by the Government,
54 Department of Labour and Industry Bulletin (Tas.), Nov. 1956, 133
55 Ibid., 134
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at which the Chairman of wages boards stated that his casting vote on any
wages board would again be exercised in favour of suspending automatic ad-
56justments ’in an endeavour to achieve some measure of stability’. The 
Chairman’s view was applied by all but one of the seventy ’operating* wages 
boards, the exception affecting only a few employees, and there was no change 
in the situation at the end of 1957. At no time during this period did 
the Government apply the principle of quarterly adjustments to the large 
number of its own employees covered by Federal awards.
Preference to Unionists:
The question of preference in this context falls into two categories. 
On the one hand, a government*,legislative ability to apply preference of 
employment to unionists generally, either directly or by empowering an indus­
trial tribunal to do so; and on the other hand, the ability of a government
to follow such a policy in relation to its own employees under its executive 
powers.
Federal, unlike State, governments normally cannot apply preference
generally by legislation, though a Labor Government was able to legislate for
compulsory unionism in the stevedoring industry under the Commonwealth’s
57
interstate trade and commerce power. But they can determine the jurisdict­
ion of Federal Industrial tribunals in this respect. In 1947 the Chifley 
Labor Government deleted the ’other things being equal’ proviso from the 
provision setting out the Federal Arbitration Court’s power to award pref-
erence to unionists, thus enabling the Court, at its discretion, to grant 
56 Ibid., 135
77 stevedoring Industry Act 19t-7. Previously the Scullin Labor Government att­
empted to provide preference in employment for members of the W.W.F. in the 
industry. Regulations to this effect were disallowed on eleven occasions 
during 1931 by the hostile Senate, the final set being repealed by the new 
non-Labor Government early in 1932.
m
stronger forms of preference. The same Government was later subject,
but did not succumb, to pressure from the budding A.L.P. Industrial Group
59movement to extend the Court’s power to an award of compulsory unionism.
The experience was not a new one. During the second world war, the unions
had pressed hard for the direct application of compulsory unionism under
the Commonwealth’s sweeping wartime powers. The Secretary of the A.C.T.U.
recalled in 1945 that three years earlier at a conference of Federal unions,
the Prime Minister ’had promised to implement [compulsory unionism]later but
60
no attempt had been made’. The 1945 A.C.T.U. Congress asked the Govern-
61
ment to ’introduce Compulsory Unionism without delay’. The Government did 
not respond.
The history of the statutory power of the New South Wales industrial
Commission to award preference, particularly in the period since the first
world war, reflects attempts by Labor governments to extend that power and
by non-Labor governments to limit it. It was a Labor Government that, in
aim
1953» realized for the first time in Australia the union/(since modified in
the light of experience with this legislation) of compulsory unionism applied
62
on a general scale by statute.
In 1953 the first majority Labor Government in Victoria’s history consol­
idated and amended the legislation governing wages boards. The Melbourne 
Trades Hall Council’s request for deletion of the long-standing statutory 
prohibition against preference clauses in wages boards determinations was 
refused by the Premier. He was apparently uneasy about the possible
58
58 A similar amendment introduced by the Scullin Labor Government in 1930 
was rejected by the Senate.
59 See (1949) 203 C»wealth Pari. Debs. 2099
60 M  unices, A . C.T. U. C o n g re s s, Tunc .Session, X . 6/ T bid.
62 See Chapter 7 for this and other State preference provisions referred to 
below.
p o l i t i c a l  re p e rcu ss io n s  of such a move, and p a r t i c u l a i l y  about th e  e f f e c t  i t  
m ight have on a number o f non=Labor members o f the  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil whose 
v o te s  were re q u ire d  to  pass the  o th e r  amendments through the  C ouncil.
The new Queensland Labor Government's a ttem p t in  1916 to  empower the 
S ta te  i n d u s t r i a l  t r ib u n a l  to  award p re fe ren ce  was d e fe a te d  in  th e  L e g is la tiv e  
C ouncil. But the  t r ib u n a l  l a t e r  in te rp re te d  i t s  en ab lin g  Act as in c lu d in g  
an im p l ic i t  power of th i s  s o r t .  I t  was n o t u n t i l  a f t e r  the  Moore non-Labor 
Government had enacted  a ban on p re fe ren ce  awards th a t  Labor co n sid ered  i t  
n e ce ssa ry , when i t  re p ea led  the  ban in  1932, to  give the  I n d u s t r ia l  Court ex­
p re ss  d is c r e t io n a ry  power to  g ra n t p re fe ren ce  on w hatever term s the  Court con­
s id e re d  a d v isa b le . As the p ro p o rtio n  o f S ta te  awards co n ta in in g  p re fe ren ce  
c lau se s  in d ic a te s ,  Queensland Labor governments have never found i t  n ece ssa ry  
to  apply  p re fe ren ce  o r compulsory u n io n is t  d i r e c t ly  by l e g i s l a t i o n .  The 
L ib era l-C o u n try  P a rty  Government e le c te d  in  1957 has n o t y e t a ttem p ted  to  a l t e r  
th i s  s i tu a t io n .  I t  h a s , however, taken  s te p s  to  throw the f u l l  burden of 
p o lic in g  and en fo rc in g  p re fe ren ce  c lau se s  on to  th e  u n io n s .
The LabOr governments formed in  South A u s tra lia  before  Labor th e re  was 
converted  in to  a near-perm anent O pposition  were in v a r ia b ly  faced  by a h o s t i l e  
L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil. The re p e a l o f the  s ta tu to r y  p ro h ib i t io n  on awards of 
p re fe ren ce  by the  I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt, l e t  a lone the in s e r t io n  of a d i r e c t io n  to  
make such aw ards, was th e re fo re  beyond t h e i r  power.
In  W estern A u s tra l ia ,  to o , Labor governments have always been faced  by a 
L e g is la tiv e  Council opposed to  m easures o f t h i s  k in d . On the  o th e r  hand, non- 
Labor governments have n o t a ttem p ted  to  rev e rse  the S ta te  A rb i t r a t io n  C o u rt 's  
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f i t s  en ab lin g  s ta tu te  as in c lu d in g  an im plied  power to  g ra n t 
p re fe ren ce  and compulsory unionism .
Tasmanian Labor governments have made no move to  enable wages boards to
43Ö
include preference clauses in their awards. One Tasmanian union official
claimed to have challenged several State ministers on the matter. ’Their
invariable replies were: “It was political dynamite”; “it might be the means
of their being defeated"; and “even if we got it in, an Upper House would 
63get it out“.’
----- 0O0-----
While there have been differences in the readiness of Labor governments 
to enact legislation providing generally for preference to unionists or com­
pulsory unionism, they have usually shown themselves more prepared to apply 
such policies to their own employees as a matter of administrative policy. 
Where they have taken action on these lines, it has usually been reversed by 
succeeding non-Labor governments. The normal pattern was clearly illustrat­
ed by Commonwealth employment policy before the first world war.
In September 1911, the Minister of Home Affairs in the Labor Government, 
King O’Malley, directed that preference was to be given to unionists in the
64engagement of employees by the Director-General of Works. Later, this re-
65
quirement was inserted in all contracts to which the Government was a party.
It appears also that compulsory unionism was at this time enforced in at
66
least one other department, the Postmaster-General’s. A measure of Oppo­
sition feeling on the matter - and perhaps of the extent to which the Labor 
administration had applied the principle - was given by the Cook Government’s
63 Official Report. A.W.U., 69th Annual Convention, January 1955, 233
64 (1911) 60 C’wealth Pari. Debs.. 716. As translated in a departmental circu­
lar, the instruction was that ’all things being equal, absolute preference’ 
should be given to unionist^, and non-unionists were to be first dismissed 
in cases of reduction of labour. O’Malley said he knew nothing about the 
dismissals policy, and, as^the other curious provision, placed emphasis on 
the ’other things being equal formula’: ibid., 717. The Prime Minister laid 
down the Government’s policy as preference to unionists ’other things being 
equal*: ibid., 788.
65 Report. N.S.W. Commission of Inquiry on Industrial Arbitration, 1913, 120.
66 See (1914) 73 C’wealth Pari. Debs. 1059
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introduction of a Government Preference Prohibition Bill ’to prohibit in
relation to Commonwealth employees preferences and discriminations on account
of membership or non-membership of an Association’. The Bill was rejected
67
twice by the Labor-controlled Senate, in 1913 and 1914> after which the Gov­
ernment obtained a double dissolution but did not survive the elections. The 
succeeding Labor Government resumed the preference to unionists policy but
soon modified it in favour of ex-servicemen, in an effort to boost the mili-68
tary recruiting campaign.
More recently, the Curtin Labor Government issued a directive shortly 
after its accession to power in 1941 stating that salary increases awarded 
by the Commonwealth Public Service Arbitrator were to be given only to employ­
ees who were members of the unions or associations concerned, with the ex­
ception of ex-servicemen. The directive was rescinded by the Menzies Gov­
ernment soon after it took office.
In New South Wales compulsory unionism as a condition of employment was 
applied to at least a section of State employees soon after Labor's return 
to office in 1941* A notice issued by the Commissioner for Railways in 
September 1941 to the staff under his control directed, 'in pursuance of a 
decision by Cabinet', that 'all railway employees must not only be prepared 
before October 6 next to satisfy an authorised officer that they have become 
members of an industrial union recognised by the State Industrial Court (sic) 
or the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, as directed by notice issued to staff 
on July 11, 1941> but each employee must remain a financial member of such
69
union'. A direction to the same effect was issued by the Minister of
67 71 C wealth Pari. Debs. 283$; 73 CAwealth Pari. Debs. 664
68 Scott, Australia During the War (Official War History), vol. XI, 296
69 Quoted in McVicar v. Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) (1950), $ I.I.B. 
70$
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70Transport to all his departmental employees in 1952. Since 1953, govern­
ment employees, most of whom are apparently covered by State awards, have 
been affected by the compulsory unionism provisions of the Industrial Arbit­
ration Act. But the Public Service Board found it necessary in 1956 to
remind public servants of their statutory obligation, and to insist that 
71they honour it.
In Victoria, a circular issued under the Premier’s signature to all 
State departments in 1947, announced that the Cain Labor Government ’expect­
ed1 its employees to join an appropriate union. No general steps were taken 
to enforce the Government’s view, though some ministers apparently applied 
the policy more strongly within their own departments. The Melbourne Trades 
Hall Council approached the second Cain Government on the same question in
1954> but its deputation reported that it ’had not succeeded in convincing
72the Premier of the widdom of compulsory unionism’ in the public service.
Again, however, a number of ministers made some attempt to enforce this 
policy in their own departments.
After the first of Queensland Labor’s many electoral successes in 1915,
State employees were ’practically required’ to be or become members of an 
73
appropriate union. This was achieved in two ways. In the first place,
74
preference was given to unionists at the point of engagement; and in the
second place, wage increases negotiated with the unions concerned were given 
only to members of those unions?^ The National-Country Party Government 
7Ü"MinutesT Labor Council of N.S.W., 20/3/1952
71 Sydney Morning Herald. 3/5/1956
72 Minutes. Melbourne Trades Hall Council, 14/10/1954
73 McCawley, J., ’Arbitration and Conciliation’, (1924) 9 Q.I.G. 506
74 (1930) 157 Qd. Pari. Debs. 2850
75 Brisbane Telegraph. 237571929. This technique’s effectiveness was indicated 
by the President of the State Court of Industrial Arbitration:’in the pub­
lic service where the conscientious objector is asked to choose between a 
smaller wage and being a non-unionist and a larger wage and being a union­
ist, the conscience always gives way’: McCawley, J., op. cit., 507
decided at its first Cabinet meeting in 1929 to do away with compulsory
76unionism in the public service. The succeeding Labor Government promptly 
re-applied the previous policy which operated until Labor*s defeat in 1957.
The Minister for Labour in the Hawke Labor Government of Western Aust­
ralia advised the unions, shortly after Labor's election in 1953, that the
Government's policy was 'to give preference to unionists' so far as its own
77
employees were concerned. The Government has encouraged the insertion of 
preference and, in some case^ compulsory unionism clauses in State awards 
covering its employees. Compulsory unionism clauses have been included 
in a number of Government contracts; and in all other cases contractors are 
expressly required to adhere to relevant awards covering State employees, 
which usually provide for preference to unionists.
Permanent employees of the Tasmanian Labor Government and its instru­
mentalities are not obliged to become unionists, nor does it appear that 
preference of employment to unionists is applied in this respect. However, 
preference usually operates in relation to employees of State instrumental­
ities who are covered by awards and determinations; and in some cases com­
pulsory unionism is enforced. The Labor Government has also customarily 
included a compulsory unionism clause in its contracts. The unions have 
sometimes found it necessary to complain that this policy, in relation to
78instrumentalities as well as to contractors, was not being enforced. But 
on at least one occasion the Minister for Lands and Works publicly threaten­
ed to cancel a contract where the contractor had failed to comply with its 
79
preference clause. On the other hand, it has been alleged that the Tasman­
ian Labor Government has sometimes opposed the insertion of preference clauses
,76 Brisbane Telegraph. 23/5/192972 Minutes. W.A. Trade Unions Industrial Council, 10/11/1953
ginutes, Hobart Trades Hall Council, I4/10/1954 79 Ibid., 25/3/1954
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in Federal awards to which it is a party, even when the private employer's
BOconcerned have agreed to it.
Long-service Leaver
Legislation granting long-service leave to employees in private ind­
ustry has been enacted by State Labor governments in New South Wales (1951),
81
Queensland (1952), Victoria (1953) and Tasmania (1956). The Tasmanian leg­
islation is applicable only to workers covered by State determinations.
The Victorian Act, on the other hand, applies to all employees including 
those covered by Federal awards. In 1955 the New South Wales and Queensland 
measures, both originally restricted to State award employees, were brought 
into line with the Victorian Act in this respect.
The Labor Premier of Western Australia promised long-service leave leg­
islation applicable to private employees in his 1956 election policy speech. 
On its re-election, the Government devoted considerable energy to devising an
ambitious scheme aimed at giving long-service leave to casual workers, but an
82
actuary's report finally showed the scheme to be impracticable. The conse­
quent modification of the scheme met with a great deal of union opposition 
despite the fact that it, or indeed any other plan likely to be acceptable to 
the unions, was given little hope of receiving the Legislative Council's
S3approval.
Following a series of deputations from the United Trades and Labor
80 Official Report. A.W.U., 69th Annual Convention, January 1955, 233
81 In all States and in the Commonwealth salaried public servants (and, in 
some cases, government wages employees), already received long-service 
leave. In the eastern States coal miners had earlier been granted long-ser­
vice leave by legislation.
82 A similar scheme was earlier rejected by the Qd, Labor Government; but the 
Qd. legislation is exceptional in providing long-service leave for season­
al workers regularly employed in the sugar and meat industries.
83 An agreement since concluded between the Trade Unions Industrial Council 
and the Employers Federation provides long-service leqve for employees 
covered by State awards and agreements: Sydney Morning Herald. 26/3/1953
Council, the entrenched Liberal Country League Government of South Australia
84
finally agreed to introduce long-service leave legislation in 1957. However, 
the measure finally enacted was less long-service leave in the sense of the 
other State Acts than an extension of annual leave.
Anti-Strike Legislation:
In all jurisdictions except Victoria, the Acts establishing industrial
regulation systems contain provisions enabling unions to be fined for strike
action. Union agitation against anti-strike legislation in recent years has
largely concentrated on these monetary penalties. However, as has been 
85
shown, it is only in the Commonwealth and New South Wales jurisdictions that 
any grea.t use has been made of them.
The penal clauses of the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Act were 
inserted by the Liberal-Country Party Government in 1951: earlier provisions 
on the same lines, enacted by the Bruce-Page Government in 1928, were deleted 
by the succeeding Scullin Labor Government. The New South Wales clauses, 
on the other hand, are a milder version (inserted in 1918 by the Nationalist 
Government of the ex-Labor Premier, W.A. Holman) of penal provisions origin­
ally enacted by the McGowen Labor Government in 1912. Successive State Labor 
governments have failed to repeal or mitigate them. The Cahill Government’s 
ostensible justification for its inaction, as explained to Labor Council dep­
utations, is that removal of the anti-strike clauses would be improper with­
out also repealing the penal provisions relating to breaches of awards by
86employers, a proposal tha.t is unacceptable to the unions. By contrast, the
84 The Advertiser. (Adelaide), 25/6/1957. The Labor Opposition in 1954 intro­
duced a long-service leave Bill without success.
85 See Chapter 6
86 The Premier showed a curious approach to the matter when he suggested that 
the Prime Minister should consider 'modifying or removing’ the Federal 
penal provisions: Sydney Morning Herald, 23/7/1955
Hawke Labor Government of Western Australia has since its election in 1953 
made two attempts, both rebuffed by the Legislative Council, to repeal the 
penal provisions enacted by its non-Labor predecessor.
Court-controlled Union Ballots:
The Chifley Labor Government amended the Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act in 1949 to provide for inquiries into disputed union 
elections and for elections to be conducted by the Industrial Registrar on 
the request of the union concerned. These provisions were later supplement­
ed by the Menzies Liberal-Country Party Government in 1951, the main feature
ox its amendment being that a section of a union's members were empowered to
87request that the Industrial Registrar conduct elections of its officials.
The 1949 amendment, which represented a striking departure from traditional
Labor policy, was distinguished from that of 1951 by the A.C.T.U.'s official
88approval of the principles involved - obtained largely as a result of dis-
89
closures of Communist malpractices in union elections. Union leaders in 
general have proved less enthusiastic about the changes made by the Menzies 
Government.
Up to the end of 1957, provisions on the lines of those in the Federal
90
measure had been enacted in only two States. The New South Wales Labor Gov­
ernment modelled its 1951 amendment of the Industrial Arbitration Act on 
, * 91that of the Federal Labor Government, while the non-Labor Government of
87 See Appendix VIII for both the 1949 and 1951 provisions.
88 See (1949) 203 C»wealth Pari. Debs.. 1399-1400, 1623, 1629; also, Federal 
Arbitration Court Controlled Ballots (A.C.T.U. pamphlet), 1954, 3
89 See Leroy S. Merrifield, »Regulation of Union Elections in Australia» (1957), 
10 Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 258
90 The Qd. Country-Liberal Party Government, elected in 1957, is expected to 
introduce similar legislation during 1958
91 The N.S.W. measure was enacted a month before that of the Menzies Govern­
ment, but the latter’s terms had been well-publicized owing to their intDin- 
poration in an unsuccessful private member’s Bill put forward by R.G. Men­
zies in 1949.
Western Australia in 1952 repeated the Federal Act!s provisions as supple­
mented by the Menzies Government,
- - - 0O0 - ---
The comparative performances of Labor and non-Labor governments in 
relation to the six issues dealt with above indicate that a fairly clear 
line can be drawn between the policies adopted by each of them in the ind­
ustrial field. But it is also evident that the line is by no means unwav­
ering. On some issues and at some times, the industrial policies of diff­
erent Labor governments are as wide apart as they can be, and the distinction 
between Labor and non-Labor seems to have little meaning. Nevertheless, 
over a range of issues and a period of time the distinction undoubtedly is 
important as a reflection of union influence.
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PART V
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 15
4 3 9
INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONISM
The a c t i v i t i e s  and in te rn a l  a f f a i r s  of A u s tra lian  tra d e  unions a re  
re g u la te d  by law to  a degree th a t  i s  perhaps u n p a ra lle le d  in  any o th er 
p o l i t i c a l  democracy excep t New Z ealand. This has meant th a t  th e  unions a re  
to  a g re a t e x te n t dependent on th e  s ta t e  fo r  th e  d e ta i le d  d e te rm in a tio n  of 
t h e i r  r ig h t s  and d u t ie s .  There i s  much to  be sa id  fo r  th e  view th a t  t h i s
development i s  'n o t  v e ry  fa r  from making the  union r e a l ly  an agency of th e
1
Governm ent'. But a d e s c r ip t io n  o f A u s tra lia n  tra d e  unions in  th e se  te rm s,
2 3
as 'a g e n ts  of th e  S ta te ' or 'o rg an s  of th e  S t a t e ' ,  can be m islead in g  i f
i t  i s  regarded  as ex tend ing  beyond a d e s c r ip t io n  of the  u n io n s ' le g a l
c h a ra c te r .  When B lackburn, w r it in g  in  1940, concluded th a t  in d u s t r ia l
a r b i t r a t io n  was co n v ertin g  th e  unions in to  'som ething  l ik e  th e  co rp o ra tio n s  
4
of I t a l y ' , he o v e rs ta te d  h is  case  because he had extended h is  d e s c r ip t io n  
beyond th e  le g a l  f i e l d .
In th e  f i r s t  p la c e , a mere r e c i t a l  of the  le g a l  p ro v is io n s  s e t t in g
out the  form al s ta t e - t r a d e  union r e la t io n s h ip  i s  n o t s u f f ic ie n t  b a s is  fo r
a s ta tem en t of t h i s  k in d . I t  i s  n ecessa ry  to  know no t only what th e  law
i s ,  but what i t s  e f f e c t iv e  a p p lic a t io n  i s  a t  im portan t p o in ts .  Thus, to
tak e  what i s  perhaps th e  c e n tr a l  p o in t ,  a lthough  s t r ik e  a c tio n  by A u s tra lia n
unions i s  alm ost in v a r ia b ly  i l l e g a l ,  th e  unions have never conceded th e
5
r ig h t  to  s t r ik e  and co n tin u e  to  e x e rc ise  i t  d e sp ite  th e  law . S im ila r ly ,  i t
1 Maurice B lackburn, Trade Unionism, 13.
2 P.H. P a r tr id g e ,  'T rade Unions and th e  S t a t e ' ,  in  Au s t r al i a n  Trade  Unionism 
(J .D .B .M ille r , e d . ) ,  4 6 .
3 J .D .B . M ille r , A u s tra lia n  Government and P o l i t i c s ,  215.
4 B lackburn, op. c i t . ,  13.
5 See C hapter 6 above.
i s  no s e c re t  th a t  the  New South Wales l e g i s l a t i o n  re g u la t in g  union 
p o l i t i c a l  funds i s  f r e e ly  f lo u te d ;  w h ile , to  tak e  a s p e c if ic  c ase , the
6
Western A u s tra lian  union d i r e c t l y  a f fe c te d  by th e  Supreme C ourt’s d e c is io n  
d eb arrin g  p o l i t i c a l  le v ie s  and ex p en d itu res  by S ta te  unions has no t stopped 
c o n tr ib u tin g  to  th e  Labor P a r ty  t r e a s u r y .  O ther examples of d isc rep a n c ie s  
between law and p ra c t ic e  could  nc^t doubt be found. For p re se n t pu rposes, 
however, i t  i s  enough to  no te  th a t  in  c ru c ia l  a re a s  th e re  a re  such 
d is c re p a n c ie s .
In th e  second p la c e , th e  s ta tu to r y  a r b i t r a t io n  m achinery is  
p r im a r i ly  concerned w ith  in d u s t r ia l  a c t io n , and th e re  a re  o th e r means, 
much le s s  su b je c t to  le g a l  c o n tro l ,  by which th e  unions can hope to  
achieve th e i r  main o b je c t iv e s . They can a c t  through th e  Labor P a r ty , of 
which th ey  a re  th e  main c o n s t i tu e n ts .  They have found in c re a s in g ly  th a t  
i t  i s  bo th  p ra c t ic a b le  and p r o f i ta b le  to  d ea l w ith  non-Labor governments.
I t  i s  e s p e c ia l ly  t h e i r  re c e n t su ccesses  in  th e  l a t t e r  f i e ld  which in d ic a te  
th a t  th e  unions a re  more than  mere ag en ts  of the  s t a t e .  The p e rio d  since  
B lackburn made h is  re fe re n ce  to  I t a l i a n  c o rp o ra tio n s  has seen in te n s i f ie d  
le g a l  re g u la tio n  of A u stra lian  tr a d e  un ions, bu t i t  has a ls o  seen the 
tra d e  union movement s tro n g e r in d u s t r i a l ly  than  a t  any tim e in  i t s  
h is to r y .  One r e s u l t  of t h i s  has been a g re a te r  re a d in e ss  on th e  p a r t  of 
non-Labor governments to  improve th e i r  r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  movement, and 
to  seek i t s  co o p era tio n  on a wide range of m a tte rs .
The e x ten s iv e  le g a l re g u la t io n  to  which th ey  a re  s u b je c t may w ell
have been th e  c h ie f  fa c to r  in flu en c in g  th e  u n io n s ’ p a s t  emphasis on
6 True v . A u s tra lian  Coal and Sha le  Employees F e d e ra tio n . W.A. Branch (1949) 
51 W.A.L.R. 73.
p a r t y - p o l i t i c a l  a t  th e  expense of in d u s t r ia l  and d i r e c t  p re ssu re -g ro u p
7
a c t io n .  N ev e rth e le ss , s in ce  th e  second world war a t  l e a s t  th ey  have
shown a more balanced approach to  th e  q u estio n , and have more com pletely
u t i l i z e d  th e  methods a v a ila b le  to  them. In d u s t r ia l  s tre n g th  is  in sep a ra b le
from t h i s  p o lic y . I t  i s  th e  foundation  of both in d u s t r ia l  and e f f e c t iv e
p ressu re -g ro u p  a c t io n . But to  expect the  unions to  renounce p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l
a c t io n , th e  one method open to  them th a t  i s  no t in  the  f i r s t  in s ta n ce  a
fu n c tio n  of t h e i r  in d u s t r ia l  s tre n g th , i s  e i th e r  to  overlook o r , as one
su sp ec ts  in  th e  case o f some non-Labor advocates of t h i s  co u rse , to
a p p re c ia te  th e  t r u th  o f L a sk i’ s s ta tem en t: ’The purposes of tra d e  unionism
can never be war on th e  economic b a t t l e f i e l d  a lo n e . At every  c r i t i c a l
8
p o in t  th e  s tru g g le  moves on to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s ta g e ’ .
On th e  assum ption t h a t  a measure of t r a d e  union independence from 
th e  s ta t e  i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  su rv iv a l of p o l i t i c a l  democracy, i t  i s  
obvious th a t  th e re  a re  dangers which a f f e c t  more than  tra d e  u n io n is ts  in  
th e  co n tin u in g  tre n d  tow ards g re a te r  le g a l  re g u la tio n  of th e  u n io n s .
However, to  d e sc rib e  th e  u n io n s ’ p o s i t io n  s o le ly  in  th e se  term s i s  to  
m isconstrue th e  n a tu re  of th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between A u s tra lian  tra d e  unions 
and th e  s t a t e .  The f a c t  t h a t  a l l  th re e  methods of union a c tio n  a re  n o t 
only  a v a ila b le  bu t a re  a c tu a l ly  employed by the tra d e  union movement g ives 
i t  a measure of independence d e sp ite  th e  law . This is  the  s u re s t  
safeguard  a g a in s t th e  dangers in h e re n t in  le g a l  c o n tro l of tra d e  unionism .
441
7 See B lackburn, op. c i t . ,  15.
8 Harold J .  L ask i, Trade Unions in  th e  New So c ie ty . 172.
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TABLE 1
Membership of A u s tra lia n  Trade Unions : 1891-1954
Year T o ta l Members
P ercen tage  of 
T o ta l Employees
1891 54,888 4 .1
1896 55,066 n .a
1901 97,174 6 .1
1906 175,529 n .a
1911 364,732 27.9
1916 546,556 47,5
1921 703,009 51.6
1926 851,478 55.2
1931 769,006 47 .0
1936 814,809 44.1
1941 1,075 ,680 49 .9
1946 1,284 ,362 50.8
1951 1,690,271 60.0
1952 1 ,637 ,542 60.0
1953 1 ,679,758 60.0
1954 1,787,504 62.0
Source: P ercen tages fo r  th e  years  1891, 1901 and
1911 ane from Kenneth F . W alker, ’A u s tra l ia ' 
in  Compar a t iv e  Labor  Movements (Galenson, 
e d . ) ,  185; a l l  o th e r f ig u re s  a re  from th e  
Commonweal t h  Labour  Repo r t s .
I LIBRARY > \
TABLE 2
I n te r s t a t e  or F ed era ted  Trade Unions: 
T he ir Share of th e  Trade Union Membership
No = Number of unions in  th e  c a teg o ry .
% = The membership of th e  unions in
each ca teg o ry  as a percen tag e  of 
th e  t o t a l  membership of a l l  
A u s tra lia n  u n io n s .
Unions covering  Four Unions Covering F ive 
Year ___or More S ta t e s ___ or More St a t es
No % No %
1912 41 53 24 40
1917 65 74 47 61
1922 73 70 57 67
1927 78 74 64 63
1932 83 72 63 60
1937 83 78 65 63
1942 86 82 69 67
1947 99 82 86 73
1952 114 83 97 76
1953 115 84 95 75
1954 116 83 90 73
Source: C alcu la ted  from d a ta  in  th e  Commonwea l th  Labour
R e p o rts .
TABLE 3
Trade Union Background of Federal Labor Members : 1901-54.
Had Held Office or Had held full-time
cost in a union secretarial office
% %
1901-10 59 20
1910-17 55 18
1917-29 60 24
1929-31 56 22
1931-40 53 27
1940-49 49 23
1949-54 50 22
Source: L.F, Crisp and S.P. Bennett, 
FederalPersonnel 1901-1954.
Australian Labor Party:
Note: The figures cover members in both the House of Represen­
tatives and the Senate. The percentages given in the 
second column are of the total membership of the 
Parliamentary Labor Party and are included in the first 
column.
TABLE 4
Preference to Unionists Clauses in Awards:
(1)
1954
(2)
Arb.Comm.
No.
%
Coal Itf
No.
%
P.S. Arb
No.
Ind.Ct.
No.
%
Awards
Clauses
C.U.
A.P.
Q.P.
Total of awards in force. 
Total of preference clauses. 
Compulsory unionism clauses. 
Absolute preference clauses. 
Qualified preference clauses.
Awards Clauses Clauses
Commonwealth
227[255] 54
Type of Preference
C.U. A.P. Q.P,
10O: 24
13 7
100 54
105 2
100 2
308 275
100 89
\S1 54[8l] I6[39l 16 16' 22 '26*
[32. 100 30[48j 30[ 20 j 40[32]
7 2 4 1
100 29 57 14
2 2
100 - 100 -
Queensland
275 245 25 5
100 89 9 2
Western Australia
No. 293 83 83 30 25 28
% 100 28 100 36 30 34
Coal I.T.
No. 4 4 4 4 - -
% 100 100 100 100 - —
R .G .Bd
No. 2 2 2 2 -
% 100 100 100 100 -
Source: Compiled from an examination of the awards concerned.
Arb.Ccmm: Arbitration Commission
Coal I.T: Coal Industry Tribunal
P.S.Arb: Public Service Arbitrator
Ind. Ct: Industrial Court
Arb. Ct: Arbitration Court
R.C. Bd: Railways Classification Board. (For notes see next page)
Notes: (Table 4)
1. Except in the case of the Commonwealth Arbitration Commission 
awards, all awards covered in the survey were those in force 
at 31 December 1934; in the case of the Commission awards, the 
corresponding date is 31 August 1954* .Only awards of a general 
character are included, and those restricted to wages or to one 
or two specific conditions of employment are excluded from the 
figure for total awards in force .
2. Federal awards in 1954 operated under the authority of the
Arbitration Court, which the Arbitration Commission has now 
replaced: the latter title is used here merely to avoid con­
fusion.
The figures in squared brackets are the numbers and percentages 
arrived at when awards restricted to the Australian Capital 
Territory are included in the calculations: the figures outside
the brackets are therefore exclusive of these awards, which not 
only cover very small numbers of employees compared with most 
other Federal awards, but, in relation to preference are, as 
we have seen, the result of circumstances that set them apart 
from the general policy of the Arbitration Commission in this 
respect.
Almost a quarter (13) of the preference clauses in awards of the 
Arbitration Commission, other than those restricted to the A.C.T. 
were in awards covering journalists.
TABLE 5
Preference to Unionists Clauses in Agreements :
Agrees = 
Clauses =
C.U.
A.P.
Q.P.
Total of agreements in force. 
Total of preference clauses. 
Compulsory Unionism clauses. 
Absolute preference clauses. 
Qualified preference clauses.
Type of Preference
Agrees. Clauses Clauses C.U. A.P. Q.P.
Commonwealth
C.Agrees
No. 38 11 11 2 7 2
%
I.Agrees ^
100 29 100 18 64 18
No. 97 33 33 13 11 9
% 100 34 100 
Queensland
39 33 28
No." H O 136 136 119 14 3
% 100 97
Western
100
Australia
88 10 2
I.Agrees'
No. 153 80 80 37 32 11
% 100 52
South
100
Australia
46 40 14
I.Agrees
No. 37 4 4 4 - -
% 100 11 100 100 - -
Source? Compiled from an examination of the agreements concerned.
C.Agrees: Certified agreements.
I.Agrees: Industrial agreements.
(For notes, see next page)
Notes: (Table 5)
1. In the case of Federal certified agreements and the industrial 
agreements of Queensland and W.A., those covered in the survey 
were all the agreements in force at 31 August 1954 (Commonwealth) 
or at 31 December 1954 (Qd. and W.A.)* As far as Federal and 
S.A. industrial agreements are concerned, there are no lists 
available of those in force at any given time; the survey there­
fore covered only those agreements filed during the ten-year 
periods of 1 September 1944 to 31 August 1954» in the case of the 
Commonwealth and of 1 January 1945 to 31 December 1954 in the 
case of S.A., eliminating repetitions or renewals in each case.
Only agreements of a general character are included, and those 
restricted to wages or to one or two particular conditions of 
employment are excluded from the figure for total agreements in 
force.
2. The preference clauses in these agreements are not enforceable
at law; they are included as having some relevance to the question 
touched on in the text, of the influence of industrial tribunals’ 
policies on agreements concluded and enforceable altogether out­
side the legal framework: see Table 7.
3. The agreement in which one of the preference clauses was included 
had been made a common rule.
TABLE 6 450
Conditions attached to
Preference to Unionists Clauses in Awards and Agreements; 
and the Incidence of Anti-Discrimination Clauses : 1954 ^
Clauses = 
A.S • =
O. U.
F.R. =
C.O.
P. E.
A.D.
Total of preference clauses.
Anti-strike provisions.
Open union provisions.
Provisions restricting union fees or subscriptions. 
Provisions for exemption of conscientious objectors. 
Preference of service to employers provisions. 
Anti-Discrimination clauses.
Clauses A.S. O.U. F.R. C.O. P.E. A.D. 
Commonwealth
Awards
(2)Arb. Commission 81 37 1 6 25
Coal Ind. Tribunal 7 — — 1 _ _
P,S. Arbitrator 2 - - - - -
Agreements
Certified Agreements 11 1 — _ _ 4
Industrial " 33 1 6 1 3 - 5
Awards
Industrial Court 275
Queensland 
6 22 3 2
Agreements
Industrial Agreements 136 1 2 - - - -
Awards
Arbitration Court
Western Australia 
83 27 22 1 2 14Coal Ind. Tribunal 4 4 _ — —
Railways Cl. Board 2 - - - - -
Agreements
Industrial Agreements 80 7 7 2 4
Agreements
Industrial Agreements
South Australia
4 — — 1
Source: Compiled from an examination of the awards and agreements 
concerned.
(For notes, see next page)
Notes; (Table 6)
1. The anti-discrimination clauses are all in awards or agreements 
which do not include preference clauses, except in the case of 
three Federal (Arbitration Commission) awards in which the anti­
discrimination clause is accompanied by a preference clause 
applicable to only one of the States covered by the award as a 
whole. One other Federal award including an anti-discrimination 
clause indicated that absolute preference would be given under 
an agreement with two of the respondent companies; the agreement 
was apparently an informal one.
2. The figures include awards restricted to the Australian Capital 
Territory.
4S
TABLE 7
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P ro p o rtio n  o f Awards and Agreements 
w ith  P referen ce  C lauses! 1954
■  Awards
VS/\ E nforceab le  Agreements
S.A . C 'w ealth  W.A. Qd.
Note! The diagram i s  based on th e  d a ta  p re sen ted  in  Tables 4
end 5* Only the  awards o f th e  main in d u s t r ia l  t r ib u n a ls  
a re  d e a l t  w ith} and , in  th e  case o f F ed era l aw ards, 
those  r e s t r i c t e d  to  the A u s tra lia n  C a p ita l T e r r i to r y  a re  
ex c lu d ed . The no n -en fo rceab le  agreem ents in c lu d ed  a re  
i n d u s t r i a l  agreem ents f i l e d  and p u b lish ed  under th e  
Commonwealth C o n c ilia t io n  and A rb itr a t io n  A ct.
ro
TABLE 8
Queensland
Preference Clauses in Awards: 1925, 1930, 1954.
Awards =
Clauses =
C.U.
A.P.
Q.P. =
Total of awards in force at 1 October 
1925, 1 January 1930, 31 December 1934.
Total of preference clauses.
Compulsory unionism clauses.
Absolute preference clauses.
Qualified preference clauses.
1925 1930 1954
No. % No. % No. 5L
Awards 210 100 236 100 308 100
Clauses 112 53 188 80 275 S9
Clauses 112 100 188 100 275 100
C.U. 35 31 126 67 245 89
A.P. 56 50 47 25 25 9
Q.P. 21 19 15 8 5 2
Source: Compiled from a 
awards in force
survey 
at the
of the contents 
specified dates
of J
•
TABLE 9
U nio n is ts  as Members of Government Advisory and 
A d m in is tra tiv e  Bodies in  A u s tra lia  : 1957
E x p lan a tio n
A lthough th e  bodies l i s t e d  below a re  d iv ided  in to  two c a te g o r ie s ,  
a d m in is tra tiv e  bodies alm ost in v a r ia b ly  c a r ry  out ad v iso ry  (or 
c o n s u l ta t iv e )  fu n c tio n s . The d i s t in c t io n  i s  based on th e  f a c t  
th a t  w hile ad v iso ry  bod ies have no powers o th e r than  th o se  of ad ­
v is in g ,  a d m in is tra tiv e  bodies combine ad v iso ry  w ith d e f in i te  
a d m in is tra tiv e  powers w ith in  th e  f i e ld  w ith which they  a re  concerned .
Two ty p es  of bodies on which unionist-m em bers a re  found a re  excluded 
from th e  T ab le . F i r s t ,  those  to  which such members a re  e le c te d  by 
p o p u la r v o te , as in  th e  case of m unicipal c o u n c ils . Second, those  
whose fu n c tio n s  a re  r e s t r i c t e d  to  d e a lin g  w ith  s t a f f  m a tte rs  w ith in  
th e  p u b lic  s e rv ic e  or w ith in  government in s t r u m e n ta l i t ie s ,  such as 
p u b lic  s e rv ic e  boards and t r ib u n a ls  d e a lin g  w ith  superan n u a tio n , 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  or appea ls  a g a in s t  prom otions.
Column I  -  The order in  which th e  bodies a re  s e t  out in  th i s  column
is  of no p a r t i c u la r  s ig n if ic a n c e , b u t rough ly  speak ing  the 
body heading th e  l i s t  in  each case  i s  considered  of g re a te r  im portance 
than  th a t  a t  the  bottom . In  cases where th e re  i s  more than  one body 
of th e  same k in d , th e  number in  e x is ten c e  i s  given in  squared b ra c k e ts  
in  th e  same column.
Column I I  -  The name of the  c o n s t i tu t in g  s ta tu te  omits bo th  th e
form al 'A c t1 and th e  d a te s  of enactm ent and amendment, 
in  o rd er to  save c lu t te r in g  th e  T ab le . Where no s ta tu te  i s  in d ic a te d , 
th e  body has been e s ta b lis h e d  by a d m in is tra tiv e  d e c is io n .
Column I I I  -  th e  t o t a l  memberships given inc lu d e  in  every  case  the
chairm an. Where th e re  i s  more than  one body of th e  same 
type and th e i r  t o t a l  memberships a re  n o t uniform , th e  e x is t in g  range 
of membership i s  given where p o s s ib le :  in  the  case  of a l l  bod ies of
th i s  ty p e , th e  t o t a l  membership i s  made up of an equal number of union 
and employer r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  p lu s  an independent chairm an.
Column IV -  The union or c e n tr a l  union o rg a n iz a tio n  w ith  which u n io n is t -  
members a re  a s s o c ia te d , or were p re v io u s ly  a s so c ia te d  in  an 
o f f i c i a l  c a p a c ity , is  given below th e  num eral. Where a u n io n is t  i s  
known to  have been appoin ted  on th e  nom ination of a c e n tr a l  un ion  o rg a n i­
z a tio n , though n o t an o f f i c i a l  of th a t  o rg a n iz a tio n , he i s  d esig n a ted  
as a s so c ia te d  w ith  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  and n o t h is  in d iv id u a l u n io n . Where 
th e re  i s  more than  one body of th e  same ty p e , union re p re s e n ta t iv e s  ccme 
from the  unions concerned in  each case ; t h i s  i s  in d ic a ted  by th e  term 
'v a r io u s ' .
Column V - The status of unionist-members refers to the character of 
their appointment, whether in a personal capacity or as a 
union or employees’ or consumers’ representative. In the first place, 
the category depends on the specification laid down in the constitu­
ting Act. If no requirement for a union or employees’ representative 
is laid down then the unionist appointee is taken to have been 
appointed in a personal capacity - unless there is provision for a 
consumers’ representative and the unionist has specifically been 
appointed in this capacity. In cases where an employees’ representa­
tive is specified, but the Act requires that he should be nominated 
by a union or union organization, or that a relevant union should be 
consulted, the member is here specified as a union representative.
Where the body concerned has been established by executive decision 
and not under any Act, the status of unionist members is given according 
to the capacity in which they are regarded as acting by the government 
authorities. It should be noted that in many cases where a unionist 
appointee is neither specified as a union representative by statute 
nor technically regarded as such by the government authorities, the 
relevant union or central union organization is frequently consulted 
before the appointment is made and may even be asked formally to 
nominate the appointee.
Column VI - The year indicated is the year in which the body concerned 
was first constituted (or statutory provision was first 
made for its constitution) with unionist-membership. In the case of 
advisory bodies this information is given where unionist-members are 
designated as union or employee representatives or as acting in a 
personal capacity. But in the case of administrative bodies it is 
given only where such members are designated as union or employee 
representatives. Thus the year of appointment of union is t-members 
to administrative bodies in a personal capacity, and to both adminis­
trative and advisory bodies as consumers’ representatives, is not 
given. All years before 1940 are indicated by the term ’Fre’.
Column VII - Payments are those to which unionists are entitled as 
members of an advisory or administrative body, and are 
subdivided here into meetings fees, annual fees and salaries. Meetings 
fees are paid on the basis of each meeting (or each day of a meeting) 
attended: they are usually modest, but in some cases are considerable
over a period,as in one case where a rather higher fee (£5.5.0) than 
usual is paid to members of a body which has fifty-two meetings a 
year. Annual fees are set sums related to membership and not to the 
number of meetings attended: in the case of bodies dealt with here,
annual fees are usually about £50 or £100, but a number are much larger 
and run as high as £750 for part-time membership of some administrative 
bodies. Salaries are, of course, paid in the case of full-time 
positions. Other payments, such as compensation for wages lost or 
reimbursement of travelling expenses incurred in attending meetings, 
are not included in the Table.
Key t o  A b b r e v ia t io n s :
G e n e ra l
Adv. . . .  A d v iso ry
AF . . .  A nnual F ee
Bd. . . .  B oard
C e i l  . . .  C o u n c il
Comm, . . .  Com m ission
CR . . .  C onsum ers’ r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
C’ t e e  . . .  C om m ittee
EN . . .  E q u a l num bers o f  e m p lo y e rs ' and e m p lo y ees ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
ER . . .  E m ployees ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
MF . . .  M eetin g s  f e e
P . . .  P e r s o n a l  a p p o in tm e n t
P re  . . .  P re -1 9 4 0
S . . .  S a la r y
UR . . .  U nion r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
O r g a n is a t io n s
ACTU
AMIEU
ARU
ASE
AWU
BMU
BOA
BTE
BUs
CSE
CU
ETU
FBA
FEDFA
FMM
FPE
FS&P
FTH
FTU
GEU
GMU
HEA
HEF
HTHC
IM
LC
A u s t r a l i a n  C o u n c il  o f  T rad e  U nions
A u s t r a l i a n  M eat I n d u s t r y  Em ployees U nion
A u s t r a l i a n  R a ilw a y s  U nion
A u s t r a l i a n  S o c ie ty  o f  E n g in e e rs
A u s t r a l ia n  W orkers U nion
B r ic k  M akers U nion
Bank O f f i c i a l s  A s s o c ia t io n
B ak ing  T ra d e s  Em ployees F e d e r a t io n
B u i ld in g  U nions (com bined)
C o a l and S h a le  Em ployees F e d e r a t io n  
C a r p e n te r s  U nion 
E l e c t r i c a l  T ra d e s  U nion 
F i r e  B r ig a d e  A s s o c ia t io n
F e d e ra te d  E ng ine  D r iv e r s  and F ire m e n s  A s s o c ia t io n  
F e d e ra te d  M i l l e r s  and M il l  Em ployees A s s o c ia t io n  
F e d e ra te d  P a s try c o o k s  E m ployees e t c .  U nion 
F e d e ra te d  S to rem en  and P a c k e rs  U nion 
F re m a n tle  T ra d e s  H a ll  
F u r n is h in g  T ra d es  Uni«jr\
F e d e ra te d  Gas Em ployees U nion 
G e n e ra l m in in g  U nions 
H o s p i ta l  Em ployees A s s o c ia t io n  
H a i r d r e s s e r s  Em ployees F e d e r a t io n  
H o b art T ra d e s  H a ll  C o u n c il  
I n s t i t u t e  o f  M arine  and Power E n g in e e rs  
L abor C o u n c il  o f  N.S.W .
LT HC 
MG 
MHEU 
MSC 
MTHC 
MU 
MWU 
PAU 
PGU 
PU 
QCEU 
RMU 
SEALP 
SU 
TAE 
TMO 
TW 
TWU 
TU IC 
UFU 
UTLC 
WHU 
WWF
Launceston Trades Hall Council 
Merchant Service Guild
Metropolitan Hairdressers Employees Union (W.A.)
Municipal and Shire Council Employees Union
Melbourne Trades Hall Council
Moulders Union
Miscellaneous Workers Union
Painters Union
Plumbers and Gasfitters Union 
Plasterers Union
Queensland Colliery Employees Union 
Railway Maintenance Employees Union 
State Executive, Australian Labor Party (W.A.) 
Seamens Union
Theatrical and .Amusement Employees Association
Tramway and Motor Omnibus Employees Association
Timber Workers Union
Transport Workers Union
Trade Unions Industrial Council (W.A.)
United Firemens Union of Victoria 
United Trades and Labor Council of S.A. 
Wigmakers and Hairdressers Union 
Waterside Workers Federation
TABLE 9
A. Advisory Bodies
I I I I I I IV V VI VII
Body Act T o ta l
Membership
No. of ^Status 
Unionists
Year Pay­
ment
Commonwealth
M in is try  of Labour 
Adv. C1c i l d '
20 7
ACTU
P 1954 MF
K.L.A.C. S tand ing  
C1 te e  (1)
- 10 3
ACTU
P 1955 MF
Im m igration P lanning  
C ’c i l
- 16 1
ACTU
P 1949 AF
Im m igration Adv. 
C’c i l
- 21 3
ACTU ,AWU
UR 1947 MF
Coal In d u s try  
C ’ te e
- 13 3
ACTU,CSE
UR 1956 -
R e h a b i l i ta t io n  
Adv. C’ te e
- 7 1
ACTU
P 1955 -
R e h a b il i ta t io n  
V o catio n a l Adv.C’ t e e (2)
- 5 1
MTHC
P 1955 -
A ppren ticesh ip  
Adv. C’ te e  (3)
- 15 1
ACTU
UR 1958 -
M arine C’c i l  N avigation 7 3
SU,MG,IM
ER P re . MF
B usiness Adv.
G r o u p
Atomic
Energy
20 1
ACTU
P 1955 -
New South Wales
F a c to ry  W elfare F a c to r ie s 3 1 ER 1941 MF
Bd. & Shops LC
(N.S.W. C ontinued......... )
m
I I I I I I IV V VI V II
(N.S.W. con tinued )
T ech n ica l Educa­
t io n  Adv. C e i l
Tech. Ed. & 
N.S.W. U niver­
s i t y  of Tech­
nology.
35 3 (4)
LC,FTU
UR 1949
Bread In d u s try  
Adv. G * te e
Bread Manufac­
tu re  & Delivery
5 2
BTE,FPE
P 1954 MF
R ural Workers Accom­
m odation Adv. C  te e
R ural Workers 
Accommodation
3 1
AWU
ER 1951 MF
H a ird re sse rs  C’c i l F a c to r ie s  & 
Shops
5 2
WHU
ER 1950 MF
B ds. of 
R eference [ l l ]
S c a ffo ld in g  
& L i f t s
3 1
V arious
UR 1948
V ic to r ia
V ic . C e i l  of 
P u b lic  Education
Education 20 1
MTHC
UR P re .
A dvisory C t e e s [15] A p p ren tice ­
sh ip
7-13 3-6
V arious
UR P re . -
E le c t r i c a l  
Approvals Bd.
S ta te  E lec ­
t r i c i t y  
Commission
7 1
ETU
UR 1934 AF
Queensland
F a c to r ie s  & Shops 
W elfare Bd.
F a c to r ie s  
& Shops
3 1 ER
FEDFA
1945 MF
A ppren ticesh ip
E xecu tive
A pprentices 
& Minors
8 3 , 5 ) ur
g en e ra l
P re . MF
Group A p p ren tice ­
sh ip  O’te e s  [28]
d i t t o 5-9 2-4 UR
V a r io u s
P re . MF
(Queensland c o n t in u e d . . . . )
I II Ill IV V VI VII
(Queensland continued)
Apprenticeship 
Adv. C ’tees [14]
Apprentices 
& Minors 5
2
various
UR Pre. ME
Auprovals Examining 
C ‘ tee
Electric Light 
& Power (regu­
lations )
6 1
ETU
UR Pre. MF
South Australia
Workmens Compensa­
tion Adv. C 1 tee
- 3 1
UTLC
UR 1953 -
Apprentices Bd. Apprentices 8 2
UTLC
UR Pre. MF
Trade C 1 tees[*4-3 ditto e n (6) various UR Pre. -
Prices (Bread) 
C  tee
Prices 7 1
BTE
CR - MF
Western Australia
Housing Adv. 
Panel
- 11 2
BMU, CU
UR 1947 -
Tasmania
Standards C 'tee - 10 2
HTHC,LTHC
UR 1957 -
Apprenticeship 
Adv. C ’tees [13]
Apprentices 5-9 2-4
various
UR 1942 -
Ladies Hairdressers 
Adv. Bd.
Hairdressers 
& Beauty 
Culturists
5 2
HEF
ER Pre. MF
(Administrative Bodies....)
TABLE 9
B. A d m in is tra tiv e  Bodies
I I I  I I I  IV V VI V II
Body- Act T o ta l No. of S tatus Year Pay- 
Membership Unionists ment
Commonwealth
A u s t’n S tevedo ring  
In d u s try  A u th o rity
S tevedoring
In d u s try
3 1
ACTU
UR '1956 S
A u st’n D airy  
Produce Bd.
D airy  P ro ­
duce Export 
C ontro l
13 1
ACTU
UR 1947 AF & 
MF
A u st’n Wheat Bd. Wheat In d u s try  14 
S ta b i l iz a t io n
1
FMM
ER 1948 AF
A ust’n Meat Bd. Meat Export 
C ontro l
12 !  (B) 
AMIEU
UR 1946 S
A ust’n Apple & 
Pear Bd.
Aople & Pear 
O rg an iza tion
12 1
AWU
ER 1947 AF
A ust’n Egg Bd. Egg Export 
C on tro l
12 1
FS&P
UR 1947 AF
A u st'n  Wool 
R e a liz a t io n  Comm.
Wool
R e a liz a tio n
9 1
FS&P
UR 1945 AF
C e n tra l C 'te e s  
[6  tra d e s ]
Tradesmens
R igh ts
R egu la tions
5 (9) 2
vario u s
UR 1940 —
L ocal C 'te e s  
[ a l l  S ta te s ]
d i t t o 5 2
vario u s
UR 1940 -
C e n tra l
R eco n stru c tio n  
T ra in in g  C’te e
— 12 1
ACTU
UR 1943 —
R egional Recon­
s t r u c t io n  T ra in in g  
C 'te e s  [6]
- 8 1
v a rio u s
UR 1943 -
(Commonwealth co n tin u ed . . . . )
I  I I  I I I  IV V VI V II
(C ommonwealth c o n tin u ed )
Re-employment -  13 6 UR 1955
G * te e s  (10) GMU
[ 2]
New South Wales
E l e c t r i c i t y  Comm.
Housing Comm.
M etro p o litan  Meat 
In d u s try  Bd.
M aritim e S erv ices
Bd.
Milk Board
Bd. of F ir e  
Commissioners
T h ea tre s  and 
F ilm s Comm.
U n iv e rs ity  of 
Sydney Senate
N.S.W. U n iv e rs ity  
of Technology 
C *cil
S ta te  Mines 
C on tro l A u th o rity
E l e c t r i c i t y
Commission
Housing
Meat In d u s try
M aritime
S erv ices
Milk
F ir e
B rigades
T h e a tre s , 
P ub lic  H alls  
& Cinemato­
graph Film s
U n iv e rs ity  &
U n iv e rs ity
C olleges
T echn ical 
Education & 
N.S.W. U ni­
v e r s i ty  of 
Technology
S ta te  Coal 
Mines
5 1
ETU
5 1
PU
3 1
AMIEU
5 1
FS&P
3 2
ARU,GEU
5 1
FBA
3
1
TAE
26 1
ARU
35 ■L&l)
LC
7 1
CSE
P — AF
P - MF
ER 1950 S
P - MF
P,CR - S
UR P re . AF
P - S
P - -
UR 1949 -
ER 1942 AF
(New South Wales c o n t in u e d . . . . )
I I I I l l IV V VI VII
(New South Wales con tinued)
Sydney H o sp ita l P ub lic 26 2 P - -
Bd. H o sp ita ls HEA,TW
Ambulance T ranspo rt Ambulance 21 1 UR 1956
S erv ice  Bd. T ran sp o rt
S erv ice
HEA
C o n c ilia t io n  C’ te e s In d u s t r ia l EN v ario u s ER P re . .
[425] A rb itr a t io n
A ppren ticesh ip In d u s t r ia l EN v ario u s ER P re . _
C 'te e s  [85] A rb itr a t io n
Workers Compensation Workers Com- 5 2 UR 1942 MF
( S i l i c o s i s )  C’te e p e n sa tio n
( S i l ic o s is )
MU, MSC
Coal and O il Shale Coal & O il 5 2 ER 1941 MF
Mine Workers Shale  Mine CSE
S uperannuation Workers
T rib u n a l (Superannuation)
Sydney C iv il — 21 1 UR 1951 —
R e h a b il i ta t io n  C 'te e LC
V ic to r ia
S ta te  E l e c t r i c i t y S ta te  E lec ­ 4 1 P - AF
Comm. t r i c i t y  Com­
m ission
ETU
Melbourne and M etro­ Melbourne & 3 1 ER 1954 S
p o l i ta n  Tramways Bd. M etropo litan
Tramways
TMO
Melbourne Harbour Melbourne Har­ 6 1 UR 1953 AF
T ru s t bour T ru s t WWF
Gas and F u e l C or­ Gas & F uel 7 1 P MF
p o ra tio n  of V ic ., C orpora tion GEU
Bd. of D ire c to rs
(V ic to r ia  co n tin u ed . . . . )
4 e 4
I I I I I I IV V V I V I I
( V ic to r ia  con tinued )
S ta te  Savings S ta te  Savings 6 1 P - AF
Bank Comm. Bank BOA
In d u s t r ia l  Appeals Labour & 3 1 ER P re. AF &
C o u rt In d u s try MTHC MF
G enera l Board d i t t o 5 2 UR P re. MF
MTHC
Wages Bds. d i t t o 5-11 2-5 ER P re. MF
L 2 1 9 J va rio u s
S ta te  A p p re n tic e - A p p re n tic e - 7 3 UR P re . MF
sh ip  Comm. sh ip MTHC
Trade C’ tees d i t t o 7-13 3 -6 UR P re . _
[3 lJ v a rio u s
Workers Compensa- Workers Com- 3 1 UR P re . S
t io n  Bd. pen sa tion  Board MTHC
Supplem entary d i t t o 3 1 UR 1956 s
Workers Compensa­
t io n  Bd.
MTHC
M e tro p o lita n  F ire F ire 10 1 ER P re . —
Brigades Bd. B rigades UFU
Melbourne U n iv e rs ity U n iv e rs ity 32 1 UR P re. —
C e i l MTHC
C e i l  o f A d u lt A d u lt 20 1 UR 1946
E ducation E ducation MTHC
S ta te  R e l ie f  C 'te e S ta te  R e lie f 15 1 UR 1940 _
C ommittee MTHC
Pensions T r ib u n a l Coal Mine 5 2 UR 1942 MF
Workers
Pensions
CSE
V ic .  Coal M iners Coal Mines 6 2 ER P re. MF
A cc iden ts  R e l ie f  Bd. R e g u la tio n CSE
(V ic to r ia  c o n t in u e d . . . . )
ITo
I I I I I I IV V VI V II
(V ic to r ia  co n tinued )
Plum bers and Gas- H ealth 9 2 UR P re . —
f i t t e r s  Bd. PGU
Cinematograph H ealth  (reg u - 3 1 ER P re . MF
O perators Bd. la t io n s ) TAE
H a ird re sse rs  R eg is - H a ird re sse rs 8 2 UR P re . MB'
t r a t ion Bd. R e g is tr a t io n HEF
Queensland
I n d u s t r ia l  Court I n d u s t r ia l 4 1 P S
C o n c ilia t io n  
& A rb itr a t io n
MWU
Coal Miners Pensions Coal & O il 4 1 UR 1941 MF
T rib u n al Shale Mine
Workers
(Pensions)
QCEU
E le c t r ic a l E le c t r ic a l 5 1 ER P re . MF
Workers Bd. Workers ETU
Bd. of A dult U n iv e rs ity  of 15 3 UR 1941 _
Education Queensland RMUjETU,AWU
South A u s tra lia
E l e c t r i c i t y  T ru s t E l e c t r i c i t y 5 1 P — AF
T ru s t of S.A. ETU
S ta te  Bank Bd. of S ta te  Bank 5 1 P mm MF
Management ASE
S.A. Housing T ru s t Housing 7 1 P - AF
Improvement UTLC
M etro p o litan  and M etro p o litan  & 9 1 UR 1945 MF
Export A b a tto irs  Bd. Export Abattoirs AMIEU
(South A u s tra lia  c o n tin u e d . . . . )
I I I I I I IV V VI V II
(South A u s tra lia  c o n tin u e d ) . . .
Board of In d u s try I n d u s t r ia l 5 2 UR P re . MF
Code UTLC
'
I n d u s t r ia l  Boards d i t t o 5-9 2-4 ER P re , MF
[67] v a rio u s
Savings Bank Bd. Savings Bank 6 1 P - MF
of S.A. of S.A. AWU
Royal Adelaide H o sp ita ls 3 1 P — AF
H o sp ita l Bd. ASE
N atio n a l T ru s t N ational 25 1 UR 1955 _
of S.A. T ru s t of S.A . UTLC
School of Mines and School of 12 1 P _ —
In d u s tr ie s  C e i l Mines and ASE
In d u s tr ie s
S a n ita ry  Plumbers Sewerage 4 1 ER P re . MB’
Examining Bd. (re g u la tio n s ) PGU
H aird re ss in g H a ird re sse rs 5 2 UR P re . AF
R e g is tr a t io n  Bd. R e g is tr a t io n HEF
Western A u s tra lia
C ourt of 
A rb itr a t io n
In d u s t r ia l
A rb itr a t io n
3 1
SEALP (1 3 )®
P re . s
S ta te  E le c t r i c i t y  
Comm.
S ta te  E l e c t r i ­
c i t y  C anmiss ion
8 1
SEALP
UR 1945 AF
S ta te  Housing Comm. S ta te  Housing 7 1
BUs
UR 1946 MF
Frem antle  Harbour 
T ru s t ,  Bd. of 
Commissioners
Frem antle  H ar­
bour T ru s t
5 1
WWF
P MF
Workers Compensa­
t io n  Bd.
Workers
Compensation
3 1
TUIC
UR 1948 S
(W estern A u s tra lia  c o n t in u e d . . . . )
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I I I I I I IV V VI VII
(Western A u s tra lia  c<on tinued)
M etropo litan M etropo litan 5 1 CR - MF
Market T ru st Market PAU
W.A. P o ta to M arketing of 6 1 CR — MF
M arketing Bd. P o ta to es FTH
W.A, Onion M arketing of 5 1 CR — MF
M arketing Bd. Onions FTH
C harcoal Iro n  and Wood D i s t i l l a - 5 1 ER 1943 AF
S te e l  In d u stry  Bd. t io n  & C harcoal AEU
of Management Iron  & S te e l 
In d u s try
Trade and In d u s tr ie s _ 17 1 UR 1956 —
Prom otion C’c i l TITIC
Bd. of Management, H o sp ita ls 9 1 P — -
King Edvard Memorial 
H o sp ita l
HEA
L ib ra ry  Bd. of W.A. L ib ra ry  Board 13 1 P - -
of W.A. AWU
H a ird re sse rs  R eg is- H a ird re sse rs 5 2 UR 1946 MF
t r a t i o n  Bd. R e g is tr a t io n MHEU
Tasmania
H y d ro -E lectric  
Comm.
Hydro-
E le c tr ic
Commission
4 1
HTHC
P - AF
M etropo litan  
T ranspo rt I r u s t
M etropo litan
T ran sp o rt
5 1
TWU
P - AF
A ppren ticesh ip  
Comm.
A ppren tices 5 2
HTHC
ER 1942 MF
Trade C’te e s  
[7]
d i t t o 7-15 3-7
v a rio u s
UR 1942 -
(Tasmania co n tin u ed . . . . )
4*
I II III IV V VI VII
(Tasmania continued)
Wages Bds. Wages Boards 5-15 2-7 ER Pre. MF
[70] various
Workers (Occupa- Workers 3 1 ER Pre. MF
tional Diseases) (Occupational AWU
Relief Bd. Diseases) Re-
lief Fund
Miners Pensions Miners 3 1 UR 1944 AFBd. Pensions CSE
Plumbers Registra- Plumbers 5 1 UR 1951 MF
tion Bd. Registration PGU
Notes
1. In February 1958 the Interstate Executive of the A.C.T.U. decided 
to withdraw from the Ministry of Labour Advisory Council, this 
decision affecting, of course, the A.C.T.U. members of the 
Council’s Standing Committee.
2. The Rehabilitation Vocational Advisory Committee operated within 
Victoria only.
3. Although the Apprenticeship Advisory Committee was set up in 1955
a union representative was not appointed to it until early in 
1958. Strictly speaking therefore this body is outside the scope 
of the Table, which in all other cases is limited to bodies in 
existence with unionist-members as at the end of 1957: it has
been included for the sake of completeness.
4. This figure excludes five members, one of them a professor, who 
represented the N.S.W. Technical Teachers Association.
5. These members were elected by the combined vote of all the unions 
concerned with apprenticeship matters.
6. The membership of these bodies varied widely.
7. The Act requires that this member of the Stevedoring Industry 
Authority should have been ’associated with trade union affairs’.
*>
8. The union in this case had in fact withdrawn its endorsement from 
the unionist-member originally appointed on its nomination and 
attempted, unsuccessfullyto secure his replacement.
9. In the case of the Central Committee and each of the Local 
Committees covering the blacksmithing trade, the full membership 
is three, including a single union representative.
10. The Re-employment Committees, one in Newcastle and the other in
Lithgow, are concerned with unemployed coal mine workers. Neither 
their total membership nor the number of union representatives is 
fixed; the figures given represent the usual attendance at 
meetings.
11* This figure excludes two representatives of the academic and 
non-academic staff associations.
12. State Labor governments have since 1925 followed the practice of 
having one member of the Industrial Court drawn from the ranks of 
union officials, though the position is technically a personal one.
13. The State Executive of the A.L.F. is also the main central union 
organization in W.A. It has, however, handed over some of its 
powers in this field to its subordinate body, the Trade Unions 
Industrial Council. The State Executive has representatives on 
government bodies other than those noted in the Table; but only 
those on which the State Executive nominees clearly represent
the industrial rather than the political side of the labour move­
ment are noted.
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TABLE 10
Com position of Membership : A .L.P. S ta te  Branches
U.M. = Membership of a f f i l i a t e d  unions 
B.M. = Membership of p o l i t i c a l  branches 
T o ta l = T o ta l membership
U . I . P .  = A f f i l ia te d  union membership as a p ro ­
p o r tio n  of t o t a l  membership
N.S.W.
(Aug'57)
V ic.
(J u ly 157)
Qd.
(Aug157)
S.A.
(Aug'57)
W.A.
( J u ly '57)
T as. 
(Dec‘ 56)
U.M. 400,000 220,000 200,000 73,000 62,094 25,400
B.M. 40,000 19,000 12,000 3,500 1,002 2,700
T o ta l 440,000 239,000 212,000 78,500 63,096 28,100
U.M.P. 90p 90.- 94$ 95% 98^ 90%
S ources: In the case of W.A. , c a lc u la te d  from the  f ig u re s of union
and branch membership fo r  which c re d e n t ia ls  fo r  d e leg a te s  
were a v a ila b le  a t  th e  1956 S ta te  C onference, and brought 
up to  d a te  by v e rb a l in fo rm atio n ; in  a l l  o ther c a se s , 
based s o le ly  on v e rb a l in fo rm ation  from re sp o n s ib le  P a rty  
o f f i c i a l s .
Note: A ll f ig u r e s ,  excep t those  fo r  W.A., a re  approxim ations only .
TABLE 11
Trade Union R ep resen ta tio n  on Major A.L.P. „  . . f t )Bodies
A.C. = Annual Conference
C.C. = C en tra l C ouncil
C.E. = C e n tra l Executive
C o n f. = Conference
Conv. = Convention
E.O, = E xecutive O ffice rs
Exec. = E xecutive
G.C. = G eneral Council
G.E. = G eneral Executive
I .E . = Inner Executive
S .E . = S ta te  Executive
T.M. = T o ta l Membership of body
U.O. = Number of union o f f i c i a l s  in  membership
U.R. = Number of union re p re s e n ta t iv e s  in  membership
<£
/o Number of union o f f i c i a l s  or r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  
as a pe rcen tag e  of the  body’s t o t a l  membership
Fed. N.S.W . V ic. Old. S.A.
(2)C hief Executive .Bodies
W.A. Tag.
6
C.E. C.E. I .E . C.E. E.O. G.E.
T . M.
U. O.
42
26 25(5)1 9 k
7
3 >> 113
% 50 62 76
In te rm ed ia te
43 30
Executive Bodies
62 27
N il N il N il C.E. C.C. x 
200^8)
S .E . N il
T.M. — - - 66 82 -
U.R. - - - 53 149 48 -
% 80
('o’)
C onferencesv '
75 59
C onf. A.C. A.C. Conv. Conv. G.C, C onf.
T.M. 36 (1°) 711 363 134 195 178 208
U.R. 16 ( n ) 461 300 59 146 126 119
% 45 68 83 44 75 71 57
S ourc e s : In  th e case of th e  N.S. W. C en tra l Executive , from th e  l i s t
of members p u b lish ed  in  th e  Sydney Morning H era ld , 21/6/1957; 
in  th e  case  of th e  W.A. G eneral C ouncil, c a lc u la te d  from th e  
l i s t  of d e le g a te s  given in  O f f ic ia l  Repor t ,  20th G eneral 
C ouncil, J u ly  1956, 6-12; in  a l l  o th e r c a se s , the f ig u re s  a re  
based on v e rb a l in fo rm ation  given by th e  a p p ro p ria te  A .L.P . 
S e c re ta ry .
(For n o te s , see nex t page)
N otes: (Table 11)
4 r1 Q
1 . The Qd. Convention and th e  W.A. G eneral C ouncil a re  held  
t r i e n n ia l l y ,  and in  th e se  cases th e  f ig u re s  a re  fo r  1956. In  
th e  case  of a l l  o th e r b o d ie s , th e  f ig u re s  a re  fo r  1957.
2. In  alm ost every  ca se , th e  re s p e c tiv e  s e c r e ta r ie s  were former 
union o f f i c i a l s  and, except in  Tasmania, were f u l l  members of 
th e  r e le v a n t  c h ie f  ex ecu tiv e  body and, where a p p lic a b le , i n t e r ­
m ediate ex ecu tiv e  body. With the  excep tion  of one whose case  
i s  considered  in  no te  4 below, th e  s e c r e ta r ie s  have n o t been 
included  in  the  Table as union re p re s e n ta t iv e s .
3 . The f ig u re s  fo r  the  Qd. Inner and C en tra l E xecutives a re  as a t  
March 1957, b e fo re  th e  ex p u lsio n  of V.C. G air, M.L.A. A fte r h is  
expu lsion  in  A p ril , th e  t o t a l  membership of th e  Inner Executive 
f e l l  to  s ix .  The number of union d e leg a te s  on th e  C en tra l Execu­
t iv e  had, by Septem ber, f a l l e n  to  48 as a r e s u l t  of changes in  
union a f f i l i a t i o n s .
4 . The d i s t r ib u t io n  of union o f f i c i a l s  among th e  v a rio u s  S ta te
d e le g a tio n s  was: N.S.W. -  1; V ic. -  2; Qd -  1; S.A. -  none;
W.A. -  1; Tas. -  1 . The f ig u re  inc lu d es  F .E . Chamberlain ( a t  the  
tim e F e d e ra l P re s id e n t and W.A. S ta te  S e c re ta ry  of th e  A .L .P ., 
S e c re ta ry  of th e  W.A. Trade U nions’ I n d u s t r ia l  C ouncil, and the  
A .L .P ., W.A. E x ecu tiv e ’s d e le g a te  to  th e  A.C.T.U. I n te r s t a t e  
E xecu tive) whose c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  as a union o f f i c i a l  i s  open to  
doubt. In  1955 th e  question  of h is  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  was considered  
by th e  I n te r s t a t e  E xecutive a f t e r  i t  had been d isc lo se d  th a t  he
was n o t a member of a tra d e  un ion . I t  was decided th a t  the  question  
of a d e le g a te 's  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  was an in te rn a l  m a tte r fo r  d e c is io n  
of th e  A.C.T.U. branch concerned, in  th i s  case  the A .L .P ., W.A. 
E xecu tive: M inutes, A.C.T.U. I n te r s t a t e  E xecu tive , May, 1955.
5 . The f ig u re  i s  as a f t e r  th e  d ea th  of John C ain, M.L.A., who was 
ren laced  by an o f f i c i a l  of th e  Melbourne Trades H all C ouncil.
6 . This f ig u re  i s  e x c lu s iv e  of th re e  p a rlia m e n ta r ia n s  (two S ta te  and 
one F e d e ra l)  who held  union p o s i t io n s .
7 . This f ig u re  in c lu d es  F .E . Cham berlain, whose q u a l i f ic a t io n s  have 
been d iscu ssed  in  n o te  4 above.
8. This f ig u re  does n o t inc lude  the  members of th e  C en tra l Executive 
who a re  a ls o  members of th e  C en tra l C ouncil.
9. In  th e  case  of th e  F e d e ra l Conference union o f f i c i a l s  a re  s t r i c t l y  
speak ing  n o t union re p re s e n ta t iv e s  b u t r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  of A .L.P. 
S ta te  b ran ch es . In  the  case  of S ta te  conferences i t  u s u a lly  happens 
th a t  some a f f i l i a t e d  un io n s , m ainly sm all ones, f a i l  to  tak e
advantage of their right to representation: at the Victorian
annual Conference of 1957, for example, credentials were 
available for 385 union delegates but only 300 union delegates 
actually attended.
10. The Federal President and Secretary are not included in this 
figure as they were not present as voting delegates.
11. This figure is exclusive of one Federal parliamentarian who was 
also at the time a union official. The distribution of union 
officials among the various State delegations was: N.S.W. - 3 ;
Vic. - 4; Qd - 4; S.A. - 2; W.A. - none; Tas - 3. The figure 
for union officials, like the corresponding figures throughout 
the Table,includes only members who were union officials at the 
time. The figure is therefore much lower than those given by 
Crisr, whose figures include both current and former union 
officials, the latter being chiefly parliamentarians. On this 
basis, the proportion of union officials (current and former) who 
were delegates between 1934 and 1951 never fell below 64 per cent, 
at any Conference, and rose as high as 75 per cent: see Crisp,
The Australian Federal Labour Party. 1901-1951. 315.
TABLE 12
D u p lica tio n  of Membership between A.L.P. and C en tra l 
Union O rgan iza tion  Executives : 1957.
ACTU = A u s tra lia n  C ouncil of Trade Unions
LC = Labor C ouncil of New South Wales
MTHC = Melbourne Trades H a ll C ouncil
TLCQ = Trades and Labor Council of Queensland
UTLC = United Trades and Labor C ouncil of South A u s tra lia
TUIC = W estern A u s tra lia n  Trade Unions I n d u s t r ia l  Council
HTHC = Hobart Trades H all Council
A .L .P . Fed. N.S.W. V ic . i S - S.A. W.A. Tas.
Union ACTU LC MTHC TLCQ UTLC TUIC HTHC
Members 2 2 6 5 d ) 6 v (2 ) 1
S o u rce s : V erbal in fo rm ation  from th e  S e c re ta ry  of th e
a p p ro p ria te  c e n tr a l  union o rg a n iz a tio n .
Notes
1 . More im portan t in  th e  case  of Queensland was the  d u p lic a tio n  
occu rring  r e l a t io n  to  th e  Inner Executive of th e  S ta te  P a rty : 
th re e  of th e  Inner Executive members (a t o t a l  of seven to  
A p ril , and s ix  th e r e a f te r )  were a lso  members of th e  Trades and 
Labor C ouncil E xecu tive .
2. T his f ig u re  in c lu d es  two members e le c te d  by the  T .U .I.C . as 
d i r e c t  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  on th e  A .L .P ., S ta te  E xecu tive . Two 
of th e  o th er d u p lic a tin g  members were P re s id e n t and S e c re ta ry , 
r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  of both  b o d ie s .
TABLE 12
Annual Affiliation and Membership Fees: 
A.L.P. State Executives v-
U
B
Rate
Paid
Total
U.P.
m
f
Affiliated unions 
Political branches 
Rate of fees per member 
Amount paid or payable
Total affiliation and membership fees paid or payable 
Proportion of total fees paid or payable by affiliated 
unions 
males
females and minors
N.S.W. Vic.
(1956)
Qi.
(1957)
S.A.
(1957)
W.A.
(1957)
Tas.
Rate
u (l/-m 
(6d f
(l/4m 
(8d f 1/6 1/9
(3/% n  
(1/9 f
(l/ 
(6d f
B 9d l/- 1/6 1/9 (4/6 m (2/3 f 2/-
Paid
U £16,805 £12,995 £15,000 £6,400 £9,000 £1,479
B £ 1,588 £ 598 £ 900 £ 300 £ 200 £ 265
Total £18,393 £13,594 £15,900 £6,700 £9,200 £1,744
U.P. 91,i 9555 94$ 9 ® 983 85%
Sources: In the case of N.S.W. and Victoria, the statement of accounts
contained in the Executive Reports to the respective 1957 
Conference; in the case of W.A., calculated from the member­
ship figures given in Table 10; in all other cases, verbal 
information from responsible Party officials. The rate of 
fees per member is from the State Constitution and Rules in 
each case.
Note: Except in the case of N.S.W. and Victoria, all figures of amounts
paid or payable are approximations only. Where 1957 is the rele­
vant year, the amounts indicated are payable; in the case of 1956, 
the amounts are those actually paid. There is usually a discre­
pancy between the two: thus the total amounts owing to the
Victorian Central Executive in 1956 were £16,820 and £1,082 from 
unions and branches, respectively, but the amounts actually paid 
were £12,996 and £598.
TABLE 14
The Union Share of Donations fo r  E le c tio n  Campaign 
Funds Handled by A .L.P. E xecutives
Executive Fed. N.S.W. V ic. cö- S.A. W.A. Tas
E le c t io n ( l ) 1955 1953(2) 1955 1957 1956 1956 1956
Union Share of 
T o ta l D onations 
Received 85% 50>J 7 5 % ^ SOfo 95% 65? 36#
Sources : V erbal in fo rm ation  given by re sp o n s ib le  o f f i c i a l s ,  excep t
in  th e  case of V ic to r ia  where th e  f ig u re  i s  c a lc u la te d  
from th e  s ta tem en t of c o n tr ib u tio n s  l i s t e d  in  th e  A .L .P ., 
V ict o rian  C en tra l Executive  R ep o rt, 1955-56, 21.
Notes
1. The e le c t io n  years  noted a re  th o se  of S ta te  e le c tio n s  excep t
in  the  case  of th a t  in d ic a te d  under th e  F ed e ra l E xecu tive .
%
2. The 1953 S ta te  e le c t io n  i s  p re fe r re d  to  th e  l a t e r  e le c t io n  o f 
1956, because in  1956 th e  s p l i t  in  th e  N.S.W. P a rty  had le d  to  
th e  fo rm ation  of a ' r e b e l 1 group of unions which c o lle c te d  and 
d i s t r ib u te d  campaign funds independen tly  of th e  S ta te  C en tra l 
E x e c u tiv e .
3 . C o n trib u tio n s  from i n t e r s t a t e  so u rces , in c lu d in g  u n io n s , were 
co m parative ly  la rg e  fo r  th i s  e le c t io n  as a r e s u l t  of a s p e c ia l  
appea l prompted by th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  form er V ic to r ia n  C en tra l 
E x ecu tiv e , c o n tro l le d  by I n d u s t r ia l  Group su p p o rte rs , had r e ­
ta in e d  c o n tro l  of th e  V ic to r ia n  P a r ty 's  a s s e ts  a f t e r  i t s  d ism is sa l 
by th e  F e d e ra l E xecu tive ; among th e  a s s e ts  was a s u b s ta n t ia l  
'e l e c t io n  campaign a c c o u n t '. As they  a re  e x c e p tio n a l, c o n tr ib u ­
t io n s  from i n t e r s t a t e  sources a re  n o t included  in  th e  f ig u re s  
from which th e  V ic to r ia n  p e rcen tag e  i s  c a lc u la te d .
TABLE 15
Duplication of Membership:
Trade Union Officials and Labor Parliamentarians
P.L.P.
U.O.
Per cent. =
H.R. =
L.A.
L .G. =
H.A.
Number of parliamentary Labor party members.
Number of former or existing union officials in the 
P,L.P. membership.
Number of union officials as a percentage of the P.L.P. 
membership.
House of Representatives.
Legislative Assembly.
Legislative Council.
House of Assembly.
PjLJ?. U.O. Per cent.
Commonwealth: September 1954
H.R. 58 28 48
Senate 29 15 52
Totals 87 43 49
New South Wales: March 1956
L.A. 49 4 8L.C. 35 21 60
Totals 84 25 30
Victoria: June 1955
L.A. 21, % 8 38
L.C. 15(!) 2 13
Totals 36 10 28
ueensland: larch 1953
L.A. 49 18 37
South Australia: June 1957
H.A. 15 5 33
L.C. 4 4 100
Totals
Western Australia: September 1953
19 9 47
L.A. 26 13 50
L.C. 12 5 42
Totals 38 18 47
Tasmania: June 1955
H.A. 15 5 33
L.C. 4 1 25
Totals 19 6 32
Table 15
Sources: The figures for each of the State parliaments were comoiled
from information obtained fron, leading trade union and 
A.L.P. officials in the State concerned. Those for the 
Commonwealth were calculated from data contained in 
Australian Labor Party; Federal Personnel 1901-195A, 
compiled by Crisp and Bennett.
Footnotes
1. This figure includes five members who at the time were members 
of the Victorian Labor Farty (Anti-Communist); they have been 
included because they were originally elected as endorsed A.L.P. 
candidates.
TABLE 16
Labor Parliam entarians as
Executive Members of Central Union Organizations : 1957.
P aris = Parliaments (Federal or S ta te ) of which p a r l ia ­
mentarians were members.
ACTU = A ustralian Council of Trade Unions.
NSLC = Labor Council of New South Wales.
MTHC = Melbourne Trades Hall Council.
QTLC = Trades and Labor Council of Queensland.
UTLC = United Trades and Labor Council of South A ustra lia . 
TUIC = Western A ustralian Trade Unions In d u stria l Council. 
HTHC = Hobart Trades Hall Council.
P a r is . ACTU NSLC MTHC QTLC UTLC TUIC HTHC
Federal - - - - - - 1
S ta te 2 4 - - 3 - 1
T otal 2d ) 4 (2) 3 o ) 2(4)
SOURCE: Information obtained from the appropriate c en tra l union
organization se c re ta r ie s .
(For notes, see next page)
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Notes: (Table 16)
1. This figure is as after the A.C.T.U. Congress of September 1957. 
The previous Interstate Executive had included three State 
parliamentarians and one Senator. Up to 1957 the A.C.T.U's un­
written ’law1 that politicians, and especially Federal 
parliamentarians, should not be Executive members had been 
honoured more in the breach than in the observance owing to the 
Hobart Trades Hall Council’s prediliction in recent years for 
electing a parliamentarian to its presidential office, its 
President usually being nominated as one of the two Interstate 
Executive members to which the Council was entitled before 
September 1957. The single member that the Council was entitled 
to nominate after this date was its Secretary. The two State 
parliamentarians noted in the Table as members (one of them was 
the Junior Vice-President) were both members of the N.S.W. 
Legislative Council, membership of which is regarded in a rather 
different light from that of any other parliamentary chamber. 
Unlike their counterparts in the lower house and in any other 
State, or the Commonwealth, M.L.C's in N.S.W • are selected by a 
voteof the State parliamentary parties instead of by popular 
election. This, together with the remuneration (more in the 
nature of an honorarium than a salary) attached to the office, 
gives it the character of a 'spoils’ appointment, and it is so 
regarded by union officials, who, unless promoted to Cabinet 
rank, continue in their union positions. The presence of these 
members on the Interstate Executive is therefore not viewed as a 
breach of the unwritten 'law' referred to above.
2. All these were members of the N.S.W. Legislative Council, and 
included the President, Secretary and Assistant Secretary.
3. One of these was the President and the other the past-President.
4. One of these, a Senator, was President; the other parliamentarian 
was Chief Secretary in the State Labor Government and immediate 
past president.
TABLE 17
P a rliam e n ta ria n s  as Members of A .L.P . E xecu tives : 1957.
Exec. =
T.M.
F e d e ra l = 
S ta te  =
T .P .
P .P .
E xecutive body.
T o ta l membership of ex ecu tiv e  body.
Number o f F e d e ra l parliam entarian-m em bers.
Number of S ta te  parliam en tarian -m em bers.
T o ta l number of parliam entarian-m em bers.
T o ta l number o f parliam entarian-m em bers 
as  a pe rcen tag e  of th e  t o t a l  membership 
of each body.
Pariiam entarian-M em bers
Exec. T.M. F ed e ra l S ta te T .P . P .P .
F e d e ra l 12 i d ) 2 (2 ) 3 25
N.S.W. 42 2 3 5 (3) 12
V ic to r ia 25 3 2 (4) 5 20
Queensland 66(5) 1 6 7 (6 ) 11
S.A. 20 2 8 (V) 10 50
W.A. 82 (8) 1 15 1 6 <9 > 20
Tasmania 11 1 4 (10) 5 45
SOURCE: In fo rm ation  ob ta ined  from th e  a p p ro p ria te  A .L.P. s e c r e ta r ie s .
(For n o te s , see n ex t page)
Notes: (Table 17)
1. A Senator from W.A.
2. One from W.A., the other from Tasmania.
3. All these members were selected by the relevant P.L.P. Caucus: 
two from the State Legislative Assembly, one from the State 
Legislative Council and two fron the Federal Parliament.
Politicians are otherwise ineligible for election to the 
Executive: A.L.P., N.S.W.. Rules and Constitution. 1954-56,
as amended to 1957, r. 4(e), (f).
4. This figure is for the Executive as elected by the 1957 Conference, 
and includes the late John Cain, Leader of the State P.L.P., whose 
replacement was not a parliamentarian. The figure also includes 
the former Deputy Leader, L.W. Galvin, who was defeated in the 1955 
State elections but whose return to Parliament appears to be only
a matter of time.
5. These figures are for the period immediately preceding the 
expulsion of the Premier, V.C. Gair, in April 1957. Following 
his expulsion the number of State parliamentarians on the Q.C.E. 
fell from six to two. In April the total membership of the Inner 
Executive of the Queensland Party numbered seven, including three 
parliamentarians, one of them the Premier. After his expulsion
this body’s total membership was six, including two parliamentarians; 
both these members, however, were defeated in the ensuing elections.
6. Under the rules, the State and Federal P.L.P's each elect one
representative direct to the Q.C.E: A.L.P., Qd., Constitution and
General Rules* 1957, r. 28(b).
7. The Leader of the State P.L.P. is an ex officio member: A.L.P.,
S.A.. Rules and Standing Orders. 1955, as amended to 1957, r. 26.
8. Including eight Executive Officers, of whcm two were State 
p arliamentarians.
9. Under the rules, the State P.L.P. and the W.A. members of the
Federal P.L.P. each elect one representative direct to the State 
Executive: A.L.P., W.A., State Constitution. Standing Orders.
Platform and General Governing Rules. 1953, as amended to 1956, 
r." 12(a).
10. The Leader of the State P.L.P. included in this figure, is an ex 
officio member: A.L.P., Tas., Platform. Constitution and Rules.
1953, as amended to 1956, r. 64.
TABLE 18 483
Comparison of V arious P ro v is io n s  in  th e  I n d u s t r ia l  
L e g is la tio n  of Queensland and South A u s tra lia  : 1956.
Queensland
(Labor)
South A u s tra lia  
(Non-Lab o r )
Trade Union A cts
1 . Unions may expend funds fo r  
p o l i t i c a l  p u rp o ses.
2 . Unions immune from to r t io u s  
l i a b i l i t y .
3 . Union o f f i c i a l  no t l i a b le  in  
t o r t  fo r  c o u n se llin g  s t r i k e s .
4 . C iv il  co n sp iracy  d o c tr in e  n o t 
a p p lic a b le  to  tra d e  d is p u te s .
5. No correspond ing  p ro v is io n .
1 . No corresponding  p ro v is io n .
2. No correspond ing  p ro v is io n .
3 . No corresponding  p ro v is io n .
4 . No corresponding  p ro v is io n .
5. The Act does n o t enable c o u rts  
reco v er union dues and p e n a l t ie s
In d u s tr i a l  A rb itr a t io n  Acts
1 . Only th e  P re s id e n t of th e  Indus­
t r i a l  C ourt must be legally-quaJifkd.
2. No co rrespond ing  p ro v is io n .
3 . S tr ik in g  n o t an o ffence  i f  
'a u th o r iz e d ' by s e c r e t  b a l lo t .
4 . P eacefu l p ic k e t in g  p e rm itte d .
5. R eg is te red  union may sue members 
fo r  f in e s ,  f e e s ,  le v ie s  and dues.
6 . R eg is te red  union o f f i c i a l s  have 
r ig h t  of e n try  on a u th o r i ty  of 
union p re s id e n t  or s e c re ta ry .
7. C ourt may award p re fe re n c e  of 
employment to  u n io n is ts .
8 . A ll awards must p re s c r ib e  a 4 0 - 
hour working week.
9 . Overtime r a te s  to  be n o t l e s s  
than  tim e -a n d -a -h a lf .
1 0 . At l e a s t  two weeks annual le a v e .
11 . At l e a s t  one wedc sick leave a y e a r .
1.
2 .
3 .
A ll members of the  In d u s t r ia l  
C ourt must be le g a l ly - q u a l i f ie d .
The d e f in i t io n  of s t r ik e  in c lu d es  
a r e f u s a l  to  accep t employment.
A ll s t r ik e s  in  th e  S ta te  a re  
i l l e g a l .
4 . A ll p ic k e tin g  i l l e g a l .
5. R eg is te red  union may sue fo r  dues, 
b u t only fo r  le v ie s  fo r  fu n e ra l ,  
s ic k  and a c c id e n t funds.
6 . R igh t of e n try  a v a ila b le  only on 
the  a u th o r i ty  of th e  P re s id e n t 
of th e  I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt.
7 . Court debarred  from awarding 
p re fe re n c e .
8. No co rrespond ing  p ro v is io n .
9. No co rrespond ing  p ro v is io n .
10. No correspond ing  p ro v is io n .
11. No co rrespond ing  p ro v is io n .
12. No co rrespond ing  p ro v is io n .1 2 . Three months lo n g -se rv ic e  l e a v e .
13 . R eg is te red  union n o t l i a b l e  fo r  arts 13. No co rrespond ing  p ro v is io n , 
of agent connected w ith a s trik e  i f  these
done unknown to cr qgainst instructions 
of u n io n 's  governing body.
SOURCE: Qd., Trade Union Act 1915 and I n d u s t r ia l  C o n c ilia t io n  & A rb itra tio n
Acts 1932-55; S .A ., Trade Union Act 1876-1935 and I n d u s tr ia l  Code 
1920-55.
APPENDIX I
4 8 4
The Composition and Powers of th e  Main 
A u s tra lia n  In dust r i a l  T rib u n a ls
1
1, Commonw ealth
AWARD-MAKING
C o n c ilia t io n  and A r b i t r a t ion Commis s io n :
Composition P r e s id e n t ia l  members: a P re s id e n t and a t  l e a s t  two
Deputy P re s id e n ts , a l l  w ith  le g a l  q u a l i f i c a t io n s .  
Commissioners: a t  l e a s t  f iv e ,  fo r  whom no q u a l i f i c ­
a tio n s  a re  s p e c if ie d .
The Commission i s  c o n s t i tu te d  by a number o f members 
(n o t le s s  than  th re e ) s i t t i n g  to g e th e r , o r by members 
s in g ly .
J u r is d ic t io n  To make awards and o rders and c e r t i f y  c o n c i l ia t io n
agreem ents on in d u s t r ia l  m a tte rs  (as de fin ed  by the Act) 
which a re  invo lved  in  an i n t e r s t a t e  d is p u te , su b je c t to  
a d iv is io n  o f the  Commission’s o r ig in a l  ju r i s d ic t io n  on 
such m a tte rs  between the  Commission in  P r e s id e n t ia l  Sess­
ion  ( i . e .  composed o f a t  l e a s t  th ree  P r e s id e n t ia l  members) 
and the Commissioners s i t t i n g  a lo n e .2 
The Commission in  P r e s id e n t ia l  Session  has ex c lu siv e  
ju r i s d ic t io n  over q u estio n s  r e la t in g  to  the b a s ic  wage, 
s tan d a rd  h o u rs , and lo n g -se rv ic e  le a v e . A ll o th e r 
m a tte rs  f a l l  e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith in  the o r ig in a l  ju r i s d ic t io n  
o f the Commissioners in  r e la t io n  to  d isp u te s  in  the  
in d u s try  o r group o f in d u s tr ie s  w ith  which each i s  
a ss ig n ed  to  d e a l. J u r i s d ic t io n  corresponding  to  th a t  
o f the  Commissioners i s  e x e rc is a b le  by the P r e s id e n t ia l  
members, s i t t i n g  s in g ly , who a re  ass ig n ed  to  d ea l w ith  
d isp u te s  in  th e  m aritim e in d u s try , the  s tev ed o rin g  indus­
t r y  and the  Snowy Mountains a re a ."  On the  o th e r  hand, 
on the a p p lic a t io n  of a p a r ty  to  a d isp u te  and su b je c t to  
the  P re s id e n t co n sid e rin g  the d isp u te  o f s u f f i c i e n t  p u b lic  
im portance, 0 d isp u te  w ith in  a Commissioner’ s ju r i s d ic t io n  
may be r e f e r r e d  fo r  d e te rm in a tio n  to  the  Commission con­
s t i t u t e d  by n o t le s s  than  th re e  members, o f whom a t  l e a s t  
one must be a P r e s id e n t ia l  member and one, where p r a c t ic ­
a b le , the  Commissioner concerned.
Procedure C o n c ilia t io n  and a r b i t r a t io n :^  proceed ings i n i t i a t e d  
by a p p l ic a t io n  o r on the  Commission’s own m otion.
Appeals
4 8 5
To th e  Commission, composed of no t le s s  than  th ree  
members o f whom a t  le a s ttw o  must be P r e s id e n t ia l  
members, from any d e c is io n  o r award o f a Commissioner 
p rov ided  th a t  the  Commission co n sid ers  the  m a tte r  of 
s u f f i c i e n t  p u b lic  im portance.
A part from t h i s ,  a l l  awards a re  f i n a l  and c o n c lu s iv e , 
and may n o t be ch a llen g ed  in  any c o u rt -  s u b je c t to  
the  o r ig in a l  ju r i s d ic t io n  o f the High C ourt, under the  
C o n s ti tu tio n , to  e n te r ta in  p roceedings by way of mandamus 
o r p ro h ib i t io n  a g a in s t  o f f i c e r s ,  such as members o f the  
Commission, o f the  Commonwealth.^
Com position
B o a rd so f  R eferenee:
U su a lly  equal numbers of employer and employee re p re ­
s e n ta t iv e s  under the chairm anship o f a Commissioner, 
C o n c ilia to r, (see below) the I n d u s t r ia l  R e g is tr a r  o r a 
Deputy I n d u s t r ia l  R e g is tr a r ;  b u t may sim ply c o n s is t  
of a Commissioner o r C o n c i l ia to r .
J u r i s d ic t io n To d e a l w ith  m a tte rs  a r i s in g  out o f th e  o p e ra tio n  of 
the  award under which a board  i s  e s ta b l is h e d .
Procedure Where employer and employee re p re se n ta tiv e  a re  members, 
each have a. s in g le  v o te , the  chairm an dec id in g  the m a tte r  
in  cases of dead lock .
Appeals To the  Commission as p rov ided  in  th e  case o f most aw ards. 
The Commission w i l l  co n sid e r an appea l on ly  where the 
m a tte r  i s  o f s u f f i c i e n t  im portance:- no appea l l i e s  
u n le ss  so p rov ided  in  the  award concerned .^
Numbers
C o n c ilia to rs :
Any number may be appo in ted ; no q u a l i f ic a t io n s  are  
s p e c if ie d .
J u r i s d ic t io n Lim ited to  c o n c i la t io n , ex cep t where c o n s t i tu t in g ,  o r 
chairman o f ,  a board  o f re fe re n c e . Competent to
p re s id e  over a. compulsory co n ference .
Procedure C alled  in  to  a s s i s t  the  s e tt le m e n t o f a d isp u te  by a 
member of th e  Commission, o r on th e  re q u e s t of the  p a r t i e s .
Com position
Local I n d u s t r ia l  Boards:
May be a C o n c i l ia to r ,  a S ta te  in d u s t r ia l  a u th o r i ty ,  o r 
a ' l o c a l  board ' c o n s is tin g  o f eq u a l numbers of employer 
and employee re p re s e n ta t iv e s  w ith  an independent chairm an.
J u r i s d ic t io n  L im ited to  in v e s t ig a t io n  and r e p o r t ,  and c o n c i l ia t io n ,  
in  accordance w ith  cowers d e leg a ted  by the  Commission.
AWARD-INTERPRETATION 486
Composition
Commonwealth Industrial Court:
Three members: a Chief Judge and not more than two other 
judges, all legally-qualified.
Jurisdiction Exclusive powers to interpret awards and conciliation 
agreements.0
Procedure Initiated on application.
Appeals No appeql from the Court's interpretation lies to 
the High Court.
AWARD-ENFORCED NT
Jurisdiction
District, County aid Local Courts and dourts 
of Summary Jurisdiction:
To impose maximum fines of £100 on a registered 
organization, or an employer who is not a member of 
such an organization, and £10 in the case of a member 
of a registered organization for breach or non-observance 
of orders, awards and conciliation agreements.
Appeals To the Industrial Court.
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission:
Jurisdiction In Presidential Session, to suspend or cancel all or any 
of the terms of an award or conciliation agreement so far 
as they apply to, or are in favour of, a registered organ­
ization and its members, where the organization has committed 
a breach or non-observance of the award, conciliation 
agreement, or of an order of the Industrial Court - or for 
any other reason.
Commonwealth Industrial Court:
Jurisdiction To impose fines as in the case of ordinary courts; to 
impose maximum fines of £500 on a registered organization, 
£200 - or imprisonment for up to twelve months - in the 
case of an employer or an office-holder in a registered 
organization, and £50 in the case of any other person for 
contempt of the Court - i.e. failure to comply with an 
order of the Court relating to bpeach or non-observance 
of an award or conciliation agreement. To cancel the
registration of an organization where its rules are contrary 
to the terms of an order, award or conciliation agreement, 
or where it has wilfully neglected to obey an order of the 
Court, or for any other reason.
- - - - o 0 o - - - -
2. New South Wales.
AWARD-MAKING 
Industrial Commission:
Composition Up to six legally-qualified members, sitting as a 
Full Bench of three, or singly.
Q
Jurisdiction To make awards and orders on all industrial matters (as 
defined by the Act) whether or not they are the subject 
of a dispute.
Procedure Conciliation and arbitration; proceedings initiated by 
application or on own motion.
Appeals From single member’s decision to Full Bench, otherwise 
decisions are final and conclusive - subject to appeal 1
to Suoreme Court on the question of exceeding jurisdiction. u
Conciliation Commissioners:
Number Not more than five; no qualifications specified.
Jurisdiction May call a compulsory confer® ce on any industrial matter 
that is, or is likely to be, the subject of direct action; 
but may make award on such matter only if the Industrial 
Commission so directs. Further powers as conciliation
committee chairman (see below).
Procedure As for Industrial Commission.
Appeal, s To Industrial Commission. 
Conciliation Committees:
Composition Equal numbers of employer and employee representatives 
under the chairmanship of a Conciliation Commissioner.
Jurisdiction To make.awards and orders, by agreement or decision, on 
all industrial matters relating to the industry or group of 
industries covered.
Procedure 11Agreement must be unanimous; where unanimity is not reached,
the chairman decides the question at issue. He may refer
any question to the Industrial Commission for determination 
or direction. Proceedings initiated bv application or by 
reference from Industrial Commission.
Appeals To Industrial Commission which may also, on application or 
its own motion, prohibit any proceedings, or vary or 
rescind any award of a conciliation committee.
AWARD- INTERPRETATION
Jurisdiction
Appeals
Jurisdiction
Appeals
Jurisdiction
3. Victoria14
Composition
Jurisdiction
Procedure
Power vested in both the Industrial Commission and 
conciliation committees in relation to both awards 
and industrial agreements.13
AWARD-ENFORCEMENT
Industrial Magistrates:
To impose a fine of up to £100 on a person for breach 
of an award or industrial agreement; to issue an 
injunction restraining further or other breaches.
To Industrial Commission.
Conciliation Committees:
Variation of award, including suspension or" cancellation 
of any of its terms, under their general award-making 
powers.
To Industrial Commission.
Industrial Commission:
On appeal from an industrial magistrate, to impose fines 
on individuals; to rescind or vary awards, under general 
powers; to cancel the registration of a union ’for any 
reasons which appear to it to be good.’
- - - - o O o - - - -
AWARD-MAKING
Industrial Appeals Court:
Three members; one with legal qualifications to be 
President; no qualifications for the other two members 
except that they be appointed to represent employers 
and employees, respectively.
Appellate jurisdiction only in relation to all wages 
board determinations. Exercises all the powers of a 
wages board (see below).
Questions of law decided by the President alone; all 
other questions by majority.
Appeals
Composition
Jurisdiction
Procedure
Appeals
Powers
Jurisdiction
Decisions final; may not be reviewed or altered 
within the succeeding twelve months except by the Court 
itself or, with the Court’s permission, by a wages board.
Wages Boardst
In the case of ordinary wages boards, equal (but not set) 
numbers of employer and employee representatives under 
an independent chairman appointed from a permanent panel 
of up to three.^ In the case of the General Board, two 
members representing employers generally and two repre­
senting employees generally, with an independent chairman, 
and additional representatives ma.y be appointed from 
particular trades when the Board is dealing with them. b
To make determinations, relating to the craft or industry 
or groups of them covered, 'on all industrial matters (as 
defined by the Act) whether or not they are the subject 
of a dispute.The General Board has similar powers in 
relation to trades, or sections of them, which are speci­
fied by the Minister as not being covered by the ordinary 
boards.
Each representative has one vote, the chairman deciding 
any question on which a majority of members fail to agree.
i.4
To the Industrial Appeals Court. To the Supreme Court 
only on the ground of illegality.
State_ Government:
The Governor in Council may suspend the operati on of a 
determination for up to six months; the relevant wages 
board must, during the period of suspension, reconsider 
its determination.
AWARD- INTERPRETATION
Neither the Industrial Appeals Court nor the wages boards 
are empowered to interpret determinations. Legally, 
interpretations can only be obtained in the course of 
enforcement proceedings. In practice, the wages boards 
have ignored this limitation on their powers.
AWARD-ENFORCEMENT
Metropolitan Industrial Court:
Limited to the Melbourne metropolitan area. To impose 
fines of up to £25 (first offence), £5-50 (second offence) 
and £50-100 (subsequent offences) on any person contra­
vening or failing to comply with a determination.
A p p ea ls TP I n d u s t r i a l  A p p ea ls  C o u r t .  
C o u r ts  o f  P e t ty  S e s s io n :
J u r i s d i c t i o n  O u ts id e  th e  M elbourne m e t r o p o l i ta n  a r e a .  Pow ers 
a s  f o r  th e  M e tr o p o l i ta n  I n d u s t r i a l  C o u r t .
A p p ea ls  To I n d u s t r i a l  A p p ea ls  C o u r t .
Wages B oard s :
J u r i s d i c t i o n  V a r ia t io n  o f  d e te r m in a t io n s ,  i n c lu d in g  s u s p e n s io n
o r  c a n c e l l a t i o n  o f  a n y  o f  t h e i r  te r m s ,  u n d e r  g e n e r a l  
p o w e rs .
A p p ea ls  To I n d u s t r i a l  A p p ea ls  C o u r t .
I n d u s t r i a l  A ppeals  C o u r t :
J u r i s d i c t i o n  A p p e lla te  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o n ly .
A p p ea ls  D e c is io n s  f i n a l .
- - - - 0 O 0 - - - -
4 . Q u een slan d 19
AWARD-MAKING
In d u s t r i a l  C o u rt
C o m p o sitio n  Up to  f i v e  m em bers; one w i th  l e g a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  to
be P r e s i d e n t ;  no q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  so e d i f i e d  f o r  th e  o th e r  
m em bers. May s i t  a s  a  F u l l  C o u rt o f  t h r e e ,  o r  s i n g l y .
J u r i s d i c t i o n  To make aw ards and  o r d e r s  and  c e r t i f y  c o n c i l i a t i o n  a g re e ­
m ents on a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  m a t te r s  (a s  d e f in e d  by  th e  A ct) 
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  th e y  a re  th e  s u b je c t  o f  an  i n d u s t r i a l  d i s p u te ;  
i n  a d d i t i o n ,  th e  C o u rt may d e a l  w ith  a n y  m a t t e r ,  ‘w h e th e r  
i n d u s t r i a l  o r  n o t* ,  w hich  i t  b e l i e v e s  t o  be c o n n e c te d  w ith  
a  s t r i k e  o r  lo c k o u t .
To a c t  a s  'm e d ia to r 1 i n  an y  q u e s t i o n ,  r e l a t e d  t o  an  in d u s t ­
r i a l  m a t te r  o r  d i s p u t e ,  ‘w h e th e r  o r  n o t  i t  i s  w i th in  th e  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  C o u r t1, w here th e  member o f  th e  C o u rt 
c o n c e rn e d  c o n s id e r s  such  a c t i o n  d e s i r a b l e  i n  th e  p u b l ic  
i n t e r e s t .
P ro c e d u re .  C o n c i l i a t i o n  and  a r b i t r a t i o n ;  p ro c e e d in g s  i n i t i a t e d  by  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o r  on own m o tio n .
Appeals Single member may state case for decision by the Full 
Court; it is mandatory for him to do so if a party makes 
application in this direction. Otherwise decisions are 
final and conclusive - subject to appeal to Supreme Court 
on ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Industrial Magistrates:
Jurisdiction To exercise such powers of the Industrial Court as the
Court delegates at any time or in relation to a particular 
matter, dispute, industry or locality.^
To act as ’mediator* with the same jurisdiction as in the 
case of members of the Industrial Court.
Procedure As in the case of the Court.
Appeals To the Industrial Court.
AWARD-INTERPRETATION
Power vested in the Industrial Court, and in industrial 
magistrates subject to appeal to the Court, in relation 
to awards, conciliation agreements and industrial agreements.
AWARD-ENFORCEMENT 
Industrial Magistrates:
Jurisdiction: On remission from the Industrial Court, to impose monetary 
penalties on individuals and registered unions for breach 
of an award or industrial agreement: for a first offence,
up to £50 in the case of an employer or union, and £10 in 
the case of an employee; for a second offence against the 
same, provision, up to £100 and £20 respectively.
Appeals To the Industrial Court.
Industrial Court:
Jurisdiction To impose fines, as above; to issue injunctions restrain­
ing further or other breaches subject to a maximum penalty 
of £1000; to issue orders relating to a first offence, 
subject to a penalty of up to £100; variation of an award, 
including suspension or cancellation of any of its terms, 
under the Court’s general powers; to suspend or cancel 
the registration of a union for disobedience of an order 
of the Court, or for any other reasons.
_ _ _ _ o 0 o - - - -
5. South  Austr a l i a
21
Composition
AWARD-MAKING 
I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt:
A P re s id e n t and up to  two Deputy P re s id e n ts , each le g a l ly -  
q u a l i f ie d ,  s i t t i n g  to g e th e r  o r s in g ly .
J u r i s d ic t io n  To make awards and o rd e rs  and c e r t i f y  c o n c i l ia t io n  ag ree -
ments on a l l  i n d u s t r ia l  m a tte rs  (as d e fin ed  by the  Act) 
w hether o r n o t th e y  a re  the  s u b je c t o f a d i s p u t e ; ^  bu t 
i t s  o r ig in a l  ju r i s d ic t io n  i s  excluded in  cases  where an 
i n d u s t r i a l  m a tte r  a f f e c t s  an in d u s try  covered by an 
in d u s t r ia l  board and th e  m a tte r  i s  w ith in  the  b o a rd ’ s 
j u r i s d ic t io n .  ~
Procedure C o n c ilia t io n  and a r b i t r a t io n ;  proceed ings i n i t i a t e d  by 
a p p lic a t io n  o r on i t s  own m otion.
Appeals A ll d e c is io n s  f i n a l  and co nclusive  -  su b je c t to  appeal 
to  the  Supreme Court on the  ground of la ck  o f ju r i s d ic t io n .
I n d u s t r ia l  Boards:
Composition Equal numbers of employer and employee re p re s e n ta t iv e s  
under an independent chairm an nominated by a m a jo r ity  of 
th e  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o r , where no m a jo rity  i s  fo rthcom ing , 
by the  I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt. k
J u r is d ic t io n  To make d e te rm in a tio n s , r e la t in g  to  the  in d u s try , s e c tio n
of an in d u s try  or group o f in d u s tr ie s  covered , on c e r ta in  
in d u s t r i a l  m a tte rs ; annual le a v e , s ic k  leave and r ig h t  o f 
e n try , f o r  example, are  o u ts id e  t h e i r  (though w ith in  the 
I n d u s t r ia l  C o u rt’s) ju r i s d ic t io n  -  u n le ss  th e re  i s  a 'custom  
o r usage* as to  such m a tte rs  in  th e  in d u s try  concerned .-^
Nor can th e  boards determ ine wage r a te s  above a s p e c if ie d  
amount.
Procedure Each re p re s e n ta t iv e  has one v o te ; in  the  even t o f dead­
lo c k , th e  chairman may decide the  q u e s tio n  in  any way he 
sees f i t .  P roceedings a re  i n i t i a t e d  by a p p lic a t io n  or
on re fe re n ce  from the  I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt.
Appeals To the  I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt. 
Board o f In d u s try :
Com position A P re s id e n t ( e i th e r  the  P re s id e n t o r a Deputy P re s id e n t 
o f the  I n d u s t r i a l  Court) and fo u r Commissioners -  two re p re ­
s e n tin g  em ployers and two em ployees.
Jurisdiction
Procedure
Appeals
Powers
Jurisdiction
Appeals
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction
To declare the State basic wage (’living wage’). To 
make recommendations to the Minister about the establish­
ment, dissolution and jurisdictions of Industrial boards.
The President has a casting as well as a deliberative vote.
No provision.
State Government:
The Minister of Industry: to cancel, on the recommend­
ation of the Board of Industry, any determination, or 
■part thereof, of an industrial board; to refer a Board’s 
determination, or any part thereof, in ’any case of extreme 
urgency’, to the Industrial Court for its consideration.
The State Governor: to suspend the operation of any
determination, or part thereof, in circumstances of ’ex­
treme urgency’, and refer it to the relevant industrial 
board for reconsideration.
AWARD-INTERPRETATION
Power vested exclusively in the Industrial Court in 
relation to awards, determinations, conciliation agree­
ments and industrial agreements.
AWARD-ENFORCEMENT
Special Magistrate.s:
To impose maximum fines of £250 in the case of a union,
£100 in the case of an employer, and £10 in the case of 
an employee for breach of an award or order of the Indus­
trial Court or of an industrial agreement, or of £100, £20 
and £10 respectively, for breach of an industrial board’s 
determination.
To issue an injunction restraining further or other breaches 
of an award, order or industrial agredment, subject to 
penalties of imprisonment for up to three months and, in 
the case of a union, a maximum fine of £250.
To the Industrial Court.
Industrial Boards:
Variation of determinations, including suspension or 
cancellation of any of their terms, under general powers.
Industrial Court:
On appeal from an industrial magistrate, t& impose fines; 
to vary or cancel awards, under general powers; to cancel 
the registration of a union for wilfully neglecting to 
obey a judgement, order or award of the Court, or for
any other reason.
6. Western Australia'
Composition
Jurisdiction
Procedure
Anneals
Jurisdiction
Procedure
Anneals
Composition
Jurisdiction
26
AWARD-MAKING 
Court of Arbitration:
Three members; one with legal qualifications to be 
President; no .qualifications specified for the other 
two except that they be appointed on the recommendation, 
respectively, of workers* and employers* organizations.
May be constituted by the President and at least one lay 
member, but in certain matters the President may act atone.
To make awards and orders on all industrial matters (as 
defined in the Act) whether or not the subject of an 
industrial dispute. The President alone is empowered 
to certify conciliation agreements and to call compulsory 
conferences.
Conciliation and arbitration; proceedings initiated by 
application or on own motion. Decisions are by majority 
opinion; or, where the Court is constituted by two members, 
according to the President’s decision.
All decisions final and conclusive; and the possibility 
of an appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground of lack 
of jurisdiction is narrowed by the statutory direction 
that the Arbitration Court’s decision as to whether any 
matter is an industrial dispute within its jurisdiction,, 
is final and conclusive and may not be questioned.
The Conciliation Commissioner:
To deal with any industrial matter remitted to him by 
the Arbitration Court, with the powers delegated to him 
by the Court for the purpose.
The procedure directed by the Arbitration Court.
To the Arbitration Court.
Boards of Reference:
Equal numbers of employers* and employees’ represent­
atives, with an independent chairman.
To deal with matters, in the way specified, arising out 
of the constituting award in each case.
Appeals To the Arbitration Court.
AWARD- INTERPEETAT ION
Power vested in the Arbitration Court in relation to 
awards, conciliation agreements and industrial agreements.^
AWARD-ENFORCEME NT 
Industrial Magistrates:
Jurisdiction To Impose fines up to a maximum of £500, as specified
in an award or industrial agreement, for breach of them.
Appeals To the Arbitration Court,
Court of Arbitration:
Jurisdiction To impose fines, as above, for breach of an award, order 
or industrial agreement; to punish contempts of its 
authority, including contravention of its orders, in 
the same way as the Supreme Court by fines or imprisonment; 
to suspend or cancel, under exoress statutory authorizatiom 
to this effect, all or any of the terms of an award, 
conciliation agreement or industrial agreement so far as 
it aoolies to a registered union and its members who have 
contravened it. The President alone is empowered to cancel 
the registration of a union that has wilfully neglected to 
obey an order of the Court, or for any other reason.
Appeals To the Court of Criminal Appeal, but only in the case of
a sentence of imprisonment or the imposition of a fine 
exceeding £20 on an individual.
- - - 0O0 - ---
287. Tasmania
AWARD-MAKING
Wages Boards:
Composition Equal(but not standard) numbers of employer and employee 
representatives, with an independent chairman - one 
government official acting in this capacity for all boards.
Jurisdiction To make determinations, elating to the industry or
industries covered in each case, ^ on all industrial 
matters (as defined by the Act) whether or not they are 
the subject of a dispute.
Procedure Each representative has one vote, the chairman deciding 
any question on which the representatives are deadlocked.
Appeals To the Supreme Court, but only on the ground of lack a q  . 0
jurisdiction. ^ 1
State Government:
Pox^ ers The Chief Secretary may summon a compulsory conference, 
in order to prevent or settle an industrial dispute, or 
may convene a meeting of the appropriate wages board for 
the purpose. He may aLso convene a wages board, at any
time after it has made a determination, for the purpose of 
reconsidering the determination.
AWARD-INTERPRETATION
Wages boards have no statutory power to interpret their 
determinations; and the only way in which an interpret­
ation can be legally obtained is through enforcement 
proceedings. As in Victoria, Tasmanian wages boards have
turned a blind eye to this limitation on their powers.
AWARD-E NFORCEMENT 
Police Magistrates:
Jurisdiction To impose a penalty of up to £20 on any person contra-
Appeals
vening or failing to comply with a determination. 
No statutory provision.
Wages Boards:
Jurisdiction Variation of determinations, including suspension or
Appeals
cancellation of their terms, under general rowers. 
As in award-making.
Notes:
1. The operative sts.tu.te is the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
1904-56.
2. A Presidential member may be assigned to deal alone with any
3.
industrial dispute or with a 11 disputes in any industry, in which 
case he has the same jurisdiction as a Commissioner.
In relation to the maritime and stevedoring industries (under 
the interstate trade and commerce provisions of the Constitution) 
and to the Snowy Mountains hydro-electric scheme (under the 
Constitutional defence power), the Commission’s jurisdiction 
is not restricted to industrial matters that are the subject 
of an industrial dispute but, as in the States, includes such 
a matter whether or not it is in dispute. The jurisdiction
of the Coal Industry Tribunal is extended in the same way - '
within New South Wal.es by virtue of an agreement between the 
government of that State end the Commonwealth.
For discussion of the implications of combining conciliative 
and arbitral, powers in the one body, see G.Sawer, ‘Conciliation 
and Arbitration of Industrial Disputes’ (1947), 23 Economic 
Record. 269-71; and A. C. Gray, ‘Two Years of Conciliation 
Commissioners’ (March 1950),22 Australian Quarterly 54-6.
R. v . C‘wealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte 
Brisbane Tramways Co. Ltd. (1913) 18 C.L.R. 54; see also (l949)
78 C.L.R. 389 and (1950) 82 C.L.R. 54.
Tait v. Australian Theatrical & Amusement Employees Ass‘n.
(1927), 25 C.A.R. 1 0 4 ”.
Jackett Bros, v. Fed.’d Millers & Mill Employees .AssJn. (1925),
22 C.A.R. 190; see also (1934) 33 C.A.R. 1Ö09.
Boards of reference have no power to interpret the terms of 
awards setting them, up (despite provisions to this effect in 
some awards) but some do carry out this function with the consent 
of the parties: Foenander, Industrial Regulation in Australia. 29.
The operative statute is the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940-57. 
Clancy v. Butchers Shop Employees1 Union (1904)2 C.L.R. 181; 
fix' oarte Brennan' "(1915TV 15 S.R. (nTs J&T) 173
Re Ferries (State) Conciliation Committee tl945j A.R.(N.S.W.)317.
A union or employer may apply, in the first instance, to either 
the Industrial Commission or the relevant conciliation committee; 
in practice the choice made usually depends on the customary 
orocedure in the trade or industry concrrned.
It appears that the committees do no usually exercise this cower: 
the Industrial Commission has frequently advised them against do­
ing so; Foenander, Better Employment Relations. 86.
Labour and industry Act 1953.
In practice, the panel has never included more than two members. 
This power has rarely been used.
Under the Act, the term ‘trade’ may be defined in relation to the 
business or occupation of an employer, or in relation to that in 
which a worker is employed: wages boards may be established on an 
industry or craft basis, or cover a mixture of both.
Boards may determine ‘any industrial matter whatsoever’ with the 
express exceptions that they cannot make determinations relating 
to preference of employment for unionists or prescribing lower 
piece-work rates for minors than for adults.
Industrial Conciliation ad Arbitration Acts 1932-55.
Awards operating outside Brisbane usually empower an industrial 
magistrate to convene compulsory conferences in the case of 
disputes under the award, and allow him, on the request of any 
party to the dispute, to determine the matter if no agreement is 
reached at the conference - subject to a right of aqoeal to the 
Industrial Court.
Industrial Code 1920-55*
The Court is expressly debarred from making an award of preference 
in emoloyment to unionists.
With the exception of boards OBvering public service, railway 
and local body employees which operate on a State-wide basis, 
industrial boards are restricted in their coverage to the Adelaide
Metropoliten area, the Industrial Court having original 
jurisdiction over the relevant trades and industries in all 
other parts of the State.
24. There are a total of six chairmen who cover aL 1 industrial boards.
25. Boarding House, Cafe etc. Employees * Case (1914)> 17 S.A.I.R. 279. 
In many cases an industrial board*s determination is supplemented 
by an award of the Industrial Court dealing with matters outside 
the board*s jurisdiction.
26. Industrial Arbitration Act 1912-52.
27. The Court may amend the terms of an award in order to remedy 
any defect or to give them fuller effect shown to be necessary 
in the light of its interpretation; it cannot amend an indust­
rial agreement in the seme circumstances.
28. Wages Boards Act 1920-51.
29. Under the Act, the term * trade* is interpreted in relation 
to the trade, industry, business or occupation of employers 
aloneJ thus wages boards in Tasmania may be established only 
on an industry basis.
APPENDIX II
The Instrumente of Industrial_ Regulation
THE AWARD
Application;
C*wealth.Binds only those organizations and persons named and notified 
as parties to an industrial dispute settled by the award,^ 
including future members of organizations, successors in title of 
an employer, and a named employer who is not in dispute with his 
existing employees or who does not employ any members of the 
union concerned.2
N.3.W. May bind all employers and employees in the industry or trade 
and locality concerned as a common rule, or may bind only 
the parties to a dispute or to negotiations - according to the 
directions given by the award-making boady.
Victoria Determinations are automatically common rules.
QTLD. Automatically a common rule.
S.A. 1. Award of the Industrial Court is initial ly binding only on
the parties to it; but, on separate application, the Court may 
declare it a common rule.''
2. Determinations of Industrial Boards are automatically common# 
rules.
W.A. Automatically a common rule.
Tasmania Determinations are automatically common rule-5*
Term of Operation;
C’wealth.For any period specified in the award up to five years from the 
date made; but after expiry o£ the period, continues in force 
until a new award is made.
N.S.W. Up to three years; but continues in force as in the C fwealth.
Victoria No limit set; remains in force indefinitely as amended from 
time to time.
Q ’LD. Up to one year; but continues in force as in the C*wealth.
S.A. Up to three years; but continues in force as in the C*wealth.
W.A. Up to three years; but continues in force as in the C 1wealth.
Tasmania Up to two years; but continues in force as in the Cwealth.
500
Variation and Cancellation:
Cwealth May be varied during currency, but such variations are limited 
to the ’ambit' set by the claims of the parties to the dispute 
in relation to which the award is made. Variations in effect,
if not in form, are possible through the creation of another 
dispute and the making of another award, between the same parties, 
which may deal with the same subject-matter as the original award. 
An award may be cancelled, suspended, or set aside during its 
currency.
N.S.W. ) 
Victoria) 
Q'LD. ) 
S.A. )
W.A. )
Tasmania)
Every award- or determination-making body is empowered to vary 
or rescind any of the provisions of its own awards or determin­
ations. There is no limitation, as there is in the C'wealth
jurisdiction, on the variation power.
- - - 0O0 - - -
C’wealth
THE CONCILIATION AGREEMENT
How Made:
Agreement reached in statutory conciliation proceedings; must 
be certified by the appropriate member of the Arbitration Comm­
ission. Certification may be refused if the certifying authority
considers the agreement is not in settlement of an industrial 
dispute, if it contains provisions outside the authority1s power 
to grant in an award, or if it is not in the 'public interest’ 
that it should be certified," Most agreements are made into 
consent awards.
N.S.W .
6No provision. " Consent awards frequent.
Victoria No provision.
Q’LD. Provision as in the C'wealth; but exercise of the power is man­
datory. Agreements are invariably converted into consent awards.
S.A. Provision as in the C'wealth; but exercise of the power is man­
datory. Ägreements are invariably converted into consent awards.
W.A. Provision as in the C'wealth; but only the President can certify, 
and the power is not discretionary. Agreements are invariably
converted into consent awards.
Tasmania No provision. 
Status:
In all the relevant jurisdictions, conciliation agreements have the 
same force and effect as awards, and may be varied in the same qray 
by the industrial authority. ?
C ’wealth
THE INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENT 
Contents:
May provide only 'for the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes existing or future by conciliation 
and arbitration.’ö
N.S.W. No restrictions on subject-matter.
Victoria No provision for filing industrial a greements.
Q !LD. As in N.S.W.
S.A. As in N.S.W.
W.A. As in N.S.W.
Tasmania No provision for filing industrial agreements. 
Application:
C ’wealth Binds only persons and organizations - including their 
members - who are parties to it.
N.S.W. Binds only parties to it.
Q'LD. Binds not only parties to it but also all employees, not 
members of a oarticipating union, who are employed by an 
employer bound by the agreement, either as a party or as a 
member of a participating employers' organization. The Indust­
rial Court may declare an agreement a common rule.
S.A. Binds only the parties to it. But in an industry or locality
not covered by the Industrial Court or an industrial board, an 
agreement entered into by at least'..three-fifths of the employers 
and employees concerned and dealing with matters within the compet* 
ence of an industrial board has the force of a boardrs determin­
ation (after its legality has been confirmed by the Industrial 
Court), thus operating as a common rule.9
W.A. . . n 10 As in Queensland.
Term of Operation:
C* wealth For any period specified in the agreement up to five years; 
but after expiry of the period it continues in force until one 
party gives notice of an intention to terminate it.
N.S.W. Up to five years; but continues in force as in the C 1wealth9 
until one party gives notice of termination, ur the Industrial 
Commission rescinds it.
Q'LD. Up to three years; but continues in force except in regard
to parties who notify their intention of retiring from it.
S.A. Un to three years; but continues in force as in the Cwealth 
until one party gives notice of termination.
W • A. Up to three years; but continues in force except in regard to 
parties who notify their intention of retiring from it.
Status:
In all the relevant jurisdictions industrial agreements are 
enforceable in the same way as awards.
Variation and Cancellation;
C1wealth May be varied or rescinded during its currency by another 
industrial agreement between the same par-ties; the Arbitration 
Commission has no general power to vary.'
N.S.W. May be varied or cancelled during its currency by a subsequent 
agreement between the parties; the Industrial Commission may 
vary or cancel it.
Q*LD. MAy be varied or cancelled during its currency by a subsequent 
agreement between the parties, subject, in the case of an 
agreement declared a common rule, to the consent of the 
Industrial Court; the Court may vary or cancel a.ny industrial 
agreement.
S.A. May be varied or cancelled during its currency by a subsequent 
agreement between the pa. rties; the Industrial Court may vary 
or cancel it.
W.A. Ma.y be varied or cancelled during its currency by a subsequent 
agreement between the parties, subject, in the case of an agree­
ment declared a common rule, to the consent of the Arbitration 
Court; the Court may suspend or cancel all or any of the terms 
of any agreement, but has no general newer of variation, ~
Inconsistency with Awards:
C*wealth)
N.S.W, ) No provision.
Q'LD. The Industrial Court may prohibit either the making or enforce­
ment of an industrial agreement that is inconsistent with a 
relevant award, where it considers this advisable in the public 
interest.
S.A. The Industrial Court may vary the terms of an agreement to con­
form with a common rule award, an industrial board determination 
(automatically a common rule), or a common rule agreement.
W.A. The Arbitration Court may vary an agreement that is incon­
sistent with an award or with another agreement declared 
a common rule.
Notes:
1. Thus the general Federal industrial power does not include the 
making of an award operating as a common rule: Australiam Boot 
Trade Employees Federation v. Whybrow & Co. (1910), 11 C.L.R.
311; see also (1949) 78 C.L.rT 389 and (1950) 81 C.L.R, 64.
On the other hand, where they ate operating under constitutional 
provisions other than the general industrial power, Federal 
tribunals are able to make awards as common rules: the Arbit­
ration Commission can do so in relation to a Commonwealth 
territory, the maritime and stevedoring industries and the Snowy 
Mountains hydro-electric scheme; the Coal Industry Tribunal in 
relation to the N.S.W. coal industry; and the Public Service 
Arbitrator in relation to the Federal Public Service.
2. Acceptance of these principles has played an imoortat part in
lessening the handicap imposed by the inability to make a common 
rule: see G.Sawer, ’Conciliation and Arbitration of Industrial
Disoutes’ (1947), 23 Economic Record 9c 8.
3. The Court does not do so automatically, the burden of proving 
sufficient reason rests on the applicant for a common rule:
Bakin? Trades (Common Rules) Case (1920), 3 S.A.I.R. 189.
4* Gas Employees Industrial Union v. Metropolitan Gas Co, LtdJ (1919), 
27 C.L.R., 'at 84 , 85 , 90; also see (1920) 28 C.L.R. 209 ahd (1945) 
55 C.A.R. 869. Thus if the original dispute involved a union 
wage claim of £20 and an employers’ counter-claim of £10 a member 
of the Commission, who is restricted in making his award to a 
figure within these limits, is similarly restricted when it comes 
to varying his award. In practice, particularly in the case of 
wages, this has caused unions to make excessive clal.ms in antici­
pation of future applications to vary the award. No similar 
restrictions exist in the case of Federal tribunals operating in 
the special fields indicated in footnote 1.
5. Wartime apart, certification is not often refused even where the 
terms of agreements are manifestly beyond the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral authority; it is doubtful, however, that the relevant 
tribunals would feel competent to enforce such terms.
6. Provisions relating to conciliation agreements were deleted from 
the Industrial Arbitration Act in 1943.
7. The Federal Arbitration Commission is somewhat more cautious in 
varying conciliation agreements than in the case of its own awards: 
see Foenander, Industrial Regulation in Australia, 49-50.
8. The general industrial power of the Commonwealth Parliament extends
no further than this provision in relation to industrial agreements 
which enables ’parties voluntarily to provide for a method of 
conciliation and arbitration other than that of the Court created 
by the Act’d Federated Engine Drivers & Firemens Ass’n. v. Broken 
Hill Pt-. /td. (No. 3) (l<vn), 1'~ C. . . ^0.
Nevertheless, industrial agreements not limited in this 
way are accepted for filing and are published in the C.A.R., 
though they are not enforceable either at common law or by 
the industrial tribunals under the Act: ibid, 715.
There are no common rule agreements operating at the present 
time.
The W.A. Arbitration Court will declare an agreement a common 
rule only on the application of a party to it: Re Kalgoorlie
& Boulder Shoo Assistants (1920), t.W.A.I.G. 52.
Merchant Service Guild v, C1wealth Steamship Owners* AssJ_n. 
(1912)7*6 C.A.B. 6; also (1917) 11 G.A.R. 5B4. The Arbitration 
Commission has, however, the power to vary an industrial agree­
ment relating to employment in a Commonwealth territory to 
bring it into conformity with a common rule applied by the 
Commission in relation to such territory: it appears that under
the wider industrial powers of the Commonwealth in the case 
of its territories, an industrial agreement operating within 
them may be enforceable in regard to industrial matters 
generally.
Re Kalgoorlie & Boulder Shop Assistants (1920), 1 W.A.I.G. 52; 
aLso (1943) 23 W.A.I.G. 185.
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C * wealth
N.S.W.
Victoria
2.
C 1wealth
Australian Anti-Strike legislation 
Strikes in Essential Services
Grimes Act 1914-50? Applicable to any public service 
carried on by the Commonwealth and its agencies and to 
industries concerned with interstate end international 
tr^de and commerce. An offence if a person, by violence, 
threat, intimidation or, ’without reasonable cause or 
excuse, by boycott or threat of boycott of person or 
property’, obstructs or hinders the operation of the ser­
vice or industry, compels or induces an employee to leave 
his employment or prevents a person from accepting employ­
ment in connection with the service or industry: penalty,
imprisonment for up to one year.
Public Service Act 1922-54: If found guilty of ’directly 
fomenting or taking part in' a strike preventing or inter­
fering with the work of the public service or any Federal 
utilities, an emoloyee must be dismissed by the Public 
Service Bo^rd.
Industrial Arbitration Act 1940-57: All strikes by employees 
of the State government and of its instrumentalities are 
illegal; penalties as in the case of illegal strikes in 
general.
Essential Services Act 1948» Applicable to ’essential 
services', relating to transport, fuel, light, power, water, 
sewerage and any other services that may be so^cified by orde^ -in- 
council. A strike or 'similar interruption’ in such a service 
is an offence unless a secret ballot conducted previously by 
the Chief Electoral Officer has resulted in a majority of 
those entitled to vote being in favour of the strike: pen­
alties, £1000 in the case of a union official or trustee, 
and £50 in any other case.'
- - -oOo - - -
Examples of Emergency legislation
TEMPORARY
Prohibited the
payment of strike allowances to strikers by the unions involved 
in the 1949 coal strike; and prohibited other unions reg­
istered under the C. & A. Act,,from giving financial help to 
the strikers or their unions: penalties, £1000 in the cose
of a union, and £100 or imprisonment for 6 months (or both) 
in the case of a person.
Q’ LD. I ndu s t r i a l  Law Amendment Act 1948; Enacted to  meet the
S te te  ra ilw ay  s t r i k e .  P ro h ib ite d  any form of p ick e tin g ' 
o r dem onstrations in  support o f 0. s t r ik e  th a t  was in  d e fien ce  
of an o rd e r of th e  S ta te  I n d u s t r ia l  C ourt o r was no t au th o r­
iz ed  as p re sc r ib e d  by the I .C . & A. A c ts, and gave th e  p o lic e  
ex ten s iv e  powers to  p rev en t p ic k e tin g  and search  p rem ises: 
p e n a l t ie s ,  £100 and 6 months’ im prisonm ent.
STANDING
O’w ealth  Crimes Act 1914-50: The F edera l govern*may p roclaim  th a t  th e re  
e x is t s  a ’ s e r io u s  in d u s t r ia l  d is tu rb an ce  p re ju d ic in g  o r th r e a t ­
en ing  tra d e  or commerce w ith  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  o r among the  
S ta te s ’ . During the  cu rrency  o f a p roclam ation  i t  i s  an 
offence to  urge o r encourage in  any way a s t r ik e  connected 
w ith  in te r s t a t e  o r in te r n a t io n a l  tra d e  and commerce, o r w ith  
the  p ro v is io n  o f any p u b lic  se rv ice  by th e  Commonwealth and 
i t s  agen c ies: p e n a l t ie s ,  im prisonm ent f o r  a year o r , i f  no t
A u s tra lia n -b o rn , d e p o r ta tio n .
S t« v e -d o r ing Indust r y  Act  1956: The m in is te r  a d m in is te r in g  the 
Act may d e c la re  t h a t  a s ta t e  of emergency e x is t s  a t  any p o r t ,  
and th e r e a f te r  i t  i s  an o ffence to  contravene o rd ers  is su e d  
by the  S tevedo ring  In d u s try  A u tho rity : p e n a l t ie s ,  £10 in  the
case of a w a te rs id e  w orker, and £100 in  the  case of any o th e r 
person  (such as a union o f f i c i a l ) .
N.S.W. Emergency Powers Act 1949: The Governor may proclaim  th a t  i t
appears to  him t h a t  ’from any cause the  supply  o r p ro v is io n  
of e s s e n t ia l  s e rv ic e s  or e s s e n t i a l  commodities i s  o r i s  l ik e ly  
to  bo in te r ru p te d  o r d is lo c a te d  o r become le s s  th an  i s  s u f f ic ­
ie n t  ^or the  reaso n ab le  requ irem en ts of the community’ -  an 
e s s e n t i a l  commodity in c lu d es  any commodity so p rocla im ed , and 
~n e s s e n t ia l  s e rv ic e  i s  s p e c if ie d  as those  r e la t in g  to  t r a n s ­
p o r t ,  f u e l ,  l i g h t ,  power, w a te r , sew erage, p u b lic  h e a l th  and 
any se rv ice  so P roclaim ed. During the cu rrency  o f a p ro­
clam ation  the  Governor has alm ost u n lim ite d  powers to  make 
re g u la tio n s :  p e n a l t ie s  fo r  d isobey ing  such re g u la t io n s ,  £500
in  the  case of a co rp o ra te  body, and £200 and im prisonm ent 
f o r  12 months in  th e  case of an in d iv id u a l .
V ic to r ia  E sse n t i a l  Se r v ices Act 1948: The Governor in  Council may
proclaim  a s ta t e  o f emergency where i t  appears th a t  any a c tio n  
in te r r u p ts  o r d is lo c a te s ,  o r i s  l ik e ly  to  do so , any e s s e n t ia l  
s e rv ic e s  d e fin ed  as o u tlin e d  above in  r e la t io n  to  l e g i s l a t i o n  
concern ing  s t r ik e s  in  e s s e n t ia l  s e rv ic e s .  During the  cu rrency  
o f the p roc lam ation  the m in is te r  ad m in is te r in g  the  Act has ex­
te n s iv e  powers to  c o n tro l o r re g u la te  any e s s e n t ia l  s e rv ic e , 
as a lso  d e fin ed  above.
Q’LD. s t a t e  T ranspo rt Act 1938: The Governor in  Council may proclaim
a s ta t e  of emergency i f  f o r  any reason  he co n sid ers  t h a t  the 
’p eace , w e lfa re , o rd e r , good government, or the  p u b lic  s a f e ty ’ 
o f the  S ta te  a re  ’ im p e r i l le d ’ . During the  curreB cy o f th e
S.A.
3.
N.S.W.
Q ’LD.
S.A.
W.A.
proclamation the Governor in Council has unlimited power 
to mave regulations: penalties, £100 in the case of any
person, or as specified by regulation.
s,/ W , ncy TJover\s A.ct 1°/.1r Confers ° wide and standing 
power on the State government to make regulations: penalties,
£200 and imprisonment for 12 months.
- - - oOo - - - 
General Penal Provisions
All strikes are illegal if begun before the expiry of 14 days 
after a notice of intention to strike has been given in writ­
ing to the Minister for Labour and Industry: penalties, for
Ttaking part in or aiding or abetting* an illegal strike, £500 
in the case of a union registered under the State Trade Union 
Act; for aiding or instigating, £50 or 6 months’ imprison­
ment in the case of a person, and. £100 in the case of a news­
paper publisher or Proprietor; for attempting to induce someone 
to take part in an illegal strike (this is directed against 
picketing), £10 or 1 month’s imprisonment.
It is an offence, regardless of whether a strike is illegal, 
to try to persuade or compel anyone to ban the handling of any 
article or commodity in sympathy with the strike: penalties,
£100 in the case of a registered trade union, and £10 or i 
month’s imprisonment in the case of an individual. >
All strikes are illegal unless they have been ’authorized1 
and, in the case of unorganized workers or of a union operat­
ing outside the State arbitration system, authorization is 
constituted by a favourable vote in a secret ballot conducted 
by the State Industrial Registrar among the employees concerned: 
penalty, in the case of any Person taking part in, instigating 
or aiding an unauthorized strike, £10.
All strikes are illegal; penalties for taking part in, £500 
in the case of any union or person or, in the case of a person, 
imprisonment for 3 months.
All picketing is illegal: penalties, £20 or imprisonment for
3 months.'
All strikes are illegal, and it is an offence to participate 
in a strike or to make a gift or donation to a striker or to 
a union with striking members: penalty, £50 in the case of
any individual.°
oOo - -
4 * Penal Provisions Applicable only within 
Industrial Regulation Systems:9
STATUTES10
11C wealth There is  no express prohibition of strikes as such. But 
i t  is  an offence for a union o ffic ia l or agent to advise or 
encourage a unionist bound by an award to refrain  from 
accepting or offering for work or from working in accordance 
with the guard, to use *go-slow* methods or otherwise lim it 
output, or to depart from customary work-procedures; i t  is  
also an offence for an o ffic ia l to try  to hinder or prevent 
a unionist bound by an award from accepting or offering for 
work, from working or from complying with the awards 
penalty, £100. 2
An offence for a registered union to impose (or state an 
. v . intention to do so) a penalty on a member because he is  work­
ing (has worked or intends to) in accordance with an award: 
penalty, £100. 12
N.S.W. 1. Any strike in an industry wholly or partial ly  covered by 
a State award or registered industrial agreement is illegals 
penalties, as in the case of strikes in  general.'^
2. Failure to comply with an order of the C6al Industry 
Tribunal is  an offences penalty, £100 and imprisonment for 
6 months.1 5
16Victoria No provision of th is character.
Q’LD. An offence for a person to take part in , instigate or aid a 
strike not authorized by the registered union concemed(a 
strike is  authorized a fte r a majority of union members affect- 
ted have voted for i t  by secret ballo t, and the Industrial 
Registrar has been informed of the ballo t resu lts and details) 
penalties as in  the case of unauthorized strikes in general, 
plus a fine of £100 against a registered union*17
S>A. An offence in  the nature of a strike to refuse or neglect, 
without *reasonable cause or excuse*, to accept or continue 
to work on the terms of an award or determinations penalties 
as in the case of illeg a l strikes in general, plus a prohib­
itio n  against the Industrial Court making i t s  awards or orders 
retrospective where any of the employees or a union concerned 
have been connected with a s trik e .
W.A. An offence for members of a registered union to take part in 
a strike or for a union to order i ts  members to refuse to 
accept employment in order to enforce employee-demands: 
penalty, £500 in  the case of a union.
An offence fo r a member of a registered union to refuse or 
neglect to accept employment, *without reasonable cause or 
excuse*, on the terms of a binding industria l agreements
Tasmania
C*wealth
W.A.
C*wealth
1 Öpenalties as in the case of strike action generally.lo 
It is a condition of the registration of a union that its 
rules should prescribe, first, that all industrial disputes 
involving the union must be referred for settlearnt within 
the arbitration system if not settled byconsent; and, second, 
that no part of the union* s funds may be applied in connection 
with a strike within the State: these rules are enforceable
by the Arbitration Court,
An offence for trade unions, their members and aaployees 
generally to adviSe, take part in or assist a strike concern­
ing a matter covered by a wages board determination: penalties
£500 in the case of a trade union, £20 in the case of an 
individual.
AWARDS AND DETERMINATIONS19
The standard clause, inserted in a number of appropriate 
awards, forbids unions bound by the award to be * in any way, 
whether directly or indirectly...a party to or concerned in 
any ban, limitation or restriction upon the performance of 
work in accordance with this award1 •
Many awards require the employee to work •reasonable* amounts 
of overtime at the prescribed overtime wage rate, and forbid 
unions concerned to be * in any way, whether dirdctly or in­
directly, a party* to a ban or limitation on the »working of 
overtime *•
Some awards are restricted to the prohibition of go-siows, 
forbidding a union, any group of employees or an employee to 
»limit the <i»ount of work [or3 restrict the rates or quantity 
of output*.
Penalties, as for breaches of awards: £100 in the case of a
union, and £10 in the case of a union member. The standard 
type of anti-strike clause usually prescribes that a new and 
separate breach of the clause is committed by the union for 
every day of the strike, in which case the union.is liable to 
the maximum penalty for each day its members are on strike.^
The standard clause, inserted in an appropriate award, usually 
only were a strike exists orlireatens, prescribes that any 
stoppage of work by members of unions.concerned constitutes 
a breach of the award by the unions*, penalty, £500 as for 
breach of award.23
LABOUR INJUNCTIONS
The Industrial Court may order compliance with an award and 
enjoin a registered union or a person from c ommitting or 
continuing a Contravention of the Act or a breach or non-ob­
servance of an award. Failure to comply with an order con­
stitutes contempt of the Court: penalties, £500 in the case
N.S.W.
of a union, £200 or imprisonment for 12 months in thecase
24of a union official, and £50 in the case of a union member.
The Industrial Commission may issue orders: penalties for
strikes in general are applicable.
Victoria No provision.
Q*LD. The Industrial Court may issue orders, whether or not a strike 
is ‘authorized1® penalties for strikes in general are applic­
able, plus £100 in the case of an individual who disobeys 
an order.
S.A. The Industrial Court may issue orders: penalties for strikes
in general are applicable.
W.A. The Arbitration Court may issue orders. Failure to comply 
constitutes contempt of the Court, which has the same power 
to punish contempts as the State Supreme Court: penalties, 
fines and prison sentences. ^
Tasmania No provision.
--- - oOo - - -
5. The Powers of Arbitration Courts 
to Deregister Striking Unions2®
C*wealth The Industrial Court may cancel the registration of a union 
tinder the C. & A. Act for any reasons it considers good or, 
specifically, if the union wilfully neglects to comply with 
an order of the Court (e.g., one directing that a strike be 
ended).
N.S.W. The Industrial Commission may cancel a union*s registration 
under the Industrial Arbitration Act for any reasons it con­
siders good or, specifically, if the union has aided or in­
stigated an illegal strike bv another union.
Q*LD. The Industrial Court may suspend or cancel a union’s regis­
tration under the I.C. & A. Acts for any reasons it considers 
good or, specifically, if the union has wilfully neglected 
to obey an order of the tribunal.
S.A. The Industrial Court may cancel the registration of a union 
under the Industrial Code for any reasons it considers good 
or, specifically, if the union wilfully neglects to c omply 
with an order of the Court.
W.A. The President of the Arbitration Court alone is empowered to 
cancel the registration of a union under the Industrial Arbit­
ration Act for any reasons he considers good or, specifically, 
if a union has wilfully neglected to comply with an order of
6.
Cfwealth
the Court or has failed to observe its own rules: the latter 
ground is relevant here in view of the fact that a registered 
union in W.Ä. is required by statute to include what is in 
effect a strike-prohibition in its rules as a condition pre­
cedent to registration. *8
The Effects of Deregistration: The main effect of deregistration 
is to deprive a union of the right to initiate proceedings for 
an award or variations of an award before the relevant arbit­
ration court. Except in South Australia and possibly Queensland 
(in the latter case under the provision allowing at least twenty 
employees to be represented before the Industrial Court) dereg­
istration also prevents a union being represented in award 
proceedings at any stage.
Deregistration further lays a union open to the threat of the 
registration of a rival union (with the right to represent the 
class of employees concerned before the court to the exclusion 
of the old union) as a consequence of the general policy against 
recognizing more than one organization in a given field. In 
the Federal jurisdiction the award obtained by a union is auto­
matically cancelled on the union*s deregistration, subject to an 
order which the Industrial Court may make declaring the award 
to have full force in all respects apart from the benefits to 
which the deregistered union and its members were formerly en­
titled under it. The effect of such an order, by virtue of the 
constitutional pre-eminence of Federal awards over State awards 
and legislation, is to prevent employers who are parties to the 
Federal award being bound by a State award in relation to their 
employees who are members of the deregistered union: see, e.g.,
Eggleston, in Essays on the Australian Constitution (Else-Mitchell 
ed.), 199* Of the State arbitration court jurisdictions, only 
in N.S.W. is the deregistration power directly linked with power 
to cancel a relevant award or agreement, but cancellation is 
not automatic as in the Commonwealth and is at the discretion 
of the Industrial Commission. Cancellation of relevant awards 
in these circumstances is, of course, available in the other 
jurisdictions under the Court*s general powers.
- - - «Oo - --
Strike Ballots
The Arbitration Commission, composed of at least three members 
including a presidential member, may order a secret ballot where 
a union registered under the C. & A. Act is concerned in an 
industrial dispute within the Commissions jurisdiction and the 
Commission considers that the views of its members or any part 
of them should be ascertained: penalties for obstructing a
ballot, £50 or imprisonment for 6 months.29
m
N.S.W. The Minister for Labour and Industry may direct the taking 
of a secret ba llo t to ascertain whether a majority of those 
concerned are in favour of the str ik e , and he may exercise  
th is power whenever he has reason to believe that a strike is  
contemplated by a union or at any time, or from time to  time, 
during the progress of a strike whether or not i t  i s  i l le g a l:  
penalties for obstructing a b a llo t, £50 or imprisonment for  
6 months .3^ Applicable to  unions inside and outside the 
State arbitration system.
Q'LD. A secret ba llo t must be taken of the employees concerned, by 
the union i t s e l f  in  the case of a union registered under the 
I.C . & A. Acts, or by the Industrial Registrar in a l l  other 
cases, before a strike may be A uthorized.*31
W.A. The Arbitration 6ourt may order a matter to be submitted to a 
vote by secret b a llo t of the members, or a section of them, of 
a registered or deregistered union where the Court considers 
that their  views ought to be ascertained: the ballo t to  be
conducted by a State o f f i c i a l . 32
Notes:
1. The term ‘boycott* includes a refusal to accept employment wh|re 
i t  i s  normally accepted by those concerned: (1928) 41 C.L.R.?A136.
2. A ll penalties noted in th is  Appendix are maxima.
3* The Act was held to be a valid exercise of the Commonwealth*s
general industrial and incidental powers under the Constitution:
(1949) 79 C.L.R. 333.
4* There appears to be some doubt about the constitutional v a lid ity  
of these provisions: see Foenander, Studies in  Australian Labour
Law and Relations. 8n.
5. Industrial Arbitration Act.
6. Industrial Conciliation and A rbitration  Acts.
7 . Industrial Code.
8 . Industrial Arbitration Act.
9 . The provisions dealt with here are additional to those applic­
able to strikes in  general in  the State jurisd iction s.
10. C*wealth, C. & A. Act 5 N.S.W., Ind. Arb. Act; V ic ., Lab. &
Ind. Act; Qd., I.C . & A. Acts; S.A ., Ind. Code; W.A., Ind.
Arb. Act; Tas., Wages Bds. Act.
11. Such a provision i s  within the le g is la tiv e  power of the Federal 
Parliament (23 C.L.R. 226), and was included in the original
C. & A. Act u n til deleted in 1930*
12. I t  i s  a statutory defence against prosecution to prove that there 
are reasonable grounds for such conduct, provided they are un­
related  to the terms of the award or arise from an employer*s 
fa ilu re  to observe the award.
13. A ll these provisions apply to unions operating under any 
arbitration tribunal established under Federal leg is la tio n .
14. A strike i s  i l le g a l  even where i t  represents an attempt to force
C i 9
* ? <r
an employer to observe an award or industrial agreement (0913]
A.R. (NS.W.) 35). The Act permits a union to withdraw from 
an award that has operated more than 12 months if approved by 
a secret ballot of its members, conducted as prescribed. The 
strike-prohibition relating to industrial agreements also affects 
unions registered solely under the Trade Union Act which are em­
powered to conclude such agreements.
15. Coal Industry Act 1946-55 (N.S.W.).
16. The only statutory anti-strike sanction applicable solely within 
the State wages board system appears to be the minister^ power 
to suspend a determination, which is outlined in the text.
17. Although a union avoids certain statutory penalties «rid is form-
given the right to strike after fulfilling the requirements 
regarding ‘authorization1, this does not preclude the State 
Industrial Court from taking other action and imposing other 
penalties within its power and an aithorized strike may still be 
declared illegal by the Court: (1949) 43 Q.J.P. 97.
18. Under the Act, this prohibition is not specified as applicable 
in relation to awajbds •
19. Strike-prohibitions in awards are of greatest importance in
the Federal jurisdiction where no general prohibition is contain­
ed in the Act. There is less need for award provisions of this 
sort in the States since in all cases but Victoria general stat­
utory prohibitions are in force; their use in W.A. appears to 
have arisen from special conditions which are outlined" below in 
note 23.
20. This clause first appeared in 1951 in the Metal Trades Award (71 
C.A.R. 507). Earlier anti-strike clauses varied in their terms, 
some prohibiting strikes aimed at enforcing demands about matters 
covered by the award (e.g., 35 C.A.R., at 433), others prohibit­
ing strikes aimed at enforcing any demaids if such action was 
‘unreasonable* (e.g., 68 C.A.R., at 547). The present standard 
clause applies in the case of a concerted refusal to accept em­
ployment on award conditions as well as a cessation of work;
the circumstances in which the clause was first inserted in the 
Metal Trades Award involved union action in both these ways. In 
the absence of such a clause employees are not obliged to accept 
employment on award conditions and even a concerted refusal to do 
so is not a breach of the award (21 C.L.R. 642). Further force 
is given the standard clause by the fact that it makes the union 
responsible for unofficial as well as official strikes.
21. The High Court held by a majority that the repeal of the statut­
ory anti-strike provisions in 1930 did not present the insertion 
of clause* in awards on these lines (54 C.L.R. 626). It seems 
that a clause of this sort is valid so long as the strike action 
prohibited relates to any industrial matter defined by the Act, 
whether or not it is covered by the terms of the award (54 C.L.R.^>43)
22. These penalties are not now usually relied on since heavier pen­
alties are available under statutory provisions relating to labour 
injunctions: see note 24.
5 * &
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24.
25.
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28*
29.
30.
31.
32.
This procedure was customarily followed before September 1952 
because i t  enabled a fine of £500 to be imposed on a union for 
strike action as a breach of the relevant award, whereas the 
corresponding general penalty available against striking unions 
was only £100. The procedure was resorted to during the metal 
trades strike early in 1952: see, e .g ., 32 W.A.I.G. 78. Simil­
arly , in relation to individual union o ffic ia ls  and s trik e rs , use 
of the injunction was preferred during th is  strike (see, e .g .,
32 W.A.I.G. 80) because breach of an injunction was subject to 
a fine of up to £100 as against the £10 which was the maximum 
amount that individuals could be fined under the general anti­
strike provisions of the Act. The amendment to the Act passed 
in  September 1952, however, raised the general penalties for 
strike action to £500 in  the case of industrial unions and £50 
in the case of an individual, and therefore appears to have made 
the previous circuitoiöprocedure largely redundant«
Because th is  procedure enables heavier penalties to be imposed 
than in the case of breach of an award, i t s  use has been preferred 
in recent years. The normal procedure is  as follows: employers
concerned apply to the Arbitration Commission for the insertion 
in  the award of the standard an ti-strike clause and of a clause 
enabling them to »stand-down* employees not taking part in the 
s trik e , then an order restraining breach of the an ti-s trike  clause 
is  obtained from the Industrial Court; and on the union* s fa i l­
ure to comply with the order, proceedings for contempt of the 
Court are begun.
See note 23 above regarding the use of th is  power.
The grounds for deregistration given here are only those which may 
be d irectly  connected with strike action. In a l l  cases there are 
other statutory grounds specified also.
This power may well be vested in the Arbitration Commission, or 
some other body, since i t  is  not a judicial power under the Con­
s titu tio n  C( 1925) 36 C.L.R. 442); and i t  appears that the Indust­
r ia l  Court is  incompetent to exercise a power of th is sort ((1957) 
31 A.L.J. 670).
See (1936) 16 W.A.I.G. 349.
C. & A. Act. This power has usually, i f  infrequently, been used 
where a strike is  in progress or threatens.(See Appendix VIII.
Ind. Arb. Act. See Appendix VIII.
I.C . & A. Acts. See Appendix VIII.
Ind. Arb. Act. See Appendix VIII.
APPENDIX TT 5 ■ 5
Commonwealth _
The Terms of Pr eference Clauses and Attached 
Conditions in  Awards and Agreements: 1954
1. Arbi tr a t io n  Commission Awards
(a) Preference Clauses:
Compulsory Unionism:
In  th e  case o f the  s ix te e n  aw ards,
o th e r  than  those  r e s t r i c t e d  to  th e  A u s tra lia n  C a p ita l T e r r i to ry ,  a l l  
were e i th e r  consen t awards o r t h e i r  compulsory unionism  p ro v is io n s  
had been the  su b je c t of co n sen t. Of th e se  compulsory unionism  
c lau se s  e ig h t ,  a l l  of which were in  awards r e l a t in g  to  j o u r n a l i s t s ,  
s t ip u la te d  sim ply  th a t  i t  should  be ’’c o n d itio n  o f employment” of a 
new employee th a t  he should  be o r become a member o f the  un io n .
Two c lau ses  p re sc r ib e d  th a t  a l l  employees should  be , o r become 
w ith in  a s p e c if ie d  time of t h e i r  engagement, f in a n c ia l  members of 
the  union: one of th e se  two, which was a p p lic a b le  on ly  to  Queensland,
though the  award i t s e l f  was o f w ider a p p l ic a t io n ,  a lso  e la b o ra te d  a 
procedure in  reg a rd  to  the  d ism is sa l o f u n f in a n c ia l  u n io n is ts  and to  
the  n o s i t io n  o f members e x p e lled  fo r  reasons o th e r than  a f a i lu r e  to  
pay dues. Four c la u s e s , one o f them in  an award confined  to  the 
N orthern T e r r i to ry ,  o rov ided  in  th e  f i r s t  p lace  th a t  ab so lu te  p re fe r ­
ence in  employment should  be given to  members of the un ion , and in  
the  second o lace  t h a t  a l l  n o n -u n io n is t emoloyees should become members 
w ith in  a s n e q if ie d 't im e . One c la u se , a p p lic ab le  on ly  to  New South 
Wales b u t in  an award which a ls o  covered V ic to r ia ,  Tasmania and Mount 
Gambier, p rov ided  th a t  on ly  members o f th e  union could be employed by 
the  em ployer. F in a l ly ,  one award, r e s t r i c t e d  in  a p p lic a t io n  to  
the  N orthern  T e r r i to ry ,  in c lu d ed  an unusual c lau se  in v o lv in g  im p l ic i t  
compulsory unionism : i t s  p ro v is io n s  s t ip u la te d  th a t  the  employer
should n o t pay to  any n o n -u n io n is t employee any o f th e  b e n e f i ts  p ro­
v ided  by  th re e  o th e r  s p e c if ie d  c lau se s  of th e  award -  th ese  d e a l t  w ith  
nayment, r e s o e c t iv e ly ,  fo r  o u b lic  h o lid a y s , annual leave  and s ic k  le a v e .
The 23 compulsory unionism  c lau ses  in  awards a p p lic a b le  s o le ly  to  
the  A.C.T. fo llow ed a s tan d a rd  fo rm ula. In  th e  f i r s t  p lace  i t  was 
p re sc r ib e d  th a t  f i r s t  p re fe re n c e , o th e r  th in g s  being e q u a l, should be 
given to  e x -serv icem ent w ith  s a t i s f a c to r y  reco rd s  of s e rv ic e , and 
th a t  second p re fe ren ce  should  be g iven , on th e  same te rm s, to  members 
o f the d es ig n a ted  union  -  o r in  some cases to  u n io n is ts  g e n e ra lly .
In  th e  second p lace  i t  was s t ip u la te d  th& t any employee, o th e r  than  
an ex-serv icem an , who was n o t a member o f the  re le v a n t union must make 
a p p lic a t io n  to  jo in  w ith in  a s p e c if ie d  tim e of h is  engagement or of 
the  da te  on which the  award was nub1ish ed .
A bsolute P re fe ren ce :
Ten o f th e se  c lau se s  s t ip u la te d  sim ply, 
w ith o u t q u a l i f i c a t io n ,  t h a t  ^ re fe ren ce  should be given t o  members,
usually financial members were specified, of the designated union: 
two of these clauses, though the awards as a whole had a more gen­
eral coverage, applied only in regard to South Australia, and one 
other was applicable only in ’States where an employee is required 
by law (Commonwealth or State) to join an organization of employees’! 
Three clauses prescribed that preference should be given to financ­
ial members of the union and to applicants who undertook to join 
the union within a specified period of their accepting employment.
Two clauses, one of which was confined in apolication to Queensland 
though the award itself was more general, provided for preference to 
be given to unionists subject to suitability, and if no suitable 
unionist was available preference was to be given unconditionally to 
a non-unionist applicant who undertook to become a union member within 
a specified period after his engagement. Finally, one clause in 
this category stipulated unconditionally that preference was to be 
riven to members of the union at the point of engagement and also 
laid down in detailed terms a procedure whereby unionists were to 
be given absolute preference in regard to the continuity of employment
Qualified Preference:
Twentytwo of these clauses,including 
those of the four A.'C.T. awards,were content with the requirement 
that preference in employment was to be riven to unionists, other 
things being equal, as between members of the union and other persans 
offering or desiring service or employment at the same time. One 
clause repeated these provisions but modified them with the stipul­
ation that such preferencewis not to operate against the members of 
other unions covered by tfe« Commonwealth awards. Two clauses 
stipulated that preference, other things being equal., should be given 
to unionists in both the engagement and dismissal of employees. One 
clause specified merely that ’preference’ should be given to members 
of the union, but excluded this requirement so far as certain work, 
classified in the award,was concerned.
(b) Conditions Attached to Preference Glauses:
Open Union:
Twentytwo of the ojben union require­
ments were in awards restricted to the A.C.T., and were part of the 
standard A.C.T. compulsory unionism clause, stipulating that in the 
event of the union’s rules being altered to restrict in any way the 
admission of new members,the preference and compulsory unionism 
provisions were to cease to have effect. Of the fifteen open union 
requirements in general Commonwealth awards, ten accompanied com­
pulsory unionism provisions. Twelve of these requirements stipulated 
briefly that the union should admit to membership any person who was 
eligible or was of good character. Two provided that the union might 
refuse applications for membership by eligible persons only for a good 
cause which was approved by the Board of Reference established under 
the award. One clause, more elaborate than the others, provided 
that any employee whose application for membership was rejected, or 
who had been expelled for a reason other than a failure to pay his
dues, should be deemed to be a unionist for the purposes of the 
award - including the preference clause.
Fee Restriction:
The one provision -of this sort set 
out in detail the maximum fees and subscriptions which the union 
might charge and the way in which they should be paid, and stipulated 
that only so long as these terms were a dhered to by the union would 
the preference provisions of the award be applicable.
Conscientious Objectors;
The compulsory unionism clauses of 
the six awards, all relating to journalits, that provided for the 
exemotion of conscientious öbjectors from the terms of the clause, 
each prescribed that an employee might be- exempted ifrom joining the 
union if he made a statutory deceleration that he had conscientious 
objections to doing so and forwarded a c opy of the declaration to a 
specified official of the union: in one case it was added that in
addition to fulfilling these reouirements the conscientious objector 
should demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Industrial Registrar 
that his declaration was made in good faith.
(c) Anti-discrimination Clauses:
Ten of the anti-discrimination prov­
isions orescribed that the employer should not discriminate against 
members of the union in regard to the engagement, oromotion or dis­
missal of employees.^ Four provided that such discrimination should 
not be exercised in relation to the employment or dismissal of employees. 
Two prohibited discrimination as far as the employment only of workers 
was concerned. One limited its prohibition in this respect to the 
dismissal of employees. Eight consisted of a general prohibition 
against any discrimination whatsoever.One provision, applicable 
only to Victoria, though the award as a whole was of wider application, 
provided that employers should not discriminate in the engagement or 
dismissal of employees against members of the designated union, and 
that they should not discriminate in favour of the members of any 
union other than the designated organization. One provision simply 
indicated that as the employers had undertaken not to discriminate 
against the members of the union, !no express stipulation for prefer­
ence in favour of such members1 was included in the award. Some of 
these clauses provided also that in the ©ondubt of his business the 
employer should do nothing with a view to injuring the union, directly 
or indirectly.
- - - 0O0 - - -
2 • Coal Industry Tribunal Awards
(a) Preference Clauses: 
Compulsory Unionism:
Of the two compulsory unionism
clauses, one, applicable to deputies and shotfirers in the Maitland 
and Newcastle coal fields of New South Wales, stipulated simply that 
all employees affected should become members of the union within a 
certain time after their engagement. The other, covering Queensland 
miners, repeated the standard clause inserted in awards made by the 
Industrial Court of that Stete, providing in the first place that 
preference of employment should be given to financial members of the 
union or to persons who gave an undertaking to become members within 
a specified time; and in the second place, that no non-unionist 
employee should be continued in employment unless he had applied for 
membership within a specified time after he had been engaged or after 
the award had come into effect.
Absolute Preference:
These four clauses prescribed absolute 
preference in identical terms, each providing simply that preference 
of employment should be given to aplicants who were members of a union 
which was registered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbit­
ration Act.C
Qualified Preference:
The one clause in this category was
applicable only to Queensland though the award as a whole also covered 
engine drivers employed in the New South Wales, Victorian and Tasman­
ian coal industries: it prescribed that a unionist should be given
Preference subject to his possession of fgood fame and character' and 
the requisite qualifications.^
(b) Conditions Attached to Preference Clauses:
The only condition explicitly
attached in this way was one restricting fees. It accompanied a com­
pulsory unionism clause, and stipulated that the entrance fee prescribed 
by the rules of the union at the date on which the award was made should 
not be increased without the consent of the Industrial Registrar of the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court - a provision that was unique in its terms.
- - - 0O0 - - -
3• Public Service Arbitrator Determinations 
Preference Clauses:
The two preference clauses both Provided
for absolute preference in identical, terms, stipulating that prefer­
ence in employment should be given to financial members of the 
designated union and to persons undertaking to become members 
within a specified time after their accepting employment. Both 
these clauses were indeterminations covering employees of the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission.
- - - 0O 0  - - -
4• Certified_ Agreements
(a) Preference Clauses: 
Compulsory Unionism:
One compulsory unionism clause
stipulated simply that all employees must be or become members of the 
union within a specified period. The clause was restricted in 
application to Queensland, but the agreement as a whole was more gen­
erally applicable. The other clause, in an agreement covering the 
Northern Territory, required the employer to notify the union before 
making any appointments, and to give absolute preference to members of 
the union; any employee not being, or becoming within a fortnight of 
his engagement, a member of the union was to be dismissed if the union 
requested this and a unionist was available and willing to do the work.
Absolute Preference:
The seven absolute preference
clauses were all couched in the ©Amplest terms, stipulating merely 
that preference of employment should be given to members of the desig­
nated union.
Qualified Preference:
The two qualified preference clauses 
provided for preference of employment to be given to members of the 
specified union conditional on competence.
(b) Conditions Attached to Preference Clauses:
Open Union:
The single open union requirement? 
accompanied a compulsory unionism clause; it provided that any 
employee whose application for membership was rejected, or who had 
been expelled for a reason other than a failure to pay his dues, should 
be deemed to be a unionist for the purposes of the award.
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(c) Anti-Piscrimination Clauses:
The four anti-discrimination
clauses prohibited discrimination against members of the relevant 
union, in general terms in two cases, and expressly in regard to 
engagement, promotion and dismissal in one case, and to engagement 
end retention in another case.
- - - 0O0 - - -
5. Industrial Agreements
(a) Preference Clauses;
Compulsory Unionism:
Six of the thirteen compulsory 
unionism clauses prescribed in the first place that preference should 
be given to unionists (absolute preference in the case of five, and 
qualified preference in the other one) at the point of engagement; 
and stipulated in the second place that in the event of a non-unionist 
being employed he must join the union. Five clauses laid down union 
membership Ps a condition of employment for any new employee in the 
industry concerned. The remaining two compulsory unionism provisions 
stipulated that all existing and future employees should be or become 
members of the union on pain of dismissal.
Absolute Preference:
Ten of the eleven clauses stip­
ulated merely that preference of employment should be given to members 
of the designated union, with the additional provision in one case that 
equal preference should be given to persons who undertook to join the 
union if engaged. The remaining clause in this category provided 
that absolute oreference should be given to financial members of the 
union at the point of engagement, and also required the employer to 
give reasonable notice of his intention to engage staff,and tih dismiss 
any emnloyee who failed to join the union when asked to do so if there 
was a unionist available and willing to take his job.7
Qualified Preference:
Of the nine qualified preference 
clauses, five relied on the 1 other things being equal1 formula. Three 
applicable to the continuity of employment as well a.s at the point of 
engagement, provided that no person other than a member of the union 
should be employed or continued in employment if there were unionists 
’willing, ready and competent to perform the work to the satisfaction* 
of the employer. The remaining clause prescribed preference to union­
ist applicants at the point of engagement conditional on their having 
’qualifications suitable’ to the employer.
q o ;
(b) Conditions Attached to Preference Clauses: c
Anti-Strike:
The single provision laid down,
in effect, that the terms of the preference clause were to cease 
to have effect in the event of a strike taking place without the 
authorization of the union’s executive, unless the strike was 
’of a minor nature'.
Open Union:
Five of the six provisions
directed that the union should not refuse membership to eligible 
persons applying in accordance with the provisions of the compulsory 
unionism clause. In the case of the sixth , itwAs stipulated 
that the compulsory unionism clause was not to operate where an 
applicant was refused admission to the union.
Fee Restriction:
The single provision of this
type directed that the compulsory unionism clause in the agreement 
was to cease operating in the event of the union1s entrance fee 
or weekly subscription being increased above a specified minimum.
Conscientious Objectors:
These three provisions were
each linked with compulsory unionism clauses. Two, one relating 
to metal workers and the other to motor workers, provided that an 
employee might be exempted from the compulsory unionism requirement 
if he had a bona fide conscientious objection to union membership 
in general, based on religious grounds, and if he filed a statutory 
declaration to this effect which included an undertaking to contribute 
to the funds of the union an amount equal to a member’s subscription. 
The third agreement, covering bank officials, provided for the exempt­
ion of employees from the compulsory unionism requirement if they 
made a statutory declaration of their conscientious objections to 
becoming union members.
(c) Anti-Discrimination Clause s:
Of the five anti-discrimination
clauses, two prohibited discrimination against unionists in any way; 
and the other three prohibited discrimination expressly in relation 
to the employment and dismissal of emolo7/ees.' In two cases, it was 
also added that the employer should do nothing in the conduct of his 
business with a view, directly or indirectly,^injuring the union.
8
Notes:
1. This award was made before the enactment of the N.S.W. compulsory 
unionism legislation; the provision seems to be directed at Qd.
qoQ
where a State award covering the industry as a common rule was ;
probably the 'lav/1 referred to.
2. This clause, in the Clothing Trades Award, was declared invalid 
by the High Court (81 C.L.R. $37) in 1950. The clause has been 
included in the survey as it was not deleted even though the award 
had been under consideration between 1950 and 1954; it was con­
solidated in 1953. Its provisions would apear, however, to be 
legally unenforceable,
3. Three awards, each applicable to more than one State, but divided 
into separate sections each dealing with one State, included more 
that one anti-discrimination clause. In such cases only one clause 
has been attributed to the award for present purposes.
4* Seven of these, all relating to ships’ officers or engineers, added 
that a State law or the determination of any State tribunal was 
invalid to the extent that it operated to compel employers to give 
preference of e mployment to members of the designated union or of 
any other union.
5. This is an unusual provision in that almost all preference clauses
in Australian awards and agreements in 1954 provided that the prefer­
ence prescribed should be given to the members of the union or unions 
specifically designated in the clause, or to ’the union’, meaning 
the organization partjr to the award or agreement.
4. Of the six awards without specific preference clauses, four (three 
covering miners and one deputies) referred to the continuance of 
existing customs and practices, which probably included compulsory 
unionism in view of the nature of this industry. The other two 
covered colliery staff employees.
7. This clause and one other were the only clauses in all the agreements 
and awards examined that expressly referred to ’absolute’ preference.
8. In one of these clauses it was added that members of the union should 
not be discriminated against because they were not members of another 
union.
9. The injunction that ’all workers shall work together in harmony1 
was added to one of these clauses.
APPENDIX V
Queenslgnd
The Terms of Preference Clauses and Attached 
Conditions in Awards and Agreements: 1954 
1. Industrial Court Awards 
(a) Preference Clauses:
oCompulsory Unionism:~
The terms of more than 90$ of the 
compulsory unionism clauses followed the same pattern,3 the only 
variation of any significance in this standard tyne being the extent 
to which union members were, in the first place, given absolute 
preference at the ooint of engagement. Most of the standard clauses 
opened with the stipulation that preference of employment should be 
given to financial members of the specified union or unions or to 
persons who gave an undertaking in writing to become financial 
members within a specified oeriod after their engagement; in other 
words, preference was given not only to the unionist but equally to 
the non-unionist who was orepared to become a union member. Nearly 
as common, however, was the initial requirement that preference of 
emoloyment should be given to financial union members and, ’if no 
such persons are available’, only then should preference be given 
to non-members prepared to give an undertaking to take out a union 
ticket: in other words, the unionist was entitled to first prefer­
ence, and the non-unionist willing to become a member was given 
second preference. The heart of this provision (the ’more or less 
standard clause of the Court on the question of preference’)^ lay in 
two requirements which normally followed the strictly preferential 
provisions of the clause. The first requirement was that no employee 
who was not a financial member of the union should be continued in 
employment unless he had made application to become a financial member 
within a specified time after his engagement or after the award came 
into force; and the second was that no employee might be continued 
in employment for* more than a specified period after the employer had 
been notified that the worker had neased to be a financial member of 
the union. In most cases both these requirements were included, but 
in some, one or the other - usually the second - was omitted, without 
impairing the general effect of the clause. A machinery provision 
often included in the standard clause laid down that no application 
for membership would be considered to have been made until the appro­
priate fee had been tendered to the union.
The r emainder of the compulsory unionism 
clauses were chiefly content with the brief stipulation that all 
employees covered by the award must be or become financial members of 
the specified union.
Absolute Preference: 5
Of the twentyfive clauses which ore- 
scribed absolute preference to unionists,^ twelve directed simply 
that preference was to be given to members, usually financial members, 
of the union. In four cases it was prescribed that preference was 
to be given to unionists or to persons who had applied for membership 
before their engagement. Nine clauses provided for equal preference 
to be given to unionists and to non-unionists who gave an undertaking 
to .join the union within a certain tlrnie after their engagement.
The provisions of these last nine clauses approach nearest to explicit 
compulsory unionism in that true preference to unionists, as such, 
is almost negligible; and it is likely that in the administration 
of such a clause, an undertaking by a non-unionist to join the union 
would tend to be interpreted as being more a pre-requisite of any 
employment at all rather than of preferential treatment. A number 
of these clauses directed that an employee who had failed to carry out 
such an undertaking was to be dismissed.
Qualified Preference:
Two of the five awards with qalified 
preference clauses, both applicable to the meat industry, prescribed 
preference to unionists subject to suitability and competence. The 
other three, covering seamen, prescribed preference subject to qual­
ifications and records. Though on their face these clauses fall 
into the least effective preference category, there were additional 
provisions in each case which suggest that in practice they would 
operate far more effectively than appears from a strict interpretation 
of thoir terms. Each of the three seamen’s awards provided for the 
engagement of men through the union office outside the normal pick- 
ing-up times; and one also provided, in relation to a person who had 
been employed before the date of the award and had been refused ad­
mission to the union, that he might be continued in employment ’not­
withstanding the fact that he is not a. member of the unimn,’ while 
another added that nothing in the clause should be construed to 
restrict the employers’ right to appoint all employees from members 
of the union. One of the meat industry awards provided for a list 
of unemployed union members to be mad^ aval, lable to the employer 
and kept up to date by the union; and the other provided for com­
pulsory unionism in regard to non-aporenticed juniors, as well as 
requiring the union to admit to membership all apprentices on comple­
tion of their term and any person employed in the industry at the 
date of the award.
(b) Conditions Attached to Preference Provisions:
Anti-Strike:
Three of the six anti-strike provisions 
laid down that the preference clause should remain in force only so 
lonr as the union submitted all disputes to the Court and refrained
from taking part in a strike. Two provided that in the event of 
a strike the employers might apply to the Court for the abolition 
of the preference orovisions. One anti-strike provision was applic­
able only in the case of a strike which was not sanctioned by the 
executive of the union, in which case, unless the stoppage was of 
a ’minor nature’, the preference clause was to cease to have effect 
in the area affected.
Open Union:
Sixteen of these provisions were attached 
to compulsory unionism clauses; four to absolute preference clauses; 
and two to qualified preference clauses. Twelve of them bound the 
union in regard to apolicants for membership generally, eleven stip­
ulating briefly that the union was to admit to membership any employee 
making application in accordance with the terms of the award’s pref­
erence clause, and one providing that any person whose application 
for membership had been refused, or who had been expelled for a reason 
other than failure to pay dues, was to be considered as a member of 
the union for the purposes of the award. The other ten open union 
requirements were applicable only to a. specified group of pefsons, in 
most cases non-unionist employees employed at the time compulsory 
unionism was inserted in the award. It was provided either that the 
union was bound to admit such Persons on applicatiqjn, or that if 
their applications for membership were refused by the union they 
might be continued in employment notwithstanding the provisions of 
the award - one stipulating that the preference clause di ould cease 
to apply in the event of such a refusal.
Fee Restriction:
In three awards it was provided that the 
preference clause should operate only so long as the union’s entrance 
fee did not exceed 5s.
(c) Anti-Discrimination Clauses:
One of the two clauses directed that 
employers should not discriminate in any way, either at the point of 
engagement or during the course of employment, against members of the 
specified union or any other members of a registered union. The 
other toolf the form of an undertaking by the employers’ organization 
that its members would not discriminate against members of the union 
either in engagement or during employment (the union gave a corres­
ponding undertaking not to object to the employment of non-unionists).
- - - 0O0 - - -
2, Industrial Agreements 
(a) Preference Clauses: 
Compulsory Unionism:
All but a few of these clauses followed
one o r o th e r  of the  v a r ia t io n s  o f th e  s tan d a rd  compulsory unionism  
c lau se  found in  aw ards, and d e sc rib ed  above. The rem ainder m ainly
d ire c te d w e re ly  th a t  a l l  employees should be o r become members of 
the  s p e c if ie d  un ion .
A bsolute P re fe ren ce :
Eleven of the fo u r te e n  c lau se s  p re sc r ib e d  
s im p ly w ith o u t q u a l i f i c a t io n ,  th a t  p re fe ren ce  should be given to  
f in a n c ia l  members o f the  u n io n . The rem aining th re e  re p ea ted  th ese  
term s b u t added th a t  equal -preference shduld  be given to  a p p lic a n ts  
who undertook to  jo in  the  un ion  w ith in  a  s p e c if ie d  tim e of t h e i r  
engagem ent.
Q u a lif ie d  P re fe ren ce ;
Each of the  th re e  c lau ses  p rovided  th a t  
p re fe ren ce  should be given to  u n io n is ts  w ith  th e  n ecessa ry  q u a l i f i c ­
a tio n s  and a b i l i t y  to  do the  work in v o lv ed . Two o f th ese  c lau se s  
showed s ig n s  of a s tro n g e r  brand of P referen ce  by v i r tu e  of a d d itio n ­
al p ro v is io n s  which suggested  th a t  lab o u r was norm alljr to  have 
r e c ru i te d  through the  u n io n .
(b) Condi t i o ns A ttached to  .P refe rence C lauses :
A n ti-S tr ik e :
The only  a n t i - s t r i k e  p ro v is io n  prov ided  
th a t  i f  a s t r ik e  a f f e c t in g  the in d u s try  o ccu rred , the employers might 
app ly  to  th e  In d u s t r ia l  C ourt f o r  the  a b o l i t io n  of p re fe re n c e , e i th e r  
w holly  o r p a r t i a l l y .
Open Union;
The two open union requ irem en ts co v e red  
c le r ic a l  w orkers employed by un ions; th ey  p rov ided  th a t  the  union  
should adm it to  membership any employee making an a p p lic a tio n  in  
accordance w ith  th e  term s of th e  agreem ent.
Not e s :
1. The g re a t bu lk  o f p re fe ren ce  c lau se s  o f a l l  types in  Queensland 
awards and in d u s t r ia l  agreem ents were e x p re ss ly  a p p lic a b le 'fo  
u n io n is ts  who were f i n a n c ia l  members o f t h e i r  un io n . P reference  
p ro v is io n s  in  th ese  term s may*not be a r l i e d  in  favour o f un- 
fin an c ia l. un ion  members: (194&) 31 Q .I.G . 115* The q u es tio n  
of the  f in a n c ia l  s tan d in g  of a member in v o lves n o t only  the  
payment of a l l  norm al fe e s  and s u b sc r ip tio n s  b u t a lso  th e  pay­
ment of f in e s  imposed by th e  un ion : see (1946) 161 Qd.G.G. 717. 
Under the  s tan d a rd  compulsory unionism  p ro v is io n s , the  onus i s  
on the  un ion  to  n o t i f y  the  employer t h a t  an employee has ceased 
to  be a f in a n c ia l  member o r has ceased  to  be a member a t
r c*'rip-
alls (1952) 46 Q.J.R. 83. Moreover, notification of this 
kind must be explicit and unambiguous in order to be sufficient: 
(1952) 46 Q.J.P.R. 70. On the other hand, where financial 
union membership is a condition of employment, the employer is 
under an obligation not only to ask applicants for employment 
whether they are financial members but also to ask them to 
produce evidence to this effect: (1935) 21 Q.I.G, 30.
2. A number of the clauses classified as prescribing compulsory 
unionism did so only in regard to permanent-, employees (i.e,, 
engaged on a weekly basis), and prescribed absolute preference 
in relation to casual workers.
3. A few of these clauses are restricted in application to the 
main towns and cities in the area covered.
4. (1951) 36 Q.I.G., at 410.
5. One of the clauses classified as absolute preference, prescribed 
such preference only in relation to pe^anent employees, but 
prescribed compulsory unionism for casuals.
6. It has been held that the employer is bound to carry out the 
Spirit1 of an absolute preference clause by taking all reason­
able steps, before filling a vacancy, to ascertain whether a 
unionist is available before employing a non-unionist: (1919)
13 Q.J.P.R. 90.
APPENDIX VT
Western Australia
The Terms of Preference Clauses and Attached 
Provisions in Awards and Agreements!1 1954 
1. Arbitration Court Awards 
(a) Preference Clauses:
Compulsory Unionism:
Thirteen of these clauses stipulated 
more or less briefly thpt all workers covered by the award were to 
be or become members of the unioh.^ Twelve prescribed in the first 
place that preference, qualified in ten cases and absolute in two, 
should be given to unionists at the point of engagement; and in 
the second place that any non-unionists who might be engaged or 
employed were to join the specified union within a certain period 
of their engagement. Two clauses provided in the first place that 
no discrimination should be exercised by employers in the engagement 
of employees, and in the second place that all non-unionist employees 
were to join the union within a specified time of their engagement.
Three clauses provided for unqualified preference to be given to 
members of the union at the point of engagement^and for qualified 
pref*rence, conditional on competence, to be given to them in relation 
to the continuance in employment of a non-unionist: they provided
further that it should not be a breach of the clause for an employer 
to employ a non-unionist if the latter apolied to join the union, 
within a specified time after his engagement. To this extent, these 
three clauses were identical to those which fall within the Qualified 
preference category below,- but they were converted into compulsory 
unionism requirements by virtue of' an additional stipulation that the 
employment of a non-unionist, who was in the employment of the employer 
at the date of the award, was to cease not later than 21 days from 
that date unless in the meantime the employee had become a union member.
Absolute Preference:
Nineteen of these clauses stipulated 
simply that preference of onployment should be given to members of the 
designated union or, in four cases, to members of any other recognized 
union^ provided that such members joined the designated union on the 
exoiry of their old ticket. Five clauses prescribed that preference 
of employment should be given to financial members of the specified 
union at the point of engagement, and further that the employer should 
not continue to employ a non-unionist if a unionist were available 
and produced reasonable proof of his experience in the class of work 
being done. One clause directed that qualified preference, condit­
ional on competence and qualifications, should be given to unionists,
b u t i t s  in c lu s io n  in  th i s  c a teg o ry  i s  j u s t i f i e d  by the a d d itio n  
o f a p ro v is io n  s t ip u la t in g  th a t  1 employees s h a l l  be s e le c te d  from 
the  l i s t s  s u p p lie d  by the  Unions th a ty p a r t ie s  to  t h i s  Award.'
Q u a lif ie d  P referen ce :
S5-X o f th e se  c lau se s  r e l i e d  on th e  'o th e r  
th in g s  being e q u a l ' fo rm ula. Seventeen prov ided  th a t  equal o r e fe r -  
ence o f employment should be g iven  to  members of the  d esig n a ted  u n ion , 
to  members of any o th e r  r e g is te r e d  un ion  p a r ty  to  an award o r in d u s t r ia l  
agreem ent in  th e  same in d u s try , and to  persons who gave th e  employer 
an u n d e rtak in g  to  jo in  a re le v a n t  union  w ith in  a s p e c if ie d  tim e a f t e r  
accep tin g  employment; such o re fe ren ce  was to  be given on ly  p rovided  
th a t  th e re  were members o f a r e le v a n t  un io n , o r in te n d in g  members, 
app ly ing  f o r  emoloyment a t  th e  same time a s , and e q u a lly  q u a l i f ie d  
w ith  o th e r w orkers o f fe r in g  t h e i r  s e rv ic e s  f o r  th e  same employment.
The rem aining f iv e  c lau se s  were framed in  term s which a t  f i r s t  s ig h t  
appear to  have p rov ided  a t  l e a s t  f o r  ab so lu te  o re fe re n c e , i f  no t 
f o r  compulsory unionism . However, as in te rp re te d  by the  C o n c ilia tio n  
Commissioner th e se  c lau se s  f a l l  in to  th e  q u a l i f ie d  p re fe ren ce  c a teg o ry . 
They prov ided  in  the f i r s t  p lace  t h a t  p re fe re n c e , w ith o u t q u a l i f i c a t io n ,  
should  be g iven to  u n io n is ts  a t  th e  p o in t o f engapement and, f u r th e r ,  
t h a t  an employer who employed a. n o n -u n io n is t would commit a breach  
of th e  award i f  d u ring  such employment th e re  were u n io n is ts  competent 
to  do the  work and a v a ila b le  and ready  to  do i t :  an a d d it io n a l  pro­
v is io n  in  each case s t ip u la te d  t h a t ,  n o tw ith s tan d in g  th e  above 
req u irem en ts , i t  would n o t be a b reach  o f th e  c lause  f o r  the  employer 
to  employ a n o n -u n io n is t i f  th e  l a t t e r ,  w ith in  14  days of the  beginn­
in g  of h is  employment, a p p lie d  to  jo in  the  un ion  and completed such 
a p p lic a t io n  on i t s  accep tance by th e  un ion .^
P reference  to  Employers:
These two c lau se s  were unique among A u s tra lian  
awards and agreem ents in  fo rce  a t  t h a t  tim e . Both p ro v is io n s , ^ccom^an 
y ing  compulsory unionism  c la u s e s , were d ra f te d  in  s im ila r  te rm s.
They p re sc r ib e d  th a t  p re fe ren ce  o f s e rv ice  was to  be g iven to  members 
of the  em ployers' o rg a n iz a tio n  by members of the  w orkers ' un ion , a 
member of the  union  being  h e ld  g u i l ty  of a b reach  of the  award i f  he 
was employed by an employer n o t a member o f the o rg a n iz a tio n  a t  a time 
when employers who were members had lab o u r vacan c ies .*
(b) jC onditions A ttached  to  P referen ce  C lauses:
A n ti-S tr ik e :
Two o f th e  tw entyseven a n t i - s t r i k e  p ro v is io n s  
were a tta c h e d  to  com pulsorv unionism  c la u se s ; th re e  to  ab so lu te  
p re fe ren ce  c la u se s ; and twentytwo to  q u a l i f ie d  p re fe ren ce  c la u s e s . 
Seventeen p rov ided  th a t  in  th e  even t o f a s t r ik e  in  th e  in d u s try , or
any restriction of output by a section of the workers acting in 
concert^ the operation of the preference clause would automatic­
ally cease to apply in relation to the union or unions involved. 
Seven Provisions stipulated that if the union or a majority of its 
members were concerned in anything in the nature of a strike, then 
the ^reference clause would cease to have effect. The corresp­
onding provisions in the remaining three cases were more limited: 
they laid down that the benefit of the preference clause should 
not apply to any worker who had taken part in a strike or ston- 
work meeting during the currency of the award.
Qoen Union:
Five compulsory unionism clauses and 
seventeen Qualified preference causes were accompanied by ooen 
union requirements. Twenty of these provided that the preference 
clause should, operate only if the rules of the union concerned 
permitted any worker of vood character, and with suitable qualif­
ications where necessary, to become a member on payment of the 
subscription and entrance fee laid down by the rules. Two 
prescribed that the operation of the preference clause was to 
cease if the union in any way obstructed the admission to member­
ship of a bona fide worker.
Conscientious Objectors:
*
The single provision of this sort accom­
panied a compulsory unionism clause. It provided that no worker 
with any *religious or other scruples’ about union membership should 
be compel.?ed to join the union, nor was it obligatory on the employ­
er in such a case to dismiss the employee concerned. If the union 
was dissatisfied with a conscientious objector’s reasons for not 
joining, it could refer the matter for determination by the Board 
of Reference set up under the Award.
(c) Anti-Discrimination Clauses:
Ten of these clauses prescribed that no 
employer should dismiss a worker, ’injure him in his employment, 
or alter his position to his prejudice,’ by reason merely of the 
fact that the worker was a member of the union or was entitled to the 
benefits of the award. Three clauses prohibited any discrimin­
ation by an empl oyer against unionists in the e mployment and 
dismissal!, of employees, one of these provisions adding a prohibition 
against auy employer doing anything in the conduct of his business 
with a view to injuring the union. The remaining clause prohibited 
discrimination against unionists, in relation to employment, where 
the available members of the union were capable of doing the work 
concerned and willing to accept employment.
2, W«A. Coal Industry Tribune 1 Awards 
(a) Preference Clauses:
The Tribunal’s four awards each included 
compulsory unionism clauses framed in almost identical terms.
They directed that all workers engaged by the employer should apply 
for membership of the designated union within a certain time of 
their engagement.
(b) Conditions Attached to Preference Provisions:
In the case of each of these four awards 
an identical open union requirement was attached to the compulsory 
unionism clause. The requirement stipulated that the union was 
to accept as members all. employees who applied, provided that they 
were persons of good character and tendered the entrance fees and 
subscriptions prescribed by the union’s rules.
- - - 0O0 - - -
3• Railways Classification Board Awards 
(8) Preference Clauses:
Both of the Board’s two awards included 
clauses prescribing absolute preference in identical terms: they
stipulated simply that preference in employment should be given to 
unionists.
- - - eOo - - -
4. Industrial Agreements
(a) Preference Clauses:
Compulsory Unionism:
Twentyfive of these clauses provided, 
more or less briefly, that all employees covered by the agreement 
were to be or become members of the relevant union.' Ten pre­
scribed, in the first place, that preference - absolute in nine cases 
and qualified in one - should be given to members of the designated 
union, or to unionists generally in the case of four clauses; and, 
in the second place, that any non-unionists employed should become 
members of the specified union within a given time. Two clauses 
began by prohibiting any discrimination against members of the 
union in regard to employment, and then directed that any non- 
unionists employed were to become members of the union within a 
specified time of their engagement.
Absolute Preference:
Twentynine of these clauses orescribed
briefly, and without other qualification, that ^reference in 
employment was to be given to members of the designated union - in 
most cases financial members only were specified. The other three 
clauses directed that preference should be given to members of the 
union orovided they were competent to do the relevant work: the
inclusion of these clauses in the category of absolute preference 
is justified by the additional provisions indicating that the bulk 
of labour engaged by the employer was to be obtained through the 
union office.
Qualified Preference:
Five of the eleven clauses provided for 
^reference to be given to members of the designated union conditional 
on either Tother things being equal' or other qualifications being 
equal. Four prescribed equal preference to members of the desig­
nated union, members of any other registered union party to an award 
or industrial agreement in the same industry, and to oersons who 
undertook to join such a union within a specified time after accept­
ing employment, provided that persons entitled to preference should 
be equally qualified with others offering their services for the same 
work at the same time. One clause directed ( in the same terms as 
those in awards which have been discussed in detail above)^ that 
members of the designated union should be entitled to preference 
at the noint of eng??ement and, given equal competence to do the work, 
in relation to the job of a non-unionist, provided that an employer 
might employ a non-unionist, and continue to employ him, if the 
non-unionist had applied within a specified period to join the union 
and had completed such application on its acceptance. Finally, one 
clause made provision for preference by implication; it laid down 
that the employer was to give the union one day's notice of any 
intention to engage new labour.
(b) Conditions Attached to Preference Clauses:
Anti-Strike:
Three of these nrovisions were attached 
to compulsory unionism clauses, and four to qualified preference 
clauses. Four of them stipulated that in the event of a strike in 
the industry concerned, or a restriction of output by workers in any 
section of it, the ^reference clause would cease to operate in rel­
ation to the union or unions concerned. Three provided that the 
preference provisions would cease to apply in the event of the union, 
or a majority of its members, taking part in anything in the nature 
of a strike.
Open Union:
Three open union requirements were attached to 
comoulsory unionism clauses and four to qualified preference clauses
Four requirements stipulated that the oreference provisions in 
favour of unionists should operate only if the unionfs rules 
permitted the admission to membership of any worker of good character, 
with the necessary qualification if any, on payment of the subscript­
ion and entrance fee prescribed by the rules. In one case the op­
eration of the oreference clause was conditional on the union not 
refusing to accept as a member any worker, eligible under the rules, 
who applied for membership in accordance with the rules. The 
remaining two orovisions simoly noted that the union had guaranteed 
to admit to membership any worker employed by the emoloyers concerned.
Conscientious Objectors:
These two provisions, both in agree­
ments covering journalists, orovided that an employee with ’conscient­
ious objections’ might be exemoted from the agreement’s compulsory 
unionism clause if he made a statutory declaration regarding his 
objections and forwarded it to the union secretary.
(c) Anti-Discrimination Clauses:
Tito of the four clauses prohibited,
in general terms, any discrimination against members of the union, one 
specifying unionists m/bh good conduct records and qualified to do 
the work involved, theA^stipulating that such discrimination should not 
be ’without just cause’ and specifying unionists with good conduct 
records who agreed to w ork according to the terms of the agreement 
(the latter added that the discrimination referred to ’was unjust 
discrimination in favour of persons not members of the union, not 
discrimination between members of the union’). One provision 
prohibited discrimination against members of the union in the engage­
ment of employees, while the remaining provision applied the prohib­
ition to both the employment and dismissal of unionists, and added 
that in the conduct of their business the employers should not do 
anything with a view to injuring the union.
Notes:
1. One clause included in this category prescribed compulsory 
unionism in regard to one group of employees and absolute 
preference in regard to others. The clause is not included in 
any other category.
2. See note 4 below.
3. The Court is reluctauit to grant an exclusive right of preference 
to the members of a. single union in an industry with which other 
unions are connected: (1940) 20 W.A.I.G. 4&2. Thus a compara­
tively high proportion of the preference clauses in Western 
Australian awards and industrial agreements are applicable not 
only to the members of designated unions but also to the members
of other registered unions, either in general or in regard 
to those connected with the industry. Nevertheless, on at 
least one occasion a oreference clause applicable to Hhe members 
of a number of unions concerned with the industry was amended 
to prescribe membership of the union that had obtained the 
award as an obligation on all employees irrespective of their 
former membership: (1953) 33 W.A.I.G. 212. The Court tool* 
this action in view of continual discutes over the question 
of union membership.
A. The Conciliation Commissioner held that, under a clause of this 
type, if a non-unionist and a unionist applied for employment 
at the same time, the employer was free to engage the non-union­
ist; a breach of the clause arose only if a competent unionist 
applied for the job at the end of the specified period - usually 
14 days - and the non-unionist employee had failed in the mean­
time to make application to join the union. The Commissioner 
ruled, therefore, that the unionist could, in the last analysis, 
claim preferential treatment only where he was eaually competent 
with the non-unionist employee, and the non-unionist had failed 
either to apply for union membership within the stipulated period 
or to complete an accepted application. There was thus no 
binding obligation on the employer to give preference at the 
point of engagement, on the Commissioner’s interpretation. He 
ruled also that the employer was under no obligation to ensure 
that a non-unionist employee had applied for membership of the 
union; nor was he obliged to find out whether competent union­
ists were available for employment: (1953) 33 W.A.I.G. 396.
Earlder, an industrial magistrate had held that, despite the 
absence of an express requirement to this effect in an absolute 
preference clause, it was obligatory for the employer to notify 
the union when labour of a specific kind was required: (1940)
19 W.A.I.G. 537.
5. Hairdressing (ladies) Award 1954, 34 W.A.I.G. 288; Hairdressers’
Award. 1951m 31 W.A.I.G. 543.
6. Two of the clauses in this category prescribed compulsory union­
ism in regard to oil« group' of employees -fetid absolute 'preference 
in regard-to -others. The clause is not included in any other category i n>-ove.
7. See note 4 a.bove.
APPENDIX VII
South Australia 
The Terms of Preference Clauses 
in Industrial Agreements
Preference Clauses:
All four of these clauses prescribed compulsory unionism.
Three directed simply that emoloyees covered by the agreement 
should be or become members of the union - financial member­
ship was specified in two cases - within a certain period.
One clause merely provided that employees who were not 
financial members of the union concerned i-/ould not be entitled 
to the benefits of the agreement.
No conditions were attached to any of these clauses.
ftnti-Disc^-mlnation guse:
The one clause of this type prohibited any discrimination 
against members of the union by the employers in the engage­
ment and dismissal of emoloyees, a.nd stipulated that in the 
conduct of their business the employers should do nothing 
with a view to injuring the union, directly or indirectly. 
This provision also enjoined that ’all workers shall work 
together in harmony.’
APPENDIX VIII
Australian Statutory Provisions Relating to 
Union Internal Affairs
Categories:
1* Constitution and Rules: General
2. Political Activities
3. Admission to Union Membership
4* Resignation from Union Membership
$. Enforcement of Union Rules: General
6. Expulsion from Union Membership
7. Union Elections
8. Fees, IXies, Fines and Levies
9. Ballots of Union Opinion 
10, Returns and Records
Explanation:
The categories into which the statutory provisions outlined 
below are grouped are roughly divisible into those connected with rule- 
making and those connected with rule-enforcing. The division, however, 
is not strict enough to enable the categories to be placed in a corre­
sponding order: to do this would mean, for example, that the provisions
concerning union elections would have to be split into two separate 
parts* While this procedure might make for a more systematic arrange­
ment of the material, it would certainly render it more difficult to 
obtain a clear picture of the statutory regulation of union elections, 
which is here considered the more important* It may be indicated, 
however, that categories 1-4, 9 and 10 relate solely to rule-making 
in the sense that the provisions in them either specify the sorts of 
things union rules must or may provide for, or lay down the actual 
terms of union rules, or direct that certain things connected with the 
internal management of unions must be done. On the other hafad, categories 
5 and 8 are concerned exclusively with the enforcement of union rules* 
Categories 6 and 7 contain elements of both rule-making and rule-enforce­
ment, The order of the categories thus represents a compromise between 
the divisions of rule-making and rule-enforcement and an estimation of 
the relative importance of the different categories.
The terms * trade union* and ‘industrial union* are used as 
defined in the text, an. ‘industrial union* being a union registered 
under an industrial arbitration Act and a ‘trade union* being one regis­
tered under a trade union Act or registered under no Act* Normally, 
however, apart from those affecting industrial unions, the statutory 
provisions outlined below relate only to registered trade unions, and 
where they apply also to unregistered trade unions this will be 
specified. In most cases trade unions* internal affairs are dealt with in 
the appropriate trade union Act, and industrial unions* in the relevant 
industrial arbitration Act«-- The exceptions, mainly registered trade 
unions affected by the N.S.W. Industrial Arbitration Act, are indicated 
where necessary.
1• Constitution and Rules: General
TRADE UNIONS
N.S.W. 1* In order to qalify for registration an applicant trade
union must make provision in its rules in relation to a number 
of specified matters, which are as follows; the name and 
meeting-place of the trade union; the whole of its objects; 
the purposes for which its funds may be expended and the 
conditions under which any member may become entitled to any 
benefit provided; the fines and forfeitures which may be 
imposed on members; the manner of making, altering, amending 
and rescinding rules; the investment of funds and a periodic 
audit of accounts; the inspection of the books and the list 
of members by anyone with an interest in the union* s funds; 
the appointment and removal of a general committee of manage­
ment and of officers; and the manner of dissolving the trade 
union. The conditions which must be included in rules dealing 
with political expenditure are laid down in detail; they are 
set out below under the heading of political activities. In 
addition, a registered union’s rules may provide for any other 
‘lawful object or purpose*, but it is expressly laid down that 
no rule may be registered which is ao ntrary to any term of 
provision of an award of the Industrial Commission.1
2. The Industrial Commission has a limited power to alter or 
annul a registered trade union’s rules; its jurisdiction in 
this respect is limited to rules relating to the admission of 
members.
3. The Registrar may cancel the registration of a trade union 
on proof that such registration has become void owing to one 
of the union’s purposes, as embodied in the rules, being 
unlawful.3
Victoria X A registered trade uninn’s rules must provide for the same 
matters as those enumerated in relatioh to N.S.W. (para. 1).
2. The registration of a trade union may be nancelled on the 
ground set out in relation to N.S.W. (para* 3).
Q ’LD. 1. Registered trade unions’ rules must provide for the same 
mattersas those specified above in relation to N.S.W. (para*
1), and must also require the keeping of separate accounts for 
particular funds and for the expenses of management. In addit­
ion, the rules of any trade union, whether registered or not, 
may make provision for ’any lawful objects’.
2. No amendment to any of the rules of a registered trade 
union is valid until registered by the Registrar.
3* The Registrar may cancel the registration of a trade union 
where he is satisfied that its constitution has been altered 
so that its ’principal objects’ are no longer’statutory objects 
or where the principal objects for which the union is ’actually 
being carried on* are not statutory objects*
S.A. 1. Registered trade unions* rules must provide for the
same matters as those enumerated above in relation to N.S.W. 
(para* 1), except that there is no requirement that such 
rules should specify the manner of the unions dissolution.
W.A. 1* A registered trade union*s rules must provide for the same
matters as those enumerated inirelation to N.S.W. (para* 1), 
and must in addition set out the terms of admission of members, 
the consequences of a failure by a member to pay a subscription 
or fine, the manner of holding meetings and the right of voting, 
and provide for an annual return to be made to the Registrar 
of the union*s accounts and list of members.
2,. No amendment to any of the rules of a registered trade 
union is valid until registered by the Registrar, who is prohib­
ited from registering an amendment that is in any respect illeg­
al or * contrary to public policy*.
3* The registration of a trade union may be cancelled on the 
ground set out in relation to N.S.W. (para. 3)*
Tasmania 1. A registered trade union* s rules must provide for the same 
matters as those enumerated in relation to N.S.W. (para* 1)*
2. The registration of a trade union may be cancelled on the 
ground set out in relation to N.S.W. (para. 3)*
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
C »wealth 1* As a condition of its registration, the rules of an applic­
ant union must specify the purposes for which it is fojtmed 
and the industry covered, and must also provide for certain 
enumerated matters: conditions of eligibility for membership;
the election of officers, committees and conferences; the 
powers and duties of officers and committees of management; 
the manner of removal of officers and members of committees; 
the control of committees of management by members; the manner 
of calling meetings; the times when and terms on which persons 
may become or cease to be members; the method of executing 
industrial agreements and other documents; the power of sub­
mitting industrial disputes to conciliation and arbitration; 
the way in which property is to be controlled and funds invest­
ed; the conditions on which funds are to be disbursed; the 
yearly audit of accounts; the office of the union and its 
branches; the alteration of the rules.^ The Act also lays 
down in detail the provision that must be made in relation to 
the election of officers; these are set out below under the 
heading of union electinns. Apart from these specified matters, 
a union*s rules may provide for any other matter *not contrary 
to law*; and it is specified that they may debar from holding 
or continuing in, or nominating for, a union office any person 
who is a member of an association advocating the violent over­
throw of established government, or who has advocated such a 
policy during the previous twelve months. Jt is stipulated 
that no rule shall be contrary to law, or to an order or award; 
tyrannical or oppressive; prevent members observing the law
or an order or award; or impose unreasonable conditions upon 
the membership of any member or on any applicant for membership» 
2» Any change in the name of a registered union7or an alter­
ation to its rules setting out the industry with which the 
union is connected and the conditions of eligibility for member­
ship, can have effect only if the Industrial Registrar, on- 
application to him, consents to the change or alteration.
Further, no alteration of any of the rules of a registered 
union can have effect until the Industrial Registrar has certi­
fied that, in his opinion, the alteration is not inconsistent 
with any statute, the regulations made under the C» & A. Act, 
or with any Federal award or order.
3» The Igdustrial Court is empowered to disallow or to direct 
the alteration of any rule of a registered union on any one of 
the following g r o u n d s t h a t  it is contrary to law or to an 
order or award made by a Federal authority;*5 that it is tyr­
annical and oppressive;9 that it prevents or hinders members 
from observing the law or the provisions of an order or award; 
or that it imposes unreasonable conditions upon the membership 
of any member or upon any applicant for membership.
4« The Industrial Court is empowered to cancel the registration 
of a union for reasons relating to the union*s rules: 1» These 
reasons axe that the rules do nfat comply with the conditions 
relating to registration, have not bona fide been observed, 
are contrary to the terms of an order or award, do not (or 
their administration does not) provide reasonable facilities 
for the admission of new members or impose unreasonable condit­
ions on the continuance of their membership, or are in any way 
‘tyrannical or oppressive*. Where the ground for deregistration 
is a defect in the union*s rules, the Court may direct their 
alteration to remedy the defect, making deregistration condition^ 
al on a failure to earry out such an alteration within a speci­
fied time.
1. Provisions applicable as in the case of registered trade 
unions. But, in addition, the Industrial Commission or the L>- 
dustrial Registrar may disallow, or direct the alteration of 
any proposed amendment to the rules of an industrial union - a 
power which will be exercised where the amendment is tyrannical, 
oppressive, contrary to law or to *the public interest*, or 
would impose unreasonable conditions on any qplicant for member­
ship.^
2. The registration of m  industrial union may be cancelled by 
the Industrial Commission for *any reasons which appear to it to 
be good*, which has been held to cover circumstances where a 
union*s rules are inconsistent with the Act.H
1. With its application for registration as an industrial 
union, a union must include copies of its rules and must indi­
cate rules setting out the whole of its objects,the conditions 
on which persons may become and continue to be members, the
fines and forfeitures to which members are liable, and the 
manner of making, amending and rescinding rules. Registration 
may be refused if the rules of an applicant union or their 
administration fail to provide reasonable facilities for the 
admission of new members, or if they impose unreasonable con­
ditions on the continuance of new members* membership, or if 
the rules are in any other way tyrannical or oppressive.
2# No alteration to the rules of a registered union is valid 
until approved and registered by the Industrial Registrar, who 
must first ascertain that the alteration does not conflict with 
the provisions of the Act or with any order or award made under it# 
3* The Industrial Court may deregister an industrial union if it 
appears that the union1 s rules or their administration do not 
provide reasonable facilities for the admission of new members or 
impose unreasonable conditions oh the continuance of their member­
ship, or are in any way tyrannical or oppressive#
1• As a condition of its registration, the rules of an applic­
ant union must make provisLon for a number of specified matters 
similar to those set out above in relation to registered trade 
unions in S.A.; in addition, such rules must define the powers 
and duties of the union*s committee of management and officers, 
and the terms on whbh persons may become and cease to be members# 
They may provide for any other matters *not contrary to law#*
2. No alteration to a registered union* s rules is valid until 
registered by the Industrial Registrar who must first ensure 
that all the statutory requirements have been complied with, 
and need not register an alteration if he considers that it 
would * prejudicially affect* the members of the applicant union 
or of any other union registered under the Act.'-’
3* The Industrial Court may deregister a union for reasons 
connected with union rules and their administration which are set 
out above in relation to Queensland (para. 3)5 in addition, 
rules failing to conform with the prescribed conditions of the 
Act is specified in S.A. as a ground for deregistration. ®
1# As a condition of registration, a union*s rules must provide 
for a number of specified matters similar to those set out above 
in relation to registered trade unions in W.A. In addition, 
such rules must define the powers and duties of the union*s 
committee of management and officers, and the terms on which 
persons may become and cease to be members; and they must express­
ly provide that nov person who is not a worker shall be a member, 
that the union*s property and funds shall not be used in connect­
ion with a strike within the State, and that all industrial dis­
putes involving the union shall be referred, unless settled by 
mutual consent, for settlement in accordance with the terms of 
the Act. A registered union*s rules must also fulfil certain 
requirements relating to union elections as laid down in. detail
by the Act; these requirements are set out below under the 
heading of union elections* The rules may also provide for 
any other matters *not inconsistent* with the Act or otherwise 
1 contrary to law1*
2. No alteration to a registered union*s rules is valid until 
registered by the Industrial Registrar, who must first ensure 
that it does not conflict with the provisions of the Act. But 
in the case of an alteration to the union *s * constitution* (i.e. 
as defined by the Act, the rules setting out qualifications for 
membership, the union*s purposes, and the area and industry 
over which it is authorized to operate), the approval of the 
President of the Arbitration Court is necessary.
3* The Arbitration Court may disallow or direct the alteration 
of any rule of a registered union on the same grounds as those 
accompanying the corresponding power in the Commonwealth, which 
are set out above in para. 3 (C*wealth)•
4. The Arbitration Court may deregister a union for reasons 
identical to those operating in S.A. and referred to in para. 3 
above (S.A.)'^
- - - oOo - --
2. Political Activities
TRADE UNIONS
N.S.W. A registered trade union may expend, funds for the * furtherance 
of political objects* subject to certain conditions which must 
be set out in the union* s rules; that political payments are 
to be made from a separate fund established for this purpose; 
that contribution to such a fund is not a condition of admiss­
ion to membership; and that a member who does not contribute to 
the political fund is not to be excluded, for this reason, from 
any union benefits or placed at any disadvantage as compared 
with other members.^®
Victoria No provisions.
Q ’LD. Any trade union, whether registered or not, is empowered to 
apply its funds to any lawful objects authorized by its rules, 
the statutory definition expressly including political matters.
S.A. )
W.A. ) No provisions.
Tasmania)
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
C*wealth No provisions
N.S.W. As for registered trade unions
Q*LD As for trade unions in general*
w !ä ! No provisions.
- - - 0O0 - - - 
3* Admission to Union Membership
TRADE UNIONS
N.S.W* 1* Qualified applicants, unless of general bad character, are 
entitled to membership and to remain members so long as they 
comply with union rules. ^
2. The Industrial Commission may decide any dispute as to an 
applicants character and the reasonableness of any admission 
fee or of any fine or levy related to admission; and may direct 
the alteration or cancellation of relevant rules.20
Victoria)
Q’LD. ) No provisions,s.A. y
W.A, A registered trade union must set out the terms of admission 
in its rules.
Tasmania No provisions.
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
C •wealth 1* Rules must set out the terms of admission,
2. A qualified applicant, unless of *general bad character* 
or a member of an unlawful association (Crimes Act, s* 30A), 
must be admitted subject to the proper payments and retain his 
membership so long as he complies with the union*s rules.
The Industrial Court may decide any dispute on this question, 
regardless of the union*s rules.
3. The Court may disallow or direct the alteration of any rule 
imposing ‘unreasonable conditions* on any applicant for member­
ship.
4# The Court may deregister a unioh the rules or the administ­
ration of which do not provide ‘reasonable facilities* for the 
admission of new members or impose ‘unreasonable conditions' on 
the continuation of their membership.21
N.S.W. 1* As for registered trade unions.
2. Accompanying the 1953 compulsory union legislation is the 
requirement that any worker subject to the legislation is en­
titled to memberdi ip, subject only to his applying in accord­
ance with union rules, and any inconsistent union rules are null 
and void: refusal to admit an applicant within a specified
period is subject to a fine of £100 against the union.
543
Q*LD. 1* Rules must set out the terms of admission,
2. A condition of registration that the rules of an applic­
ant union, and their administration, provide reasonable facile 
ities for the admission of new members and do not impose un- ^  
reasonable conditions on the continuance of their membership..
S.A. 1. Rules must set out the terms of admission.
2. The Industrial Court may deregister a union if its rules 
or their administration fail to provide reasonable facilities 
for the admission of new m e m bers. ^
W.A. 1. Rules must set out the terms of admission.
2. The Arbitration Court may disallow or direct the alteration 
of a union rule imposing unreasonable conditions on any applic­
ant for membership.
£. Deregistration power as in the case of S.A. Ipara. 2).
---- oOo- - -
Lm Resignation from Union Membership
TRADE UNIONS
No trade union Act makes any provision relating to resignation 
from the membership of a registered trade union.
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
C* wealth 1. Rules must set out the terms of resignation.
2. The Act also prescribes that a member may resign if he 
accepts employment in an industry not covered by his union, or 
if he gives 3 months1 notice of his resignation and pays all 
dues owing up to the date of resignation.^
N.S.W.) 
Q'LD. ) No provisions.
S.A. 25Rules must set out the terms of resignation.
W.A. 1. Rules must set out the terms of resignation.
2. No member can resign without giving 3 months* notice (or 
paying 3 months * subscription in lienj, and without paying all 
fees, fines, levies and other dues payable under the rules.
---- oOo ----
5. Enforcement of Union Rules: General
TRADE UNIONS
N.S.W. 1. Unregistered trade unions: Nothing in the Trade Union Act
is to be taken as empowering the ordinary courts to enters 
tain proceedings instituted for the purpose bf *dixtectly 
enforcing or recovering damages for* breach of certain agree­
ments between union members relating to the internal management 
of unions. '
2. Registered trade unions; the Industrial Commission may 
directly enforce, or recover daaages for breach of the constit- 
ion and rules of a trade union and certain agreements outside 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts; but such rules and 
agreements must have been filed with the Commission.2**
Victoria) Nothing in the relevant Act is to be taken as enabling the 
Q*LD. ) ordinary courts to entertain proceedings instituted for the 
S.A. ) purpose of ‘directly enforcing or recovering damages for*
W.A. ) breach of certain agreements between union members relating to 
Tasmania} the internal raaiagement of both registered and unregistered 
trade unions.29
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
C’wealth 1 • Every dispute between a union and any of its members must 
be decided in accordance with the union*s rules.™
2. The Industrial Court may make an order, after hearing the 
parties tB the dispute, directing any person under an oblig­
ation to do so to perform or observe any of a union* s rules.31
3. The Industrial Court may deregister a union if it considers 
that its rules have not bona fide been observed.
N.S.W. As in relation to registered trade unions.
Q*LD. The only express statutory power relating to the enforcement 
of industrial union*s rules is connected with rules dealing 
with fines, fees, dues and levies, which are recoverable in a 
magistrate’s court: see section S below.
S.A.
W.A.
1. Every dispute between a registered union and any-.members 
must be decided in accoriance with the union*s rules•
2. The Industrial Court may deregister a union if its rules 
have not been bona fide observed.
Provisions identical to those operating in the case of the 
Commonwealth.
---- oOo- - -
6. Expulsion from Union Membership
The New South Wales Industrial Arbitration Act is the only 
measure that includes provisions expressly related to the expul­
sion of union members. These povislons, enacted in 1953 in 
company with the compulsory unionism provisions of the Act, are
applicable only to industrial unions registered undefc the Act,
No member of an industrial union may be expelled except in 
accordance with certain conditions. The member must be given 
28 days* notice of the intention to expel; if within this 
period he qplies to the Industrial Commission for an order re­
straining his expulsion, the union is debarred from taking 
further steps in the matter pending the Commissions decision. 
After an inquiry into the reasons for the proposed emulsion, 
the Commission may either grant leave to the union to expej. 
the member or may issue an order restraining such action.
An expulsion carried out other than in accordance with these 
provisions renders the union liable to a fine of up to £100,
----- 0 O 0 -------
7, Union Elections
TRADE UNIONS
N.S,W, Provisions similar to those set out in relation to Commonwealth 
industrial unions, in paras, 2 & 3 below, in all important 
respects except that an application for a conducted election 
can be made only by the union*s committee of management in N.S,W.
Victoria)
Q ’LD, )
S.A. ) No provisions.
W.A. )
Tasmania)
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
C*wealth 1. The rules of all registered unions and their branches must 
prescribe that elections for union offices are to be hy secret 
ballot and must also make provision for absent voting, the 
manner in which candidates are nominated, the appointment and 
duties of returning officers and scrutineers representing can­
didates, and the conduct and declaration of the ballot; rules 
may further provide for compulsory voting, and are to be framed 
so as to ensure, as far as practicable, the elimination of 
irregularities•
2, Any member, or a person who has been a member within the 
preceding 12 months, may apply to the Industrial Registrar for 
an inquiry by the Industrial Court into alleged irregularites 
in elections held by his union. If the matter is referred-to 
the Court by the Registrar (his rejection of such an application 
is not subject to appeal) and the Court finds that irregularites 
have occurred, it may declare the election void, declare a 
person other than that purporting to be elected as having been 
elected, direct that a new election be held or that any step 
connected with the election be taken again (in accordance either
with the union18 rules as they stand or with the rules as 
varied or added to by the Court so far as such action is nec­
essary to rectify procedural defects) • In the case of a new 
election or the retaking of any steps, the Court may, notwith­
standing anything in the union*8 rules, direct the taking of 
such safeguards as it considers necessary, and may appoint a 
person to act as a returning officer in conjunction with the 
union returning officer.^
3* On the request of the committee of management of a union 
(or branch of a union) or a specified number of members, the 
Industrial Registrar may make arrangements to have a union 
election conducted by a Commonwealth official; and the person 
conducting such an election is empowered, notwithstanding the 
union*s rules, to take any action and give any directions he 
considers necessary to ensure that no irregularities occur In 
connection with the election or to r emedy any procedural de­
fects in the union*s rules.35
N.S.W. Provisions similar to those set out in paras* 2 & 3 above, in 
relation to the Commonwealth, in all important respects except 
that the application for a conducted election {para. 3) can be 
made only by the union*s committee of management in N.S.W.
2 * No provisions•b • A •
W.A. Provisions identical to those set out in relation to the
Commonwealth in paras. 1, 2 and 3 above, with the exception 
that there is a right of appeal to the Arbitration Court from 
the Industrial Registrar* s decision on an application for an 
inquiry into a disputed election.
---- oOo------
8. Fees. Dues. Fines and Levies
TRADE UNIONS
N.S.W. 1. Unregistered trade unions: The Trade Union Act provides
that nothing in it is to be taken as enabling the courts dir­
ectly to enforce an agreement for the payment by any person of 
a subscription or penalty to a trade union.
2. Registered trade unions: The Industrial Arbitration Act
empowers a registeted trade union to enforce at law the payment 
by any of its members of a fine, levy, penalty,call or subscript- 
ioh owing in accordance with the union*s rules.3«
Victoria Nothing in the Trade Unions Act is to be taken as enabling the 
courts directly to enforce an agreement for the payment by any 
person of a subscription or penalty to either a registered or 
unregistered trade union.
Q’LD The Trade Union Act omits the provision re la tin g  to  
subscriptions and penalties  noted above in re la tio n  to  the 
V ictorian Act; but lik e  a l l  other corresponding measures, 
the Queensland Act empowers the tru s tee s  of a reg is te red  
trade union to  sue for debts owing to  the union, and in 
th is  case subscrip tions, fines and le v ie s , i t  appears, may 
be included among such recoverable debts.
S.A. )
W.A. ) Provisions as in the case of V ic to ria .
Tasmania)
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
C’wealth 1. A ll f in es , fees, le v ie s  or dues payable under the ru les  
of a reg is te red  union by any member in  a period subse­
quent to  the union’s re g is tra tio n  may be sued for and 
recovered in any court of competent j u r is d ic t io n .^ '
2. The In d u stria l Court i t s e l f  (on the application  of the 
o f f ic ia ls  of a reg is te red  union authorized to sue on i t s
behalf) is  empowered to  order a union member to  pay any fin e , 
penalty , or subscription payable under the ru le s , or to  pay 
any contribution to  a penalty  incurred by a union under an 
order or award as long as such contribution  does not exceed £10.
N.S.W. Provisions sim ilar to  those s e t  out above in re la tio n  to  the 
Commonwealth (para. 1 only)2^ See also  the corresponding pro­
visions re la tin g  to  reg is te red  trade unions.
Q’LD Provisions sim ilar to  those applicable in the Commonwealth 
(para. 1 o n l y ) . 39
S.A. Only subscrip tions, or lev ies  for funera l, sick or accident 
b en efits , payable under a reg is te red  union’s ru les  may be r e ­
covered by o ffice rs  authorized to  sue on behalf of the u n i o n . 40
W.A. Provisions sim ilar to  those se t out above in re la tio n  to  the 
Commonwealth (paras. 1 and 2).
9. B allo ts of Union 0dinion
TRADE UNIONS
N.S.W. Under the In d u s tr ia l A rb itra tion  Act, the M inister may a t  any 
time or from time to  tim e, e ith e r  in the course of a s tr ik e  or 
whenever he has reason to  believe th a t a s tr ik e  is  contemplated 
by members of a union, d ire c t  th a t a sec re t b a llo t  be taken to
determine whether a majority of such members is in favour of 
strike actions the Minister is entitled to appoint a return­
ing officer and scrutineers, the latter of whom must be officers 
or members of the union concerned* These provisions are 
applicable to both registered and unregistered trade unions.
Victoria No provisions
Q! LD. Under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, the
Industrial Registrar must conduct a secret ballot of the employ­
ees affected before a strike, in a calling where no union reg­
istered under the Acts exists, can be considered authorized. 
These provisions are in effect appUsable to both registered 
and unregistered trade unions.
C1 wealth The Arbitration Commission (composed of at least three members, 
including a presidential member) may order that a matter be 
submitted to a vote by secret ballot of the members of a reg­
istered union, or any section of them, if the Commission thinks 
that the views of such members should be ascertained as a means 
of assisting the prevention or settlement of an industrial dis­
pute, which is within the jurisdiction of any Federal tribunal, 
even if the dispute is not the subject of proceedings before 
the Commission or any other tribunal.
N.S.W. As for trade unions, both registered and unregistered#
Q*LD. 1. A strike by a registered union is not to take place until 
all members in the calling and district affected have had the 
opportunity of taking part in a secret ballot at a general mmet- 
ing held under the union’s rules, and a majority have voted in 
favour of strike action: where a general meeting is impractic­
able, the secret ballot must be taken by post or at a series of 
meetings held for the purpose. The result of the ballot, together 
with details of the voting, must be communicated to the Industrial 
Registrar before the strike can be considered as ’authorized*.
2. If the ballot, specified in para. 1, is not taken within a 
reasonable time or is improperly or irregularly conducted, the 
Industrial Court may order a postal ballot on the matter to be 
taken by the Industrial Registrar.
S.A. No provisions.
W.A. The Arbitration Court is empowered to order that a matter should 
be submitted to a vote by secret ballot of the members, or a sect­
ion of the members, of a registered or deregistered union where
S.A. )
W.A. )
Tasmania)
)
) No provisions.
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
5*9
the Court considers that the views of those members ought to r\ 
be ascertained: such ballot to be conducted by a State official.
- - - 0O0 - ---
10, Returns and Records
TRADE UNIONS
N.S.W. 1. Returns must be made annually to the Industrial Registrar 
of a registered trade union*s accounts, alterations to rules 
and nev; rules, and changes in its officers.
2. Returns must also be furnished of the names and addresses 
of all the members of a union and of its officers.
3. The appropriate officers must render account to the trustees 
or members of the union*s financial affairs, as and at such times 
as required by the union*s rules; and accounts must be properly 
audited.
4« Registered trade unions most retain, for at least one year, 
the ballot pqers used in connection with union elections
Victoria Provisions identical to those noted above in paras, 1 and 3 as 
operating in N.S.W .4-3
Q*ID. Provisions identical to those noted above in paras, 1 and 3 as 
operating in N.S.W.; in addition, the Registrar may appoint an 
auditor if the union fails to do so or if he is dissatisfied with 
the manner in which the audit is carried out, and the Registrar 
has substantial powers to inquire into the funds and accounts of 
a registered trade union and to supervise the manner in which its 
accounts are kept.
S.A. Provisions identical to those noted above in para*. 1 and 3 as 
operating in N.S.W.
W.A. 1, Annual returns of a registered trade union * s accounts only 
are required.
2, Provisi. ons identical to those noted above in para, 3 as 
operating in NS.W.
Tasmania Providons identical to those noted above in paras. 1 and 3 as 
operating in N.S.W.
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS
C*wealth 1, Registered unions are required to keep a register of their 
members* nanes and addresses; a list of the naaes, addresses 
and occupations of their officers; a list of the offices of their 
branches; the duplicate or butt of the latest union ticket issued 
to each member, showing his name and address; full accounts of 
their finances and those of their branches; and, for at least
550
one year, the ballo t pepers used in union elections.
2. A copy of the reg ister of members must be f iled  with the
Industrial Registrar, together with quarterly statements of 
alterations in the register: provided that the Registrar, i f
he is  sa tisfied  as to the way i t s  reg ister is  kept, may exempt 
a union or any of i t s  branches from these requirements and from 
the requirement that i t  retain  duplicates or butts of members* 
tickets . The Registrar may revoke a certifica te  of exemption*
In addition a l l  other records which a union is required to keep 
must be filed  annually with the Registrar, together with a l l  
alterations to rules and changes in the union*s officers.
3. Every union and each of the ir branches are required to app­
oint annually an auditor and to give him fu ll and complete access 
to their books and documents.
N.S.W. As for registered trade unions.
Q*LD. 1. Registered unions are required to keep a reg ister of members, 
the ir addresses and the date they became members; and a duplicate 
or butt of each member* s la te s t union ticket shoving his name 
and address. There is  an implied, but not express, requirement 
that l i s t s  of officers and accounts should be kept.
2. A copy of the reg ister of members must be filed  annually with 
the Industrial Registrar and a statement or alterations to the 
reg ister must be f ile d  quarterly: the Registrar, in  similar
circumstances to those applicable in the Commonwealth, may exempt 
any union from these reqx irements and may revoke such eaemption. 
Unions are also required to f i le  annual statements of accounts, 
l i s t s  of officers within a specified time afte r any change in i ts  
officers occurs, and any alterations to rules within aAspecified 
period a fte r  such alterations are made.
S.A. Registered unions are required to  f i le  annual returns of the ir 
membership, and half-yearly returns of any changes in membership 
occurring during the previous six months: and a copy of each union*s 
audited accounts must be filed  annually .^
W.A. 1. Registered unions are required to  keep a reg ister of members, 
the ir addresses and th e ir  occupations; a duplicate or butt of each 
member*s la te s t union ticket showing his name and address; and, 
for a t least one year, the ballot papers used in union elections. 
There is  an implied, but not express, requirement that l i s t s  of 
officers and accounts should be kept.
2. A copy of the reg ister of members must be f iled  annually with 
the Industrial Registrar and a statement of alterations to the 
reg ister must be f ile d  quarterly: the Registrar, in  similar cir­
cumstances to those applicable in the Commonwealth, may exempt a 
union from the requirement relating to quarterly returns only, 
and may revoke such exemption. Each union must also f i le  annual 
returns relating  to i t s  officers and i t s  accounts.
Notes:
1* The provisions outlined in the last sentence are, like the power 
given the Industrial Commission to alter or annul certain rules, 
contained in the Industrial Arbitration Act.
2. Individual members of the Industrial Commission have interpreted 
its powers of alteration and annulment as extending to rules other 
than those directly affecting the right of admission to membership:- 
see 094$ A.R. (N.S.W.) 59; 0942] A.R. (N.S.W.) 513. But this 
view has been overruled in later cases by the Full Bench which acted 
on the proposition that the statutory provisions are restricted to 
cases of rules relating to admission and not to internal management 
in general: see [194Ö A.R. (N.S.W.) 347; [194Ü A.R. (N.S.W.) 877.
3* Under this provision, a trade union*s registration is not ipso facto 
void, but remains good until steps are taken to withdraw or cancel 
its registration: (1915) 15 S.R. (N.S.W.) 173.
4* The conditions as to rules are equally applicable to the branches 
of registered unions: (1933) 32 C.A.R. 443.
5. An alteration to these rules, defined as the union*s ‘constitution*,
will, apparently be accepted only if the union proves the existence 
of fresh circumstances or facts of sufficient importance to justify 
the change: (1925) 21 C.A.R. $95. Any constitutional change likely
to help in the settlement of industrial disputes will, be ratified;
(1913) 18 C.A.R. 813.6. Failure to register alterations, even if union members agree to ob­
serve rules subject to such alterations, renders thßm ineffective:
(1951) 73 C.A.R. 3.
7. The High Court has held that this power is outside the jurisdiction 
of the Industrial Court: (1957) 31 A.L.J. 670. This decision was 
made on the basis that, as previously decided by the High Court,
the power is an arbitral and not judicial one: (1947) 73 C.L.R. 549.
It is to be expected, therefore, that legislation to give the Arbit­
ration Commission,or some other body, power in this respect is 
likely in the near future.8. This ground has received judicial attention chiefly in relation to 
the statutory requirements affecting the election of committees of 
management and officers and their control by members. What is rele­
vant here is not the degree of control by members, which is for the 
members to determine, but that there should be provisions setting out 
some form of control which is not ‘illusory1® (1912) 6 C.A.R. 49.
On a number of occasions rules giving the Federal executive body of 
a union considerable powers over branches and their officials have 
been disallowed on this ground: e.g., (1933) 32 C.A.R. 19; (1946)56 C.A.R. 561. On the other hand, such powers may be permissible 
with certain safeguards: see (1944) 52 C.A.R. 594; (1950) 66 C.A.R3D2.
9* This, as the most general ground available, appears to have been most 
used. The fact that a rule, quite proper in itself, may be applied 
harshly or unjustly is no ground for disallowing it: (1938) 39 C.A.R.^
Nor is the manner in which a rule is made relevant: (1948) 57 C.A.R.124
Q6
10. This ground has less commonly been relied on. It has been 
applied in relation to a rule providing for contributions to a 
political fund without adequate safeguards ((1948) 61 C.A.R. 726), 
and to a rule requiring candidates to union office to declare they
are not connected with a specified political party: (1951) 73 C.A.R.18.
11. It appears that in view of the High Courts decision of 1957 in 
relation to the disallowance of rules power (see note 7 above) that 
deregistration is also ultra vires the Industrial Court, since the 
High Court previously held that deregistration of a union is not
a judicial power: (1925) 36 C.L.R. 442.
12. It appears that the power to direct the alteration of rules under
this provision is restricted to cases where deregistration is just­
ified on the ground that rules do not comply with the conditions 
relating to registration of a union: see (1918) 12 C.A.R. 378; (1920)
14 C.A.R. 324« Though it has been implied that the power may be used 
in relation to other grounds also: (1921) 15 C.A.R. 1102.
13. [19541 A.R. (N.S.W.) 592.
14. D916J A.R. (N.S.W. 41.
15. Rules prohibiting union members from taking piecework, bonu3 work 
and overtime, and restricting numbers and terms of apprentices were 
held to prejudicially affect the union’s members: (1932) 12 S.A.I.R255.
16. In S.A., as in other jurisdictions, the Industrial Court may exercise 
the deregistration power for any reason other than those specified.
The Court has ruled that the administration of a rule, though not 
falling within any of the specified grounds, might be ’sufficiently 
objectionable* to justify deregistration on the general ground:
(1930) 11 S.A.I.R. 96.
17. The term ’tyrannical* is omitted in the .W.A. Act, only ’oppressive’ 
being used. The deregistration power has been used by the President 
of the Arbitration Court to secure the amendment of a rule by pro­
viding for the annulment of a deregistration order if the union alt­
ered its rules, as directed, within a specified period! (1913) 23 
W.A.L.R. (Industrial Cases) 37.
18. These provisions are contained in the Industrial Arbitration Act 
and not the Trade Union Act. The protection given the individual 
member under them is strengthened by his statutory right to appeal 
to the Industrial Commission if he is aggrieved by a breach of a 
rule relating to any fine, penalty, levy, call or subscription im­
posed by the union, the Commission having power to remedy the breach 
as it thinks fit. A union’s political fund is immune from attach­
ment in the enforcement of an ordef for payment of any penalty
made against the union.
19. These and the provisions below are in the Industrial Arbitration Act 
and not the State Trade Union Act.
20. The only questions the trade union’s admitting body is entitled to 
consider dr& whether the applicant is one of the class of which the 
union is constituted, and whether he is of general bad character:
P94Q) A.R. (N.S.W.) 126.
’General bad character* does not mean ‘general bad character from 
the standpoint of the union*: 0946] A.R. (N.S.W.) 160.
21. An unduly high entrance fee contravenes the req&irement for reason­
able facilities: (1928) 27 C.A.R. 43.
22. Entrance fees must not be unduly high if the requirement is to 
complied with: (1937) 32 Q.J.P.R. 28.
23. The test of reasonable administration is not whether the method of
rejection of an application is regular, but whether the grounds of 
the rejections are reasonable! (1929) 10 S.A.I.R. 91. Thus ‘union 
bad character* (in the specific case the applicant’s failure to 
apply for membership during the previous 16 years when he was eli­
gible to do so) does not justify a refusal to admit to membership: 
(1942) 17 S.A.I.R. 217. *
24. A union rule that resignation is effective only if 3 months* notice 
is given is invalid: (1933) 39 C.A.R. 326. As also is a rule pre­
scribing 6 months* notice: (1931) 30 C.A.R. 789.
2$. The Industrial Code does, however, include a provision stipulating 
that no resignation from a registered union can take effect while 
the union is involved in proceedings before the Industrial Court.
26. In the absence of statutory provisions or rules of this sort it 
appears, as the Supreme Court of Qd. has held, that a resignation 
becomes effective on the expiry of the prescribed notice despite 
liability for contributions, fines and levies payable to the union: 
fl95l] Q.S.R. 84.
27. The agreements specified include, among others, those concerning 
the conditions on which members shall or shall not be employed, 
the payment of a subscription or penalty to a trade union, the 
application of a union*s funds to provide benefits for members, and 
any bond to secure the observance of agreements on these subjects; 
but it is expressly stated that these provisions are not to be taken 
as making such agreements unlawful. Under these provisions, for 
example, the courts cannot enforce a union rule providing strike 
pay, such a rule constituting an agreement to provide benefits for 
members: (1893) 14 L.R. (N.S.W.) 261.
28. These provisions, unlike those noted above in note 27, are embodied 
in the Industrial Arbitration Act and not the Trade Union Act.
The Industrial Commission has held that it cannot enforce rules in­
tended for the protection of a union member If the member has,
2q expressly or by his conduct, waived 3uch rules: p932] A.R. (N.S.W.)385 
The relevant agreements are identical to those detailed in note 27 
above in relation to N.S.W., with the exception that the Qd. Trade 
Unidin Act omits from its provisions the reference to an agreement 
for the payment of a subscription or penalty. For a discussion of 
the applicability of these provisions, derived from the British 
Trade Union Act, to both registered and unregistered unions (in the 
absence of other statutory provision as in N.S.W.), see Lloyd The 
Law of Unfonarpnrated Associations. 147-8.
30. This provision does not operate to exclude a rule allowing 
elasticity: (1944) 53 C.A.R. 108* Ahd although Isaacs, J.,
considered the provision to require a »strict and rigid adherence* 
to the rules((1916)) 23 C.L.R., at 40)» it appears that the members 
of a union, at a general meeting, may waive compliance with a rule: 
(1937) 33 C.A.R. 605» Moreover, it has been held that the pro­
vision does not debar a court from giving relief where the plain­
tiff has failed to avail himself of a union rule permitting a 
right of apoeal within the union against the decision in question: 
Ü938} Q.S.R. 33,
31* This power is discretionary* It is to be used where the failure 
to observe or perform a union*s rules is of a substantial nature 
and, if not remedied, might destroy members* confidence in the union:- 
(1944) 53 C.A.R* 432* An order of this character may be refused 
if the lapse of time between the action complained of and the app­
lication for the order is excessive ((1949) 65 C*A.R* 418)# but 
where a deregistered union has been re-registered, an order has been 
made relating to an action taken before the union*s deregistration: 
(1951) 72 C.A.R. $2.
32* It appears that this provision is limited in application to the 
rules of a union that have been made in order to comply with the 
statutory requirements for registration: (1933) 39 C.A.R. 319* 
Moreover, an agent*s act which fails to conform with the union*s 
rules is not a ground for deregistration under this provision if 
the act has not been adopted or authorized by the union: (1915) 9 
C.A.R. 33.
33* The Industrial Court has held that it is not concerned with enforc­
ing matter^relating solely to the internal management of a union: 
(1948) 22 S.A.I.R. 178. Thus it appears that the Court is interested 
only in the matters for which union rules must make provision as a 
condition of registration: (1931) 11 S.A.I.R. 350.
34* Where a union returning officer declines to act with a Court-app­
ointed returning officer, the latter may act alone in this capacity: 
(1950) 81 C.L.R. 27.
35. The Act provides that an election conducted under these provisions 
may not be the subject of a Court inquiry (para. 2 above)• The 
request to the Registrar to conduct an election must be made, in
the case of a union, by 1000 members or one-tenth of the total member­
ship, or, in the case of a branch, by 500 members or one-fifth of 
the branch*s membership. Such members need not be financial; and 
the fact that the rules may deprive unfinancial members of certain 
rights (even if these include the right to nominate candidates or 
to vote) is irrelevant: (1952) 73 C.A.R. 170.
36. In relation to such payments, a trade union member aggrieved by a 
breach of a relevant union rule may appeal to the Industrial Comm­
ission which is empowered to remedy the breach as it considers just. 
In addition, the Commission is empowered to determine any dispute
as to the reasonableness of any subscription, fine or levy.
37. A branch of a union cannot take action under this provision in its 
own name ((1917) 23 C.L.R. 143), and a branch committee has no power 
to institute proceedings in the name of thd union: 0921] V.L.R. 71.
Nor, it appears, can the union itself use the provision to 
recover dues owing to one of its branches: (1912) 15 C.L.R. 235.
38. It appears that the Industrial Commission will enforce levies 
only where the purpose of the levy is expressly stated in union 
rules ( D 91Q  A.R. (N.S.W.) 65), and only where the purpose is 
stated with some precision: 09171 A.R* (N.S.W.)360. It will 
not enforce levies raised for the assistance of persons outside 
N.S.W. on the ground that such levies are outside the scope of 
the Act which deals only with industrial conditions within the 
State: C1904) A.R. (N.S.W.) 371. Moreover, strike levies are
against the spirit of the Act, and a contract to pay such levies 
is contrary to public policy and void: 0904) A.R. (N.S.W.) 140.
Nor will a fine imposed on a member for disobeying a union instruct­
ion not authorized by its rules be enforced: 0933] A.R. (N.S.W.) 461.
39* The Qd. Industrial Court has refused to enforce a levy imposed to 
aid strikerg, contending that the levy was illegal because the 
strike in question was not authorized tinder the terms of the Act: 
(1946) 40 Q.J.P. 116. See also, 0941] QS.R. 117.
40. There is thus no power under the S.A. Act to enforce fines or 
general levies imposed by registered unions on their members.
41. A related provision peculiar to W*A. is the requirement that an 
application for registration under the Industrial Arbitration Act 
must be authorized by a majority present at a general meeting of 
the union called specially for this purpose, for which 7 days* 
notice must be given, specifying time, place and purposes. In 
addition, rules required by the Act must be approved by a majority 
at such meeting or at another called for the purpose.
42. The provisions in paras.2 and 4» unlike those in paras. 1 and 3, 
are contained in the Industrial Arbitration Act instead of the 
Trade Union Act.
43. In Victoria returns are to be made to the Government Statist, and 
in Tasmania, the Statistician.
44* Failure on the part of a registered union to have its accounts 
audited (or if its accounts or the audit fail to disclose the 
union*s true financial position) is sufficient ground for its 
deregistration: this statutory specification is found in the Western
Australian as well as the South Australian Act.
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